Legal Profession Blog

Broad Order Limiting Use of Discovered Information Vacated

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a district court order limiting use by counsel of information and documents obtained in discovery of a class action.

Counsel

Appellant Columbia Legal Services (“Columbia”) represented farmworkers in a now-settled class action against Stemilt AG Services, LLC (“Stemilt”). Columbia now appeals in its own name to challenge a broad protective order entered by the district court.

The district court

The district court wrote with some understatement, “Discovery in this case ha[s] proven quite litigious, with the parties unable or unwilling to resolve disputes independently and without judicial intervention.”

Protective order vacated

Here, the district court entered a broad and undifferentiated order prohibiting Columbia from using any information and documents obtained in discovery in this case without prior approval from the district court. The order included only a brief explanation and no finding of good cause to support this prohibition. The district court did not identify any prejudice or particularized harm that would result from Columbia’s use of or public access to particular documents or information, and it did not balance the relevant interests against any potential harm. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in thus restricting Columbia’s use of information and documents obtained in this litigation.

Conclusion

We vacate the portion of the district court’s order requiring Columbia to seek court leave before using in other advocacy information obtained in discovery in the class action. We remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

(Mike Frisch)

Bronx Cheer

A press release of the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct describes a recent censure of a Bronx County judge

The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct has determined that Naita A. Semaj, a Justice of the Supreme Court, 12th Judicial District (Bronx County), should be censured for repeated poor demeanor on the bench, particularly toward assistant district attorneys (ADAs).

Judge Semaj agreed to the censure.

Between March 2022 and April 2023, Judge Semaj unjustifiably ejected three ADAs from her courtroom, yelled at ADAs who appeared before her, made sarcastic comments about them, and inappropriately commented on the pregnancy of one of them. In its determination the Commission stated that Judge Semaj, who despite being counseled by an administrative judge, “continued to be impatient and discourteous toward assistant district attorneys who appeared before her which created at least the appearance of bias against them.” In accepting the jointly recommended sanction of censure, the Commission noted that the judge “acknowledged that her conduct was improper and warrants public discipline.” Judge Semaj has been a Justice of the Supreme Court, 12th Judicial District, since 2022, having previously served as a Judge of the New York City Civil Court, Bronx County, from 2019 to 2021. Her current term expires on December 31, 2035.

(Mike Frisch)

Instagram Communication Violated Confidentiality Obligation

The Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility has publicly censured an attorney

On July 9, 2025, Michael James Thompson, #028041, an attorney licensed to practice law in Tennessee and Kentucky, received a Public Censure from the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Tennessee Supreme Court.

Mr. Thompson represented a client in a custody proceeding in Kentucky state court. Mr. Thompson exchanged sexualized communications with his client during the representation, evidencing a concurrent conflict of interest. Mr. Thompson also communicated with his client about the subject matter of the custody proceeding through Instagram messaging without any privacy controls.

By these acts, Mr. Thompson has violated Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6 (protecting confidential information) and 1.7(a)(2)(concurrent conflict of interest) and is hereby Publicly Censured these violations.

A Public Censure is a rebuke and warning to the attorney, but it does not affect the attorney’s ability to practice law.

(Mike Frisch)

Admonition Of Fictitious Authority

The growing body of AI misuse case law has been added to by the Idaho Supreme Court

Petitioner Verlanic is advised that in accordance with ldaho Appellate Rule 11.2, he is responsible for the validity and accuracy of all legal citations in documents submitted to the Court. Petitioner Verlanic cited "Ybarra v. Nevada Workers' Compensation Board 129 ldaho 740 1997,' "ln Re: Marriage of Hall 134 ldaho 789 2000," and "Brown v ldaho Transportation Department 140 ldaho 629 2005', in his Petition for writ of Mandamus. These cases do not appear to exist. Citing nonexistent case law in documents submitted to this Court or any other court can result in sanctions.

The order is styled as an Admonition of Fictitious Authority. (Mike Frisch)

Suspension Proposed For California Bar Former Executive Director

The California State Bar Court Review Department has recommended a 30-day suspension of the Bar's former Executive Director

This case stems from misconduct allegations against Joseph Lawrence Dunn while he served as Executive Director of the State Bar of California (State Bar) between 2010 and 2014. Dunn was charged with three counts of misconduct involving moral turpitude in violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106 based on alleged misrepresentations he made to the State Bar Board of Trustees (Board). Prior to the disciplinary trial, Dunn moved to dismiss this proceeding arguing that it was time barred pursuant to rule 5.21 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. The hearing judge granted Dunn's motion in part, dismissing count one and certain related allegations in count three. The State Bar' filed a petition for interlocutory review of the judge’s order, which we denied, finding no error of law or abuse of discretion. After trial in the Hearing Department, the judge found Dunn culpable of two counts of moral turpitude. She determined that Dunn made a misrepresentation to the Board regarding the funding of a trip to Mongolia in January 2014, and thus, breached his fiduciary duties to the Board as Executive Director. She found four mitigating circumstances and no aggravation and recommended a one year stayed suspension.

Both Dunn and the State Bar appeal. Dunn seeks a dismissal of all charges and raises a due process challenge. The State Bar argues the dismissed counts should be reinstated, requests us to affirm the hearing judge’s culpability findings, and seeks a 60-day actual suspension.

Upon independent review of the record (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.12), we affirm the hearing judge’s findings of culpability, aggravation, and mitigation. However, we determine that a 30-day actual suspension is the appropriate discipline in this matter.

Travel to Mongolia 

From January 24 through 29, 2014, Dunn traveled to Mongolia, and he was accompanied by then State Bar employee Tom Layton and former State Bar President Howard Miller, who was working as an attorney with the law firm, Girardi & Keese. Justin Ewert, Finance Director of the State Bar, was employed in 2014 as a budget analyst for the State Bar, and he testified at the disciplinary trial about the use of State Bar funds for the trip. He identified airfare and cell phone usage charges for Dunn and Layton totaling $6,041.72 that were billed to and paid by the State Bar. On March 4, 2014, Dunn submitted a reimbursement request for $1,114.37, which he testified was for cell phone charges incurred on his personal line while traveling. Peggy Van Horne, Chief Financial Officer of the State Bar, approved the request. The State Bar issued Dunn a check for the requested amount on March 11, which he deposited on March 14.

In April 2014, the State Bar received a $5,000 check from the Girardi & Keese law firm, dated March 20, 2014, that was sent by Miller; the check was made payable to the State Bar Access & Education Foundation. According to Dunn, the purpose of the check was to cover the State Bar’s expenses related to the Mongolia trip. Miller testified during Dunn’s employment arbitration that the $5,000 check was “intended to cover all costs, all out-of-pocket State Bar travel costs to Mongolia . . . past or future.” However, during the disciplinary trial, Ewert testified that the $5,000 did not reimburse the State Bar for the Mongolia trip expenses.

Finding 

the hearing judge found that Dunn’s denials lacked credibility, especially given his prior inconsistent statements. During the arbitration hearing, Dunn testified that he knew he would use State Bar funds prior to going to Mongolia, and he made a presentation to the Board in November 2013, informing the Board that the State Bar would pay coach airfare, but that Miller had proposed raising funds for the trip and would reimburse the State Bar. He also testified differently in a September 2016 arbitration deposition where he said that he told Rodriguez that State Bar funds would be used to cover the cost of the Mongolia trip, but he did not inform the Board of this, because “it would not have been standard for me in describing a potential expenditure.” We agree that Dunn’s shifting and inconsistent testimony damages his credibility, and we see no reason to otherwise disturb the judge’s credibility determination. (See McKnight v. State Bar, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1032.) Accordingly, we credit the testimonies of Colantuono, Mangers, and Krinsky over Dunn.

Misleading Board

Finally, that Dunn requested and received reimbursement from the State Bar for his cell phone expenses while in Mongolia yet failed to then clarify his prior statements to the Board regarding the lack of State Bar funds being used for travel further demonstrates concealment. (See Zitny v. State Bar, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 792.) In sum, we conclude that Dunn intentionally misled the Board in violation of section 6106.

Sanction

One of the most fundamental rules for attorneys is honesty. (Tomlinson v. State Bar (1975) 13 Cal.3d 567, 577.) We consider the absence of aggravation and the substantial mitigation but find a period of actual suspension is warranted here given the serious misconduct that occurred in Dunn’s position as Executive Director of the State Bar. Even in the absence of harm, “dishonest acts are grounds for suspension or disbarment.” (Levin v. State Bar (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1140, 1147.) Accordingly, we find a 30-day actual suspension is necessary to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession.

Hat tip to ABA Journal. (Mike Frisch)

Rehabilitation Establishes Fitness To Practice

The Ohio Supreme Court has issued an opinion allowing an applicant to sit for the bar examination.

