Wednesday, September 16, 2020
The New York Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department affirmed the grant of summary judgment to a law firm sued for a referral fee
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover attorneys’ fees from the defendant law firm for a client referral made by the plaintiff’s decedent, George Moss, who was an attorney. The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied the plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment on the complaint. Thereafter, the court entered a judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff appeals.
The defendant established its prima face entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that there was no written agreement between George Moss and the defendant to share fees in the underlying medical malpractice case. Furthermore, even assuming that there was a fee-sharing agreement in place, an attorney who seeks a share of the fee pursuant to such an agreement must have contributed some work, labor, or service toward the earning of the fee (see Benjamin v Koeppel, 85 NY2d 549, 556; Krug v Offerman, Fallon, Mahoney &Cassano, 214 AD2d 889; Grasso v Kubis, 198 AD2d 811). Here, the record establishes that George Moss’s role was merely that of a finder, who referred the plaintiff in the underlying action to the defendant. In order to be entitled to a portion of the fee, more is required of the forwarding attorney than the mere recommendation of a lawyer (see Nicholson v Nason & Cohen, P.C., 192 AD2d 473). The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition.