Wednesday, February 5, 2025

Paradis Lost

A criminal conviction has led to disbarment by the New Jersey Supreme Court.

The Disciplinary Review Board described the offense

In or around fall of 2014, respondent’s law firm, Paradis Law Group, PLLC, received inquiries from customers of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (the DWP) concerning potential litigation stemming from the DWP’s billing system, which incorrectly had billed hundreds of thousands of customers and resulted in multiple class action lawsuits against both the DWP and the City of Los Angeles (the City).

In or around December 2014, Antwon Jones retained respondent to represent him in connection with a potential lawsuit concerning the DWP billing practices.

On December 16, 2014, respondent and another California attorney, Paul Kiesel, Esq., with whom respondent was acquainted, met with two officials from the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office (the CAO) to discuss obtaining the City’s help with a potential lawsuit, on behalf of Jones, against PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PWC), the vendor for the DWP billing system. During that meeting, respondent and Kiesel agreed to represent the City in a lawsuit against PWC. Respondent informed the CAO official that he also represented Jones for the purpose of potential litigation related to the DWP billing system.

In January and February 2015, respondent, Kiesel, and the CAO pursued a parallel litigation strategy, which entailed respondent and Kiesel representing both the City and Jones in contemporaneous lawsuits against PWC. The parallel litigation strategy required convincing the attorneys for the plaintiffs in the existing class action lawsuits against the City to dismiss their claims and to join the City in a coordinated lawsuit against PWC. In furtherance of the parallel litigation, respondent drafted a complaint, on behalf of Jones, against PWC (hereinafter Jones v. PWC) and circulated it among the members of the CAO for their review and comment. In late February 2015, members from the CAO informed respondent that the City no longer intended to proceed with the parallel litigation strategy.

On February 23, 2015, respondent, Kiesel, and respondent’s partner met with at least one member of the CAO to discuss how the City intended to proceed in lieu of the abandoned parallel litigation strategy. At the meeting, respondent and Kiesel were directed and authorized to find outside counsel that was friendly to the City and its litigation goals, who would then purport to represent Jones in a class action lawsuit against the City. The new strategy was dubbed the “white knight strategy” to reflect the understanding that this plaintiff would not be adverse to the City’s goals and would allow the City to orchestrate a collusive lawsuit for the purpose of quickly settling all existing DWP claims on terms favorable to the City. Respondent and Kiesel would continue to prepare the City’s anticipated lawsuit against PWC.

On February 25, 2015, in furtherance of the white knight strategy, respondent contacted an Ohio attorney (the Ohio Attorney), with whom he was acquainted, and asked him to “play the role” of the attorney representing Jones, and the other class members, in the lawsuit against the City (hereinafter Jones v. City). Respondent explained to the Ohio Attorney that the case would be “pre-settled” on the City’s desired terms. Respondent explained that he would do all the work in the case in exchange for twenty percent of the Ohio Attorney’s legal fees. The Ohio Attorney agreed to this scheme.

A lawsuit was filed

From the outset, respondent and the Ohio Attorney agreed to maximize the counsel fee award for their mutual benefit. At respondent’s direction, the Ohio Attorney submitted falsified billing records reflecting that he had commenced work on the Jones v. City matter in November 2014 when, in fact, he had not become involved in the scheme until February 2015. The falsified billing records included hundreds of hours of work which the Ohio Attorney did not perform, including the drafting of pleadings, conducting discovery, and engaging in legal analysis and strategy.

On July 20, 2017, relying on the false representations made by the Ohio Attorney – which respondent knew to be false – the Los Angeles Superior Court judge overseeing the Jones v. City matter granted final approval of the settlement agreement, including an attorneys’ fee award of approximately $19 million, of which the Ohio Attorney received approximately $10.3 million. In July 2017, respondent reminded the Ohio Attorney of their prior agreement that respondent would receive twenty percent of the Ohio Attorney’s share of the  awarded fees, totaling $2.175 million. Respondent and the Ohio Attorney then agreed they would each form a shell company to facilitate and conceal the illegal “kickback” payment.

Further

Over the course of the three bribery schemes, respondent and his companies amassed approximately $24 million. In or around March 2019, respondent began cooperating extensively with law enforcement and engaged in approximately 184 “undercover operations.”

On November 19, 2021, respondent signed a forty-six-page plea agreement, in which he agreed to plead guilty to an information filed with the United States District Court for the Central District of California alleging that he committed the felony of bribery in federally funded programs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). On January 28, 2022, respondent pleaded guilty to the sole count of the information.

On November 7, 2023, Judge Blumenfeld sentenced respondent to thirty-three-month term of incarceration, followed by a three-year term of supervised release, with conditions.

Respondent has been disbarred in New York.

LA Times described the sentencing

[Judge] Blumenfeld, in imposing sentence, cited Paradis’ long legal career. He said that Paradis, an aggressive plaintiff’s attorney from New York, had a “keen” intellect and was “blessed with charm and charisma.”

But ultimately, Paradis went down a path of corruption. “Mr. Paradis was at the center” of a “greedy and corrupt” scheme, Blumenfeld said.

Paradis, in his remarks to the judge, expressed remorse. He wept as Blumenfeld talked about Paradis’ difficult childhood.

(Mike Frisch)

February 5, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Appeal Dismissed

The Ontario Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division dismissed an appeal of an attorney admitted in 2002 who had practiced construction law capably for many years who has been the subject of a capacity proceeding since 2019

In 2015, the appellant was terminated from his law firm employment as a result of erratic behaviour at work, including allegations that he made about undercover spies operating there and in his own family.

The appellant then commenced several proceedings before federal administrative bodies and Federal Court over the following years, seeking production, confirmation and compensation in relation to an alleged covert government campaign to recruit him into the security service. He believed the campaign was mounted by several individuals in his personal and professional life – his family, the firm that had employed him, several lawyers at that firm, friends and ex-girlfriends – as agents of the Crown associated with the federal government’s security apparatus.

The three orders before us on appeal are the latest in a long line of decisions by the Federal Court and the Hearing and Appeal Divisions of this Tribunal since Mr. Hutton commenced litigation in 2017. The Federal Court has made numerous rulings dismissing his motions and striking his pleadings as frivolous and abusive.

Disposition summary

The Lawyer appealed orders from the Hearing Division denying his motion for leave to issue several summonses; finding that he was incapacitated; and suspending his licence and imposing conditions relating to treatment and monitoring ‒ He also requested leave to submit fresh evidence ‒ The panel rejected his fresh evidence motion, finding that the evidence would not reasonably be expected to have affected the result in the Hearing Division ‒ It dismissed his appeal, finding that the Hearing Division did not err in its assessment of expert evidence, its overall finding on capacity or in its decision to reject his request for leave to issue a summons.

(Mike Frisch)

February 5, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, February 4, 2025

Non-Cooperation Draws Interim Suspension

The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department has ordered an interim suspension of an attorney

The Attorney Grievance Committee (the Committee) seeks an order pursuant to Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.9(a)(3) and (5), immediately suspending respondent from the practice of law until further order of the Court, based on his failure to produce bookkeeping records and other documents as repeatedly directed by the Committee, which he is required to maintain under Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) rule 1.15(d); and based on his admission that he took more than the one-third contingency fee in personal injury matters to which he was entitled, and provided financial assistance to clients and failed to explain the details thereof despite the Committee’s request.

