Friday, October 30, 2020
On October 29, Egypt deposited its instrument of ratification for the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Multilateral Convention or MLI), which now covers almost 1700 bilateral tax treaties, with the OECD’s Secretary-General, Angel Gurría, thus underlining its strong commitment to prevent the abuse of tax treaties and base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) by multinational enterprises. The MLI will enter into force on 1 January 2021 for Egypt.
With 94 jurisdictions currently covered by the MLI, this ratification now brings to 54 the number of jurisdictions which have ratified, accepted or approved it. The Convention will become effective on 1 January 2021 for over 600 treaties concluded among the 54 jurisdictions, with an additional 1100 treaties to become effectively modified once the MLI will have been ratified by all Signatories. The text of the Multilateral Convention, the explanatory statement, background information, database, and positions of each signatory are available at http://oe.cd/mli.
Sunday, October 11, 2020
The OECD has released the outcomes of the third phase of peer reviews of the BEPS Action 13 Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting initiative, demonstrating strong progress in continuing efforts to improve the taxation of multinational enterprises (MNEs) worldwide.
CbC reporting, one of the four minimum standards of the BEPS Project, requires tax administrations to collect and share detailed information on all large MNEs doing business in their country. Information collected includes the amount of revenue reported, profit before income tax, and income tax paid and accrued, as well as the stated capital, accumulated earnings, number of employees and tangible assets, broken down by jurisdiction. CbC reporting provides an unprecedented level of transparency to tax administrations worldwide. As a result, tax administrations, often for the first time, will have received detailed information on all large MNEs doing business in their country. As CbC Reporting is one of the four minimum standards of the BEPS Project, all members of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS have committed to implement it, and to have their compliance with the standard reviewed and monitored by their peers. This is to ensure a timely and consistent implementation across the world, which is key to the success of CbC reporting.
This third annual peer review considers implementation of the CbC reporting minimum standard by jurisdictions as of April 2020. Highlights include:
- Coverage increased to 131 jurisdictions. The peer review includes a comprehensive examination of 131 Inclusive Framework members. A small number of members were not included in this review either because they recently joined the Inclusive Framework or they faced capacity constraints, but these will be reviewed as soon as possible.
- Practically all MNEs that are over the threshold for filing are now covered. Over 90 jurisdictions have already introduced legislation to impose a filing obligation on MNE groups, covering almost all MNE Groups with consolidated group revenue at or above the threshold of EUR 750 million. Remaining Inclusive Framework members are working towards finalising their domestic legal frameworks with the support of the OECD.
- Implementation largely consistent with BEPS Action 13. Where legislation is in place, the implementation of CbC Reporting has been found largely consistent with the Action 13 minimum standard.
- Jurisdictions acting on prior recommendations. A large number of recommendations made in the first two peer review phases have now been addressed and these recommendations have been removed.
- Over 2500 exchange relationships now in place. Exchanges of CbC reports began in June 2018 and more than 2500 bilateral relationships for CbC exchanges are now in place.
In addition, work progresses on the 2020 review of the CbC reporting minimum standard, to be completed this year. This will take into account feedback received from a public consultation, including a meeting held in May 2020 via Zoom with around 270 participants from business and non-business stakeholders.
Wednesday, July 29, 2020
This is the fourth annual progress report of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS. The report describes the progress made to deliver on the mandate of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, covering the period from July 2019 to July 2020, while also taking stock of the progress made since BEPS implementation began.
The report contains an overview and four sections of substantive content. Part I focuses on inclusivity and support for developing countries. Part II describes the progress made on strengthening coherence. Part III describes the progress made on substance. Part IV describes the progress made with respect to evaluation, transparency and tax certainty. These are followed by two annexes providing information on the membership of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS (Annex A) and the text of the Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy as agreed in January 2020 (Annex B).
Friday, July 17, 2020
Oman deposited its instrument of ratification for the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Multilateral Convention or MLI) with the OECD’s Secretary-General, Angel Gurría, thus underlining its strong commitment to prevent the abuse of tax treaties and base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) by multinational enterprises. For Oman, the MLI will enter into force on 1 November 2020.
With 94 jurisdictions currently covered by the MLI, today’s ratification by Oman now brings to 49 the number of jurisdictions which have ratified, accepted or approved it.
The text of the Multilateral Convention, the explanatory statement, background information, database, and positions of each signatory are available at http://oe.cd/mli.
Texas A&M University School of Law has launched its online international tax risk management graduate curricula for industry professionals.
Wednesday, July 15, 2020
Scroll down to paragraph 241-245 for the application of arm's length to the Irish branches, paras 255-309, and then paragraph 322 for the analysis of the application of the TNMM transfer pricing method - The most relevant parts excerpted from the EU General Court's decision are on my WordPress blog here
(ii) Whether the Commission correctly applied the Authorised OECD Approach in its primary line of reasoning
241 Ireland and ASI and AOE submit, in essence, that the Commission’s primary line of reasoning is inconsistent with the Authorised OECD Approach, inasmuch as the Commission considered that the profits relating to the Apple Group’s IP licences should necessarily have been allocated to the Irish branches of ASI and AOE, in so far as the executives of ASI and AOE did not perform active or critical functions with regard to the management of those licences.
