Friday, September 6, 2019
Thursday, September 5, 2019
A Philadelphia man alleged Wawa knowingly sold coffee in defective cups, leading to his scalding injury:
The main thrust of the litigation is that the defendants allegedly knew the model cup manufactured by RPC Letica and used by Wawa, the Model 24 HDC Cup, was defective, but took no action to correct the cup’s design and make it safe for consumers.
The suit stated on Feb. 25, 2017, Hall purchased coffee from a Wawa store and when holding the cup in his hand, the sides of the cup buckled, causing the cup's contents of scalding hot coffee to spill onto his lap, resulting in severe injuries.
The case settled for an undisclosed amount of money. The plaintiff was seeking damages in excess of $50,000, plus punitive damages, costs and interest. Pennsylvania Record has the story.
Wednesday, September 4, 2019
Mark Geistfeld has posted to SSRN Folk Tort Law. The abstract provides:
The standard of reasonable care is the most important example of a substantive tort obligation that is largely determined by folk law or the understanding that jurors as lay individuals have about the legal obligation. In order to be adequately determinate, the folk law of reasonable care must be based on a widely shared metanorm that jurors use to evaluate socially acceptable behavior. Studies of jury decision-making in tort cases assume that there is such a metanorm without identifying it. These studies, like torts scholarship more generally, have not accounted for the substantial body of evidence showing that individuals are guided by a metanorm of reciprocity that is highly relevant to the resolution of negligence cases. By applying this metanorm to the case at hand, jurors enforce behavioral obligations that map into the modern tort rules of negligence and strict liability. A metanorm of reciprocity quite plausibly defines folk tort law, although it is a separate question why the legal system chooses to enforce this social norm. Folk tort law is not fully capable of answering this question, but as an important component of modern tort law, it should be accounted for by any persuasive interpretation of the practice.
Tuesday, September 3, 2019
D'Andra Shu has posted to SSRN When Food is a Weapon: Parental Liability for Food Allergy Bullying. The abstract provides:
Food allergies in children are rising at an alarming pace. Increasingly, these children face an added threat: bullies targeting them because of their allergies. This bullying can take a life-threatening turn when the bully exposes the victim to the allergen. This article is the first major legal analysis of food allergy bullying. It explores the legal system’s failure to adequately address the problem of food allergy bullying and makes the case for focusing on the potential tort liability of the bully’s parents. Parents who become aware of their child’s bullying behavior and fail to take adequate steps to stop it are tacitly encouraging it and should be liable for their child’s conduct. So too should parents who enable the bullying by flouting school policies and sending their child to school with a prohibited food that is then used to bully or by modeling intolerant behavior that their child mimics at school. This will ensure that parents who contribute to their child’s bullying are held accountable and that the bully’s victim receives justice.
Thursday, August 29, 2019
Back in July, I reported the Third Circuit had held that, under Pennsylvania law, for products liability purposes, Amazon is a seller of items appearing on its website, even if they are owned by third parties. The Third Circuit has agreed to take up the issue en banc. Law 360 has the story.
Wednesday, August 28, 2019
The European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law (ECTIL) and the Institute for European Tort Law of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the University of Graz (ETL) cordially invite you to a conference on Fault-based and Strict Liability, which is organized together with the University of Yantai, China, and will be held in Vienna on 18 October, 2019.
FAULT-BASED AND STRICT LIABILITY
The fourth project in the cooperation between ETL, ECTIL and Yantai University (China), addresses the topic ‘Fault-based and Strict Liability’. While it seems safe to say that all European legal systems, as well as the Chinese Tort Liability Law, endorse liability based on fault, they differ in their attitude towards liability in the absence of that foundation. A thorough examination of the relatively cautious use of strict liability found in the Chinese Tort Liability Law and the common law on the one hand, and the prominent support for it in influential Continental European jurisdictions on the other may lead to valuable new perspectives on the viability of commonly-used bases for strict liabilities. The project pays special attention to the use of rules reversing the burden of proving fault in Chinese and European statutes, which are sometimes considered to fall into a grey area between fault-based and strict liability.
