Friday, November 16, 2018
Congratulations to Nestor Davidson (Fordham), Michèle Finck (Oxford), and John Infranca (Suffolk) on the publication of their book The Cambridge Handbook of the Law of the Sharing Economy (Cambridge U. Press). I had the pleasure of serving as a peer reviewer on the original proposal, and can verify that the book takes a comprehensive look at the sharing economy -- not just the employment stuff that readers of this blog mostly focus on. Here's the publisher's description:
This Handbook grapples conceptually and practically with what the sharing economy - which includes entities ranging from large for-profit firms like Airbnb, Uber, Lyft, Taskrabbit, and Upwork to smaller, non-profit collaborative initiatives - means for law, and how law, in turn, is shaping critical aspects of the sharing economy. Featuring a diverse set of contributors from many academic disciplines and countries, the book compiles the most important, up-to-date research on the regulation of the sharing economy. The first part surveys the nature of the sharing economy, explores the central challenge of balancing innovation and regulatory concerns, and examines the institutions confronting these regulatory challenges, and the second part turns to a series of specific regulatory domains, including labor and employment law, consumer protection, tax, and civil rights. This groundbreaking work should be read by anyone interested in the dynamic relationship between law and the sharing economy.
Thursday, November 15, 2018
Congratulations to Ken Dau-Schmidt, Marty Malin, Roberto Corrada Chris Cameron, and Catherine Fisk on the imminent publication of their casebook Labor Law in the Contemporary Workplace (3d ed. West, 2019). Here are the publisher's notes:
Labor Law in the Contemporary Workplace prepares students for the practice of labor law by introducing them to the principles of American labor law and many of the issues that labor attorneys face. The book is organized around contemporary problems as a means of teaching the core principles of labor law. Although the primary focus of the book is the National Labor Relations Act, considerable attention is given to the Railway Labor Act and public-sector labor laws because of their growing importance in contemporary practice. The third edition takes account of changes in the law since the first edition and second editions were published and in particular new interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act by the National Labor Relations Board and recent state restrictions on public sector collective bargaining.
Wednesday, November 14, 2018
Equality Law Scholars’ Forum
Friday, November 16 – Saturday November 17, 2019
The Forum is designed to provide junior scholars with commentary and critique by their more senior colleagues in the legal academy and, more broadly, to foster development and understanding of new scholarly currents across equality law.
This year, the Forum will feature six presenters (chosen from over forty submissions):
1. The New Coverture
Albertina Antognini, Arizona College of Law
2. Stealing Education: Protecting Racial Capital in “White” Schools
LaToya Baldwin Clark, UCLA School of Law
3. Affirmative Action Misclassification
Jonathan Feingold, UCLA Office of Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion
4. The Aesthetics of Disability Law
Jasmine Harris, UC Davis School of Law
5. Legislating with Tall Tales
Goldburn Maynard, University of Louisville School of Law
6. Diversity to Deradicalize: A New Theory for How Affirmative Action Became Tied to Intellectual Pluralism
Asad Rahim, American Bar Foundation
The event is co-organized by Tristin Green, USF Law, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, UC Berkeley Law, and Leticia Saucedo, UC Davis Law.
Comment and critique will be provided by the following scholars:
Bridget Crawford, Pace Law School
Jonathan Glater, UC Irvine Law School
Tristin Green, USF Law School
Angela Harris, UC Davis Law School
Jill Hasday, U. of Minnesota School of Law
Anthony Infanti, U. of Pittsburgh School of Law
Osamudia James, U. of Miami School of Law
Tom Joo, UC Davis Law School
Courtney Joslin, UC Davis Law School
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Boston U. Law School
Kimani Paul-Emile, Fordham U. School of Law
Leticia Saucedo, UC Davis Law School
We will also hold a panel discussion on Producing Scholarship in Equality Law with the following UC Davis Law School panelists participating: Jack Chin, Kevin Johnson, Courtney Joslin, Tom Joo, Lisa Pruitt, and Brian Soucek.
Monday, November 12, 2018
The National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions announces its 46th annual conference, with Paul Krugman giving the keynote speech. See this link for conference information. As sign of how many presentations and speakers there are--there are too many for me to list here. Check out the link and see for yourself. Deadline for early bird registration is Dec. 28.