The applicant's criminal history

Notestine testified that she started using marijuana in high school to self-medicate debilitating migraines that sometimes resulted in hospitalization. She explained that the medications prescribed to her were ineffective and that marijuana was the one thing that relieved her pain. While she currently holds a medical marijuana card, the drug was not approved for medical use when she started using it. She stated that in order to obtain the drug, she was “going to places where other things [were] being sold” and exposing herself to people and experiences that lowered her moral compass.

Notestine was first convicted of marijuana possession, a minor misdemeanor, in July 2004, when she was 20 years old. She testified that, unbeknownst to her, a friend who was riding in her car lit a marijuana cigarette. The police pulled Notestine over, searched the vehicle, and ticketed her after finding her own unsmoked marijuana cigarette. Notestine stated that she considered the offense to be like receiving a traffic ticket; she paid the fine but did not take it seriously or change her behavior.

Notestine testified that while she was using marijuana illegally, she spent time around drug dealers and that after seeing them sell “bad drugs,” including heroin, to other people, she thought selling drugs would not be hard to do. She stated that she purchased less than a gram of heroin with the intent to sell it. Approximately one week later, two of her associates suggested that they go out to eat. As she drove into the restaurant parking lot, her vehicle was rushed by law enforcement officers. The officers found the heroin on Notestine’s person and arrested her.

Notestine testified that she never sold any of the heroin she purchased but that she had taken it with her that day with the intent to sell it. In August 2005, she pleaded no contest in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas to a fifthdegree felony count of heroin possession. The court sentenced her to two years of community control, suspended her driver’s license, and ordered her to submit to random drug testing for six months. With her NCBE questionnaire, Notestine submitted a copy of an August 28, 2007 entry of the common pleas court terminating her community control and closing the case.

In July 2006, after finishing the drug-testing portion of her sentence, Notestine decided to smoke marijuana again. Hours later, federal agents came to her home to investigate a conspiracy case involving the two associates with whom Notestine had previously been arrested. Agents found the marijuana, which resulted in a second minor-misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana.

In October 2006, an indictment was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, naming Notestine and eight others who were associates in an illegal-drug network—two being those who were with Notestine during her heroin-possession arrest. The indictment alleged that Notestine and her associates had engaged in a conspiracy and racketeering to possess and distribute large quantities of heroin and cocaine and that in furtherance of that conspiracy, her associates possessed numerous firearms and body armor, threatened a witness at gunpoint to prevent his testimony in another case, and participated in robbery and murder.

On May 17, 2007, Notestine pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute, attempt to distribute, and possess with intent to distribute in excess of one kilogram of heroin and an amount of cocaine. In April 2008, she was sentenced to ten years in prison and was ordered to serve six years of supervised release.

Legal education

Notestine testified that she enrolled in an online undergraduate program through Ohio University in 2019, but because of the lack of desired course offerings, she transferred to Sinclair Community College and then to the University of Cincinnati. She worked about 70 hours a week while carrying a full course load and graduated in 2022. Notestine began studying law at the University of Cincinnati College of Law in August 2022. She stated that she continued to run her business, which included two salons, full time during her first year of law school “to ensure that [she] had something to stand on, just because [she] understood it’s very difficult to get a job with [criminal] convictions.”

The opinion details her rehabilitative efforts with one setback

Notestine testified about the one setback she has experienced since being released from prison in 2014—her arrest, guilty plea, and conviction on a single minor-misdemeanor count of disorderly conduct in 2017.

Notestine claimed that her bipolar ex-boyfriend, a retired NFL player—who had previously hit her—drugged her and took her to a club, where the mother of his child and her friends jumped her. Notestine testified that she fought back and was arrested. She believed that the incident was a setup to exact revenge for her breaking up with the ex-boyfriend and that the responding police officer was a party to the setup because the other women knew him and called him “uncle.” Notestine claimed that after the officer arrested her, he gave her ex-boyfriend her keys, purse, and cellphone. And although she found her vehicle a few days later, she never recovered her cellphone or purse.

Favorable recommendation of the Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness

The board found that at the time of her character-and-fitness hearing, Notestine was a 41-year-old woman who “now surrounds herself with really good people who support her, including her family.” The board noted that she has mentors on whom she may rely, and that she has developed healthy habits and ways to deal with stress. It also acknowledged Notestine’s desire to use her experiences to help people who are in bad situations to understand that they can change the trajectory of their lives.

Finding that Notestine has fully accepted responsibility for her conduct and the consequences of her actions, and that sufficient time has elapsed since her criminal convictions, the board concluded that Notestine had proved by clear and convincing evidence that she has the present character, fitness, and moral qualifications for admission to the practice law in Ohio.

The court

Notestine testified candidly about her criminal history and acknowledged the wrongfulness of her conduct. She has reflected on her past decisions, resolved to learn from them, and worked tirelessly to better herself. She obtained her medical-massage license and several certifications from the cosmetology board, and she operated her own business while she earned her undergraduate and law degrees. She has completed a fellowship with the Ohio Innocence Project helping those who may have been wrongfully convicted and has worked for the public defender’s office, where she has not only encouraged her clients to change the course of their lives but has served as a positive example of how it can be done.

Conclusion

Upon consideration of the record and the applicable rules, we find that Notestine has carried her burden of proving that she currently possesses the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications for admission to the practice of law in Ohio.

Accordingly, we approve Notestine’s character, fitness, and moral qualifications for admission to the practice of law in Ohio and permit her to sit for the July 2025 bar exam provided that all other application requirements, including but not limited to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. I(3)(E), have been satisfied.

HAWKINS, J., joined by FISCHER, J., dissenting.

Today this court concludes that Bethany Joy Notestine is morally fit to practice law in Ohio and approves her application to sit for the July 2025 bar examination. Majority opinion, ¶ 37. An applicant for admission to the Ohio bar bears the burden of showing that she possesses the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications for admission. Gov.Bar R. I(13)(D)(1). And when, as here, the applicant’s background includes a felony conviction, she must also show her full and complete rehabilitation. See In re Application of Davis, 38 Ohio St.2d 273, 275 (1974). Because I don’t believe that Notestine has met that burden, I respectfully dissent from this court’s decision to approve her application. I write to explain why I believe the court’s judgment falls short.

The character-and-fitness-review process asks a simple question: Does an applicant to the bar have the “morality, attention to duty, forthrightness and self-restraint . . . associated with the accepted definition of ‘good moral character’ ”? Id. at 274. Though the process is nonadversarial, id., it is not without significance. Admission to the bar is a promise to members of the public—both from this court and from the legal profession—that they can trust the applicant with their affairs. See Clemens, Facing the Klieg Lights: Understanding the “Good Moral Character” Examination for Bar Applicants, 40 Akron L.Rev. 255, 268 (2007). Similarly, admission to the bar makes lawyers officers of the court, and with that privilege comes the duty and responsibility to maintain high ethical standards. Dayton Bar Assn. v. O’Brien, 2004-Ohio-3939, ¶ 13; see also Prof.Cond. R., Preamble [1] (“As an officer of the court, a lawyer not only represents clients but has a special responsibility for the quality of justice.”). These are demanding expectations, and we owe it to the profession—and to the public— to admit only those who meet them.

Whether an applicant meets those high standards of trust turns on her past conduct. And that brings us to Notestine. Notestine was charged with and pleaded guilty to a federal felony drug charge: conspiracy to distribute, attempt to distribute, and possess with the intent to distribute heroin and cocaine. In 2008, the federal court sentenced her to a ten-year prison term for this offense. She was released from prison in January 2014 and remained on supervised release until June 2017. But just six months after her supervised release was terminated, Notestine again appeared in court, this time to plead guilty to disorderly conduct. This bears a resemblance to her conduct after pleading guilty to possession of heroin in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas in 2005. Following that conviction, Notestine was subject to probation and drug testing. Yet, as soon as she had completed her probation and was no longer subject to the court’s testing requirements, she began illegally using marijuana again. In both situations, Notestine violated the law again almost immediately after completing her courtimposed sanctions.

Together these incidents show a pattern that this court shouldn’t overlook. Notestine’s application does not present just a one-time mistake. It’s a story that keeps repeating. To be sure, under this court’s precedent, a felony conviction does not, in itself, prohibit an applicant from showing she has the moral fitness necessary to practice law in Ohio or prevent her from entering the legal profession. See In re Application of Poignon, 2012-Ohio-2915, ¶ 16, citing In re Application of Keita, 1995-Ohio-33, ¶ 7, citing In re Application of Davis, 38 Ohio St.2d at 275. But the problem isn’t only Notestine’s convictions—it’s what she kept doing afterwards. She finished her sentence and then promptly broke the law again. Indeed, in the case of the disorderly-conduct conviction, Notestine acquired a new misdemeanor conviction less than a year after her release from federal supervision. The record reveals a pattern: a failure of self-restraint, a disregard for the law, and a troubling absence of integrity—the kind that the public must be able to expect from members of the bar. This leaves me with one conclusion: Notestine lacks the moral character the law demands, and we should not approve her application.