At this public conference, contributors will present their most significant findings. The results will be published in English by Jan Sramek Verlag (Vienna) under the title ‘Fault-based and Strict Liability. Chinese and European Perspectives’.
Please find the Conference folder here: Download Yantai2019_ConferenceFolder
For registrations, please contact Lisa Zeiler (email@example.com), preferably before 30 September, 2019.
The conference will be held in English and is free of charge.
Tuesday, August 27, 2019
In the first trial against an opioid manufacturer, a judge in Oklahoma found Johnson & Johnson liable for a public nuisance and ordered it to pay $572 million to the state of Oklahoma. The court found J&J played down the dangers and oversold the benefits of opioids, forcing the state to pay addiction treatment costs. The state had sought $17 billion. J&J promises to appeal. NYT has the story.
Monday, August 26, 2019
Greg Keating has been busy lately. He has posted two more pieces to SSRN. First, Between Absolutism and Efficiency: Reply to Professors Geistfeld, Grady, and Priel. The abstract provides:
This paper replies to Professor Geistfeld, Grady, and Priel’s excellent comments on my article Principles of Risk Imposition and the Priority of Avoiding Harm, 36 Revus J. for Const. Th. & Phil. of Law, 7 (2018). Both my article and Professor Geistfeld’s, Grady’s and Priel’s papers a part of the “Symposium: Risk Regulation and Tort Law, A discussion with Gregory C. Keating.” This Reply completes the Symposium. It attempts, briefly, to develop two lines of argument. One line attempts to respond to the specific criticism that Professors Geistfeld, Grady, and Priel, make in the Comments. In part, my specific replies seek to show that the safety and feasibility standards are rationally justifiable and genuine alternatives to cost-justification as a standard of precaution. Though I disagree with specific arguments of each of my critics, I believe that other claims they make are true, but do not undermine my arguments. For example, my arguments are compatible with Professor Grady’s correct observation that juries have the authority to reach verdicts inconsistent with the priority of avoiding harm — or any other theory of negligence. The merits of jury adjudication are not settled by any normative theory of reasonable care. I also agree with Professor Priel’s thesis that societies do not prioritize harm prevention. We are, I think, torn between competing moral outlooks and the standards of precaution that express those outlooks. My point is that standards of precaution which prioritize the avoidance of harm are rationally defensible, albeit in non-welfarist terms. I am likewise persuaded that Professor Geistfeld is correct to contend that welfare economics is compatible with non-welfarist normative commitments, but mistaken to think that measures such as willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept are the best ways to articulate the concrete implications of non-welfarist principles of precaution.
This Reply leads, however, with a second line of argument. We are all — consequentialists and non-consequentialists, philosophers and economists — imprisoned in the grip of the debate between utilitarianism and its critics that dominated political philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century. Classical utilitarianism fell into disfavor because its commitment to maximizing utility is capable of justifying deprivations of basic rights for a minority whenever such restrictions promoted the greatest net happiness. The cure for this disease lay in making some basic rights “absolute” — in ruling out some trade-offs entirely. Applied to problems of risk imposition, the legacy of this debate is the assumption that we must choose between “absolutism” and “efficiency”. Unattractive as “efficient” trade-offs may be, the absolute prohibition of trade-offs is untenable when risks of physical harm are at issue. The safety and feasibility standards must fail because they are unacceptably absolutist. Once we shake ourselves free of this philosophical legacy we can see that this is not the case: these standards are standards for making trade-offs not for forbidding them and that the trade-offs they prescribe are perfectly plausible.
Second, Fair Precaution. The abstract provides:
This book chapter briefly sketches a general framework which explains why questions of fairness have a natural salience when the imposition of risks of harm by some on others is at issue, and it applies that conception to major aspects of negligence law. Fairness comes to the fore because risk impositions require us to compare what those who impose the risks stand to gain, and those upon whom they are imposed stand to lose. Determinations of due care reconcile competing claims of liberty and security, for a plurality of persons. Fairly reconciling liberty and security requires reconciling them on terms that are justifiable both to those who impose risks and to those upon whom they are imposed. This, in turn, requires comparing the benefits and burdens of risk impositions in terms of their objective urgency, assessing the burdens and benefits of risk impositions qualitatively, and assigning a certain priority to the avoidance of harm. The framework is used to explicate the concept of due care articulated by the Hand Formula, to illuminate the circumstance where risks are imposed with a “community of risk”, and to situate subordinate doctrines of due care such as custom, statutory negligence, and jury adjudication. Brief contrasts are drawn with both law and economic approaches to justified precaution as efficient precaution, and with versions of corrective justice which see negligence liability falling out of a universe of conceptual possibilities where it holds the high ground of a golden mean.