Friday, November 9, 2018
As just reported by the New York Times and other media outlets, Facebook has ended its policy of requiring arbitration for employees raising claims of harassment at the company. With changes made by Google to its harassment policies only yesterday (see below), these technology sector businesses are definitely feeling the pressure to revisit how they approach hostile work environment claims.
Thursday, November 8, 2018
The recent worldwide walkout at Google (as reported in the NY Times here) has lead to a response from the company today. Google will make a number of changes to its sexual harassment policies that will impact all workers at the company. From the LA Times, noting that Google is:
"dropping the requirement that sexual misconduct cases be handled in arbitration. . . Google also promised to provide more details about sexual misconduct cases in internal reports available to all employees. . . The company said it is also stepping up its training aimed at preventing misconduct, requiring all employees to go through the process annually instead of every other year."
This is a great illustration of how increased awareness in the area of sexual harassment and hostile working environments -- combined with the collective action of employees -- lead to concrete results and action by an employer (though not all of the workers' demands were met).
-- Joe Seiner
Wednesday, November 7, 2018
Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk (both Berkeley) have posted on SSRN their essay (132 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 42, (2018)) Exaggerating the Effects of Janus: A Reply to Professors Baude and Volokh. The Baude/Volokh article is an apologia to the multiple cases filed post-Janus, ostensibly by public-sector former union dues-payers but in reality financed by employer-friendly organizations trying to break public-sector unions, to apply Janus retroactively. Here's an excerpt from the abstract of the Chemerinsky/Fisk article:
This essay responds to an article by William Baude and Eugene Volokh, who argue that unions are likely retroactively liable for the agency fees that union-represented workers previously paid. We explain that public employee unions, as private membership organizations, are not state actors liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.We then show that even if unions were found to be acting under color of law for purposes of section 1983, they would be entitled to qualified immunity as a defense because negotiating for fair share fees did not violate the constitution at the time unions negotiated fair share fee agreements and received fees. At the very least, unions are entitled to the separate defense of good faith immunity available to private actors who are sued under section 1983 for conduct undertaken in good faith in collaboration with government actors. Finally, we show that unions are not liable on state law theories. Qualified immunity is a defense only to claims for damages under federal law, and good faith immunity has likewise been applied only to claims for damages. For that reason, plaintiffs in the post-Janus fee recovery litigation have alleged state law claims and styled them as equitable. Some states (e.g., California) have eliminated such liability through legislation. Even in states that have not enacted such laws, however, we show that well-settled equitable principles foreclose liability. Finally, this essay responds to Baude and Volokh's argument that Janus endangers other mandatory fees imposed by the government, such as bar dues and public university student activity fees.
Tuesday, November 6, 2018
The Supreme Court issued its first decision of the term today, and it was the age discrimination Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido case. I'll claim credit for predicting a win for the public-sector plaintiffs--minus the fact that I was wrong about saying it wouldn't be unanimous. So, the outcome wasn't a surprise, but the unanimous support for both a group of employees and the Ninth Circuit was. You can read the full opinion here. For lazy readers, here's the syllabus:
John Guido and Dennis Rankin filed suit, alleging that the Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision in Arizona, terminated their employment as firefighters in violation of the Age Discrimina- tion in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The Fire District responded that it was too small to qualify as an “employer” under the ADEA, which provides: “The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees . . . . The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State . . . .” 29 U. S. C. §630(b).
Initially, both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADEA applied solely to private sector employers. In 1974, Congress amended the ADEA to cover state and local governments. A previ- ous, 1972, amendment to Title VII added States and their subdivi- sions to the definition of “person[s],” specifying that those entities are engaged in an industry affecting commerce. The Title VII amend- ment thus subjected States and their subdivisions to liability only if they employ a threshold number of workers, currently 15. By con- trast, the 1974 ADEA amendment added state and local governments directly to the definition of “employer.” The same 1974 enactment al- so amended the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), on which many aspects of the ADEA are based, to reach all government employers regardless of their size. 29 U. S. C. §203(d), (x).
Held: The definitional provision’s two-sentence delineation, set out in §630(b), and the expression “also means” at the start of §630(b)’s second sentence, combine to establish separate categories: persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 20 or more employees; and States or political subdivisions with no attendant numerosity limitation.