Our profession does not demand perfection, but it does require integrity. When we approve an applicant as morally fit to join the profession, we give the public our word that the applicant can be trusted to follow the law. Because I cannot extend that promise in good conscience here, I respectfully dissent.

Applicant's journey was chronicled in a story in the University of Cincinnati News. (Mike Frisch)

Sanction Disagreement In Ohio

Dan Trevas summarizes a bar discipline matter decided today by the Ohio Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of Ohio today suspended a Pickerington attorney for two years, with six months stayed, for taking money from three clients, not performing work, lying to a judge, and masquerading as an assistant to relay false information to his clients.

A Supreme Court majority suspended Jeffrey D. Hunter and required him to pay $15,000 in restitution to two former clients. He must also undergo an assessment by the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (OLAP) and comply with any treatment and counseling recommendations stemming from the evaluation.

Justices R. Patrick DeWine, Joseph T. Deters, Daniel R. Hawkins, and Megan E. Shanahan joined the per curiam opinion.

In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy noted the Court has consistently held that accepting payments from clients and not performing that work is tantamount to theft, and the appropriate sanction for such conduct is disbarment. She disagreed with the majority’s finding that Hunter cooperated with the disciplinary proceedings and ultimately would have permanently disbarred him.

Justice Patrick F. Fischer stated he concurred with most of Chief Justice Kennedy’s opinion, but found that Hunter should be indefinitely suspended.

Justice Jennifer Brunner did not participate in the case.

Lawyer Misses Court Appearances, Lies to Judge
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a complaint against Hunter with the Board of Professional Conduct based on Hunter’s handling of three criminal clients between November 2020 and March 2024. This included his 2023 representation of Miles Gibson, who in two separate cases was charged with aggravated murder, murder, and other felonies, his 2020 agreement with Kerry Hanawalt to represent her incarcerated brother in a futile attempt to shorten his sentence, and his representation of Derek Shaffer in his postconviction appeal.

Gibson’s mother, Lillian Lancaster, paid Hunter a $12,500 flat fee in June 2023 to represent her son. Hunter notified the trial court that he was representing Gibson. But Hunter did not appear at Gibson’s first hearing , scheduled for July 10, or for a rescheduled first hearing on Aug 22. Because Hunter was not in court, the trial judge ordered Hunter to appear at a September “show-cause” hearing to explain his absence. The day after he missed the Aug 22 hearing, Hunter appeared in court and told the judge he missed the scheduled hearing because he was out of town at his mother-in-law’s funeral.

The trial court scheduled Gibson’s next hearing for October. The court told him he would need to provide proof of his travel or funeral attendance at the show-cause hearing. Hunter did not appear at the hearing. Hunter later claimed he was at the show-cause hearing, but the judge was not. The court rescheduled the hearing and sent Hunter a letter stating his attendance was mandatory. In the meantime, Hunter failed to appear at another hearing on behalf of his client, Gibson.

At the show-cause hearing, the judge confronted Hunter about missing the court dates and conferring with his client. Hunter alleged he met with Gibson during the week of the hearing he missed. The judge confronted Hunter with evidence that Hunter had not met with Gibson since he visited him in jail on July 10.

The trial court gave Hunter until October to provide evidence that he had met with Gibson, but Hunter did not offer proof that the two met. Hunter also changed his story about why he missed the Aug. 22 hearing, asserting he was at the funeral of a friend, not his mother-in-law.. When asked to provide proof of his attendance, Hunter could provide nothing more than a photo of his wife’s luggage tag for a flight on Aug. 21, the day before the court hearing.

The judge disqualified Hunter from Gibson’s case and filed a grievance against Hunter with the disciplinary counsel. Two weeks later, in November 2023, Lancaster, Gibson’s mother, learned the court had removed Hunter. He told Lancaster he would file a motion to be reinstated, but he did not. He also never told Gibson that he was no longer his lawyer. Lancaster sought a refund of her $12,500 from Hunter. He had not refunded the fee at the time of his disciplinary hearing.

Hunter and the disciplinary counsel stipulated that Hunter violated seven professional conduct rules while representing Gibson, including knowingly making a false statement to a court and requiring a lawyer to promptly refund any unearned fees.

Hunter Masquerades as a Paralegal to Relay False Information to Clients
In two other cases, Hunter acknowledged he committed 12 more instances of misconduct by accepting fees and not completing work on behalf of his clients.

Kerry Hanawalt hired Hunter to seek the early release of her incarcerated brother, James Wills. Hunter charged Hanawalt $2,500 and then inaccurately advised her on when Wills would be eligible for release, and falsely stated that his sentence could be reduced if the victim’s family agreed to the reduction.

While accepting payment from Hanawalt in November 2020, Hunter did not notify the court that he represented Wills or file anything on Wills’ behalf until April 2023. Shortly after hiring him, Hanawalt sent text messages to Hunter seeking updates on the case. Hunter failed to respond to one text and provided Hanawalt with false information in others. She then requested a refund in May 2021.

In response, Hunter met with Hanawalt, and the representation continued. Two months later, in August 2021, Hanawalt received a text message from Hunter’s phone. The message was purportedly sent by a paralegal named “Yolanda Harris.” The message falsely stated that Hunter filed a motion on Wills’ behalf. Hunter later admitted he wrote the message, and the disciplinary counsel found no evidence of a person named Yolanda Harris working for Hunter.

Hunter continued to lie to Hanawalt about the status of her brother’s case. She filed a grievance against him and reiterated a request for a refund. When the disciplinary counsel inquired about the refund, Hunter sent another text to Hanawalt claiming to be “Harris.” The text stated that Hunter attempted to send a refund check a couple of years ago, but it was returned because Hanawalt had not signed it.

In September 2023, he finally provided Hanawalt with a refund.

Hunter used the same “Harris” ruse to respond to the family of a third client, Derek Shaffer, who paid him $2,500 to work on a postconviction appeal. Hunter performed little to no work on the case and did not provide Shaffer’s parents with a requested refund by the time of his disciplinary hearing.

The Board of Professional Conduct found Hunter committed the 19 rule violations. It recommended the Court suspend Hunter for two years, with six months stayed, and require Hunter to pay restitution, undergo the OLAP assessment, and comply with any treatment plans.

Supreme Court Considered Recommended Sanction
When considering the sanction in a disciplinary case, the Court considers aggravating circumstances that could increase the penalty and mitigating factors that could lead to a lesser sanction. Among the aggravating circumstances, the board found Hunter made false statements and acted deceptively during the disciplinary process. As a mitigating circumstance, it found Hunter cooperated in disciplinary hearings.

The Court stated that Hunter’s “long list of lies and deficiencies in communication with his clients” violated several ethical rules.

“His failures to act promptly or seek help from other lawyers while representing Wills, Gibson, and Derek Shaffer reflect a serious lack of the competence and diligence that are cornerstones of the legal profession,” the opinion stated.

The Court majority compared Hunter’s conduct to three other attorneys sanctioned for similar rule violations and concluded a two-year suspension with six months stayed was appropriate. It also ordered Hunter to refund Lancaster $12,500 and Shaffer’s parents $2,500 within 90 days and pay the cost of the disciplinary proceedings.

Lawyer Should Be Disbarred, Chief Justice Maintained
In her separate opinion, Chief Justice Kennedy wrote that for more than 40 years, the Court has found disbarment to be the “normal sanction” for a lawyer who steals client money and neglects client matters.

“Based on this court’s precedent  – and our responsibility to protect the public – the appropriate sanction in this case is permanent disbarment,” she wrote.

The chief justice disagreed with the board’s finding that Hunter cooperated with the disciplinary proceedings. She wrote that the board contradicted itself by finding that Hunter had lied to disciplinary counsel, yet was considered to have cooperated. In cases where attorneys who committed similar misconduct to Hunter were not disbarred, she noted that those lawyers presented many more mitigating circumstances.

2024-1720. Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-2406.

(Mike Frisch)

Misappropriation Sufficient To Impose Disbarment

The New Jersey Supreme Court has disbarred an attorney  based on multiple sanctions imposed elsewhere as described by the Disciplinary Review Board

Effective March 2, 2020, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida permanently suspended respondent from the practice of law in connection with her mishandling of thirty-eight bankruptcy cases underlying this matter, spanning almost a decade, in which she exhibited a pattern of filing cases and then “immediately abandoning them,” without paying the filing fee or submitting the required documents.

Additionally, effective April 11, 2020, the Supreme Court of Florida imposed a “disciplinary revocation” of respondent’s admission to the Florida bar in connection with her knowing misappropriation of entrusted funds underlying this matter. In re Wilson, 2020 Fla. LEXIS 470 (Fla. 2020).3

Moreover, effective October 27, 2020, the United States Department of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, disbarred respondent “from practice before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the [United States] Immigration Courts, and the [United States] Department of Homeland Security,” based on her knowing misappropriation of entrusted funds underlying her disciplinary revocation in Florida.

