Monday, December 28, 2015

Call for memorial judges for the Stetson International Environmental Moot Court Competition (IEMCC)

The Stetson IEMCC, now in its 20th year, is the world’s largest moot court competition devoted exclusively to global environmental issues. This year’s problem focuses on the return of confiscated poached elephant ivory and implicates UNCAC and UNTOC. We are seeking knowledgeable volunteers to evaluate memorials (briefs) submitted by student teams. 

There is one more opportunity to judge:  For the International Finals, judges will receive their assignments at the end of February/beginning of March. The due date for evaluations is Monday, April 11. We expect that each judge will read six to eight memorials.

If you are interested in assisting, please contact Prof. Brooke Bowman at bowman@law.stetson.edu. General information about the Stetson IEMCC is available at http://www.stetson.edu/law/international/iemcc/index.php. Many thanks for your consideration and happy new year!

(esp)

December 28, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, December 24, 2015

Pirela Pirela, Where You Been So Long?

Title 18 U.S. Code, Section 1546(a) prohibits a person from using a document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into the United States if the document was "procured by means of" a false claim and false statement. In U.S. v. Pirela Pirela, out of the Eleventh Circuit, Pirela Pirela obtained a visa to enter the United States from Venezuela and intentionally failed to mention his Venezuelan criminal conviction. Charged with a violation of 1546(a), he argued that the statute requires the government to prove that he would not have obtained the visa but for his false statement. The government argued that it need only prove the materiality of the false statement. The government won.

(wisenberg)

December 24, 2015 in Judicial Opinions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, December 23, 2015

The Day Oriole Magic Was Killed

Here is the Ninth Circuit's opinion in U.S. v. Douglas DeCinces. Absolutely no surprise that the district court's exclusion of 404(b) evidence was overturned. Like, duh. Here is the real lesson. There is no such thing as a tentative ruling. You exclude the evidence or you don't. All evidentiary calls are tentative in nature until the parties close. If you sense a favorable ruling but don't want the government to get an interlocutory appeal, ask the judge to carry the motion with the trial. Ask the judge to allow you to approach the bench and argue admissibility. Ask for anything but an actual pre-trial ruling, because, nine times out of ten, you are going to frigging lose on interlocutory appeal. I wouldn't even call this inside baseball. More like Pee-Wee Leagues.

(wisenberg)

December 23, 2015 in Judicial Opinions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 22, 2015

Boy-Boy Strikes Out--For Now

Today in U.S. v. Gregory Bell, aka Boy-Boy, the D.C. Circuit denied appellants' consolidated petitions for rehearing en banc, which challenged the sentencing court's use of acquitted conduct to  dramatically enhance appellants' sentences. Two separate and outstanding concurrences are worth a view. Judge Patricia Millett incisively critiques current sentencing jurisprudence which condones such horrific results. Judge Brett Kavanaugh agrees with Judge Millett and provides guidance for district courts who find by a preponderance of the evidence that acquitted conduct occurred, but do not want to enhance the sentence. What is the guidance? In a nutshell, utilize Booker to downwardly vary the sentence. Hopefully the Supreme Court will grant certiorari and end this appalling vestige of sentencing law.

(wisenberg

December 22, 2015 in Judicial Opinions, Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 21, 2015

Ninth Circuit Willfully Inserts Footnote Two

Paragraph two of 18 U.S.C. Section 1542 criminalizes the willful and knowing use of a passport secured by reason of a false statement. Long ago, in a galaxy far away, the Supreme Court held that "willfully and knowingly" in the context of paragraph two means "deliberately and with knowledge" and not a damn thing more. The case, as every schoolboy knows, is Browder v. United States. (I was discussing one of Browder's more subtle points just yesterday with my haberdasher.) In U.S. v. Aifang Ye, the Ninth Circuit dealt with the appeal of Ms. Ye, who was convicted under Section 1542, paragraph one, of willfully and knowingly making a false statement in a passport application. The Ninth Circuit held that what's good for paragraph two is good for paragraph one. And what about those pesky intervening Supreme Court decisions seeming to indicate that willfulness requires "bad purpose" and a "knowledge that the conduct was unlawful"? You know, cases like Bryan v. United States and Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Burr? Not to worry. All disposed of in footnote two of the Ninth Circuit's opinion. Since Browder "directly applies" (although it dealt with a different paragraph of a predecessor statute), its ruling controls, even if its reasoning has been rejected in subsequent Supreme Court decisions.

