Tuesday, February 1, 2022
State Of The Union (Counsel)
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of a legal malpractice case on the grounds that no attorney-client relationship existed
The defendants, Dwyer & Duddy, P.C., and attorney Christina C. Duddy (collectively, union counsel), are legal counsel to the Boston Teachers Union (union). The plaintiff (grievant) was a tenured teacher and a member of the bargaining unit. Union counsel and the union followed a discrete protocol governing the filing of arbitration demands when the union agreed to take a case of a teacher termination2 to either contractual or statutory arbitration. See the Education Reform Act (ERA or act), G. L. c. 71, § 42. Union counsel was authorized to demand arbitration only when directed to do so by the union leadership, in writing.
Grievant was terminated after an untimely demand was made.
As to the merits of the prohibited practice charge, the hearing officer ruled that the grievant would have been successful in reversing her dismissal and would have been reinstated, but for the untimely filed arbitration demand. The hearing officer imputed to the union the conduct of union counsel as agents of the union. The hearing officer found that "no attorney-client relationship exists between the [union counsel] handling an arbitration and the grievant." The department ordered the union to make the grievant whole, but restricted the remedy to wages and contractual benefits lost between her September 25, 2014 termination and March 16, 2015. This restriction was based on the factual finding that the grievant would not have returned to work. No appeal was filed from the hearing officer's decision.
The grievant filed suit in the Superior Court alleging legal malpractice against union counsel due to the untimely filing of the arbitration demand. Union counsel moved for summary judgment, contending that they never had an attorney-client relationship with the grievant, and, alternatively, that the grievant was unable to establish recoverable damages due to the award issued by the department. After a hearing, a Superior Court judge allowed the motion, concluding that no attorney-client relationship existed; judgment entered in favor of union counsel. This appeal followed.
To no avail
Because the grievant's claims against union counsel are for actions they took as agents of the union, summary judgment was properly granted to union counsel. The grievant's exclusive remedy for a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union or its agents was the filing of prohibited practice charges with the department.