Finally, effective November 13, 2023, our Court temporarily suspended respondent in connection with her failure to cooperate with the OAE’s investigation underlying this matter. In re Wilson, 256 N.J. 1 (2023).

Conclusion based on Florida revocation

In sum, based on respondent’s protracted scheme to knowingly misappropriate entrusted funds, disbarment is the only appropriate sanction, pursuant to the principles of Wilson and Hollendonner. Therefore, we need not address the appropriate quantum of discipline for respondent’s additional, serious ethics violations.

(Mike Frisch)

Once Removed

A recent complaint filed by the Illinois Administrator alleges that an attorney falsely claimed to have a court order in a matter where the client was seeking the return of property.

The case

On October 14, 2021, a woman with the initials T.J. filed a pro se complaint against her sister, a woman with the initial D.L. (“D.L.”) in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Municipal Department (“the Municipal matter”). Judge Patricia M. Fallon presided over the Municipal matter for the duration of the case.

The complaint alleged that D.L. was in possession of T.J.’s personal property and that D.L. had allegedly locked out T.J. of a house located on South Wallace Street in Chicago (“Wallace Street Residence”), thus preventing T.J. from retrieving her property. T.J. sought approximately $30,000 in damages against D.L. At all times alleged in this complaint, D.L. was not represented by counsel.

After Respondent was retained it is alleged

On January 8, 2023, Respondent contacted the Chicago Police Department, identified herself as an attorney, and asked that Chicago Police Department officers to accompany her to the Wallace Street Residence. The Chicago Police Department representative agreed to the request and on that date, Respondent arrived at the Wallace Street Residence, along with two Chicago Police Department officers.

On January 8, 2023, when they arrived at the Wallace Street Residence, one of the Chicago Police Department officers asked Respondent if she had a court order allowing the removal of T.J.’s personal property from the Wallace Street Residence; to which Respondent replied that she did.

Respondent’s statement that she had a court order allowing the removal of T.J.’s personal property from the Wallace Street Residence was false because neither Judge Fallon nor any other judge had entered such an order in the Municipal matter allowing the removal of T.J.’s personal property.

Respondent knew her statement to the officer that she had a court order allowing the removal of T.J.’s personal property from the Wallace Street Residence was false because she knew that neither Judge Fallon nor any other judge had entered such an order in the Municipal matter that allowed the removal of T.J.’s personal property from the Wallace Street Residence.

Once Respondent and the Chicago Police Department officers’ arrived at the Wallace Street Residence, R.J. told the Respondent and Chicago Police Department officers that T.J.’s personal property was in the backyard of the Wallace Street Residence. Respondent, with the assistance of the Chicago Police Department officers, then removed T.J.’s property, consisting of several bags and boxes of personal items, from the backyard of the Wallace Street Residence.

The judge learned of the unauthorized action

After D.L. testified regarding the events, Judge Fallon questioned Respondent as to the factual basis for Respondent’s apparent statement to D.L. and R.J. that Respondent had been authorized by a court order to enter the Wallace Street Residence and removal T.J.’s personal property. Respondent told Judge Fallon, “something to the effect of, ‘well, you kinda did [enter an order], Judge.’”

Then

in ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the trial, Judge Fallon found that Respondent “lied to the Court in an effort to conceal her egregious conduct” and “had now made herself a witness in the instant matter.”

Respondent also is alleged to have made false statements in the Administrator's investigation. (Mike Frisch)

Up In Smokes

A Michigan Tri-County Hearing Panel imposed a two-year suspension of an attorney who had stipulated to misconduct that included smuggling cigarettes and other contraband to an incarcerated client

Respondent and the Grievance Administrator filed a Stipulation for Consent Order of Discipline pursuant to MCR 9.115(F)(5), which was approved by the Attorney Grievance Commission and accepted by Tri-County Hearing Panel #10. The stipulation contained respondent's no contest pleas to the factual allegations and grounds for discipline set forth in the Two-Count formal complaint. Regarding Count One, respondent was retained to represent his clients in a breach of contract and conversion lawsuit but failed to file a response to a motion, drafted a fake settlement agreement, and in response to a request for investigation, admitted that he “dropped the ball” and was not honest with his clients. As a result, his clients later faced a garnishment. As to Count Two, respondent represented a client in a criminal case, who was incarcerated, and surveillance footage from respondent’s visit to the jail showed respondent meeting with his client and smuggling cigarettes to her. Additionally, recorded jail phone calls unprotected due to respondent’s failure to register his number as privileged with the phone company – revealed conversations between he and his client about bringing over-the counter medication, cigarettes, and two vape pens for respondent’s next visit, as well as discussions about concealing the contraband. Respondent later admitted to bringing six to eight cigarettes to clients during the visit.

(Mike Frisch)

All Along the Watchtower

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a sanction imposed on an attorney

Attorney Philip Brumley was sanctioned by the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for submitting a signed affidavit that demonstrated a reckless disregard for providing an accurate and truthful accounting of facts relevant to determining whether the court had personal jurisdiction over defendant Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania (“WTPA”), causing the proceedings to be multiplied for seventeen months. Brumley, an attorney admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court, signed the affidavit in his role as General Counsel for WTPA but contends he cannot be sanctioned under § 1927 because he was acting as a fact witness, not as an attorney, when he signed the affidavit. We disagree and therefore affirm.

Two Jehovah’s Witnesses corporations were sued in federal court by women who alleged they had been repeatedly sexually molested as young girls in the 1970s and 80s by Jehovah’s Witnesses officials in Hardin, Montana. One of the defendant corporations, WTPA, moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The sole evidentiary basis for WTPA’s motion to dismiss was an affidavit signed by Brumley. In the affidavit, Brumley identified himself as “General Counsel for defendant Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania” and stated that “[i]n this role, I have direct knowledge of the information contained in this Affidavit.”

The majority of Brumley’s statements in the affidavit were made in the present tense. Id. For example, Brumley’s affidavit stated that WTPA “has no contact with congregations of Jehovah’s Witnesses located in Montana,” “does not establish or disseminate policy or procedure to congregations of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Montana,” and “does not appoint or remove elders, ministerial servants or publishers in congregations of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Montana.” Plaintiffs produced evidence that raised questions as to whether Brumley’s present-tense statements in his affidavit would be true if applied to the relevant time period, the 1970s and 80s. Finding that the relevant facts were controverted, the district court ordered jurisdictional discovery.

More than a year later, citing evidence obtained during discovery and from independent sources, plaintiffs served WTPA with a motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The motion alleged Brumley’s representations to the district court had been “knowingly false and misleading.” Fifteen days later, WTPA withdrew its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, triggering the safe harbor provision of Rule 11.

Plaintiffs next filed for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, contending that Brumley and another WTPA attorney had unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings for the purpose of obstructing plaintiffs’ claims.

Sanction affirmed on appeal

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, a court may sanction “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously,” and the court may require the sanctioned attorney to “satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” The sole issue on appeal is whether Brumley was  an “attorney” within the meaning of § 1927 when he signed an affidavit testifying to “direct knowledge” gained in his role as “General Counsel” for WTPA. Brumley argues that he was not acting as “an attorney” when he signed and submitted the affidavit because he was not an attorney of record in the underlying matter. He further argues that he was acting only as a fact witness so could not have been acting as “an attorney” when he signed the affidavit. We disagree.

That Brumley was not an attorney of record is immaterial. In Caputo v. Tungsten Heavy Powder, Inc., 96 F.4th 1111 (9th Cir. 2024), we stated that “[t]he plain language of [§ 1927] . . . supports the conclusion that the attorneys of record for a specific client do not represent the entire universe of individuals who may be sanctioned pursuant to § 1927.” Id. at 1153. Caputo also forecloses Brumley’s argument that he may not be sanctioned under § 1927 because he is not admitted to practice before the district court or any court in the Ninth Circuit. Id. We further explained in Caputo that “§ 1927’s language is also broad in that it can reach ‘any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States’ provided they personally ‘multiply the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.’” Id. Counsel for Brumley stated at oral argument that Brumley is an attorney admitted to practice in the United States Supreme Court. Thus, Brumley is an attorney admitted to conduct cases in a court of the United States whose undisputed conduct before the district court may be reached by § 1927. There was therefore no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to sanction Brumley under § 1927 for unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying proceedings.

(Mike Frisch)

Court Order Violations Lead To Suspension

A Colorado Hearing Board has imposed a six-month suspension

Respondent violated a temporary protection order when he tried to send a letter to the protected party through her lawyer. The next day, he sent two text messages to the protected party, again violating the protection order. After Respondent was found in contempt, he repeatedly challenged the contempt order, which tied up the protected party in litigation for almost three years. Respondent violated a second order when, in a different matter, he filed a notice to depose the opposing party, his former spouse. Respondent did so for the purpose of harassing his former spouse and in contravention of the court’s order permitting only counsel to schedule depositions in the case. Finally, during the discovery phase of this disciplinary proceeding, Respondent did not provide requested discovery or attend his deposition until he was ordered to do so. Respondent’s failure to comply with court orders and his gamesmanship during litigation warrant his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months.

In his domestic case, several allegations were not established

In sum, we cannot find by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly disobeyed the support order in his domestic relations case. The People thus have not shown that he violated Colo. RPC 3.4(c) with respect to that order.

But

The People next allege that Respondent violated Colo. RPC 3.4(c) in the civil case against [ex-spouse] Slaughter when he personally noticed Slaughter’s deposition rather than through counsel, violating the order issued in that matter on July 10, 2023. We agree. The July 10 order required that “[s]cheduling of the deposition shall be handled by [Respondent’s] counsel.” In its order dated November 30, 2023, the trial court found that Respondent breached C.R.C.P. 11(a) by filing the notice of deposition. That finding was based on an e-filing screenshot showing that Respondent had drafted and served a notice of deposition on Slaughter, violating its order from July 2023. The trial court’s detailed findings, coupled with Respondent’s concession at the disciplinary hearing that he failed to abide the trial court’s directive that the deposition be scheduled by counsel, is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly violated that court’s order of July 10, 2023. The People thus have demonstrated that Respondent violated Colo. RPC 3.4(c) as to that order.

Separate charges involved a fitness instructor that he had hired during Covid and then left his employ

Around May 2020, Respondent hired Megan Skelly to work at Bovo Law. Skelly, who is currently employed as a marketing manager, testified at the disciplinary hearing that she met Respondent at the gym. At the time they met, Skelly worked as a fitness instructor. But when the Covid-19 lockdowns shuttered gyms in spring 2020, Skelly lost her job. Soon afterwards, she said, Respondent contacted her on social media and offered her part-time work with his law firm. Skelly accepted. She said that Respondent pitched the job as a marketing position, but her duties at the law firm varied: she developed and strengthened the firm’s relationships with referral sources; she undertook various administrative duties; and she created content for the firm’s website, including marketing videos about the firm. Skelly testified that she worked on the website with On the Map, Inc., a digital marketing services provider that Respondent hired in July 2020 to improve the firm’s website and boost the firm’s online visibility.

In November 2020, Skelly left Bovo Law and accepted a full-time position with another employer. During the months that followed, Respondent continued working with On the Map and its account manager, Nikolai Hernandez, to revamp the firm’s website. On April 6, 2021, Respondent sent Hernandez a link to photographs that Respondent wanted to use on the website. On the Map worked up a quote for the edits to the website’s homepage and sent him an invoice for his signoff on July 27, 2021. After Hernandez sent Respondent the new homepage designs, Respondent replied on August 30, 2021, “LOOOOOOOOOOOVE IT!. I think it looks great. Let’s keep rocking.”

Meanwhile, on April 15, 2021, Skelly sought a civil protection order against Respondent in Denver County Court. In her motion, she alleged that Respondent physically and sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions between October and December 2020, that he verbally and emotionally abused her during repeated telephone calls and in encounters at her house, and that he “does not listen to boundaries when asked to stop.” At the hearing, Skelly testified that she and Respondent had a consensual sexual relationship that began while she worked at the law firm but that “started to dissolve” when she accepted new employment. Skelly stated that the relationship ended for good around February 2021 after a “drawn-out breakup.”

The county court issued a temporary protection order on April 20, 2021; three days later, a sheriff personally served the order and citation, along with Skelly’s motion, on Respondent.  Skelly and Respondent appeared on the return date of May 4, 2021, and the county court extended the temporary protection order until June 24, 2021. On that day, the county court extended the protection order a second time, to April 15, 2022. Respondent signed the order on June 24, 2021, acknowledging that he received it on that date. The protection order provided that Respondent “shall have no contact of any kind with [Skelly and] shall not attempt to contact [Skelly] through any third person, except [Respondent’s] attorney.” The order explicitly disallowed any exceptions to the no-contact directive. It also restrained Respondent from, among other acts, harassing or intimidating Skelly. 

Allegations

Finally, the People contend that Respondent transgressed Colo. RPC 3.4(c) by thrice knowingly violating Skelly’s temporary protection order dated June 24, 2021: first, by contacting Skelly’s lawyer via email and asking the lawyer to forward a letter attached to the email to Skelly; second, by sending text messages to Skelly from an anonymous phone number; and third, by displaying a picture of Skelly on his firm’s website and misrepresenting on the website that Skelly worked at the firm as a lawyer. We consider each of the People’s allegations in turn.

We recognize that the county court determined beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the evidence placed before that tribunal, that Respondent violated the protection order by posting Skelly’s image and false credentials on his law firm’s website. Even so, the county court’s order itself does not—and cannot—conclusively prove the disputed elements of the People’s claim under Colo. RPC 3.4(c). Rather, we find that the evidence presented to us at the disciplinary hearing fails to clearly convince us that Respondent knowingly posted the webpage, thereby violating the protection order in this instance. As such, the evidence does not meet all of the elements of Colo. RPC 3.4(c) to satisfy the standard of proof in this case.

In sum, we resolve the People’s first claim by finding that Respondent knowingly violated the order governing depositions in the civil case against Slaughter and that he knowingly violated Skelly’s protection order, but only as to the email and letter sent on January 7, 2022, and the text messages dated January 8, 2022. Based on those determinations, we find that Respondent violated Colo. RPC 3.4(c).

No violation based on website representations

...we are not convinced that Respondent knowingly posted Skelly’s image and false credentials on the firm’s live website as the People allege. Nor did the People convince us that Skelly’s “profile” was accessible from or linked to the live website, where Respondent could have located the page and removed it. Finally, we are unable to find that Respondent knowingly misrepresented Skelly’s credentials, as no evidence indicated that he designed the faux profile. We are influenced by Smith’s credible testimony that he recognized Skelly’s screenshot as a mockup webpage that Skelly designed in 2020. Given the conflicting evidence, we cannot find clearly or convincingly that Respondent dishonestly created the fake credentials as the People allege.

Sanction

With these guideposts in place, we turn to Respondent’s misconduct. In his civil case against Slaughter, Respondent knowingly violated the order governing depositions without regard for the trial court’s directives. That court also concluded that Respondent sought to harass Slaughter, warranting sanctions under C.R.C.P. 11(a). In Skelly’s matter, Respondent knowingly violated Skelly’s protection order twice in a span of twelve hours. While the violations were isolated and not especially egregious, the brazen nature of Respondent’s conduct evinced his disregard for the county court’s authority and for Skelly’s wellbeing.

But we are most affronted by Respondent’s conduct in Skelly’s matter following the violations. He enmeshed Skelly in litigation over her attempt to enforce the protection order, eviscerating the order’s purpose by forcing Skelly’s participation in the process. For Skelly, the protection order became a tether attaching her to the legal system as Respondent used his position as a lawyer to keep the case active.

Considering Respondent’s demonstrated disregard for court orders and his willingness to use the mechanisms of litigation to Skelly’s and Slaughter’s detriment, we find that a six-month, fully served suspension best accords with the ABA Standards, case law, and the facts of this case. In making this determination, we are mindful of the personal nature animating Respondent’s misconduct and his otherwise clean disciplinary record. Indeed, Respondent’s conduct, though selfish, was not dishonest. As we see it, Respondent’s challenge lies more in personal growth than growth as a lawyer. To that end, we strongly urge him to explore lawyer support resources like the Colorado Lawyers Assistance Program and the Colorado Attorney Mentoring Program.

(Mike Frisch)

Discovery Lapse Draws Sanction

A case summary from the Colorado Presiding Disciplinary Judge

People v. Charles John Vanstrom. 25PDJ45. July 3, 2025.

The Presiding Disciplinary Judge approved the parties’ stipulation to discipline and suspended Charles John Vanstrom (attorney registration number 20479) for six months, with the requirement that Vanstrom petition for reinstatement, if at all, under C.R.C.P. 242.39. Vanstrom’s suspension took effect on July 3, 2025.

On an hourly basis, a client hired a firm for which Vanstrom worked as an independent contractor. The firm paid Vanstrom an hourly rate, and Vanstrom submitted his work to the firm for payment. In 2021, the firm filed a lawsuit on behalf of the client. The opposing party filed an amended answer with several counterclaims, seeking significant economic and noneconomic damages.

In late autumn 2022, Vanstrom began to work on the case more. In January 2023, the court lifted a stay on discovery, answers to which came due soon thereafter. Beginning around that time, the firm’s lawyer had little involvement in the case aside from checking in with Vanstrom, who entered in the case under his own firm. Vanstrom received an extension to respond to discovery requests. But he did not timely send his client’s discovery responses to the opposing party. Opposing counsel moved to compel, and the court held a hearing, during which Vanstrom appeared without his client. Vanstrom explained that the discovery responses were delinquent due to difficulties in communicating with his client. The court granted the motion to compel, giving Vanstrom additional time to provide discovery, but also ordered the client to appear at the next conference to explain his lack of participation.

