Thursday, February 4, 2016

Cosby Decision May Affect Oral Agreements in Practice of Criminal Law

 

The decision by a Philadelphia suburban trial court that a previous prosecutor's publicly announced promise not to prosecute Bill Cosby was not enforceable has virtually no precedential value anywhere, but it may affect how prosecutors, defense lawyers, defendants and targets act throughout the nation. The rule of law from this case seems to be that a former prosecutor's (and perhaps a current prosecutor's) promise not to be prosecute, at least when not memorialized in a writing, is not binding, even when the target relies on it to his potential detriment.  That promise can be disavowed by a successor prosecutor, and perhaps by the prosecutor himself.

Occasionally, cases arise where defense lawyers contend that prosecutors violated oral promises made to them and/or their clients.  Such situations include those where a prosecutor, it is claimed, promised a lawyer making an attorney proffer that if his client testified to certain facts, he would not be prosecuted or would be given a cooperation agreement and favorable sentencing consideration.  Often these instances result in swearing contests between the adversary lawyers: the prosecutor denies making any such promise and the defense lawyer says he did.  In most instances, in the absence of a writing,  the court sides with the prosecutor.  With respect to plea agreements, some courts have set forth a black-letter rule that promises not in writing or on-the-record are always unenforceable.

The Cosby case is very different.  There the (former) prosecutor in testimony avowed his promise, which was expressed in a contemporaneous press release, although there was no formal writing to defense counsel or a court, and expressly testified he did so in part in order to deprive Cosby of the ability to invoke the Fifth Amendment in a civil case brought by the alleged victim,  he also said that he believed his promise was "binding."   Cosby, according to his civil lawyer, testified at a deposition because of that prosecutorial promise.  (Generally, prudent prosecutors, when they announce a declination to prosecute give themselves an "out" by stating that the decision is based on currently-known information and subject to reconsideration based on new evidence).

To a considerable extent, the criminal justice system relies on oral promises by prosecutors (and sometimes judges) to defense lawyers and defendants, especially in busy state courts.  And, in federal courts, while immunity agreements are almost always in writing, federal prosecutors (and occasionally, but rarely,  federal judges) often make unrecorded or unwritten promises.   Sometimes such prosecutorial promises are made in order to avoid the time-consuming need to go through bureaucratic channels; sometimes they are made by line assistants because they fear their superiors would refuse to  formalize or agree to such a promise;  sometimes they are made to avoid disclosure to  a defendant against whom a benefiting cooperator will testify.  Based on the Pennsylvania judge's decision,  some defense lawyers (and some defendants) will believe that prosecutors' oral promises are not worth the breath used to utter them, and, perhaps, since there appears to be no dispute that such a promise was made here, that written promises are barely worth the paper they are written on. 

Defense lawyers are frequently asked by their clients whether they can trust the prosecutor's word in an oral agreement.  My usual answer is that they can: most prosecutors are reliable and honest.  Defense lawyers are then sometimes  asked a variant question about what will happen if the promising prosecutor leaves the office or dies.  My usual answer is that if there is no disagreement as to whether the promise was made, it will be honored.  The Cosby decision has made me reconsider that response. 

There are certain highly-publicized cases of celebrities of little precedential or legal value that have a considerable effect on the practice of law by both prosecutors and defense lawyers.  The case of Martha Stewart, who was, on highly disputed testimony,   convicted of 18 USC 1001 for lying in a voluntary proffer to prosecutors investigating her purported insider trading (which, assuming it occurred, was most likely not a crime),  is still invoked by prosecutors in cautioning witnesses not to lie to them and by defense lawyers in cautioning witnesses about making a voluntary proffer.  The Cosby case will likely be cited by defense lawyers and their clients concerning the uncertain value of oral agreements with prosecutors.  The skepticism of many defense lawyers about the reliability of agreements with the government and trustworthiness of prosecutors will grow.   I suspect the sarcastic refrain of some defense lawyers, "Trust me, I'm the government," will be said more often. 

I assume that the decision will be appealed, and also that a motion will be made to exclude Cosby's deposition because it was a consequence of the promise.  That latter motion is likely to be denied based on the judge's decision on the issue discussed here, although since the judge failed to set forth any reasoning for his decision, there may be room for distinguishing that issue from the one decided.

Although the judge's ruling has no doubt pleased those clamoring for Cosby's conviction and those desiring a decision on the merits, it may have a considerable negative effect on the perceived integrity and reliability of prosecutorial  non-memorialized promises and the actual practice of criminal law.  And it reveals once again how celebrity cases often make bad law.

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2016/02/cosby-decision-may-affect-informal-dealmaking-in-practice-of-criminal-law.html

Celebrities, Civil Litigation, Current Affairs, Defense Counsel, Martha Stewart, Privileges, Prosecutors | Permalink

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