Friday, August 23, 2019
Steven Shavell has posted to SSRN On the Redesign of Accident Liability for the World of Autonomous Vehicles. The abstract provides:
This article proposes a scheme of liability that would desirably control accident risks in the coming world in which motor vehicles will be autonomous. In that world, travelers will not be drivers, rendering liability premised on driver fault irrelevant as a means of reducing accident dangers. Moreover, no other conventional principle of individual or of manufacturer liability would serve well to do so. Indeed, strict manufacturer liability, recommended by many commentators, would actually tend to leave accident risks unchanged from their levels in the absence of liability. However, a new form of strict liability – the hallmark of which is that damages would be paid to the state – would be superior to conventional rules of liability in alleviating accident risks and would be easy to implement.
Thursday, August 22, 2019
Two football players at Lackawanna Junior College were injured during the same tackling drill in 2010. Their suits against the school were dismissed by the trial court on the ground the players had signed a waiver. The Superior Court reinstated the suits and now the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has affirmed that ruling. The court noted waivers against gross negligence and recklessness were ineffective and held there were sufficient facts for the players to present the case to a jury. The "Oklahoma Drill" the players were engaged in later became subject to criticism during investigations about concussions and the school did not have licensed athletic trainers present to treat injuries. PennLive has the story.
Tuesday, August 20, 2019
Gregory Keating has posted to SSRN Is Tort Law 'Private'?. The abstract provides:
A prominent, important strand of contemporary thinking about tort law — represented most powerfully by the work of Arthur Ripstein and Ernest Weinrib — has coalesced around the thesis that the concept of “private law” is the key to the subject. In one familiar usage of the term, the thesis that tort is private law is innocuous. Tort is private law in the sense that it is concerned with relations among persons in civil society. As the banner under which a school of thought marches, “private law” is a much weightier concept. It asserts that the essence of tort law is encapsulated in the traditional bipolar lawsuit. Within that formal structure, all that matters are the relations between the particular plaintiff and the particular defendant.
This book chapter argues that modern tort law is not private in the way that these theorists claim, for reasons that are both historical and normative. Modern tort took shape in response to the emergence of accidents as a social problem and its rise involved the displacement of traditional bipolar wrongs from the center of the field. Long established intentional wrongs — battery, trespass, defamation, and the like — arise out of episodic, one-off collisions between individual persons going about their lives. In an industrial, technological society, accidents are the recurring byproducts of organized and fundamental social activities. Modern fault liability emerges as the center of modern tort law in response to this social transformation. When this happens, accidents become the focal point of tort law and fault is sharply divorced from moral notions of personal responsibility and blameworthiness. To be sure, negligent wrongs remain genuine wrongs. The fault standard is an attempt to articulate what a right to the physical integrity of one’s person requires in the way of care owed by others. Failures to exercise reasonable care are wrongs when they result in harm to persons who can claim the right to such care. But they are also wrongs that may be blamelessly committed. Negligence is wrongful conduct, not culpable mens rea. We require reasonable care not because failing to be reasonably careful is always and everywhere egregiously blameworth, but because even blameless and slight negligence can inflict severe harm.
Champions of tort as private law implicitly recast tort in a pre-modern form, thereby obscuring fundamental and significant features of our law. Modern tort law responds to a pressing social problem and protects persons’ fundamental interest in physical integrity. It is a part of basic justice concerned with interactions that cannot be avoided in the course of normal modern lives — not a law which addresses random and voluntary individual interactions. And almost since its inception, modern tort law has been only one of a family of institutions that address organized, systematic, risk. Direct regulation of risk and administrative schemes are two others. This family of institutions is not sundered by a radical separation of the private law of torts from the public law of regulation. Tort law, direct regulation of risk, and administrative schemes are complementary and competitive alternatives to one another, responding to overlapping problems and articulating related values.