Vanstrom sent the client the discovery requests and template responses in early March 2023. The client responded promptly, but Vanstrom never provided any discovery responses to the opposing party. At a court conference in late March 2023, the client did not appear, and the court noted the client’s absence in its order imposing sanctions for failing to respond to discovery. In that order, the court also dismissed the client’s claims with prejudice and granted the counterclaims against the client. The opposing party requested economic and noneconomic damages of almost $2,000,000.00. No one discussed the order or the February 2023 order compelling discovery with the client until the firm’s lawyer communicated with the client in May 2023. Vanstrom did not keep contemporaneous records of his communications with the client.

Through this misconduct, Vanstrom violated Colo. RPC 1.3 (a lawyer must act with reasonable diligence and promptness when representing a client) and Colo. RPC 1.4 (a lawyer must reasonably communicate with the client).

(Mike Frisch)

He Needed A Stinking Badge

A bribery conviction has drawn a complaint from the Illinois Administrator.

The recipient (since pardoned) was a Virginia sheriff

In or around July and August 2019, [business associate] Rahim told Respondent that he would have to make a $20,000 “donation” to obtain an auxiliary deputy sheriff badge. On or about October 1, Respondent gave Rahim check number 1169, drawn on Respondent’s personal bank account, in the amount of $20,000, payable to Rahim’s company Food Truck Company LLC. In the memo line of the check, Respondent wrote, “LLC Investment.” Respondent understood that Rahim would pay all or a portion of those funds to Sheriff Jenkins or his campaign to induce him to deputize Respondent.

On or about December 23, 2019, Rahim sent Respondent and an unnamed auxiliary deputy sheriff (“Individual One”) a text message that stated, “Fred [Respondent] is the close friend who helped me provide all the recent support for our great Sheriff.” Rahim asked Individual One to facilitate Respondent being sworn in as an auxiliary deputy sheriff.

On or about March 6, 2020, Respondent traveled to the County, and the Circuit Court Clerk swore him in as an auxiliary deputy sheriff. The Sheriff’s Office issued Respondent an auxiliary deputy sheriff badge and identification card. After Respondent was sworn in, he purchased a firearm. Respondent did not receive any training from the Sheriff’s Office and did not qualify in the use of a firearm.

On two occasions between 2020 and 2023, while at an airport, Respondent showed his auxiliary deputy sheriff badge to request access to the TSA Pre-Check line when his boarding pass failed to indicate he was cleared for TSA Pre-Check. On one of those occasions, Respondent was granted access, and on the other occasion, he was denied access.

On one occasion between 2020 and 2023, while driving on a highway, Respondent showed his auxiliary deputy sheriff badge through his car window as he passed a marked police car after he drove on the shoulder to bypass a traffic jam and exit the highway.

In or around March 2021, when scheduling an appointment for a Covid-19 vaccine, Respondent represented himself as a law enforcement officer or first responder to try to secure a vaccine appointment prior to the general public. Respondent was not permitted to receive an early vaccination.

In or around February 2022, after Respondent was issued a ticket for parking in a handicapped space with an expired handicapped placard, Respondent informed the deputy who issued the ticket that he was a deputy sheriff with the Sheriff’s Office.

In or around 2021, Respondent showed his auxiliary deputy sheriff badge to an unnamed individual, who was a businessperson residing in Fairfax County, Virginia (“Individual Two”), and Respondent told Individual Two he had paid Sheriff Jenkins to obtain the badge. Individual Two expressed interest in acquiring an auxiliary deputy sheriff badge. Thereafter, Respondent introduced Individual Two to Individual One with the intent to assist Individual Two
in obtaining an auxiliary deputy sheriff badge in exchange for a payment to Sheriff Jenkins. On or about September 9, 2022, Respondent sent a text message to Individual One that read, “Also [Individual Two] is in for supporting the Sheriff,” which referred to Individual Two’s agreement to pay Sheriff Jenkins in exchange for an auxiliary deputy sheriff badge.

Plea

Count Nine of the indictment charged Respondent with the federal offense of bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. Section 666(a)(2). Specifically, it alleged that from approximately April 2019 through approximately March 2020, Respondent, aided and abetted by Rahim, corruptly gave, offered, and agreed to give a thing of value to Sheriff Jenkins (i.e., approximately $20,000) with the intent to influence and reward Sheriff Jenkins, an agent of the County and the Sheriff’s Office, a local government and an agency thereof, both of which received benefits exceeding $10,000 under federal programs involving grants, contracts, subsidies, loans, guarantees, insurance, and other forms of federal assistance in the fiscal years ending June 30, 2019, and June 30, 2020, in connection with any business, transaction, and series of transactions of the County and the Sheriff’s office involving something of value of $5,000 or more (i.e., the appointment of Respondent as auxiliary deputy sheriff for the County)

(Mike Frisch)

The Great Oz

A motion to disqualify a judge from presiding over a host of joined cases was denied by the Ohio Supreme Court

Over 400 cases (“the Durrani cases”) have been filed by various plaintiffs alleging that Durrani fraudulently induced patients to undergo unnecessary surgeries and caused them significant injury. Many of those plaintiffs were initially represented by Deters, who was subsequently suspended from the practice of law in Ohio and then relinquished his law license. However, according to [plaintiff's counsel] Porotsky, Deters has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by continuing to provide legal and strategic advice to plaintiffs in the Durrani cases while acting as a consultant. Attorney David Drake has taken over the plaintiffs’ representation in the Durrani cases, but because he is not licensed to practice law in this State, Ohio attorney Alan Statman supervises the Durrani cases.

Durrani fled to Pakistan after a 2013 indictment for health care fraud. 

Alleged bias

Porotsky alleges that Judge Reece’s words and conduct have created an appearance of bias against MedPro. Porotsky maintains that the judge has cast doubt on MedPro’s claims and vigorously questioned him about MedPro’s providing a defense to Durrani and his practice while also seeking to void the policies. For example, Porotsky notes that during one exchange at a hearing held on May 21, 2024, the judge asked him, “[W]ho is the Great Oz here?” (i.e., who is controlling the defense against the medical claims). Porotsky also asserts that Judge Reece has improperly granted a motion without allowing MedPro to respond to it while denying or not deciding MedPro’s own motions. He says that Judge Reece also has tolerated Deters’s public statements allegedly promoting violence against MedPro, its CEO, and its counsel and that the judge denied MedPro’s request for a gag order without citing legal authority supporting the decision.

Porotsky also claims that Judge Reece engaged in an ex parte communication with opposing counsel, Statman, after Porotsky moved to compel the production of emails involving Deters, who had been listed as a defense witness. After Porotsky filed the motion, Porotsky says, Statman sent him an email indicating that he had spoken to the judge and would be withdrawing Deters as a witness. Judge Reece then denied the motion to compel.

Finally, Porotsky contends that Judge Reece has condoned Deters’s participation in the case, even after Statman violated a protective order by giving Deters access to confidential information. Porotsky moved for sanctions, he says, since Statman had allowed access to the confidential material. He also asserts that the judge has not stopped Statman from making unprofessional comments in the courtroom. And, Porotsky avers, Judge Reece failed to rule on a motion to strike an 84-page argumentative affidavit that Deters emailed to the judge.

Judge Reece denies any bias on his part. Regarding the “Great Oz” remark and Porotsky’s claim that the judge has prejudged the underlying case, Judge Reece says that asking tough questions does not demonstrate bias and that the transcript of the May 21 hearing shows that he said he would not make any decisions that day. Judge Reece admits that he may have erred in ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion to supplement in the Durrani cases, and he says that because of a clerical error, his order vacating that decision was not filed. Although he says he may have erred in ruling on some of MedPro’s motions, the judge argues that any possible error is not grounds for disqualification and that he intends to have the case ready for motions for summary judgment in a timely manner.

Judge Reece contends that the decision whether to enter a gag order to prevent Deters from engaging in violent rhetoric or to enforce an existing gag order is committed to his discretion and that his denial of MedPro’s motion for such an order is not an abuse of discretion. He also maintains that Porotsky has not shown that Deters has engaged in additional conduct that the judge previously found “highly inappropriate” and that would have required the judge to take action. Judge Reece adds that he “rejected” the affidavit Deters emailed him and that he did not read it. 

Regarding Statman’s allegedly unprofessional comments, Judge Reece suggests that Porotsky engaged in similar conduct, and the judge notes that he admonished both counsel during a January 24, 2025 hearing. Lastly, the judge denies that he engaged in an ex parte communication.