(wisenberg)

December 21, 2015 in Judicial Opinions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, December 20, 2015

The Importance of a Record in Guidelines Variances

    Last week in U.S. v. James Wendell Brown the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed a Booker upward variance in a child pornography case. The majority found Judge Richard Leon's sentence procedurally unreasonable, even under the plain error standard. The problem? Judge Leon was too general, and generic, in explaining how the four (out of seven) 3553(a) factors that he referenced applied to the defendant and justified an upward variance. As a white collar practitioner I always get nervous when a variance of any kind is sent back. Case law supporting upward and downward variances is substantial, and generally very favorable to the defense, and any chink in the armor of broad district court sentencing discretion is worrisome. Here there should be no great cause for concern. While talismanic recitation of all Booker factors is not required in any federal circuit to justify an upward or downward variance, there has to be some specific effort to link the factors relied upon to the individual conduct or character of the defendant standing before the sentencing court. Making sure that the court performs this linkage is the practitioner's job. Here, Judge Leon was simply too vague in reciting the 3553(a) factors and explaining why they justified a significant upward variance, and no practitioner chose to fill in the details, because the variance was opposed by both the prosecution and defense. In the mine run case, where defense counsel is arguing for a downward variance, it is his or her job to convince the trier of fact and, if necessary, help the court articulate, on the record, the reasons for the variance, such that the sentence will stand up on appeal. To fail is to screw your own case up and create a bad precedent for your peers.

    Judge Edwards, writing for the majority, distinguished U.S v. Ransom. In writing about Ransom here last year, I noted that the DC Circuit "rejected appellants' argument that the sentencing court improperly relied on factors in varying upward that the Guidelines had already accounted for. Joining some sister circuits the Court held (internal quotes and citations omitted) that:

It is not error for a district court to enter sentencing variances based on factors already taken into account by the Advisory Guidelines, in a case in which the Guidelines do not fully account for those factors or when a district court applies broader [Section] 3553(a) considerations in granting the variance.

    Notice that there are two alternative prongs to this portion of Ransom. The Brown court seems to indicate that the failure of the Guidelines to fully account for certain factors will only occur when the sentencing court sees and identifies special additional factors that exist in a specific defendant's particular circumstance. Thus, in Ransom, although the Guidelines already assessed two points for committing the offense while on probation, the sentencing court stated on the record that the offense of conviction (embezzlement) and the identity of the co-defendant were identical to the violated probationary offense and that this (and other things) justified an upward variance. Contrat this with Brown, where Judge Leon failed to articulate anything about Brown's particular offense/conduct/background that was not fully accounted for in the applicable Guidelines provisions.

    The other prong of Ransom is completely undisturbed. A sentencing court can apply broader Section 3553(a) considerations, that is, broader considerations than those contained in the Guidelines, in granting an upward or downward variance. Again, there must be an explanation by the sentencing court. The sentencing court is always free to articulate its disagreement with the Guidelines' approach, and as long as that disagreement is rational and reasonable, the sentence cannot be disturbed. Two classic examples of this are family circumstances and aberrant conduct, both of which are nearly impossible to achieve as grounds for downward departure, but which regularly enter in to downward variance judgments in the post-Booker-Gall-Kimbrough world.

    Judge Sentelle, who wrote the majority opinion in Ransom, dissented in Brown, because he did not see plain error.

(wisenberg)

 

December 20, 2015 in Judicial Opinions, Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 8, 2015

Dewey & LeBoeuf Case to be Retried

Not surprisingly, New York County District Attorney Cyrus Vance's office has announced it will after a hung jury retry, albeit in slimmed-down form with fewer defendants and counts, the criminal case involving the defunct firm of Dewey & LeBoeuf's alleged misrepresentations in seeking financing during its desperate dying days.  Prosecutors rarely admit defeat in big cases after a single hung jury.  Double jeopardy does not apply.

The major defendant, against whom (as often happens with the highest-ranking officer) there is the least evidence, Steven H. Davis, its former chair,  has been pared from the case and apparently will receive a deferred prosecution.  "Deferred prosecutions" are rarely, if ever previously, given to individuals by New York state prosecutors, at least by that name.  Although the terms have not been announced, this disposition, I suspect will essentially be just a dismissal dressed up so that the prosecutor can save some face and not admit a total loss.