Non-cooperation is the basis for the action

While negligent, nonvenal misappropriation is sufficient for the Committee to bring formal charges against respondent under 22 NYCRR 1240.8, it does not rise to the level warranting his interim suspension, nor does respondent’s possible
commingling of client and personal funds in his escrow account and financial assistance to non-pro bono clients (Matter of Spinnell, September 27, 2017 unpub order [M-2272] [interim suspension motion denied where the record evidenced nonvenal misappropriation of escrow funds due to deficient bookkeeping]). Committee later brought formal charges based thereon and attorney was suspended for one year (Matter of Spinnell, 185 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 909 [2021]; see also Matter of Salo, May 4, 2007 unpub order [M-3234] [interim suspension motion denied where record evidenced unintentional misappropriation of lien funds, commingling, and deficient bookkeeping; formal charges later filed and attorney suspended for one year for nonvenal misappropriation of lien funds]; (Matter of Salo, 77 AD3d 30 [1st Dept 2010]).

Accordingly, the Committee’s motion should be granted to the extent of suspending respondent from the practice of law on the grounds of noncooperation, in accordance with 22 NYCRR 1240.9(a)(3), effective immediately, and until further order of this Court.

(Mike Frisch)

February 4, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

A Shield Becomes A Sword

Disbarment has been ordered by the New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department

The record also supports the Referee’s finding that respondent intentionally misused his escrow account to shield his personal funds from tax authorities (see Matter of Kirschenbaum, 29 AD3d at 102; Matter of Goldstein, 10 AD3d 174 [1st Dept 2004]; Matter of Weinstein, 4 AD3d 29, 33 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 608 [2004]). The Referee’s findings sustaining the other escrow related charges (charges 2, 4-9), namely, misappropriation, commingling, misuse of an attorney escrow account as a personal account, failure to maintain required bookkeeping records, and making cash withdrawals and issuing checks payable to “cash” from an escrow account, are well founded and should be affirmed as well (charges 2, 4-9).

As to sanction, the Referee’s disbarment recommendation should be affirmed because this Court has repeatedly found that, in the absence of extremely unusual mitigating circumstances, which are not present in this case, intentional conversion of client funds mandates disbarment (Matter of Ethridge, 231 AD3d at 129; Matter 5 of Castro, 210 AD3d 107 [1st Dept 2022]; Matter of Carlos, 192 AD3d 170 [1st Dept 2021]; Matter of Bernier, 177 AD3d 37 [1st Dept 2019]; Matter of Ballner, 140 AD3d 115 [1st Dept 2016]). Respondent’s intentional misuse of his escrow account to shield his personal funds from tax authorities, which by itself would warrant a suspension, only adds to the case for his disbarment (Matter of Harper, 192 AD3d 174 [1st Dept 2021]; Matter of Sieratzki, 186 AD3d 85 [1st Dept 2020]; Matter of Cassidy, 181 AD3d 51 [1st Dept 2020]; Matter of Brown, 133 AD3d 7 [1st Dept 2015]; Matter of Goldstein, 10 AD3d at 174).

Accordingly, the Committee’s motion should be granted, respondent should be disbarred, and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law in the State of New York, effective immediately and until further order of this Court. All concur.

(Mike Frisch)

February 4, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 3, 2025

Appeal Of Penalty Rejected

The Ontario Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division rejected an appeal to a 30 day suspension imposed by a hearing panel

Before the hearing panel, the parties put forward an agreed statement of facts (ASF) and a joint document book (JDB) relating to three particulars of alleged professional misconduct:

•           sexual harassment or discriminatory conduct toward some of his female employees, contrary to Rules 6.3-3 and 6.3.1-1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct;

•           sending correspondence to Client A that was abusive, offensive or otherwise inconsistent with the proper tone of professional communication from a lawyer, contrary to Rule 7.2-4 of the Rules; and

•           sending correspondence to Client B and Client B’s father that was otherwise inconsistent with the proper tone of professional communication from a lawyer, contrary to Rule 7.2-4 of the Rules.

The first particular

•           The appellant made references to “hookers” in front of three of his female staff, referring to sex trade workers.

•           He made comments about his female receptionist in front of others, asking clients, “Doesn’t my receptionist look good?” He also commented on her age and told her he could not believe how young she looked. This caused her to leave her employment after three months.

•           After a telephone encounter with a post office employee, he sent an email to two employees who had unsuccessfully attempted to retrieve a package before turning to him for help. Among other things he told them he had “shouted at both these bitches but it didn’t do any good…. A little bit of power going to the head of people on minimum wage.”

Reply to an unhappy client

The appellant replied, in part: “It is clear from all you have been through – beating and been urinated on – you are a very unhappy person – Not our problem – Don’t take it out on people who tried to help you. It was explained clearly to you why matter was sent from one court to another.” He also stated, “…apart from offer of a discount I am not willing to spend more time in it until we get [t]o court as I know you just [m]eant to punish someone to get back at your husband by proxy.”

Appeal of penalty

As always, penalty determinations are case-specific, and mitigating and aggravating circumstances vary widely in cases involving similar seriousness of misconduct. Given the circumstances of the three particulars in this case, and the fact that the appellant essentially conceded at the hearing that his penalty appeal would not be successful, this is not a case in which to delve further into the appropriate penalty for sexual harassment alone, or sexual harassment combined with one or two particulars of uncivil communications.

The hearing panel addressed much of the relevant jurisprudence, although it was responding to a case in which liability was largely admitted, and in which the parties’ opposing positions effectively put before it a penalty range between a reprimand and a one-month suspension.

We therefore dismiss Mr. Rogerson’s appeal against the penalty.

(Mike Frisch)

February 3, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Horseplay With Loaded Gun Draws Ten Day Suspension

From the February 2025 Florida Bar disciplinary summaries

Albert V. Medina, 6616 NW 43rd Terrace, Boca Raton, suspended for 10 days, with conditions, and payment of disciplinary costs effective February 10, 2025. (Admitted to practice: 2014) Medina entered a plea and adjudication of guilt to the offense of culpable negligence, causing personal injury to another (a misdemeanor) after accidentally shooting his brother with a firearm while both were engaged in horseplay. (Case No. SC2024-1845)

The incident is described in a stipulated to the entry of an agreed order

The following allegations and rules provide the basis for respondent’s guilty plea and for the discipline to be imposed in this matter:

(a) On October 9, 2022, while engaged in horseplay with his brother, respondent retrieved a firearm from another room. Believing it was unloaded, respondent pulled the trigger, striking his brother in his bicep. Respondent immediately applied first aid measures and called 911 for help. Both respondent and his brother informed the police that the incident was an accident. Respondent was charged with misdemeanor culpable negligence.

(b) Respondent’s brother subsequently informed law enforcement that he wanted respondent prosecuted, but then signed a non-prosecution affidavit, informing authorities that he did not want his brother prosecuted and affirming that the incident was unintentional. In the interim, the charge against respondent was enhanced to attempted manslaughter. However, the felony charge w as subsequently nolle prossed.

(c) The criminal case against respondent was resolved on December 21, 2023, with respondent’s plea and adjudication of guilt to the offense of culpable negligence, causing personal injury to another, a first-degree misdemeanor. Respondent was placed on probation for twelve (12) months with special conditions. Upon his successful completion of the probation terms, respondent’s probation was terminated early on July 22, 2024.