The court

Porotsky’s claims, standing alone, do not establish that there is an appearance that Judge Reece is biased against MedPro. It has been recognized that “the combination of the factors cited by [an] affiant” may be sufficient to require a judge’s disqualification when the individual factors by themselves are not. In re Disqualification of Maschari, 1999-Ohio-8, ¶ 3. But in this case, whether the evidence is considered in isolation or all together, the average person on the street who knows all the relevant facts of the case would not believe that Judge Reece’s words and conduct have created the appearance of bias.

For these reasons, Porotsky’s allegation of the appearance of bias lacks merit.

(Mike Frisch)

Revocation Rejected

The Ontario Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division has imposed an eight month suspension

In Law Society of Ontario v Chima, 2025 ONLSTH 21, we found Mr. Chima had engaged in professional misconduct contrary to Rule 6.3-3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by sending his client communications of a sexual nature and by making unwelcome advances and engaging in verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature towards her.

Mr. Chima admitted sending the sexual communications. Although he did not say so explicitly, we understand he does not accept our findings concerning the unwelcome advances and having engaged in any inappropriate verbal or physical sexual conduct.

The Law Society had alternative proposals with respect to the appropriate sanction

The Law Society argued that revocation was appropriate if, having regard to the Lawyer’s absence of remorse, insight and any evidence of rehabilitation we could not be satisfied Mr. Chima would not repeat his misconduct and the public would be at risk. However, if we accepted that the Lawyer was remorseful and had attained insight into his misconduct, a suspension of eight months, together with an order that he attend the upcoming continuing professional development program on addressing harassment and discrimination in the legal professions, would be appropriate. Ms. Kala advised that, if a suspension was ordered, it should take effect immediately notwithstanding that Mr. Chima is presently subject to an undertaking not to practise while another matter is being investigated.

Aggravating factors

The misconduct occurred over several months despite the client’s attempts to communicate her discomfort by responding to the inappropriate texts with biblical quotes. The misconduct was not a single “slip up” or a momentary lapse in judgement. Mr. Chima’s actions escalated from sexist and sexual texts to inappropriate sexual comments and advances. They culminated in touching of a sexual nature when he placed his hand on the client’s breast.

The client was extremely vulnerable. She believed the Lawyer was experienced and trusted him to represent her in a matter of extreme importance to her. She

had very limited financial resources. She had neither the resources nor the means to seek out other counsel.

Respondent had no prior discipline.

The committee

To be candid, we struggled with our determination in this matter. While Mr. Chima expressed remorse and told us he had discussed his conduct with members of his church community, it was not evident that he truly understood and appreciated his misuse of power or that he accepted full responsibility for his actions. This was clear from his plan not to meet with women clients without another person present. It is hi

s responsibility to manage his future behaviour – not the responsibility of a chaperone.

On the other hand, the Lawyer’s misconduct, while odious, was not as odious as that engaged in by the respondents in Bondzi-Simpson, Fathi or Piruzza. Further, unlike in those matters, there is evidence of at least some remorse and insight. Further, we are convinced Mr. Chima fully appreciates the seriousness of this proceeding and, if permitted to continue to practise, will do all that he can to avoid any further discipline.

 In the end, we concluded that an eight-month suspension and required attendance at the upcoming Continuing Professional Education program titled “Addressing Harassment and Discrimination in the Legal Professions 2025: Part 1 of 2” was appropriate. It meets the goals of specific and general deterrence, the Lawyer’s ongoing education and rehabilitation and will maintain the public’s confidence in the legal professions.

From the misconduct findings

Below are descriptions of some (but not all) of the content found in the messages and videos sent by the Lawyer to AA:

a)     An image of a little boy and girl, both wearing only their underwear. The little boy is seen peering into a little girl’s underwear. The caption above the little girl states, “Mommy says it’s a future gold mine and I should not show it to any boys.” The caption above the little boy states, “Really, My [sic] dad says it’s where all his money goes.”

b)     An image of a woman and a man who have the following conversation:

Woman: “Honey, before we got married, you used to give me gifts and expensive jewelry [sic].”

Man: “Yes... So [sic]?”

Woman: “How come you don’t do it anymore?”

Man: “Have you seen a fisherman give worms to the fish after catching it?”

c)      An image which is captioned “Mother of all advertisement [sic].” The image contains an ad for an imaging and photo company which reads “we can shoot your wife & frame your mother-in law [sic]” and also “if you want we can hang them too!”

d)     A cartoon image of a courtroom scene with a character stating, “If physical relationship with wife without her consent is termed as rape then Shopping without a husband’s consent should be termed as Robbery [sic]”

e)     A sexualized image of larger woman wearing tight clothing with the caption,” Think big Dream big Believe big and the result will be big [sic].”

f)      An image that reads “Million Dollar Truth” and “Wife is Cute when she is Mute” as well as “Husband is Honey when he gives Money [sic].”

g)     A video featuring a man, who is allegedly a massage therapist for professional models, massaging women in bikinis and speaking about the difficulties of his job. The video caption reads “Everybody Hates Their JOB LMAO [sic].”

h)     A video of a comedy skit involving an elevator, painted as a naked woman’s private parts, and men who can enter the elevator after flashing their private parts.

(Mike Frisch)

At Most An Incidental Beneficiary

The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief in a law firm's suit for a fee

In 2008, the former Attorney General of Mississippi desired to sue the national utility company Entergy Corporation and its subsidiaries/affiliated entities (Entergy) based on the electricity rates it charged in the State. To help prosecute the claims, the attorney general entered into a retention agreement with the Kilborn Firm. The Kilborn Firm subsequently entered into an agreement with Roedel Parsons Blache Fontana Piontek & Pisano (Roedel Parsons), a Louisiana law firm, agreeing to split any compensation and reimbursement earned by the Kilborn Firm under its agreement with the State. The Kilborn Firm is not a party in this case.

Following years of litigation, the trial judge granted Entergy’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case against it with prejudice. The State chose not to appeal. Yet Roedel Parsons determined that it was entitled to a payment of $34,625,000 from the State. Roedel Parsons sued the State through the office of the attorney general, alleging breach of contract and seeking a declaratory judgment that it was a third party beneficiary under the State’s retention agreement with the Kilborn Firm or, in the alternative, for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit recovery. The trial judge granted the State’s Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Roedel Parsons appealed the trial judge’s decision. Finding no legal error, we affirm.

The court

In the case sub judice, the trial court found that “the contract forecloses any claim that the Plaintiff might have had against the State as a third-party beneficiary because the Retention Agreement specifically provides that the Kilborn Firm may associate other counsel at the expense of the Kilborn Firm and at no cost to the State.” We agree. Roedel Parsons failed to plead sufficient allegations showing that it possessed any rights springing from the terms of the agreement between the former attorney general and the Kilborn Firm. ¶20. The unambiguous terms of the retention agreement fail to reveal any intent of the former attorney general that Roedel Parsons would benefit under the State’s agreement with the Kilborn Firm. The Court has held that “[i]f a written contract is unambiguous, ‘the intention of the contracting parties should be gleaned solely from the wording of the contract and parole evidence should not be considered.’” Rosenfelt v. Miss. Dev. Auth., 262 So. 3d 511, 518 (Miss. 2018) (quoting Epperson v. SOUTHBank, 93 So. 3d 10, 16 (Miss. 2012)). Rather than vesting Roedel Parsons with a direct interest under the terms of the agreement, the unambiguous language expressly excluded Roedel Parsons from recovering any amount from the State, explicitly directing that “the undersigned attorneys may associate other attorneys . . . at their own expense and at no cost to the State of Mississippi.” (Emphasis added.)

Accordingly, Roedel Parsons is at most merely an incidental beneficiary to the retention agreement. The Court has held that “[a] mere incidental, collateral, or consequential benefit which may accrue to a third person by reason of the performance of the contract, or the mere fact that he has been injured by the breach thereof, is not sufficient to enable him to maintain an action on the contract.” Burns, 171 So. 2d at 324-25. “Where the contract is primarily for the benefit of the parties thereto, the mere fact that a third person would be incidentally benefitted does not give him a right to sue for its breach.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 307, at 732-33 (1964)).

To be frank, Roedel Parsons is barking up the wrong tree. Accepting its factual allegations as true—that Roedel Parsons qualified as “other attorneys” as specified in the retention agreement, that Roedel Parsons had a 50/50 side-agreement with the Kilborn Firm, that Roedel Parsons exerted a vast amount of labor and expenses by prosecuting the Entergy litigation, and even accepting as true that a “substantial recovery” was indeed had in the Entergy litigation—the only recourse for Roedel Parsons to recoup the fees to which it claims entitlement is against the Kilborn Firm.

Because Roedel Parsons failed to plead sufficient allegations showing third-party beneficiary status under the retention agreement between the former attorney general and the Kilborn Firm, it has no standing to sue the State for an alleged breach of the agreement. The issue of whether the State breached its agreement with the Kilborn Firm, therefore, is moot.

