Motion To Disqualify Denied

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Judge Nichols) has denied a motion to disqualify counsel (and for injunctive relief) to a party in an employment dispute in which the party (Shrensky) claimed wrongful discharge from the company "he helped found a half a century ago"

A final issue remains: Shrensky’s motion to disqualify. “A motion to disqualify counsel is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Ambush v. Engelberg, 282 F. Supp. 3d 58, 61 (D.D.C. 2017) (citation omitted). Disqualification of an attorney “is highly disfavored,” and any motion to disqualify “is therefore examined with a skeptical eye.” United States v. Crowder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 135, 141 (D.D.C. 2018). That is because disqualification “negates a client’s right to freely choose his counsel” and can be sought “to advance purely tactical purposes.” Ambush, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 62 (citations omitted).

Shrensky’s motion to disqualify Connie Bertram and Bertram LLC is based on his theory that Bertram and her firm are or were simultaneously representing Fort Meyer and some of the company’s “directors, officers, employees, members, [and] shareholders”—specifically, Rodriguez and his daughter. Mot. to Disqualify at 6 (citation omitted). But Fort Myer has persuasively represented that neither Bertram nor her firm have engaged in any such concurrent representation. Mem. in Opp. to Mot. to Disqualify at 2–3, 5–6, ECF 10. Rather, “Bertram LLP ceased representing Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Rodrigues before being retained by [Fort Myer]” and “[n]either Ms. Bertram nor Bertram LLP represent either Mr. Rodriguez or Ms. Rodrigues in connection with this litigation.” Id. at 6. Shrensky has not adduced any evidence that convinces the Court otherwise.

In any event, Shrensky is not impacted by any potential conflict of interest. He was never a client of Bertram or Bertram LLC, so neither would have any information obtained from him via an attorney-client relationship that could harm him in this litigation. Thus, any concurrent representation would risk harm only to the company or Rodriguez and his daughter. It is not Shrensky’s place to step in and assert their rights. See Colyer v. Smith, 50 F. Supp 2d 966, 968 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Regardless, the Court perceives no “serious question as to counsel’s ability to act as a zealous and effective advocate for the client, nor a substantial possibility of an unfair advantage to the current client because of [a] prior representation of the opposing party.” Koller v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted), vacated on other grounds, 472 U.S. 424 (1985). Thus, Shrensky’s concerns do not justify disqualification.

(Mike Frisch)