242 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the Authorised OECD Approach..., the aim of the analysis in the first step is to identify the assets, functions and risks that must be allocated to the permanent establishment of a company on the basis of the activities actually performed by that company. It is true that the analysis in that first step cannot be carried out in an abstract manner that ignores the activities and functions performed within the company as a whole. However, the fact that the Authorised OECD Approach requires an analysis of the functions actually performed within the permanent establishment is at odds with the approach adopted by the Commission consisting, first, in identifying the functions performed by the company as a whole without conducting a more detailed analysis of the functions actually performed by the branches and, second, in presuming that the functions had been performed by the permanent establishment when those functions could not be allocated to the head office of the company itself.
243 In its primary line of reasoning the Commission considered, in essence, that the profits of ASI and AOE relating to the Apple Group’s IP (which, according to the Commission’s line of argument, represented a very significant part of the total profit of those two companies) had to be allocated to the Irish branches in so far as ASI and AOE had no employees capable of managing that IP outside those branches, without, however, establishing that the Irish branches had performed those management functions.
245 In those circumstances, as is rightly argued by Ireland and ASI and AOE ..., it must be found that the Commission erred in its application, in its primary line of reasoning, of the functional and factual analysis of the activities performed by the branches of ASI and AOE, on which the application of section 25 of the TCA 97 by the Irish tax authorities is based and which corresponds, in essence, to the analysis provided for by the Authorised OECD Approach.
(1) Strategic decision-making within the Apple Group
298 Ireland and ASI and AOE claim that the ‘centre of gravity’ of the Apple Group’s activities was in Cupertino and not in Ireland. All strategic decisions, in particular those concerning the design and development of the Apple Group’s products, were taken, in accordance with an overall business strategy covering the group as a whole, in Cupertino. That centrally decided strategy was implemented by the companies of the group, which include ASI and AOE, which acted through their management bodies, much like any other company, according to the rules of company law applicable to them.
299 In that regard, it should be noted, in particular, that ASI and AOE submitted evidence, in the administrative procedure and in support of their pleadings in the present instance, on the centralised nature of the strategic decisions within the Apple Group taken by directors in Cupertino and then implemented subsequently by the various entities of the group, such as ASI and AOE. Those centralised procedures concern, inter alia, pricing, accounting decisions, financing and treasury and cover all of the international activities of the Apple Group that would have been decided centrally under the direction of the parent company, Apple Inc.
300 More specifically, with regard to decisions in the field of R&D — which is, in particular, the functional area behind the Apple Group’s IP — ASI and AOE provided evidence showing that decisions relating to the development of the products which were then to be marketed by, inter alia, ASI and AOE, and concerning the R&D strategy which was to be followed by, inter alia, ASI and AOE had been taken and implemented by executives of the group based in Cupertino. It is also apparent from that evidence that the strategies relating to new product launches and, in particular, the organisation of distribution on the European markets in the months leading up to the proposed launch date had been managed at the Apple-Group level by, inter alia, the Executive Team under the direction of the Chief Executive Officer in Cupertino.
301 In addition, it is apparent from the file that contracts with third-party original equipment manufacturers (‘OEMs’), which were responsible for the manufacture of a large proportion of the products sold by ASI, were negotiated and signed by the parent company, Apple Inc., and ASI through their respective directors, either directly or by power of attorney. ASI and AOE also submitted evidence regarding the negotiations and the signing of contracts with customers, such as telecommunications operators, which were responsible for a significant proportion of the retail sales of Apple-branded products, in particular mobile phones. It is apparent from that evidence that the negotiations in question were led by directors of the Apple Group and that the contracts were signed on behalf of the Apple Group by Apple Inc. and ASI through their respective directors, either directly or by power of attorney.
302 Consequently, in so far as it has been established that the strategic decisions — in particular those concerning the development of the Apple Group’s products underlying the Apple Group’s IP — were taken in Cupertino on behalf of the Apple Group as a whole, the Commission erred when it concluded that the Apple Group’s IP was necessarily managed by the Irish branches of ASI and AOE, which held the licences for that IP.
(2) Decision-making by ASI and AOE
303 With regard to ASI and AOE’s ability to take decisions concerning their essential functions through their management bodies, the Commission itself accepted that those companies had boards of directors which held regular meetings during the relevant period, and reproduced extracts from the minutes of those meetings confirming that fact in Tables 4 and 5 of the contested decision.
304 The fact that the minutes of the board meetings do not give details of the decisions concerning the management of the Apple Group’s IP licences, of the cost-sharing agreement and of important business decisions does not mean that those decisions were not taken.