Quantum Meruit

Under the unambiguous terms of the agreement between the State and the undersigned attorneys, “[i]n the event that no recovery is realized, the undersigned attorneys shall receive no compensation or reimbursement.” Had recovery been realized, whether Roedel Parsons would be entitled to compensation for its legal services by the State or the Kilborn Firm is unquestionably clear, as the Kilborn firm expressly could “associate with other attorneys . . . at their own expense and at no cost to the State of Mississippi.” (Emphasis added.) As such, the State had no notice of a reasonable expectation by Roedel Parsons that it would be compensated by the State for the legal services it provided during the Entergy litigation. See Tupelo Redev. Agency v. Gray Corp. Inc., 972 So. 2d 495, 514515 (Miss. 2007). Accordingly, Roedel Parsons failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted for quantum meruit recovery and unjust enrichment.

(Mike Frisch)

Fat Graft Is Medical Practice

The Utah Supreme Court declined to disturb a finding that a registered nurse had engaged in unlawful medical practice

The Utah Division of Professional Licensing (DOPL) filed a notice of agency action against Karen Jean Anderson, a licensed advanced practice registered nurse (APRN). DOPL alleged that Anderson unlawfully engaged in the practice of medicine and practiced outside the scope of her APRN license by performing tumescent liposuction and fat grafting procedures. The parties do not dispute that under the Utah Code these procedures are considered ablative cosmetic medical procedures.

In its order, DOPL sustained these allegations, reasoning that with few exceptions, physicians and osteopathic physicians have “exclusive authority” to perform ablative cosmetic medical procedures. DOPL barred Anderson from performing the procedures and imposed a fine. Anderson next sought agency review with the Department of Commerce. The Department reduced the fine but otherwise upheld DOPL’s order. Anderson then sought judicial review.

We hold that the Utah Code bars APRNs from independently performing ablative cosmetic medical procedures. The statutory scheme limits the performance of such procedures to either those licensed to practice medicine—meaning physicians and osteopathic physicians—or licensees whose scope of practice includes the authority to operate or perform surgery. Because the scope of practice for APRNs contains no such authorization, Anderson both unlawfully practiced medicine and exceeded the scope of her APRN license by performing the ablative cosmetic medical procedures of tumescent liposuction and fat grafting. Therefore, we do not disturb the Department’s order.

(Mike Frisch)

Slip-and-Fall Slip Up

The New York Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department has suspended an attorney for three years 

The respondent is a partner at the law firm Blyer & Kurland, P.C. (hereinafter the law firm). In February 2018, the law firm represented Chiriboga in connection with a slip-and-fall accident that occurred on February 10, 2017. The law firm was to commence an action on Chiriboga’s behalf. The statute of limitations for the cause of action expired on February 10, 2020, and the law firm failed to commence an action before the statute of limitations expired.

On or about February 18, 2020, the respondent filed a summons and complaint in Supreme Court, Queens County, titled Chiriboga v Chopenko (Index No. 702814/2020). In the complaint, the respondent asserted that Chiriboga’s accident had occurred on February 20, 2017, rather than February 10, 2017. The respondent also signed the name of another attorney, Andrew Staulcup, to the summons, complaint, and the attorney’s verification without Staulcup’s knowledge or consent. On or about June 13, 2020, the respondent served the complaint on the defendant. On or about January 27, 2021, the respondent executed a stipulation of discontinuance with prejudice in the action without Chiriboga’s consent. The respondent did not notify Chiriboga until on or about February 7, 2022, that her case had been discontinued with prejudice. As of March 31, 2022, the respondent had not informed Chiriboga that she may have a legal malpractice claim against the law firm.

Respondent's evidence

The respondent and Staulcup met Chiriboga through her brother. According to the respondent, Chiriboga’s brother was the “family representative” and the respondent communicated with the brother about various legal matters for which the family had retained the law firm. However, according to the respondent, when Chiriboga was injured in the slip-and-fall accident, she called Staulcup to retain the law firm, and Staulcup alone was handling this case.

According to the respondent, a few days after February 10, 2020, shortly before Staulcup left for vacation, Staulcup placed a copy of the summons and complaint for the Chiriboga matter on the respondent’s desk. On the summons, Staulcup had written, “SOL Has Been Blown.” The respondent testified that he subsequently had a conversation with Staulcup regarding the date of the accident, and the respondent continued to believe that the date of the accident was February 20, 2017. Staulcup left for vacation, and the respondent retrieved a copy of the summons and complaint from the law firm’s computer, changed the complaint to state that the date of the accident was February 20, 2017, signed Staulcup’s name on the summons, complaint, and attorney’s verification, and filed those documents in the Supreme Court, Queens County, on February 18, 2020.

The respondent testified that he kept Staulcup’s name on the court filings because Staulcup had drafted the complaint and the respondent and Stualcup had an understanding that they could sign the other’s name if one of them was not in the office. The respondent testified that although Staulcup, who had been strictly handling Chiriboga’s slip-and-fall case, had informed the respondent that the date of the accident was February 10, 2017, the respondent did not call Chiriboga to verify the accident date because the respondent was “embarrassed” that he did not know about the case. The respondent figured that if Staulcup was correct and the date of the accident was February 10, 2017, then the case would not proceed. If the respondent was correct and the date of the accident was February 20, 2017, the respondent would avoid embarrassment and the case would proceed. During his examination under oath (hereinafter EUO), the respondent testified that he did what he thought was best for the client and that his actions were “not to benefit [himself] in any way.”

When Staulcup returned from vacation, he discovered that the respondent had signed Staulcup’s name on the summons, complaint, and attorney’s verification, and expressed his disapproval. The respondent testified that he and Staulcup had a short conversation during which the respondent explained that signing Staulcup’s name to the court filings was “the simplest way to get it done.” The respondent admitted that Staulcup told the respondent not to serve the summons and complaint on the defendant, but the respondent did so anyway because Staulcup never provided evidence that the respondent was wrong about the date of the accident.

On or about October 19, 2020, Staulcup produced an email from Chiriboga stating that her accident had occurred on February 10, 2017. At the respondent’s EUO, he contended that this email was “fictitious.” Nevertheless, after the respondent was shown the email, he testified that he had notified the parties at a preliminary conference on November 20, 2020, that the statute of limitations had expired. A stipulation of discontinuance dated January 27, 2021, was not filed until March 19, 2021.

Sanction

In view of the evidence adduced at the hearing and the respondent’s admissions, we find that the Special Referee properly sustained all seven charges in the amended petition. Accordingly, the Grievance Committee’s motion to confirm the Special Referee’s report is granted. In determining an appropriate measure of discipline, we have considered the respondent’s prior disciplinary history for similar misconduct, his lack of remorse, the injury to the client, and the mitigation provided by the respondent.

Under the totality of the circumstances, we find that the respondent’s conduct warrants a suspension from the practice of law for three years.

(Mike Frisch)

The Key

The South Carolina Supreme Court imposed a retroactive six-month suspension of an attorney for failure to return a client file and an act of domestic violence

Respondent was arrested on May 20, 2024, and charged with felony domestic violence in the first degree. Respondent assaulted S.S., who is both his legal secretary and his ex-wife, in the morning hours at his law office.

Around 8:30 a.m., Respondent asked S.S. for a copy of the new key to her home, which Respondent owns. S.S. refused to give Respondent the new house key. While S.S. was sitting in an office chair, Respondent approached S.S., grabbed her, and pulled her by the arms in an attempt to remove her from the chair. When he was unsuccessful, Respondent grabbed S.S. around her neck area and shook her in an effort to force her to give him the key, which S.S. continued to refuse to do. Respondent then took S.S.'s other personal keys and her cell phone and left the office. Shortly thereafter, Respondent was arrested at Due West Town Hall, where he sought to have the electricity service to S.S.'s home disconnected. The assault left visible marks on S.S.'s arms and neck area, which law enforcement observed and documented upon their arrival.

On May 23, 2024, Respondent timely self-reported his arrest to ODC. On May 30, 2024, the Court placed Respondent on interim suspension and appointed the Receiver. In re Surface, 443 S.C. 48, 902 S.E.2d 40 (2024).1 On November 19, 2024, S.S. signed a Statement of Intent with the Anderson County Solicitor's Office, requesting the warrant be dismissed because she no longer wished to cooperate with the prosecution of the case. The following day, the criminal charge against Respondent was dismissed.

Respondent represents his behavior during this incident was triggered by several factors, including the recent passing of his nephew, his lack of access to a prescriber for his psychiatric medications, and his long and dysfunctional relationship with S.S.

Respondent proactively applied to and completed a 26-week specialized treatment program for domestic violence offenders, as well as a separate thirteen-session therapy program with a licensed professional counselor to treat his post-traumatic stress disorder.

Sanction

We find a six-month definite suspension is the appropriate sanction for Respondent's misconduct. Accordingly, we accept the Agreement and suspend Respondent from the practice of law for a period of six months, retroactive to May 30, 2024, the date Respondent was placed on interim suspension.