Friday, November 15, 2019
The Kansas Supreme Court remanded a case that involved an employer's potential liability for conduct committed by an attorney-employee in his (prohibited) private practice
The Trust Company of Kansas (TCK) employed Jon M. King, a Kansas-licensed attorney, as a trust officer. TCK had a policy prohibiting employees from practicing law during employment. Unbeknownst to TCK, King represented his TCK client—Marilyn K. Parsons—in legal matters before, during, and after his employment with TCK. In his capacity as a trust officer, King would transfer funds from Parsons' TCK account to her personal account to pay a flat rate legal fee of $5,000 per month. Once TCK learned about King's attorney-client relationship with Parsons, TCK filed a complaint of suspected elder abuse with the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services and an ethics complaint with the Kansas Disciplinary Administrator's Office.
Further investigation by the Kansas Disciplinary Administrator's Office revealed that Parsons paid King approximately $250,271.50 in attorney fees during his employment at TCK. As a result, King voluntarily surrendered his license to practice law. See In re King, 297 Kan. 208, 300 P.3d 643 (2013). Soon after, Parsons filed a lawsuit against TCK and King, asserting various theories of liability. The case went to trial, and a jury found TCK liable for "negligent training" and King liable for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court of Appeals reversed the jury's verdict against TCK, finding the evidence insufficient. Accordingly, the panel remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of TCK.
On review, we conclude the district court's instructions failed to present the jury with an accurate statement of our negligence law and incorrectly separated Parsons' negligence claim against TCK into two causes of action. As a result of these errors, questions of fact remain. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this matter for a new trial decided on proper instructions.
The end is in the middle
We take the unusual step of beginning with our conclusion. In short, we agree with both parties. The trial court's jury instructions on Parsons' negligence claim were erroneous. And as a direct result of this error, the Court of Appeals erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of TCK. The instructions and verdict form in this case were so erroneous that an after-the-fact evaluation of the evidence is not possible. The jury instructions did not adequately or accurately explain the elements of Parsons' negligence claim. This prevented the jury from ever being able to consider whether Parsons had sufficiently proven each of the elements of the claim. Given this failure, any review of the evidence for sufficiency became futile and the case must now be returned to the district court for a new trial on proper instructions.
Oral argument linked here. (Mike Frisch)