Monday, August 19, 2019
Gregory Keating has posted to SSRN Corrective Justice: Sovereign or Subordinate?. The abstract provides:
The concept of “corrective justice” has figured prominently in debates over the formal structure and normative commitments of private law — especially tort law — over the past generation. This chapter organizes those debates around two very different conceptions of the role and significance of corrective justice in private law, especially tort law. One conception sees corrective justice as “sovereign” the other sees it as “subordinate”. On a subordinate conception, corrective justice is an aspect of the institution of tort law and it must be accounted for by an adequate theory of tort. On a sovereign conception, corrective justice is the master concept of tort law; it does the explaining. In the disciplinary battles of the past few decades, economically inclined theorists of tort — especially Richard Posner — have conceived of corrective justice as subordinate whereas philosophically inclined theorists have taken it to be sovereign. The thought behind the subordinate conception is obvious enough. Ordinary tort adjudication does corrective justice; a theory of tort worthy of the name ought to explain way. The argument for the sovereignty of corrective justice is less obvious. It grows out of a critique of the economic analysis of tort developed by Jules Coleman and Ernest Weinrib. In a nutshell, they argue that corrective justice is a backwards-looking practice and is therefore poorly explained by the forward-looking logic of economic analysis.
On their face, the central concepts of negligence law — duty, breach, harm, actual and proximate cause — hang together to articulate a relationship of right and responsibility between victim and injurer. Breach of duty is a reason to hold a defendant responsible for harm done to a victim by the breach of that duty. Tort law looks backwards toward the past interactions of the parties in order to determine if the defendant should be held responsible for the plaintiff’s injury. For orthodox economic analysis, however, liability is not imposed because the defendant breached a duty of care and was the actual and proximate cause of harm done. Liability is imposed when and because we rightly conclude that the imposition of liability for past harm will induce optimal prevention of accidental harm going forward. For economics, the concepts of duty, breach, actual and proximate cause, and harm are not the real grounds of liability. They are evidentiary markers that do a respectable job of identifying cheapest cost-avoiders going forward.
This chapter argues that the corrective justice critique of economic analysis is powerful, but that the conclusion that corrective justice is the sovereign principle of tort, and perhaps even private law more generally, is not. Corrective justice in tort looks back to the violation of tort law’s primary norms. Those norms, and the values they seek to institute, deserve to be at the center of our understanding of the field. For the economic analysis of tort, the path forward may lie in moving towards the kind of indirect account of the institution now familiar in property scholarship. Such an account would give due recognition to the norms that figure prominently in tort adjudication, and seek to show how the institution as a whole is justified by its desirable consequences.
Friday, August 16, 2019
Ken Abraham & Ted White have posted to SSRN First Amendment Imperialism and the Constitutionalization of Tort Liability. The abstract provides:
To what extent does the First Amendment impose limits on the permissible scope of tort liability? Until recently, the clear answer would have been, “only under very limited circumstances.” During the last few decades, however, the First Amendment has been so greatly expanding its empire that giving this answer is no longer possible. “All bets are off” would be a more accurate answer, because the forms of speech to which the Supreme Court has extended First Amendment protection have become impressively broad. Although existing First Amendment restrictions on the permissible scope of tort liability currently are limited, the very existence of those restrictions confirms that many torts involving speech potentially are subject to First Amendment protection. And many torts do involve speech – the duty to warn about the dangers of prescription drugs, fraud, and even some forms of simple negligence are just a few examples.
If the First Amendment of the future limited all or even many of these different constitutionally unprotected forms of tort liability, then its scope would be pervasive. We contend, however, that neither existing First Amendment doctrine nor sensible constitutional policy supports extending free speech protection to torts that are accomplished through speech, except in extremely narrow circumstances. Extending First Amendment protection to such torts would aggravate what we argue are two of the principal risks posed by First Amendment imperialism: the erosion of the cultural distinction between truth and falsity, and devaluation of the status of speech about matters of public concern. Our contention is that most of the forms of speech involved in torts that are accomplished through speech currently are, and should remain, excluded from First Amendment protection. To support this contention, we examine the First Amendment’s extension to previously unprotected forms of speech over the last three-quarters of a century, compare the new First Amendment protections to the doctrinal elements of a series of torts that always or often are accomplished through speech, and argue that it would make little sense, as a matter of tort or constitutional law, to restrict liability for those torts on First Amendment grounds.