The prosecutor, as is a custom in New York County, announced publicly on the record his plea offers to the three defendants remaining.  I find this custom repugnant and sometimes in return I announce the defendant's terms for a final disposition -  such as, a dismissal, an apology by the prosecutor and a testimonial dinner in the defendant's honor.

The plea offers here were a felony plea with a one-to-three year jail term to Joel Sanders, a felony plea with 500 hours of community service to Stephen DiCarmine, both of whom spent six months at the trial that ended in  a hung jury, and a misdemeanor plea with 200 hours of community service, to Zachary Warren, who was severed and has not yet gone to trial.  I would not be surprised if these cases were settled before trial, not necessarily at the offered price.

December 8, 2015 in Current Affairs, Deferred Prosecution Agreements, News, Prosecutions, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, December 5, 2015

Total Defense Victory in EDVA Health Care Fraud Trial

Congratulations to the defense team members and their client in U.S. v. Bajoghli. After a 16 day trial, the dermatologist defendant was acquitted on all counts--over 40. Dr. Bajoghli was represented by Peter White and  Nicholas Dingeldein of Schulte Roth & Zabel and Kirk Ogrosky and Murad Hussain from Arnold & Porter. The jury was out a day and a half.

There was some interesting motion work during the pre-trial phase, for those of us interested in government efforts to affect witness testimony. Six weeks before the original trial date, the government sent "victim impact notification" letters to several of Dr. Bajoghli's patients. Dr. Bajoghli complained that the patients, many of whom were scheduled to be defense witnesses, were not victims and that the letter was intended to prejudice the patients against him. Judge Gerald Lee granted the motion and issued a corrective letter. Here are the relevant papers: Bajoghli Motion in Limine Seeking Corrective Witness Instructions,  Exhibit A Ogrosky Letter to DOJExhibit B to Bajoghli Motion,  Order Granting Motion for Corrective Witness InstructionCourt's Corrective Witness Letter.

(wisenberg)

December 5, 2015 in Defense Counsel, Fraud, Judicial Opinions, Prosecutions, Verdict | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, December 4, 2015

Plea Bargaining and the Trial Penalty

This morning's Wall Street Journal contains an opinion piece I wrote on the subject of the "trial penalty."  Entitled "The Injustice of the Plea-Bargaining System," the commentary examines the manner in which the trial penalty induces too many defendants to give up their constitutional right to trial.  In examining the issue, the piece includes a discussion of the tragic case of Orville (Lee) Wollard.  Wollard, who was charged with a crime after firing a warning shot in his home into the wall next to his daughter's allegedly abusive boyfriend, turned down a plea offer of five years probation and ended up receiving a sentence of twenty-years in prison after conviction at trial.  I hope you will have an opportunity to read the entire piece

(LED)

December 4, 2015 in Media, News, Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, December 3, 2015

Not Guilty on Two Counts and Conviction on a Misdemeanor Count in CEO's Case Following Deadly Mining Accident

It is interesting to see the headlines from the NYTimes - Former Massey Energy C.E.O. Guilty in Deadly Coal Mine Blast and Politico - Coal baron convicted for mine safety breachesBoth headlines focus on the conviction of the CEO.  The Wall Street Journal headline says - Jury Convicts Former Massey CEO Don Blankenship of Conspiracy - but does say in smaller print below this headline "Former executive found not guilty of securities-related charges after deadly West Virginia mining accident."

Yes, it is important to note that a CEO was convicted here of workplace related safety violations and this was after a deadly accident.  But what is also important is that CEO Blankenship was found not guilty of the serious charges that he initially faced.  What started as a 43 page indictment by the government (see here), ended as a misdemeanor conviction on one count.  William W. Taylor, III of Zuckerman Spaeder LLP was the lead on this defense team.   

(esp)

December 3, 2015 in Defense Counsel, News, Prosecutors, Securities, Verdict | Permalink | Comments (0)

21-Day Insider Trading Sentence to Cooperator Considered Harsh

The New York Times reported today (Goldstein, "Witness in Insider Trading Inquiry Sentenced to 21 Days, see here) what it called a "surprising" 21-day prison sentence imposed  by Judge P. Kevin Castel upon a felony conviction broke "what has been the standard practice" in insider trading cases in the Southern District of New York.  Anyone not familiar with the customs of that court's prosecutors and judges might think that such a sentence was out-of-the-ordinary lenient.  However, as the article makes clear, that sentence, for a major cooperator, was apparently considered out-of-the-ordinary harsh.