(Mike Frisch)

February 3, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Harmless Error

The Florida Supreme Court accepted a petition for disciplinary revocation of an attorney 

David Michael Carnright, 33 Fonseca Ave., Coral Gables, disciplinary revocation with leave to seek readmission after five years effective immediately following a January 9 court order. (Admitted to practice: 2011) Carnright petitioned for disciplinary revocation following his felony suspension. The court granted the petition, effective immediately. (Case No. SC24-1668)

From the criminal appeal to the Florida Third District Court of Appeal which affirmed the conviction

The pertinent facts are undisputed. Carnright was charged with three counts of sexual battery for an incident that occurred on the night of March 1–2, 2018. Carnright allegedly met the victim in a bar, offered her cocaine, brought her back to his vehicle to have sex, and attempted to offer her money afterward. The primary dispute turned on consent, with the victim alleging that Carnright took advantage of her inebriation to force her to perform sexual acts against her will, and defense counsel arguing that the victim fabricated the claims to extort Carnright for drugs and money.

The State proffered evidence that Carnright made several PayPal payments to the victim shortly after the incident and that the victim promptly returned most of these payments except for $100 of an initial $300 payment. Carnright and the victim also exchanged several text messages on the night of the incident, including messages in which Carnright accuses the victim of taking his bag of cocaine and subsequently apologizes after the victim confronts him about her lack of consent. The State's case was also supported by several witnesses to whom the victim described the incident, as well as photographs of a bump on the victim's forehead that she testified she received from being pushed against the floor in Carnright's vehicle. Carnright himself did not testify.

To impeach the victim's credibility, defense counsel sought to introduce evidence of the victim's internet search history from the days following the incident, which included searches about how to keep cocaine and Xanax from appearing in drug tests. The defense claimed that these searches would be inconsistent with the victim's testimony that she did not remember doing cocaine with Carnright. The defense also sought to introduce text messages between the victim and her friends in the days following the incident, including messages in which the victim says that she “did coke all night with this guy” (referring to Carnright), appears to boast about receiving money from him, and suggests that she would perform oral sex for money and had done so before. The defense claimed that these messages would show that the victim's claims were false and financially motivated.

The trial court allowed the defense to cross-examine the victim about these records, paraphrase their content, and use them to refresh her recollection, but did not allow the exact language to be shown to the jury or read into evidence. The victim ultimately acknowledged making these searches and messages, but denied ever using Xanax, maintained that she did not remember using cocaine with Carnright (but did not deny using cocaine, either), and claimed that the messages suggesting she had traded sex for money were a “joke.” The jury returned a guilty verdict on only one of the three counts, acquitting on the two predicated on unconsented oral sex. This appeal followed.

Affirmed

In sum, despite the exclusions, upon review of the trial record, no reasonable possibility exists that any error contributed to the conviction. Thus, we find any impropriety in the exclusion of the verbatim text messages to be harmless. 

(Mike Frisch)

February 3, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

A Three Phase Conspiracy

The New Jersey Supreme Court has imposed a three-year suspension of a convicted attorney effective from June 2017, the date of Respondent's suspension.

The offense was described by the Disciplinary Review Board

On May 17, 2017, before the Honorable Kevin McNulty, U.S.D.J., respondent entered a guilty plea to one count of making false entries to deceive the FDIC and First State Bank (FSB) (18 U.S.C. §§ 1005 and 2) and one count of conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371) to make false entries and to influence the action of the FDIC by making or inviting reliance on a false statement, document, or thing (18 U.S.C. §§ 1005, 1007). Respondent entered her plea pursuant to an Information, voluntarily waiving her right to an indictment by a grand jury.

Specifically, respondent admitted that, in 2009 and 2010, while she was serving as outside counsel to FSB, she and several co-conspirators engaged in a complex scheme to deceive FSB and government regulators regarding FSB’s financial condition.

The scheme involved respondent and four additional co-conspirators. Co-Conspirator One (CC One) was an attorney, licensed to practice law in New Jersey, who provided services to FSB. Co-Conspirator Two (CC Two) held a senior management role at FSB and served on FSB’s Board of Directors (the FSB Board). CC Two recommended to the FSB Board that FSB hire Co-Conspirator Three (CC Three) to act as FSB’s investment advisor, and CC Three, in turn, identified himself to FSB as undertaking efforts to raise capital for FSB through one of two entities based in Canada (collectively, “the Canadian Company”). Co-Conspirator Four (CC Four) held himself out as a principal of several insurance companies operating in New Jersey.

By September 2009, respondent, CC One, CC Two, and CC Three knew that the FDIC and the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance (NJDOBI) (collectively, the Regulators) had determined that FSB was insufficiently capitalized. Around the same time, CC Two proposed to the FSB Board that FSB retain CC Three to restructure its investment portfolio. Accordingly, FSB entered into a contract with CC Three, wiring roughly $12 million dollars in FSB funds to the Canadian Company for CC Three to invest on FSB’s behalf.

Subsequently, respondent became involved in an elaborate, three-phase scheme to deceive FSB and the FDIC regarding FSB’s true financial health.

Sanction

On balance, in light of the magnitude of the harm to the client, respondent’s misuse of her role as FSB’s attorney in connection with the conspiracy, and her continued participation at each juncture in the conspiracy’s three distinct phases, we determine that a three-year suspension is the quantum of discipline necessary to protect the public and preserve confidence in the bar.

A report on the plea from the United States Attorney's office for the District of New Jersey

The three-phase scheme took place from 2009 to 2010. The first phase was to fraudulently infuse $7 million of capital into FSB. In the second phase of the scheme, various conspirators caused FSB to make millions of dollars in loans based on material misrepresentations in order to cover up the fraudulent nature of the capital infusion and end inquiries from FSB’s auditors. The final phase involved lying to the FDIC and FSB, among others, about the fraudulent capital infusion and loans.

(Mike Frisch)

February 3, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

"An Obvious Conflict Of Interest"

A reprimand imposed by the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers

Sometime in August 2021, there was a hazardous waste spill on real property located in the town of Oak Bluffs on Martha’s Vineyard. Francis Bernard (Bernard), who was nearly eighty-eight-years-old at the time, owned and lived in the house on that property. Bernard’s daughter, Mary Johnson (Johnson), was considering financing the necessary clean-up at her father’s property, but she was keen to ensure that she was reimbursed in some manner. Faced with this conundrum, Johnson sought and obtained legal advice from the respondent whose law practice focused on real estate and probate matters, and they thereby formed an attorney-client relationship by no later than September 2021.

In April 2022, Bernard, at Johnson’s suggestion, retained the respondent to draft a revised last will and testament. Bernard’s house was his only significant asset, and he informed the respondent that it was his desire to bequeath the house to Johnson on the condition that Johnson pay $100,000 to each of her siblings, Ricky Bernard and Stephanie Boudreau, and pay another $100,000 collectively to Benard’s grandchildren. While forming an attorney-client relationship with Bernard, the respondent failed to provide him with a written fee agreement. The respondent never finalized a revised last will and testament for Bernard that reflected his expressed desires for his property.

