Friday, December 1, 2023
Disclosure issues in a Colorado bar application drew a censure from the Kansas Supreme Court
The Hearing Panel findings of misconduct were far more extensive than found by the court, as the panel had found that
The respondent violated KRPC 7.1 when she published a website containing materially false information, including masses of information copied from the Roth Davies website (leading searchers to land on her website when actually searching for Roth Davies), her bar association memberships, her alleged Martindale-Hubbell A/V rating, and her alleged experience, particularly in motorcycle and wrongful death cases. This was exacerbated when, having removed the website upon receipt of the complaint in this matter, she put the offending website back up within a few months thereafter. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 7.1(a).
Colorado bar application
In the present case, respondent intentionally failed to include her employment with the Boys and Girls Club, as well as her employment with Crystal Specialties and Colorado State University-Pueblo in her application for admission to the Kansas bar.
Additionally, respondent failed to disclose a number of matters, and misstated a number of facts to the Colorado bar authorities in her several applications to that bar...
We conclude that our court has subject-matter jurisdiction to discipline Morton for conduct related to her 2019 Colorado bar application and that Morton inadequately briefed her due-process challenges. But we agree with Morton that the facts and law do not support many violations the panel found. We also agree with her that the discipline recommended by the Disciplinary Administrator (disbarment) and the hearing panel (indefinite suspension) is too severe. Giving due consideration to the violations supported by clear and convincing evidence, Morton's state of mind, the injury she caused, and the applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we conclude that the appropriate discipline is a censure to be published in the Kansas Reports.
we have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider whether Morton's out-of-state conduct— including statements and omissions in her Colorado bar application—violated Kansas' professional-conduct rules.
The court rejected a host of asserted due process violations.
As to the website
Clear and convincing evidence does not support the panel's finding that the use of the Martindale-Hubbell A/V Preeminent was an "intentional misrepresentation." There is no dispute that Morton had not received that rating. But the record shows only that the logo was on the website for some time until a complaint was filed, that Morton promptly removed it, and that she did not republish it on her July 2021 website. The Disciplinary Administrator argues that we should infer that Morton knowingly violated the rule simply because she controlled the contents of her website. But we cannot agree. No evidence suggests that Morton's use of the logo was intentional, as the panel found, rather than inadvertent or negligent. And the Disciplinary Administrator has not argued that lawyers are strictly liable for a KRPC 7.1 violation or that a lawyer may violate the rule by way of ordinary negligence. We therefore reject the panel's conclusion.
Nor do we agree that Morton's use of the Roth Davies material violated KRPC 7.1. That rule prohibits a lawyer only from making "a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services." (Emphasis added.) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 423). But Morton's inclusion of the Roth Davies material—whether inadvertent or intentional—was not a communication about Morton or her services. Instead, it consisted of summaries of Kansas and federal caselaw, a question-and-answer section about Kansas domestic-violence law, and an explanation of the criminal-trial process. Perhaps Morton's use of the materials violates a different rule of professional conduct (a possibility we address, in part, below), but KRPC 7.1 is simply inapplicable under these facts. We therefore conclude that the November 2020 version of Morton's website fails to support any KRPC 7.1 violations.
Bar application disclosures
The panel concluded that Morton had violated that rule when she (1) "intentionally failed to include her employment with the Boys and Girls Club, as well as her employment with Crystal Specialties and Colorado State University-Pueblo" in her Kansas bar application; (2) stated in "her several applications" to the Colorado bar that she had "voluntarily quit her employment with Boys & Girls Club" and "had not been a member of any bar associations"; and (3) had failed to disclose this disciplinary case to the Colorado attorney-admissions authorities. We address these violations in order, noting that neither the panel nor the parties have addressed how each alleged violation fits into each subsection of KRPC 8.1.
First, we mostly agree with the panel's conclusion about Morton's failure to disclose prior employment on her Kansas bar application. Question 22 of the Kansas bar application required Morton to disclose 10 years of employment history. Morton filed her application in March 2016, meaning that she needed to disclose all employment dating back to March 2006. Morton was an employee of the Boys & Girls Club in late 2007, so she needed to disclose that employment. That omission was material because Morton's supervisor testified that she was fired for misconduct, and "employment misconduct" is one of the factors considered when establishing character and fitness qualification for the Kansas bar. Supreme Court Rule 712(d)(3) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 574). And because Morton had listed her Boys & Girls Club employment on her earlier Colorado bar applications, it is reasonable to infer that she intentionally omitted it from her Kansas application. Even so, we disagree that there is evidence in the record suggesting that Morton's failure to disclose her employment with Crystal Specialties or Colorado State University-Pueblo was material, so those omissions do not support the violation.
While some of these alleged non-disclosures were not material
we agree with the panel that Morton violated KRPC 8.1 by failing to disclose her Kansas disciplinary complaint to the Colorado attorney-admissions authorities while her 2019 Colorado bar application was pending. That application asked if the applicant was the subject of any complaints or disciplinary or grievance actions. Morton answered no, which was accurate when she submitted the application in June 2019. But when she submitted the application, Morton acknowledged that she had a continuing obligation to timely update the information on the application until she was admitted to practice in Colorado. And she acknowledged that an amendment was considered timely when made "no later than 10 days after any occurrence that would change, or render incomplete, any answer on" her application. As a result, when Morton learned of the pending Kansas complaint against her in February 2021, she needed to timely update her Colorado bar application, which was still pending. Her failure to do so was a material omission.
We agree with the panel that clear and convincing evidence supports a KRPC 8.4 violation for Morton's statement that she "voluntarily" quit her employment with the Boys & Girls Club. Her supervisor's testimony clearly and convincingly supports the panel's finding that Morton was fired for misconduct. Morton's statement involves a material misrepresentation and adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law. We also agree that clear and convincing evidence supports a KRPC 8.4 violation for Morton's failure to disclose her Kansas disciplinary complaint to Colorado attorney-admissions authorities while her Colorado bar application remained pending. The record shows that Morton acknowledged that she had a continuing obligation to update the information on the application until she was admitted to practice in Colorado. Her failure to disclose the complaint is a material misrepresentation or deceitful, and it adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law.
But we have not yet discussed Morton's use of the Roth Davies material because we concluded that such content did not represent a communication about Morton or her services under KRPC 7.1. KRPC 8.4 contains no such limitation, so we agree with the panel that it may sometimes apply when a lawyer misappropriates materials for a professional website. But the record before us contains no evidence showing that Morton's use of the Roth Davies material was anything more than inadvertent or negligent. Thus, we "discern mistake rather than malevolence," and cannot agree that clear and convincing evidence establishes that Morton engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation under KRPC 8.4(c) or that adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law under KRPC 8.4(g). In re Pyle, 283 Kan. at 827
Having rejected most of the violations found below, the court imposed a published censure. (Mike Frisch)