The defendant, Richard Choo-Beng Lee, was a California hedge-fund owner who, after being approached by FBI agents with evidence that he (and his partner, Ali Far, who was later sentenced to probation by a different judge) had broken securities laws, cooperated with the government by recording 171 phone calls with 28 people, including Steven A. Cohen, DOJ's no. 1 target, who has not been indicted (although his firm, SAC Capital Advisers, was and pleaded guilty and paid a multi-billion dollar fine). 

New York City is the cooperation capital of the world.  As the Times article indicates, cooperators in white-collar (and other) cases in the Southern District of New York are given considerable benefits for cooperating (far greater than in most jurisdictions) and the default and almost uniform sentence for them is probation and not jail.  To be sure, cooperators make cases, and many of those cases and the individuals charged would go undetected without cooperators looking to provide assistance to the government to lessen their own potential sentences.

However, the cooperation culture in New York has many deleterious consequences. To the extent that deterrence is achieved by jail sentences (and I believe it is in white-collar cases, but not in many other areas), its effect has been minimized.  The clever white-collar criminal (and most but not all are intelligent) knows that he has in his pocket a "get-out-of-jail card," the ability to cooperate against others and get a non-jail sentence. The mid-level financial criminal can commit crimes, enjoy an outrageously lucrative, high-end life style, and, when and if caught, cooperate, stay out of jail and pay back what assets, if any, remain from his wrongdoing.

Knowledgeable white-collar defense attorneys are well aware of the benefits of cooperation.  It is often good lawyering to urge cooperation, at times even in marginal cases, to avoid jail sentences.  Indeed, more than a  a trifling number of those who plead guilty in white-collar cases are actually innocent, often because they lack the requisite mens rea  (a difficult, even when accurate, defense).  And sometimes, at the urging of their lawyers, they admit guilt and tailor their stories and testimony to what the prosecutors and agents (who usually see only the dark side of equivocal facts and circumstances) believe actually occurred so that others actually innocent are convicted (or also choose to plead guilty and perhaps cooperate against others).  The bar for indictment and conviction has been lowered. The adversary system has been turned sideways, if not upside-down.

To many, probably most,  lawyers, cooperation is personally easier than going to trial.  Cooperation avoids the stress of battle and the distress of  (statistically probable) defeat at trial.  No longer do lawyers walk around with "no-snitch" buttons.  The white-collar bar has become generally a non-combative bar. To the extent it ever had one, it (with notable and not-so-notable exceptions) has lost its mojo. The first (and often only) motion many lawyers make upon being retained is to hail a taxi to the prosecutor's office.

I write about the role of the bar as a lament more than a criticism.  I too represent cooperators when I think cooperation is to their benefit.  There is a great penalty (or, to put it gently, "loss of benefit") for not cooperating.  Those accused who choose not to cooperate, or those whose own scope of criminality and knowledge of wrongdoing of others is so limited that they cannot, receive (in my opinion sometimes, but far from usually, appropriate) severe jail sentences.  Those who cooperate, except for the unfortunate  Mr. Lee, almost always avoid jail.

Lawyers and professors talk about the "trial penalty," the extra, often draconian, prison time one receives for exercising his right to trial.  The principal "penalty" in white-collar cases is not the trial penalty, but the "non-cooperation penalty."  Even those who choose not to go to trial and plead guilty are punished much more severely than those who cooperate.

 

 

December 3, 2015 in Current Affairs, Defense Counsel, Insider Trading, Judicial Opinions, Prosecutors, Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Felony Charges Dismissed in a BP Deepwater Horizon Case

Remaining in this case is a single misdemeanor charge following the court's dismissal of homicide charges against a BP engineer on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig. (see here) Eleven charges were dismissed by the government in 2014 premised on the statute not applying to the operator of a drilling ship and eleven other charges were now dismissed by the court as the "government agreed" to this dismissal of charges of "'involuntary homicide' based on lack of evidence and other arguments. Initially, this individual faced 22 felony homicide charges, plus one misdemeanor charge of water pollution. The remaining misdemeanor charge is scheduled for a February trial. David Gerger from Quinn Emanuel represented the accused.  See also Smyser, Kaplan & Veselka, LLP lawyers David Isaak, Shaun Clarke, and Dane Ball's role in this case (see here).

(esp)

December 3, 2015 in Defense Counsel, News | Permalink | Comments (0)