Nevertheless, on May 20, 2022, the respondent met with Bernard and Johnson, and the respondent presented Bernard with and had him sign a Quitclaim Deed transferring his house to Johnson as a “gift for no consideration”. At the same time, the respondent presented Johnson with and had her sign a Form LB1 Affidavit and a Form LB2 Affidavit as the grantee of the property. The respondent signed the Form LB1 Affidavit as Johnson’s legal representative.

On August 22, 2022, Bernard contacted the respondent and demanded that she have Johnson convey the house back to him, but the respondent told Bernard that she could not do so. By letter dated August 23, 2022, Bernard terminated the attorney-client relationship with the respondent.

There was an obvious conflict in the respondent’s simultaneous representation of Bernard and Johnson concerning the property. Bernard was harmed by having his house transferred to Johnson without being subject to the express conditions he expressed to the respondent. The respondent did not obtain from Bernard and Johnson their informed consent to the conflict of interest confirmed in writing.

The respondent stipulated that her forgoing misconduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 (competence); 1.3 (diligence); 1.5(b)(1) (Fees); and 1.7(a) and (b) (Conflict of Interest: Current Clients).

(Mike Frisch)

February 3, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

A Substantially Different Sanction

The New Jersey Supreme Court imposed reciprocal discipline of a three-month suspension, reducing the year and a day sanction ordered in Pennsylvania.

Reinstatement requires medical attestation of proof of fitness.

The court adopted the recommendation of its Disciplinary Review Board to impose "substantially different discipline" than Pennsylvania

In our view, subsection (E) applies here because the unethical conduct established by the record warrants substantially different discipline. As discussed below, the crux of respondent’s misconduct was twofold: (1) her practice of law while administratively ineligible, and (2) her gross neglect of the A.A. matter. Pursuant to New Jersey disciplinary precedent, respondent’s misconduct warrants a three-month suspension, rather than the one-year suspension that would be the equivalent to the one-year-and-one-day suspension imposed in Pennsylvania.

Sanction

On balance, we find that the mitigating factors are outweighed by the egregious effect of respondent’s misconduct on A.A., who suffered a loss of liberty for more than a week owing to respondent’s failures to attend a court 44 proceeding and, thereafter, to take any steps whatsoever to attempt to have the resulting bench warrant lifted. Accordingly, we determine to grant the motion for reciprocal discipline and conclude that a three-month suspension is the appropriate quantum of discipline necessary to protect the public and preserve confidence in the bar.

In addition, because the joint petition indicated the need for respondent to prove her fitness to practice law before being reinstated in Pennsylvania, we also determine to recommend the condition that, prior to reinstatement in New Jersey, she provide to the OAE proof of her fitness to practice law, as attested to by a medical doctor approved by the OAE.

(Mike Frisch)

February 3, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, February 1, 2025

Undomesticated

The New Hampshire Supreme Court Professional Conduct Committee recommends disbarment of an attorney

Mr. Ray was admitted to the New Hampshire Bar on May 24, 2016, after having practiced in Massachusetts for over a year. Mr. Ray never opened a client trust account in New Hampshire and, in August 2022, he closed his Massachusetts client account. Mr. Ray filed his last Trust Account Compliance Certification (TACC) on July 30, 2023, for the reporting period ending May 31, 2023. Mr. Ray did not file a TACC for the reporting period ending May 31, 2024.

In July 2023, Mr. Mark Maupin retained Mr. Ray to domesticate a foreign judgment in New Hampshire. Mr. Maupin paid Mr. Ray a $3,000 retainer for the work. The Attorney Discipline Office was unable to determine where Mr. Ray deposited this retainer and there was no evidence that it was placed in a client trust account, as required.

In August 2023, Mr. Ray twice represented to his client that he had filed the Registration of Foreign Judgment in the 6th Circuit Court – District Division – Hillsborough. Mr. Ray also represented to Attorney David DeBold, counsel for another interested party in the case, that the Registration of Foreign Judgment had been filed. Although Mr. Ray had drafted a document for this purpose, no Registration was filed with the circuit court in Hillsborough and there was no evidence that it had been filed in any other court.

Mr. Ray had no further communication with his client after August 30, 2023, nor did he complete any other cognizable work on the case. After having discovered on his own that no Registration of Foreign Judgment had been filed, the client filed a grievance on October 24, 2023. At no point has Mr. Ray returned any portion of the retainer to Mr. Maupin. Mr. Ray has not responded to any of the Attorney Discipline’s Office many attempts to speak to him or to any proceeding in the disciplinary matter.

Mr. Ray was administratively suspended on July 2, 2024, by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for failing to comply with his CLE requirements.

Sanction

When determining to impose the ultimate sanction of disbarment,” the Supreme Court focuses “not on punishing the offender, but on protecting the public, maintaining public confidence in the bar, preserving the integrity of the legal profession, and preventing similar conduct in the future.” In re O’Meara’s Case, 164 N.H. 762, 179 (2012). Here, Mr. Ray’s self-dealing with client money, dishonesty, abandonment of his client, and refusal to participate in the attorney discipline process all support disbarment.

(Mike Frisch)

February 1, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 31, 2025

Consent Moots Sanction Disagreement

The New Jersey Supreme Court accepted an attorney's consent to disbarment.

The consent mooted a disagreement over the appropriate sanction.

The special ethics adjudicator had recommended that a censure be imposed.

At issue was a complex transaction involving Respondent's son where a third party was defrauded and he did not profit. 

A majority of the Disciplinary Review Board had recommended disbarment on its finding of knowing misappropriation with a dissent that found the recommendation an unwarranted expansion of existing law

We agree with the Majority’s conclusion that respondent was not aware of the alleged criminal scheme to divert the money and as a result, had no duty to take affirmative steps to prevent the implementation of a criminal scheme to divert the money. We also agree with the Majority that respondent did not, in fact, represent LaTour and that, as a result, respondent did not have a conflict of interest. Where we part ways with the Majority is that we cannot find that respondent knew the funds were not going for the purpose intended, namely purchase of the insurance policy. In our view, absent that knowledge, there can be no knowing misappropriation.

Respondent’s conduct was far from blameless. After the funds had been disbursed, he knowingly misrepresented to LaTour that the funds were still in his escrow account when, in fact, they were not. He also improperly insisted that LaTour withdraw his ethics grievance as a condition precedent to respondent returning the funds. While we do not find that respondent knowingly misappropriated the funds, we agree with the Special Ethics Adjudicator that he was negligent in that he did not take additional steps to ensure the funds were used for the purpose for which they were intended. We find the amount of money involved, $400,000 to be an aggravating factor. We find as mitigating factors (1) the fact that respondent reimbursed LaTour in full for the funds lost, and (2) the fact that respondent had no prior discipline in over thirty years as a member of the New Jersey bar and almost fifty years at the bar in New York when the events giving rise to this proceeding occurred. Based upon the foregoing, and our conclusion that there was no knowing misappropriation proven by clear and convincing evidence, we would recommend the imposition of a one-year suspension for respondent’s misconduct.

(Mike Frisch)

January 31, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Admission Denial Affirmed

The full Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a single justice's denial of an application for bar admission

Moran graduated from an accredited law school in 2013 and first filed an application for admission to the Massachusetts bar in 2018. He did not pass the written examination in July 2018, but he reapplied and subsequently passed the examination in February 2019.