Wednesday, August 14, 2019
Danielle Keats Citron has posted to SSRN Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death Videos: The Internet As It Is (And As It Should Be). The abstract provides:
Fiction and visual representations can alter our understanding of human experiences and struggles. They help us understand human frailties and suffering in a visceral way. Nick Drnaso’s graphic novel Sabrina does that in spades. In Sabrina, a woman is murdered by a misogynist, and a video of her execution is leaked. Conspiracy theorists deem her murder a hoax. A cyber mob smears the woman’s loved ones as crisis actors, posts death threats, and spreads their personal information. The attacks continue until a shooting massacre redirects the cyber mob’s wrath to other mourners. Sabrina captures the breathtaking velocity of disinformation online and the rapid escalation to terroristic threats.
Every day, people are radicalized online to wreak havoc and violence. On August 3, 2019, in El Paso, Texas, a twenty-one-year old man posted a racist manifesto on 8chan and then walked into a Wal Mart with a powerful rifle, killing 20 people and injuring many others. The killer trafficked in and engaged with others in hateful conspiracy theories.
Drnaso invites a conversation about cyber mobs, conspiracy theories, and death videos and the norms, attitudes, and laws enabling them. Right now, it is cheap and easy to wreak havoc online and for that havoc to go viral. Platforms act rationally — some might say responsibly to their shareholders — when they tolerate abuse that earns them advertising revenue and costs them nothing in legal liability. Combatting cyber-mob attacks must be a priority. Law should raise the cost of cyber-mob attacks. It is time for tech companies to redress some of the negative externalities of their business model. Platforms should not enjoy immunity from liability for user-generated content unless they have earned that immunity with reasonable content moderation practices. Education should play a role as well. As digital citizens, we need to do better.
Tuesday, August 13, 2019
The Peter A. Allard School of Law at UBC is in the process of hiring several Assistant Professors to begin in 2020-2021. Torts is an area of particular interest. The deadline to apply is September 10, and the link to information is here: http://www.allard.ubc.ca/sites/www.allard.ubc.ca/files/images/homepage/assistant_professor_job_posting.pdf
They are also hiring Full or Associate Professors (any fields) and recruiting to nominate a Canada Research Chair (Tier 2) in Health Law, Law and Technology, or Legal Ethics. A link listing UBC's current academic employment opportunities is here: http://www.allard.ubc.ca/about-us/careers-allard-school-law
Monday, August 12, 2019
Monday, August 5, 2019
Steve Hedley has posted to SSRN The Unacknowledged Revolution in Liability for Negligence. The abstract provides:
Wide availability of insurance today makes nonsense of most of tort’s traditional justifications. No longer can it punish or deter wrongs, or deal even-handedly between claimant and defendant: the defendant simply drops out of the picture in favour of their employer or insurer. Tort therefore merely compensates, though theorists are reluctant to concede this. Modern theoretical accounts emphasise deterrence, personal responsibility and corrective justice – all of which are important goals, yet none of which has much to do with tort’s bureaucratic reality. But tort is not so easy to uproot, and the interest groups which can speak most authoritatively have too much to gain from its operations to permit substantial reform. For theorists, therefore, the justification of tort is an important problem with no plausible solution: it is an itch which constantly irritates, but which we cannot properly scratch.
Monday, July 29, 2019
Last year, the House passed legislation on autonomous vehicles, but a complementary bill died in the Senate. Given the lack of progress since then, industry leaders did not expect much to happen this year. In the past few weeks, however, a bipartisan group in both houses of Congress has held five meetings in an attempt to reach a deal. A new bill is reportedly being written. The Verge has the story.
Friday, July 26, 2019
Earlier this week, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that a law requiring medical malpractice plaintiffs to obtain a certificate of compliance from a state agency is unconstitutional because it violates separation of powers. Jurist has the story.