The words “also means” in §630(b) add new categories of employers to the ADEA’s reach. First and foremost, the ordinary meaning of “also means” is additive rather than clarifying. See 859 F. 3d 1168, 1171 (case below) (quoting Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 34). The words “also means” occur dozens of times throughout the U. S. Code, typically carrying an additive meaning. E.g., 12 U. S. C. §1715z–1(i)(4). Furthermore, the second sentence of the ADEA’s definitional provision, §630(b), pairs States and their political subdivi- sions with agents, a discrete category that carries no numerical limitation.
Reading the ADEA’s definitional provision, §630(b), as written to apply to States and political subdivisions regardless of size may give the ADEA a broader reach than Title VII, but this disparity is a consequence of the different language Congress chose to employ. The better comparator for the ADEA is the FLSA, which also ranks States and political subdivisions as employers regardless of the num- ber of employees they have. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has, for 30 years, interpreted the ADEA to cover political subdivisions regardless of size, and a majority of the States impose age discrimination proscriptions on political subdivisions with no numerical threshold. Pp. 4–6.
In short, if you're an employee plaintiff, it really helps to have a strong textual argument.
Thursday, November 1, 2018
Many thanks to Aaron Halegua for sending word of this labor dispute in Myanmar. As many of you know, I visited Myanmar last month to meet with labor leaders. This article describes the prototypical labor strike in Myanmar. The vast majority of strikes occur because an employer fires workers who are (or who the employer believes are) trying to organize workers. Laws protecting workers from retaliation for union activity are weak, and employers feel free to fire such workers with impunity. Often the employer is a Chinese company, which is significant because in theory community-based mediation is available, and managers at a Chinese company aren't concerned about their standing in the local community. The tension escalates until the workers use the only tool available to them -- a strike -- which often results in bloodshed.
Here's an excerpt from the article, originally in the Irrawaddy, picked up by Reuters:
Dozens of striking workers from a Chinese-owned garment factory in Myanmar marched to a government compound in Yangon on Monday, securing a late-night meeting with the city’s chief minister, as part of efforts to get sacked colleagues reinstated.
Staff from Fu Yuen Ltd factory, on the outskirts of the commercial capital of Yangon, have been demonstrating alongside other labor activists since August, after 30 members of a trade union were fired.
This month, dozens of Fu Yuen workers were injured when iron-wielding assailants attacked a crowd gathered outside the factory. Police said a fight had broken out after protesters urged employees still working to join them.
Myanmar’s textile industry is its top export earner after oil and gas, employing more than 450,000 people and generating more than $2 billion in exports last year.
Wednesday, October 31, 2018
Thanks to Paul Harpur (U. Queensland - Beirne Law) for sending word that today, the Australian State of Queensland introduced a new Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld) before Parliament. As Queensland has only one House of Parliament, where the government currently has a majority, it is almost certain this bill will soon become law.
The Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld) declares that Queenslanders have 21 Civil and political rights and two Economic, social, and cultural rights. Many of these rights are relevant to university students and workers/labour in Queensland. On the labor side, thee rights include:
- Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief,
- Freedom from forced work,
- Freedom of expression, and
- Peaceful assembly and freedom of association
On the education side, the right is extended, beyond K-12, to a right to “have access, based on the person’s abilities, to further vocational education and training that is equally accessible to all.” Ability equality is a concept that disability rights scholars across the globe have been arguing for. In Queensland, for example, Paul testified in 2018 to a Queensland Parliamentary Committee, arguing that the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is the declaration of ability equality.
Some recent labor and employment news:
- Wages look like they're finally rising in a significant way. A DOL report showed an almost 3% increase in wages for this time last year, which outpaces inflation and is the highest increase in a decade.
- A couple of joint-employer items. First, the NLRB has extended the time to comment on a proposed new rule to Dec. 13. Also, the tussle between Congressional Democrats and the Board over the proposed change continues. As this Bloomberg Law (subscription required) article details, the Democrats want evidence supporting the claim that the current, broader joint-employer test is causing the problems that critics claim. This touches on a broader area--the NLRB is really bad at using actual evidence to support its policy views. Some of this is the legacy of the ban on economic analysis (which is so stupid--why in the name of all that is rational can't we have a bipartisan agreement that analysis is useful for labor law, like, say, the rest of the government?). But some of this, frankly, is just lazy. There's nothing stopping the Board from citing others' studies, which it does far less that it could. And this is an equal-opportunity offense. Although some members have been better on this, Board from both parties tend to be woefully inadequate on this score.