Character issues

Moran has a history of alcohol-related legal issues spanning the years 1997 to 2014, including seven arrests and three convictions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OUI) or a related offense. Some of these incidents occurred while Moran was attending law school and led to a suspension and expulsion from school, although he did ultimately obtain his law degree. Moran was also arrested three other times for nonalcohol related incidents. In its report of non-qualification, the board noted that Moran has made positive "purposeful life changes" and has had no arrests since 2014. The board also specifically stated that it "did not give weight to the facts or circumstances underlying . . . Moran's alcohol-related arrests or convictions in its determination relative to [his application for admission to the bar]."

a. Commercial pilot certificate. The board did, however, have concerns with Moran's OUI arrests and convictions as they were relevant to Moran's commercial pilot certificate. In particular, the board was concerned with Moran's failure to inform the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regarding the OUI charges and convictions. Moran was initially issued a pilot's certificate in 1993. The certificate was inactive from the late 1990s until April 2021, when Moran obtained a new certificate. When the board first inquired of Moran whether he was required to disclose his arrests or convictions for OUI, and any related suspension of his driver's license, to the FAA, Moran responded that he did not know what his obligations were, that he would find out, and that he would provide that information to the board.

Moran subsequently submitted a letter to the board indicating that inactive pilots are not required to disclose OUI arrests and convictions to the FAA. More specifically, Moran indicated that he had spoken with a particular administrative investigator at the FAA and that the investigator had told Moran that there was no such requirement. This was, as it turns out, untrue. Moran later suggested that he had misunderstood what he had been told by the FAA and acknowledged that his rendition of whom he spoke with at the FAA and what they had told him were inaccurate. Moran subsequently reported the required information to the FAA but then failed to cooperate with the FAA's investigation by demanding that the FAA itself obtain the relevant records relating to his criminal history rather than providing them himself. Eventually, Moran accepted a 120-day suspension proposed by the FAA and was able to obtain a new pilot's certificate in April 2021.

b. Tax filings. The board was also concerned with Moran's conduct in relation to certain tax filings. When the board initially inquired whether Moran had filed income taxes for the years 2016, 2017, and 2018, both individually and on behalf of the company that Moran owned, he was unable to answer the question. During the course of the special counsel's investigation, Moran gave conflicting answers regarding whether he had filed his taxes, and although he eventually provided draft copies of his returns for the indicated years, he stated that the returns for two of the years needed to be revised because they were missing certain income. He also indicated that he would update special counsel regarding those revisions, but never followed up with that information. At the formal hearing following the special counsel's investigation, Moran testified as to some confusion on his part regarding the filing of individual and corporate taxes. Although he did eventually look into the matter and ensured that his taxes were properly filed, he did not do so until prompted by the special counsel's investigation. Additionally, there was some indication that not all of the information included in his tax returns was accurate.

Conclusion

Overall, Moran has not established "by clear and convincing evidence his . . . current good character and fitness to be admitted to the practice of law." Rule V.2.2 of the Rules of the Board of Bar Examiners. He has not, in short, demonstrated that he has the ability to conduct himself with respect for and in accordance with the law. As such, we are not "confident that allowing [Moran] to practice law would not be detrimental to the public interest." Porter v. Board of Bar Examiners, 489 Mass. 1012, 1015 (2022), quoting Matter of an Application for Admission to the Bar of the Commonwealth, 444 Mass. at 411.

(Mike Frisch)

January 31, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, January 30, 2025

Telemarketing Violations Draws Reciprocal Censure

A reciprocal censure has been ordered by the New York Appellate Division for the Third Judicial Department

Respondent was admitted to practice by this Court in 2012 and has also been admitted in his home state of Utah, among other jurisdictions. At all relevant times, respondent operated a law firm in Utah which primarily engaged in credit repair services and, in 2019, the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau commenced a lawsuit that alleged that the firm and other codefendants had violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule (hereinafter TSR) (see 16 CFR 310.4 [a] [2]). Following a motion for summary judgment, the US District Court for the District of Utah concluded that the services offered by respondent's firm violated the TSR (Bureau of Consumer Fin. Protection v Progrexion Mktg., Inc., 2023 WL 2548008, *5 [D Utah 2023], appeal dismissed 2023 WL 5835551 [10th Cir 2023]) and, in August 2023, it entered a stipulated judgment requiring respondent's firm to conduct regular compliance reviews, comply with reporting and record-keeping requirements and pay restitution and civil penalties, among other things.

Utah's Office of Professional Conduct thereafter filed a complaint against respondent based on the findings of the federal District Court, wherein it alleged that he had violated that state's Rules of Professional Conduct. Upon his admission to violations of facts and rule violations, the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County placed respondent on a two-year term of probation with conditions additionally imposed. The Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department (hereinafter AGC) now moves, by order to show cause initially marked returnable on October 7, 2024, but adjourned upon respondent's request to November 4, 2024, to impose discipline upon respondent in this state as a consequence of his Utah misconduct. Respondent has submitted papers in response to the motion, AGC was heard in reply and respondent has submitted papers in surreply. Upon respondent's request, the parties were heard at oral argument.

The consequence of multiple bar admissions

Respondent is admitted to practice law in several other jurisdictions in addition to Utah and New York, including Georgia, Texas, Washington, DC, Colorado and Idaho. As a consequence of his admitted misconduct in Utah, respondent advises that he has received a six-month stayed suspension with two years of probation with conditions in Colorado; a private reprimand and two-year probation with conditions in Idaho; a two-year probationary term with conditions in the District of Columbia; and a two-year suspension in Texas that is fully probated.

The court noted that probation is not an available option

While acknowledging the bevy of mitigating factors cited by respondent and his compliance with the conditions imposed as a consequence of the disciplinary stipulation in Utah, we would be remiss in not addressing the significance of respondent's admitted misconduct, which ran afoul of a law specifically established to protect consumers who sought credit repair services. Even accepting respondent's arguments that clients were satisfied with the firm's efforts and benefitted from its efforts, we note that even positive benefits or outcomes to clients do not diminish the significance of an attorney's misconduct. To that end, we censure respondent (see e.g. Matter of Chang, 232 AD3d 1197, 1199 [3d Dept 2024]; Matter of Mendelsohn, 230 AD3d at 945), and further direct respondent to complete 10 continuing legal education credits in the area of Ethics and Professionalism (see Rules of App Div, All Depts [22 NYCRR] § 1500.2 [c]), and provide proof of his compliance with this condition to AGC within six months of the date of this order.

(Mike Frisch)

January 30, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, January 29, 2025

When 7-Eleven Isn't Lucky

The Illinois Administrator has filed a complaint alleging that an attorney stole and attempted to use a colleague's credit card

Beginning in or about April 2022, Respondent was hired as a contract attorney at the law firm in Chicago. On or about May 1, 2022, Respondent became an associate attorney at the firm, working in the firm’s real estate and corporate practice groups.

On Friday, April 21, 2023, another associate attorney at the firm, E.O., left her cell phone unattended in her office while she attended a firm meeting. Her phone case had a pocket attached which contained a credit card belonging to E.O.

On April 21, 2023, while E.O. was in the meeting, Respondent entered her office and took her credit card from her phone case. Respondent did so without E.O.’s knowledge or authorization.

Respondent then took E.O.’s credit card to a 7-Eleven convenience store near the firm’s office and attempted to purchase gift cards. That purchase was flagged as potentially fraudulent and was declined. Respondent then attempted to make various on-line purchases using E.O.’s credit card from Target and other retailers. Those attempted purchases were also declined.

