Monday, May 13, 2024

But Her Email

A summary of a decision issued today by the New Jersey Appellate Court

This appeal presents a novel issue requiring the court to determine whether the New Jersey Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, or the common law right of public access, mandates disclosure of an attorney's identity when the attorney renders legal advice to a colleague or friend about an ongoing prosecution.  In the present matter, a municipal prosecutor sought counsel from an attorney who, in turn, rendered advice via email to the prosecutor's personal account.  The prosecutor, in turn, disclosed the contents of the email in open court and provided a printed copy of the email to the defense, but redacted the sender's name and email address.  The municipality thereafter denied a government records request for the unredacted email.

 Plaintiff Association for Governmental Responsibility, Ethics, and Transparency (AGREAT) appeals from the March 3, 2023 Law Division order denying its order to show cause to compel production of the email requested from defendants Borough of Mantoloking, its clerk, and its custodian of records.  The motion judge concluded the email did not fall within OPRA's definition of a government record.  The court affirms the order under review and further holds the email is not subject to disclosure under the common law.  The court also concludes, even if the email were a government record, the work product privilege and confidentiality exemptions under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b) weigh against disclosure.

Smith, J.A.D., filed a dissenting opinion, concluding:  the redacted email was a public record under OPRA; the redacted email was privileged pursuant to the work-product privilege, but an attorney waived that privilege in court; a balancing of the public's access to government records with the email sender's reasonable expectation of privacy under Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (1995), justifies disclosure of the name and email address of the sender.


This appeal has its genesis in a quasi-criminal municipal court action against Donald F. Burke, Sr., counsel for AGREAT in the present matter. To give context to the issues raised on appeal, we summarize the nature of those proceedings from our prior decision reversing the Law Division's interlocutory discovery order and remanding the matter to the municipal court. See State v. Burke, No. A-0503-22 (App. Div. July 19, 2023) (slip op. at 1-19).

In October 2020, Jakob Weingroff filed a citizen's complaint in Mantoloking Municipal Court alleging Burke had committed various traffic infractions during their verbal altercation the prior month. Id. at 2. The complainant and defendant were not strangers; the bad blood between them emanated from "an ongoing property dispute" involving the men and their family members. Ibid.

At the time of the incident, Weingroff had resigned from his employment as a New Jersey State Police (NJSP) trooper. Id. at 3 n.1. Previously charged criminally with fourth-degree falsifying or tampering with records, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4, and administratively with misconduct regarding the same unspecified incident, Weingroff was admitted into the pretrial intervention (PTI) program in 2018, and voluntarily forfeited his employment with the NJSP. Ibid.

Elizabeth Leahey was appointed as prosecutor due to the conflict.

...the potential for harm regarding further nonconsensual disclosures is substantial. In our view, compelling disclosure of the name and email address of attorneys who render advice to one another has the potential for a chilling effect on the collegiate relationship among attorneys and their private communications concerning their shared legal advice (factor three). Additionally, although defendants did not articulate specific injury that would result to the relationship between Leahey and the sender if his name and address were disclosed – and defendants bear the burden of proof – it is clear from Leahey's certification that the sender was a colleague and friend, whose name and address she redacted before providing the November 17 email to Burke (factor five). Finally, because Leahey redacted the sender's name and address, there exists no other means to provide the requested record without disclosing personal information (factor six).


We are cognizant that the circumstances presented in this appeal are unique – an OPRA request limited to the name and email address of an attorney by the attorney for the requestor, who also is the defendant in the underlying quasi-criminal action and who perceives the contents of the disclosed communication as a threat to quell his interrogation of a witness in that matter. We take no position on AGREAT's contention that the November 17 was threatening in nature or – as our dissent colleague suggests – that the municipal prosecutor was improperly influenced by her colleague's advice. We simply conclude the disclosure under OPRA or the common law right of access should not be used as a sword to access shielded information.

SMITH, J.A.D., dissenting.

I submit that the public has a right to know if, and when, the prosecution of one of our citizens has been improperly influenced. Based on this principle, I respectfully disagree with the majority. I would find that the disputed email sent to the municipal prosecutor is a government record under OPRA and would not reach the common law right of access analysis. I would also hold, on these unique facts, that while the email's sender has a reasonable expectation of privacy, a Doe analysis warrants disclosure of the full, unredacted email, including the name and email address of the sender.

(Mike Frisch)

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