California Expert May Be Able To Opine On Wyoming Malpractice

The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of law firm defendants in a legal malpractice case

Victoria Loepp appeals the district court’s summary judgment order that dismissed her legal malpractice claims and all other claims she brought against her former counsel (Appellees). The district court’s summary judgment decision was based on its concurrent order striking her malpractice expert. Because the district court did not fully analyze the proffered expert’s reliability and fitness under W.R.E 702, and because we find no other basis on which to affirm the court’s summary judgment order, we reverse and remand.

Issue

The issue presented is whether an out-of-state expert may provide opinion testimony about the standard of care in legal malpractice actions in Wyoming.

The underlying case involved an inheritance dispute between sisters over their late mother's house

Ms. Loepp hired attorney Ryan Ford of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C. to help. Mr. Ford sent Ms. Scott a demand letter. He also initiated an eviction by serving a Notice to Quit. He ultimately negotiated with Ms. Scott’s attorney to settle the dispute by Ms. Loepp selling the house to Ms. Scott for $90,000. On March 22, 2019, the title company managing the closing of the transaction received the funds from Ms. Scott. The next day, Ms. Loepp notified Mr. Ford that she would not accept the money or settlement terms. Ms. Loepp declined Mr. Ford’s advice to abide by the settlement agreement, and Mr. Ford withdrew from representation.

Scott Murray replaced Mr. Ford as Ms. Loepp’s counsel. He prepared a complaint to file against Ms. Scott for a declaratory judgment and to quiet title. However, before that complaint was filed, Ms. Scott sued Ms. Loepp for breach of contract and related claims, seeking specific performance of the agreement to sell her the house. In April 2020, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of Ms. Scott. The remainder of Ms. Scott’s suit settled when Ms. Loepp agreed to transfer the property to Ms. Scott in exchange for the $90,000.

Loepp pursued the malpractice case pro se and retained a California attorney as her expert.

Mr. Watters based his opinions on his knowledge and experience as a trial attorney, as a practice group leader and managing partner in his firm, as a torts professor, and as a frequent expert witness in fee disputes. To support his assertions that the Appellees misapplied contract law, Mr. Watters included a legal memo which cited Wyoming case law and referenced the Restatement of Contracts.

The district court

After hearing argument on both motions, the district court acknowledged that Mr. Watters brought experience, finding it “nothing short of impressive,” but found Mr. Watters did not speak with any Wyoming attorneys and that his research of legal standard  consisted only of comparing some rules between states. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to strike, concluding there was an insufficient showing that Mr. Watters had knowledge of “what a prudent Wyoming lawyer would have done.” Having stricken Ms. Loepp’s expert, the court then granted summary judgment on all claims. Ms. Loepp timely appealed.

Out of state does not necessarily mean out of luck (and court)

We therefore instruct the court on remand to analyze the reliability of Mr. Watters’s opinion under W.R.E. 702, considering the nature of each of Ms. Loepp’s malpractice claims and whether those claims are so state-specific that Mr. Watters could not assist the trier of fact.

Conclusion

Having determined that W.R.E. 702 governs the admissibility of expert opinion in legal malpractice cases and that where a proffered malpractice expert is licensed or practices is just one factor to consider in the W.R.E. 702 analysis, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on the motion to strike. Because we find no other basis on which to affirm the related summary judgment decision, we also reverse and remand the court’s summary judgment order for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

(Mike Frisch)