Respondent knew that she was not authorized to take or use E.O.’s credit card, and when she attempted to do so, she did so dishonestly.

On April 21, 2023, upon returning to her desk from the firm meeting, E.O. discovered numerous fraud alert contacts on her phone, where the credit card provider alerted her to attempted purchases on her credit card while she was away from her office, including the attempted purchases at 7-Eleven and the online purchases described above. E.O. declined all charges as unauthorized and examined her phone case to discover that her credit card was missing.

E.O. later determined that she had not lost or misplaced her credit card and that someone must have taken it from her office. On Monday, April 24, 2023, E.O. reported the incident to a partner at the firm.

Following E.O.’s report that her credit card had been stolen in the office, other attorneys and staff at the firm quickly learned of the theft. Upon hearing the news, on or about April 23, 2023, Respondent then falsely reported to a firm partner that her own credit card had been stolen as well.

On April 27, 2023, another attorney from the firm filed a police report with the Chicago Police Department concerning the theft of E.O.’s credit card and the alleged theft of Respondent’s credit card.

On or about May 2, 2023, a Chicago Police Department detective went to the 7-Eleven store to investigate. At that time, the detective obtained a surveillance video from April 21, 2023, showing Respondent attempting to use E.O.’s credit card to purchase gift cards. The detective then went to the firm’s office and provided a copy of the surveillance video to a partner at the firm.

In the afternoon of May 2, 2023, members of the firm confronted Respondent with the surveillance video. Respondent initially denied that it was her in the video, and when showed a later segment of the surveillance video, did not deny it was her but said she had never been in that 7-Eleven store. When asked again, Respondent again stated she had never been in that 7-Eleven store and had no explanation for the images in the surveillance video.

Respondent’s statements to firm partners on May 2, 2023, were false and Respondent knew they were false at the time she made them. The firm then terminated Respondent’s employment.

(Mike Frisch)

January 29, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Oral Argument Held In Bar Prosecution Of Chandra Levy Prosecutors

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals heard oral argument today (second case argued at link here) in the appeals of bar discipline matters brought against prosecutors in the high profile Chandra Levy murder case.

The allegations involved disclosures not made to the defense in connection with a key government witness.

The Board on Professional Responsibility has recommended a 60-day suspension for one attorney and dismissal of charges against the other.

Rule 3.8 of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct sets forth the “Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.” Rule 3.8(e) provides, in pertinent part, that a prosecutor in a criminal case shall not “[i]ntentionally fail to disclose to the defense, upon request and at a time when use by the defense is reasonably feasible, any evidence or information that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know tends to negate the guilt of the accused or to mitigate the offense . . . .” As the Board has stated:

[A] violation of Rule 3.8(e) undermines our entire system of criminal justice. Prosecutors are not merely advocates; they are called upon to make sure that criminal trials are fair to the accused and that the machinery of prosecution is credible. At its most severe, a violation of Rule 3.8(e) can mean that an innocent person languishes in prison . . . .

In re Dobbie, Board Docket No. 19-BD-018, at 37-38 (BPR Jan. 13, 2021).

Respondents Haines and Campoamor-Sanchez are charged with the failure to timely disclose exculpatory evidence to defense counsel, in violation of Rule 3.8(e); for this same alleged misconduct, both are also charged with engaging in conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d). Respondent Haines is also charged with knowingly disclosing confidential government information, in violation of Rule 1.6(a). We find that Disciplinary Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Haines violated Rules 1.6(a), 3.8(e), and 8.4(d), and we recommend that she be suspended for sixty days. For the reasons discussed herein, we dismiss all charges against Respondent Campoamor-Sanchez.

Respondents

Respondents Amanda Haines and Fernando Campoamor-Sanchez were Assistant United States Attorneys responsible for prosecuting Ingmar Guandique for the murder of a congressional intern, Chandra Levy, who had disappeared in 2001 and whose remains were found in Rock Creek Park a year later. FF 1-4.2 The trial of Ingmar Guandique took place in October and November 2010. Jt. Stip. 6-8.3 At that time, Respondent Haines, who began working as an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia in 1998, was a seasoned trial lawyer. Beginning in about 2007 she began working primarily on unsolved homicide cases involving female victims. FF 3. Respondent Campoamor-Sanchez joined the D.C U.S. Attorney’s Office in 2004 and was assigned to its homicide section in September 2007. FF 4.

At the center of this disciplinary case is a three-page letter, dated February 23, 2009, that federal inmate Miguel Zaldivar had sent to law enforcement (the “Zaldivar letter”). FF 6-7. This letter detailed information about the Levy case provided to Zaldivar by another federal inmate, Armando Morales. Morales provided this information to Zaldivar for the specific purpose of inclusion in the letter to law enforcement. At the time this letter was written, Morales and Zaldivar were incarcerated in the same facility, and Morales considered Zaldivar to be his “mentor.” FF 7-8, 59. Morales ultimately served as a key prosecution witness in the trial of Ingmar Guandique for the murder of Chandra Levy. See, e.g., FF 49, 61, 65

The first page of the Zaldivar letter provided background information about Armando Morales, including, among other things, that Morales: (i) had seen Levy’s case on CNN; (ii) knew who killed Chandra Levy; (iii) was a founder of the Fresno Bulldogs, a notorious gang closely associated with the “Mexican Mafia”; (iv) was a drop-out from the gang; (v) had “debriefed to law enforcement about his gang involvement”; and (vi) was willing to help law enforcement with the Levy case. FF 7; see also DCX 6 at 88

The second and third pages of the Zaldivar letter contained text, written in the form of a narrative by Morales, in which Zaldivar “hope[d] . . . to capture the essence” of what Morales knew about the murder as Morales had told it to Zaldivar. DCX 5 at 49. The narrative recited that, while Ingmar Guandique and Morales shared a cell three years earlier in 2006, Guandique told Morales he had attacked Chandra Levy and was afraid he would be charged with her murder. Id. at 49-50

Key disputed fact

There is no dispute that Respondents did not disclose the Zaldivar letter to defense counsel prior to the start of trial. Pages two and three of the letter were produced mid-trial, as Jencks material, roughly two nights before Morales testified. FF 46. Although the issue was hotly contested by the parties, the Hearing Committee found that the first page of the Zaldivar letter – which, again, contained the statement that Morales had previously “debriefed to law enforcement” – was never produced to the defense before the end of the trial. See FF 37, 56.

(Mike Frisch)

January 29, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

In Veritas She (Allegedly) Trusted

A prehearing conference is schedule for tomorrow at 1:30 pm in a District of Columbia bar discipline matter described in a post by Reason.com

After black-clad demonstrators protested Donald Trump's inauguration in an "Anti-Capitalist/Anti-Fascist Bloc" march on January 20, 2017, federal prosecutors in Washington, D.C., charged more than 200 of them with rioting. While 21 defendants pleaded guilty, all of the other cases ended in acquittals, mistrials, or charges dismissed with prejudice. One reason for that fiasco, according to recently filed disciplinary charges, was the discovery that the federal prosecutor who oversaw the cases persistently withheld exculpatory evidence and repeatedly lied about it to judges and defense attorneys.