- As is the case when the White House changes parties, the DOL has been adjusting how it regulates union finance requirements. Unsurprisingly, they're ratcheting up the requirements by increasing the number of entities covered and expanding what covered entities need to provide. This is shades of the Bush II administration, where the changes were challenged in court. Expect the same here.
- The General Counsel has announced that it's changing its approach to allegations of union negligence. In contrast to the long-standing deferential approach the Board has taken, the GC says he will now prosecute unions for negligence under Section 8(b)(1)(A) (for failure of the duty of fair representation) when it does things like lose a complaint or fails to return a call.
Tuesday, October 30, 2018
Joe Seiner just his latest article, The Discrimination Presumption, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. __ (2019) (Forthcoming), on SSRN. The short version--everyone's had it wrong and Twombley & Iqbal don't apply to Title VII. The abstract:
Employment discrimination is a fact in our society. Scientific studies continue to show that employer misconduct in the workplace is pervasive. This social science research is further supported by governmental data and litigation statistics. Even in the face of this evidence, however, it has never been more difficult to successfully bring a claim of employment discrimination. After the Supreme Court’s controversial decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), all civil litigants must sufficiently plead enough facts to give rise to a plausible claim. Empirical studies show that this plausibility test has been rigidly applied in the employment context, creating a heightened pleading standard for workplace plaintiffs. This paper argues that Twombly and Iqbal are largely irrelevant for employment discrimination claims. As employment discrimination is a fact, most allegations of workplace misconduct are plausible on their face, rendering these Supreme Court cases meaningless for this subset of claims. This Article summarizes the overwhelming number of social science studies which demonstrate the fact of employment discrimination, and this paper also synthesizes the governmental data and litigation in this field. This Article offers a model framework that the courts and litigants can use to evaluate workplace claims, taking into consideration the widespread scientific research in this area. This proposed model navigates the Supreme Court decisions and federal rules and provides a new approach to pleading employment claims, where the fact of discrimination is presumed. This Article concludes by situating the proposed framework in the context of the broader academic scholarship.
Check it out!
Tuesday, October 16, 2018
Amazon has long been known as a high-tech Moneyball employer, striving to make data-driven decision when possible. But this week shows that there are limits to that approach. After working since 2014 to develop AI-driven hiring algorithms, Amazon recently abandoned that approach. The reason? The algorithms were biased against women. This is an issue that several folks, including Rick Bales, have been talking about (and is a small part of a larger tech project I'm working on), and isn't a surprise given the dearth of women in the tech industry. This is the classic garbage-in-garbage-out issue. Amazon was training its algorithms based on resumes it has received, and because men disproportionally applied to the company, the algorithms were spitting out decisions that undervalued women; indeed, they were specifically penalizing resumes that included references to women. If Amazon or other companies want to use AI (really Machine Learning) for hiring, they should first use the technology to analyze its current hiring practices to try to root out pre-existing bias. Only once that's addressed does AI have even the hope of being effective.
To be clear: Amazon says that it never actually used the algorithms for actual hiring decisions. It wasn't for a lack of trying though. Amazon realized what was going on in 2015, but didn't disband the program until the start of last year. In other words, despite working for quite a while to eliminate the bias, they couldn't do it to their satisfaction. That a company like Amazon couldn't pull this off should serve as a strong warning to everyone about the limits of AI. I'm actually more optimistic on AI's eventual potential to reduce employment discrimination than many, but I am still extremely cautious about the technology. There's definitely a right way and wrong way to use it and, as Amazon shows, the right way can be really hard. As a result, I think the greatest risk of AI in personnel decisions is its misuse by companies that are too lazy, cheap, or blinded by the shiny object that is AI to realize that is is only a tool and, like other tools, can be used the wrong way.
Saturday, October 13, 2018
ILERA is pleased to announce the third call for book proposals with the theme of comparative labour and employment relations. The term “labour and employment relations” will be interpreted broadly to include all aspects of work including labour policy, labour market analysis, labour relations and collective bargaining, human resource management, and work- and workplace- related topics. Book proposals by a single author, multiple authors, or edited volumes will all be welcome. Books in this series will be published by ILERA in English, French or Spanish, based on the language of the manuscripts received.
A Committee of Editors was established under the leadership of Prof. Mia Rönnmar (Lund University, Sweden), President-Elect of ILERA, who will act as Editor-in Chief. Editorial members include: Prof. Anil Verma (University of Toronto, Canada), Prof. Annette Jobert (ENS Cachan, France), and Prof. Cecilia Senén González (University of Buenos Aires, Argentina).
