Won An Election, Lost A Job And A Claim

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a complaint brought by a former assistant county attorney who was terminated from longtime service after a successful run for public office

David Bobzien (“Bobzien”), the County Attorney for Fairfax County, Virginia, terminated the employment of Nancy Loftus (“Loftus”), an assistant county attorney, following her election to the Fairfax City, Virginia, City Council (the “City Council”). After an unsuccessful grievance proceeding, Loftus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, challenging Bobzien’s decision to terminate her employment “solely because she had been elected to the City Council.” J.A. 4. Loftus contended Bobzien’s actions violated her rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as a Virginia statute and Fairfax County ordinance. The district court dismissed Loftus’ complaint, concluding the termination of her employment did not violate the First Amendment, Virginia law or the local ordinance. For the reasons set out below, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

Bobzian raised ethical concerns during the candidacy, citing Virginia bar ethics opinions

In response to Bobzien’s concerns, Loftus contacted the “Ethics Hotline” of the office of the Virginia State Bar’s Ethics Counsel (“Ethics Counsel”). She inquired: “is it unethical for me to be an [a]ssistant [c]ounty [a]ttorney for Fairfax County and also serve on the Fairfax City Council?” J.A. 57. Answering by letter, Ethics Counsel stated that the “short answer” is “it is not per se unethical for a lawyer to be employed in a law firm or government attorney’s office and concurrently hold a public position or office.” J.A. 57. Ethics Counsel then qualified his abstract answer by cautioning “lawyers that serve on public bodies will create conflicts of interest if the law firm in which the public official practices also interacts with the public body on which one of its lawyers sits.”

Loftus was placed on administrative leave and later terminated, leading to the suit

...Loftus’ claim must fail. Although Loftus contends her termination was in violation of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has made clear that public employers may permissibly bar their employees from participating in a wide array of political activities, including running for elective office. If a public employee can be prohibited from running for office, it follows all the more strongly that she also can be barred from holding elective office while remaining a public employee. In large part, the constitutional questions raised by this case are resolved by Clements. If the resign-to-run and automatic resignation provisions of the Texas Constitution -- which stripped certain public employees of their office upon declaring their candidacy for the state’s legislature -- pass muster under the First Amendment, surely the termination of Loftus’ employment only after her election to the City Council survives First Amendment scrutiny.

...The record reflects multiple potential points of conflict that could face Loftus as a member of the City Council and an attorney in the Fairfax County Attorney’s Office. As the LEOs from the Standing Committee illustrate, it is not simply Loftus’ status as a public employee that creates a problem, but particularly her status as a lawyer for a public “law firm.” That role appears to create non-waivable conflicts of interest not simply limiting Loftus under her ethical duties as a lawyer, but imposing significant burdens on her public employer.

Moreover, Loftus is unable to point to any appellate authority to suggest that, all else being equal, her employment by a different municipality should be a dispositive factor in our analysis. In fact, she can muster only two district court cases to support her position, both of which are factually inapposite and of no precedential value. See Segars v. Fulton Cty., 644 F. Supp. 682 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Hickman v. City of Dallas, 475 F. Supp. 137 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Neither case involves an attorney representing one municipality while also running for office in another municipality to which her client potentially will be adverse in the future.

The court rejected other claims raised by the plaintiff. She had worked as an assistant county attorney since 1997.

The Washington Post reported on the firing. (Mike Frisch)