In a "specification of charges" filed with the D.C. Court of Appeals Board of Professional Responsibility last month, Disciplinary Counsel Hamilton P. Fox III alleges that Jennifer Kerkhoff Muyskens, who is now a federal prosecutor in Utah but previously worked at the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, violated six rules of professional conduct while trying to convict "DisruptJ20" protesters, including many who had not participated in vandalism or violence. Muyskens "knew that most defendants did not commit violent acts themselves," Fox notes, but "she argued that these defendants were still liable for felony rioting and felony property destruction because they joined a criminal conspiracy to use the protest march to further the violence and destruction that occurred."

To support that theory, Muyskens presented video of a DisruptJ20 planning meeting that had been clandestinely recorded by an "operative" from Project Veritas, a conservative group that frequently has been accused of using misleadingly edited videos to portray progressive and leftist organizations in a negative light. Although Muyskens "understood Project Veritas had a reputation for editing videos in a misleading way," Fox says, she initially concealed the source of the video, saying in court that "who provided it is irrelevant." And although Muyskens "knew that Project Veritas had omitted and edited some of its videos" before releasing them, Fox adds, she "did not request or obtain Project Veritas's missing videos or unedited footage."

According to Fox, Muyskens and Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Detective Greggory Pemberton edited the meeting footage in ways that bolstered the prosecution's case, and Muyskens covered up the extent of those edits. Fox says Muyskens also withheld Project Veritas videos of other DisruptJ20 meetings that would have been helpful to the defense, pretending that they did not exist. And she allegedly concealed the fact that Pemberton, in testimony to a grand jury, had erroneously identified one of the DisruptJ20 defendants as a woman who appears in the video of the planning meeting.

According to the Supreme Court's 1963 ruling in Brady v. Maryland, due process requires prosecutors to share potentially exculpatory evidence with the defense. Fox says Muyskens violated that rule by excising footage and withholding videos that could have been useful in rebutting the prosecution's case.

The material that Muyskens and Pemberton excised from the planning meeting video included footage that would have revealed its provenance. They also cut footage of a phone call in which a Project Veritas infiltrator told a colleague, "I don't think they know anything about the upper echelon stuff."

The excised footage "revealed that the video was filmed as part of Project Veritas's infiltration of DisruptJ20, which tended to undermine the credibility and reliability of the government's evidence," Fox writes. "In addition, the operative's post-meeting report indicated that some DisruptJ20 protest organizers did not know anything about plans or decisions that were being made by an 'upper echelon.' This lack of knowledge supported the non-violent defendants' theory that, assuming a plan to riot existed at all, only a small group was involved, which they knew nothing about. Alternatively, if the operative was discussing protest organizers being unaware of Project Veritas's 'upper echelon' plans, the statements supported…claims that Project Veritas conspired to frame DisruptJ20 defendants for third-party violence, including by possibly inciting violence themselves. Both judges who later considered the issue…found that the complete, unedited footage was exculpatory."

The videos that Muyskens withheld included evidence that, contrary to the prosecution's narrative, the DisruptJ20 protest was supposed to be peaceful. Those videos "were exculpatory," Fox explains, "because they showed that DisruptJ20 planning meetings consistently involved training and instructing protesters how to participate in its unpermitted 'Actions,' including the anti-capitalist march, as non-violent protests, using nonviolence and de-escalation techniques, which supported the non-violent defendants' claim that their intent was merely to peacefully protest."

The undisclosed videos also "showed Project Veritas operatives discussing their infiltration operation of DisruptJ20, which supported the defense's theory that Project Veritas conspired to blame DisruptJ20 for others' misconduct," Fox notes. "For example, the undisclosed videos showed Project Veritas operatives discussing—before the Inauguration protests—how they were providing information on DisruptJ20 to the FBI, how there was likely to be violence from 'outside influencers,' and how DisruptJ20 would 'catch the blame' for outsiders' misconduct because the FBI was 'going to say' that they incited it."

In court, Fox says, Muyskens "falsely said that the government had made only two edits, which were both to redact the identity of the videographer and an undercover officer," and "that, other than the two redactions, the defense had the same videos as the government." She "falsely told the court that she had provided defense counsel with 'the full entirety of those videos from that day.'"

According to Fox, "Pemberton testified falsely that Project Veritas had produced only the four disclosed video segments of the [planning meeting video]" and that "the only editing the government did was to combine the first three video segments into one exhibit to be played at trial." Muyskens and Pemberton "did not disclose how they had edited the original videos they received from Project Veritas," and they did not "disclose that they had omitted from discovery many other videos Project Veritas videos of DisruptJ20's planning meetings."

Muyskens told a judge that Project Veritas had "provided unedited video" at Pemberton's request and that "we posted the video" to the discovery portal. Those statements, Fox says, "were false and misleading." Muyskens also "falsely said that other than redacting the identities of the Project Veritas operative and [the undercover officer], 'the defense has the exact video we have.'" The judge "later found that [Muyskens] 'left a clear impression' that she had disclosed everything that Project Veritas had produced."

Muyskens told another judge that "the government had 'provided the clips as we have them'" and that "'the only editing' by the government 'was to combine the three clips' of the anti-capitalist 'breakout' into a single video exhibit for trial." Those statements also "were false and misleading," Fox says.

Muyskens eventually "acknowledged that the government had additional, undisclosed Project Veritas videos of DisruptJ20's planning meetings." But she "mischaracterized them and falsely suggested that they were irrelevant."

During the investigation of her conduct, Fox says, Muyskens "repeated her false statements and material omissions" regarding the video edits, the withheld videos, her suppression of "relevant information and evidence," her failure to produce grand jury transcripts from the misidentified defendant's case, her "misrepresentations and omissions to the grand jury, the defense, and the court," and her failure to "correct known misrepresentations to the court." She also "made additional false statements and material omissions to falsely explain her conduct." She claimed, for example, that the undisclosed videos "were irrelevant and did not discuss the anti-capitalist march."

Fox says Muyskens' actions violated the District of Columbia's Rules of Professional Conduct in half a dozen ways:

She allegedly violated Rule 3.3(a) by "knowingly making false statements, offering false evidence, and failing to correct material false statements to the court."

She allegedly violated three sections of Rule 3.4 by "obstructing the defense's access to evidence and altering or concealing evidence, or assisting another person to do so when she reasonably should have known that the evidence was or may have been subject to discovery; knowingly disobeying the court's direct orders to produce information in the government's possession without openly asserting that no valid obligation existed; and/or failing to make reasonably diligent efforts to comply with the defense's discovery requests."

She allegedly violated two sections of Rule 3.8 by "intentionally avoiding pursuit of evidence and information because it may have damaged the prosecution's case or aided the defense; and by intentionally failing to disclose to the defense, upon request and at a time when use by the defense was reasonably feasible, evidence and information that she knew or reasonably should have known tended to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense."

She allegedly violated Rule 8.4(a) by "knowingly assisting or inducing another to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct and/or doing so through the acts of another."

She allegedly violated Rule 8.4(c) by "engaging in conduct that involved reckless or intentional dishonesty, misrepresentations, deceit, and fraud, which misled the grand jury, the defense, the court, the government, and disciplinary authorities about the evidence in the government's possession and the government's conduct."