To encourage members to submit high-quality book proposals, ILERA provides an incentive of USD 5,000 as a contribution towards the expenses of preparing a manuscript which is accepted for publication. Future book royalties will accrue to ILERA.
The deadline for submission of the book proposal has been extended to 30 November 2018.
Proposals should elaborate on the following headlines:
- a brief description of the themes of the book;
- its contribution to existing knowledge in the field;
- its novelty compared with similar previous books;
- a summary of the structure and contents of the book;
- the names, full contact details and institutional affiliations of the authors and editors (if necessary);
- a curriculum vitae of all contributors; and
- a proposed time-table for completion of the manuscript.
Julia Belian (Detroit Mercy) sends word of a call for papers for University of Detroit-Mercy Law Review's extraordinarily timely Women in the Law Symposium. Here are the details:
The Detroit Mercy Law Review will host its 2019 Symposium, Women and the Law, on Mar. 8, 2019. The deadline for proposals is Nov. 9, 2018 at 5:00pm EST.
Possible topics include, but are not limited to: the history of women in the law, how women have impacted the law, how the law impacts women today, how future legal decisions could affect women’s rights (e.g. if Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) were to be overturned), what challenges women still face in the legal profession, the role of gender in the law, and any other topic regarding women and the law. Proposals should be approximately 250-500 words, double-spaced, and detail the proposed topic and presentation. Submit to Samantha Buck, Symposium Director, at firstname.lastname@example.org. Please indicate whether your proposal is for a presentation only or if you would also like to publish an article with the Detroit Mercy Law Review on your presentation topic. If you are interested in submitting an article, it will be due to the Law Review on Friday, Mar.15, 2019. Please submit a current CV or resume along with your proposal. We will notify chosen speakers by Nov. 30, 2018. Preference will be given to those willing to submit an article for publication.
Wednesday, October 10, 2018
Meanwhile, back in Kentucky, employers are thinking about next steps in the wake of Northern Kentucky Area Development District v. Synder, decided Sept. 27, 2018. There, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 ("FAA") does not preempt a Kentucky statute that, among other things, bans employers from making arbitration of employment disputes a condition of employment. Given how at least four US Supreme Court Justices may want to read the FAA, Synder might soon be headed to Washington.
The background: The FAA provides that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. The US Supreme Court today reads this as "a sort of 'equal-treatment' rule for arbitration contracts" that preempts any law that discriminates against arbitration, either on its face or covertly, such as by interfering with some fundamental attributes of arbitration. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018).
In 1994, the Kentucky legislature enacted this statute:
[N]o employer shall require as a condition or precondition of employment that any employee or person seeking employment waive, arbitrate, or otherwise diminish any existing or future claim, right, or benefit to which the employee or person seeking employment would otherwise be entitled under any provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes or any federal law.
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 336.700(2). About a year later, the Sixth Circuit read the FAA workers exemption, 9 U.S.C. § 1, to cover only transportation workers. Asplundh v. Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 600-02 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)(adopting this view).
Some years later, the lawsuit: After getting fired, Danielle Synder sued her former employer, a State government entity, for violating State whistleblower and wage-and-hour law. The employer sought to compel arbitration pursuant to the mandatory arbitration clause in her employment contract. The lower courts denied the employer's motion on the ground that Ky. Rev. Stat. § 336.700(2) had rendered that clause unenforceable.
So, why doesn't the FAA preempt that statute? In Synder, the Kentucky Supreme Court reasoned that the statute satisfied the FAA's equal-treatment rule, for two main reasons. First, the statutes doesn't single out arbitration clauses. Rather, it treats arbitration as only an example of an agreement that tends to "diminish" a worker's rights, claims, or benefits ("waive, arbitration, or otherwise diminish"). Other examples include "an agreement whereby the employee waives the ability to file a [Kentucky Whistleblower Act] claim against the employer, or an agreement that limits the amount of damages the employee can recover against the employer." Slip Op. at 12. This reasoning implies that the FAA permits Kentucky's statute even though the US Supreme Court reads the FAA as endorsing the idea that employment arbitration does not tend to diminish workers' legal protections.
