NACDL Trial Penalty Report and White Collar Crime

The NACDL recently released an important report detailing the impact of the trial penalty, which is the difference between the sentence a defendant receives in return for pleading guilty and the often much larger sentence he or she receives in return for exercising his or her constitutional right to trial. 

From the NACDL press release:

The ‘trial penalty’ refers to the substantial difference between the sentence offered in a plea offer prior to trial versus the sentence a defendant receives after trial. This penalty is now so severe and pervasive that it has virtually eliminated the constitutional right to a trial. To avoid the penalty, accused persons must surrender many other fundamental rights which are essential to a fair justice system

This report is the product of more than two years of careful research and deliberation. In it, NACDL examines sentencing and other data underlying the fact that, after a 50 year decline, fewer than 3% of federal criminal cases result in a trial. With more than 97% of criminal cases being resolved by plea in a constitutional system predicated upon the Sixth Amendment right to a trial, the fact of imbalance and injustice in the system is self-evident. The report identifies and exposes the underlying causes of the decline of the federal criminal trial and puts forth meaningful, achievable principles and recommendations to address this crisis. With its release, NACDL intends to launch a sustained effort to rein in the abuse of the trial penalty throughout federal and state criminal justice systems. The Trial Penalty report, and the principles and recommendations it puts forward, seeks to save the right to a trial from extinction.

The entire report is well worth reading.  For those in the white collar field, I'll note that the report contains a specific section on economic crimes.  This portion of the report focuses on Section 2B1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  The report discusses the role of 2B1.1 and loss calculations in creating incentives for defendants to plead guilty.  You can access the entire NACDL report here.

I found the NACDL report particularly interesting as I've engaged in much research on the issue of plea bargaining and sentencing differentials, including the impact of such incentives on innocent defendants.  In one study, we found that 56% of innocent participants were willing to falsely confess guilt and "plead guilty" in return for a bargain.  You can read more about those findings and the issue of plea bargaining's innocence issue here. 

(LED)