She allegedly violated Rule 8.4(d) by "engaging in conduct that seriously interfered with the administration of justice'

Possible sanctions against Muyskens range from "temporary suspension of her law license to full disbarment," Washington City Paper notesThe Washington Post reports that lawyers for Muyskens did not respond to requests for comment and that "Pemberton also did not respond to an inquiry." The U.S. attorney's offices in D.C. and Utah "declined to comment." So did the MPD, which "would not say whether the department has opened an investigation of Pemberton, who now chairs the police labor union."

The failed prosecutions and the disciplinary charges against Muyskens are not the only embarrassments stemming from the Inauguration Day march. In 2021, the Post notes, "the D.C. government agreed to pay $1.6 million to settle two lawsuits" by protesters who argued that the police response to the DisruptJ20 march violated their First Amendment rights.

"It speaks volumes that the District has chosen to settle rather than defend MPD's obviously unconstitutional actions in court," Jeffrey Light, one of the protesters' attorneys, said when the settlement was announced. Scott Michelman, legal director at the American Civil Liberties Union of the District of Columbia, added that "MPD's unconstitutional guilt-by-association policing and excessive force, including the use of chemical weapons, not only injured our clients physically but also chilled their speech and the speech of countless others who wished to exercise their First Amendment rights but feared an unwarranted assault by D.C. police."

The bar charges are being defended by Greenberg Traurig attorneys headed by Adam Hoffinger.

The prehearing can only be viewed in real time. (Mike Frisch)

January 29, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Round Numbers

A District of Columbia Hearing Committee has recommended disbarment of an attorney based on findings of a number of ethics violations including misappropriation.

Respondent did not participate in the hearing.

Respondent accepted advance fee payments through Square and PayPal. DCX 8 at 4-9; DCX 14 at 59-86; Tr. 29, 33-35 (Matinpour). When Square and PayPal routed the advance fees to Respondents trust account, they deducted their financial services fees from the transferred funds. Tr. 34 (Matinpour); see, e.g., DCX 14 at 63-67, 70-71, 76). This meant that the amount deposited in Respondents trust account was less than the amount of the advanced fee the client paid. DCX 10 at 207-208, 215-216, 223; Tr. 33-35 (Matinpour).

Respondent did not maintain client ledgers or other records that showed when client funds were deposited into or withdrawn from her trust account or how much money she held in trust for each client at any given time. DCX 14 at 1; Tr. 28-29 (Matinpour).

Respondent routinely wrote checks on her trust account for round-numbered sums to herself and to Nicholas Wilt, her then-husband, who worked as a paralegal in her firm. DCX 18 (bank statements showing majority of checks written in round numbers); DCX 19 (selected specific examples of such checks); Tr. 32 (Matinpour). Respondent did not indicate on the checks, or anywhere else, which clients advanced legal fees were being withdrawn from the trust account. DCX 19; Tr. 32 (Matinpour).

Respondent also used the funds in her trust account to pay for personal and/or business operating expenses. Tr. 29-31 (Matinpour); DCX 18 at 17, 21-22, 29, 35, 39, 42.

On June 22, 2020, Respondent should have been holding at least $7,881.59 in trust for nine clients Eric Birts ($1,792.50), Michael Ceres ($350.77), Rita Collins ($625.00), April Davis ($62.50), Seon French ($2,000.00), Marisa Jennings ($1,000.00), Tabatha McNeill ($26.08), James Scholler ($687.50), and Darrell Shipman ($1,337.24) but the balance in her trust account was $1,347.64. DCX 17 at 1-4, 7-13, 17, 22, 27; DCX 18 at 31; DCX 20 at 1-4, 6-7; Tr. 36-42 (Matinpour).

An overdraft notice brought the attention of Disciplinary Counsel.

Proposed sanction

The law regarding misappropriation is clear and consistent: absent extraordinary circumstances, disbarment is the presumptive sanction for intentional or reckless misappropriation. In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190, 191 (D.C. 1990) (en banc) ( [I]n virtually all cases of misappropriation, disbarment will be the only appropriate sanction unless it appears that the misconduct resulted from nothing more than simple negligence. ); see also In re Hewett, 11 A.3d 279, 286 (D.C. 2011). We discern no extraordinary circumstances or substantial mitigating factors to rebut the presumption of disbarment. And we further recommend that, should Respondent seek reinstatement, she should be required to prove her payment of restitution of $4,000.00 to Ms. Washington and $4,780.97 to the CSF. See FF 30, 42-43. See In re Hager, 812 A.2d 904, 922-23 (D.C. 2002) (disgorgement may be imposed as a reasonable condition of reinstatement under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 3(b) to prevent unjust enrichment).

(Mike Frisch)

January 29, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Arizona Reciprocally Disbars Bankruptcy Attorney

An order removing an attorney from practice in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona drew a reciprocal sanction from the Arizona Presiding Disciplinary Judge

As the Bankruptcy Court found, Ms. Ambs failed to follow numerous rules and regulations applicable in that forum, including 11 U.S.C. § 329 (failing to properly disclose compensation and fee-sharing), 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(2) (making false and misleading statements), 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(1)(B) (failing to accurately and clearly explain fees and charges to debtor clients), and Rule 2016(b) of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (failing to properly disclose fee-sharing agreements with other entities). Ms. Ambs also failed to comply with the court’s order to submit a sworn declaration and supplement prior filings, and she appeared late and virtually for an in-person hearing set to consider her alleged misconduct. Ms. Ambs abandoned clients, failed to explain her failures to comply with the court’s orders, and made material misrepresentations to the court.

In imposing sanctions, the Bankruptcy Court found, in pertinent part:

[T]he undisputed record reflects that Ms. Ambs has engaged in a clear and consistent, year-long pattern and practice of violating the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules intended to protect consumer debtors. When the improper circumstances surrounding her practice were brought to light, Ms. Ambs initially lied to this Court, and Ms. Ambs has since failed and/or refused to participate in these proceedings in any meaningful respect.

The State Bar opened a screening investigation based on the Bankruptcy Court’s order. Ms. Ambs failed to respond to the Bar’s requests for information in that matter and ignored a subpoena served on her, resulting in Order to Show Cause proceedings before the PDJ that she failed to attend. An order of summary suspension issued thereafter.

(Mike Frisch)

January 29, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Default Reciprocal Disbarment Ordered

Reciprocal discipline has been imposed by the Colorado Presiding Disciplinary Judge for an Arizona sanction

The Presiding Disciplinary Judge entered default and imposed reciprocal discipline, disbarring Mark David Goldman (attorney registration number 19301). The disbarment takes effect on March 4, 2025. Goldman is currently serving a three-year period of suspension that took effect on October 4, 2024, and a thirty-day period of suspension that took effect on August 15, 2024.

This reciprocal discipline case arose out of discipline imposed on Goldman by the Arizona Supreme Court’s Presiding Disciplinary Judge, who issued a “Final Judgment and Order” disbarring Goldman on September 4, 2024. Goldman’s discipline in Arizona was premised on his abandonment of multiple clients’ cases, leaving his clients unrepresented, in default, and facing significant sanctions; his knowing violation of multiple court orders that needlessly expanded and interfered with court proceedings; and his previous suspension for similar misconduct.

Through this conduct, Goldman engaged in conduct constituting grounds for reciprocal discipline under C.R.C.P. 242.21, which calls for imposition of the same discipline as that imposed in by Arizona.

(Mike Frisch)

January 29, 2025 in Bar Discipline & Process | Permalink | Comments (0)