Federal Circuit Interprets Scope of 38 U.S.C. § 1110 Language in Spicer (by Emma Wimberly and Teco Proffitt, Student Attorneys at the University of Georgia School of Law's Veterans Law Clinic)

On March 8, 2023, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided Spicer v. McDonough. This decision provides veterans with a strong new tool for obtaining secondary service connection when a service-connected condition functionally worsens or impedes treatment of a non-service-connected condition.

Spicer centered on the interpretation of 38 U.S.C. §1110.  It provides veterans with compensation “for disability resulting from” personal injury.  Federal Circuit and Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“CAVC”) caselaw acknowledges that it authorizes secondary service connection for disability that results from a service connected condition.

The issue in this case dealt with the causation standard required of a “disability resulting from” a service-connected disability. The Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs (“Secretary”) and Mr. Spicer agreed that but-for causation between the primary and claimed secondary condition is required.  However, they disputed how broadly it should be interpreted. 

The Secretary contended that “resulting from” required a more narrow causal link, or something akin to an onset or etiological link between the conditions. On the other hand, Mr. Spicer argued that “resulting from” should be interpreted more broadly, such as where a service-connected disease or injury (leukemia) impedes treatment (total knee replacements) of a secondary disability (arthritis of the knees). 

Building from Judge Allen’s dissent before the CAVC, the Federal Circuit ultimately agreed with Mr. Spicer and held that “resulting from” carries a broader causation standard.  Its holding was based on an interpretation of the plain meaning of section 1110.  

The Federal Circuit reasoned that the plain text of “disability resulting from” referred only to the nature of the secondary disability and not its cause.  Moreover, “resulting from” did not contain any qualifiers or exceptions that would require a more narrow causation standard.  Congress specifically invoked but-for causation based on the language it used when drafting section 1110; if it wanted a narrower (proximate) standard it would have used different language.

The Court then noted that its holding was not inconsistent with VA’s treatment of secondary conditions generally.  VA routinely grants secondary service connection for conditions multiple steps down the causal chain.  The Federal Circuit was not persuaded that granting secondary service connection for such conditions was “speculative.”  Rather, it noted that “the VA regularly evaluates how medical intervention affects or would have affected a veteran’s disability.”  “Such an assessment would seem within the VA’s capabilities, especially given the VA’s everyday use of medical opinions to guide its factfinding.”

Ultimately, the Court agreed with Mr. Spicer.  It held that “disability resulting from” encompasses the worsening of “the natural progression of a condition not caused by a service-connected injury or disease, but that nonetheless would have been less severe were it not for the service-connected disability.”  We think that it is possible that this holding may be interpreted narrowly to apply only to veterans with similar facts to Mr. Spicer.  

Alternatively, it may broaden the scope of causation for a large number of veterans claiming secondary service connection.  If this is true, then Spicer stands as a monumental case for veterans.  It allows them to argue for secondary service connection based on more attenuated circumstances.  This includes cases like Mr. Spicer’s where a service-connected disability worsens or impedes treatment of a non-service-connected condition. 

From here, it will be up to the VA to see what effect they give Spicer in practice.