Second, the statute "only proscribes conditioning employment on agreement to arbitration, not the act of agreeing to arbitration." Slip Op. at 9. Thus, the statute does not "invalidate arbitration contracts because they are arbitration contracts; KRS 336.700(2) only invalidates arbitration contracts when the employer evidences an intent to fire or refuse to hire an employee because of that employee’s unwillingness to sign such a contract. This is not an attack on the arbitration agreement—it is an attack on the employer for basing employment decisions on whether the employee is willing to sign an arbitration agreement." Id. at 11. In this respect, the statute is a generally-applicable "antiemployment discrimination provision." Id. at 12. The premise here: Making employment arbitration mandatory (a condition of employment) isn't a fundamental attribute of such arbitration.
In so reasoning, the Kentucky Supreme Court did not follow the plaintiff's lead. She'd argued more narrowly: Because her former employer was a political subdivision of the State, the FAA couldn't be read to supplant statutory restrictions on her government employer's powers without raising concerns of "federalism and the Tenth Amendment." It's unclear how much that litigating position will affect the odds that, if asked, the US Supreme Court will hear this case.
Tuesday, October 9, 2018
Last week (yeah, I'm still catching up), the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido. It's one of those technical cases that hinges on textual question's about the ADEA's definition of "employer." In particular, at issue is whether the ADEA's usual 20-employee small employer exception applies to government employers. There's no question that the exception applies to private employers, but because of the way the provision is written, its application to public employers is less clear. Because the text is so important, let me quote the relevant part (Sec. 11(b)):
(b) The term “employer” means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year: Provided, That prior to June 30, 1968, employers having fewer than fifty employees shall not be considered employers. The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency, but such term does not include the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States.
As you can see, the small-employer exception is in a separate sentence from the sentence that includes public employers under the ADEA. That's what the plaintiffs stress and the 9th Circuit held. But four other circuits went the other way, holding that "person" includes public employers. Charlotte Garden's (Seattle) provided an argument analysis in SCOTUSblog. Although she's too wise to make a prediction, I'm going to go out on a limb and say that I think the plaintiff is going to win this one. Not unanimous, but questions from some of the conservative justices (e.g., Roberts) makes me think that the more grammatical reading of the text is going to win the day. Also, I hope someone mentions to Justice Alito that if the Court is going to align the ADEA's coverage to Title VII's simply because they were enacted a couple of years apart from each other, then the Court needs to overrule all of its cases where it expressly rejected that argument when it came to interpreting the 1991 Civil Rights Act Amendments (e.g., Nasser and Gross).
Saturday, October 6, 2018
Wednesday, October 3, 2018
John Howe (University of Melbourne) writes to remind us that the deadline for submitting paper ideas to present at the Fourth Labour Law Research Network Conference is October 15. You can get more info about the conference here: Download LLRN4 Valparaiso - Call for Papers).I The conference will be from June 23-25 in Valparaiso, Chile.
I went to the first LLRN conference in Barcelona, which was very interesting. From what I've heard, they're only getting better, so submit your ideas soon.
Tuesday, October 2, 2018
Robert Iofalla at Bloomberg Law has an interesting article out today looking at the number of times the NLRB's new joint-employer test in Browning-Ferris has been applied. As readers know, there has been a lot of handwringing over this test. But according to the article, it's been applied in only 14 out of almost 1,100 ALJ and Regional Director cases since it was issued in 2015. But it's unclear what that figure means.
As the article points out, there are two ways to look at this. On one hand, it may mean that Browning-Ferris isn't that big of a deal and that employers easily adjusted to the new standard or, as was likely the case for the majority of businesses, the changed standard didn't affect them in the first place. On the other hand, the number of cases invoking Browning-Ferris doesn't capture its full impact, as businesses may have made significant changes to stay in compliance. I suspect there's truth to both views. For instance, the 14 cases almost certainly doesn't capture the new rule's full impact; it's impossible to believe that far more businesses didn't at least have Browning-Ferris as a consideration when making relevant decisions since 2015. However, this also reflects that the histrionics that followed Browning-Ferris--predicting the demise of franchising and the like--were grossly exaggerated. As the Board explained in Browning-Ferris, it was returning to an earlier version of the joint-employer rule and the changes it made from the immediately prior standard were not so great that it would fundamentally change business models like franchising.
Time may tell whether we'll see further evidence of Browning-Ferris' impact. Or not, if the tea leaves are correct that the NLRB will reverse it soon.