305 The summary nature of the extracts from the minutes reproduced by the Commission in Tables 4 and 5 of the contested decision is sufficient to allow the reader to understand how the company’s key decisions in each tax year, such as approval of the annual accounts, were taken and recorded in the relevant board minutes.
306 The resolutions of the boards of directors which were recorded in those minutes covered regularly (that is to say, several times a year), inter alia, the payment of dividends, the approval of directors’ reports and the appointment and resignation of directors. In addition, less frequently, those resolutions concerned the establishment of subsidiaries and powers of attorney authorising certain directors to carry out various activities such as managing bank accounts, overseeing relations with governments and public bodies, carrying out audits, taking out insurance, hiring, purchasing and selling assets, taking delivery of goods and dealing with commercial contracts. Moreover, it is apparent from those minutes that individual directors were granted very wide managerial powers.
307 In addition, with regard to the cost-sharing agreement, it is apparent from the information submitted by ASI and AOE that the various versions of that agreement in existence during the relevant period were signed by members of the respective boards of directors of those companies in Cupertino.
308 Moreover, according to the detailed information provided by ASI and AOE, it is the case for both ASI and AOE that, among ASI’s 14 directors and AOE’s 8 directors on their respective boards for each tax year during the period when the contested tax rulings were in force, there was only one director who was based in Ireland.
309 Consequently, the Commission erred when it considered that ASI and AOE, through their management bodies, in particular their boards of directors, did not have the ability to perform the essential functions of the companies in question by, where appropriate, delegating their powers to individual executives who were not members of the Irish branches’ staff.
(d) Conclusions concerning the activities within the Apple Group
310 It is apparent from the foregoing considerations that, in the present instance, the Commission has not succeeded in showing that, in the light, first, of the activities and functions actually performed by the Irish branches of ASI and AOE and, second, of the strategic decisions taken and implemented outside of those branches, the Apple Group’s IP licences should have been allocated to those Irish branches when determining the annual chargeable profits of ASI and AOE in Ireland.
The EU General Court of Justice press release described its decision as follows: In 2016 the Commission adopted a decision concerning two tax rulings issued by the Irish tax authorities (Irish Revenue) on 29 January 1991 and 23 May 2007 in favor of Apple Sales International (ASI) and Apple Operations Europe (AOE), which were companies incorporated in Ireland but not tax resident in Ireland. The contested tax rulings endorsed the methods used by ASI and AOE to determine their chargeable profits in Ireland, relating to the trading activity of their respective Irish branches. The 1991 tax ruling remained in force until 2007, when it was replaced by the 2007 tax ruling. The 2007 tax ruling then remained in force until Apple’s new business structure was implemented in Ireland in 2014.
By its decision, the Commission considered that the tax rulings in question constituted State aid unlawfully put into effect by Ireland. The aid was declared incompatible with the internal market. The Commission demanded the recovery of the aid in question. According to the Commission’s calculations, Ireland had granted Apple 13 billion euro in unlawful tax advantages.
By today’s judgment, the General Court annuls the contested decision because the Commission did not succeed in showing to the requisite legal standard that there was an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. According to the General Court, the Commission was wrong to declare that ASI and AOE had been granted a selective economic advantage and, by extension, State aid.
The General Court endorses the Commission’s assessments relating to normal taxation under the Irish tax law applicable in the present instance, in particular having regard to the tools developed within the OECD, such as the arm’s length principle, in order to check whether the level of chargeable profits endorsed by the Irish tax authorities corresponds to that which would have been obtained under market conditions.
However, the General Court considers that the Commission incorrectly concluded, in its primary line of reasoning, that the Irish tax authorities had granted ASI and AOE an advantage as a result of not having allocated the Apple Group intellectual property licences held by ASI and AOE, and, consequently, all of ASI and AOE’s trading income, obtained from the Apple Group’s sales outside North and South America, to their Irish branches. According to the General Court, the Commission should have shown that that income represented the value of the activities actually carried out by the Irish branches themselves, in view of, inter alia, the activities and functions actually performed by the Irish branches of ASI and AOE, on the one hand, and the strategic decisions taken and implemented outside of those branches, on the other.
In addition, the General Court considers that the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating, in its subsidiary line of reasoning, methodological errors in the contested tax rulings which would have led to a reduction in ASI and AOE’s chargeable profits in Ireland. Although the General Court regrets the incomplete and occasionally inconsistent nature of the contested tax rulings, the defects identified by the Commission are not, in themselves, sufficient to prove the existence of an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Furthermore, the General Court considers that the Commission did not prove, in its alternative line of reasoning, that the contested tax rulings were the result of discretion exercised by the Irish tax authorities and that, accordingly, ASI and AOE had been granted a selective advantage.
This case will be analyzed and included in William Byrnes' annually update of his 4th Edition of Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing. The next supplement will contain 50 chapters of 2,000 pages of technical, jurisprudence, and regulatory analysis to advise clients from a tax risk management perspective and to mitigate controversy. Order a copy here: https://store.lexisnexis.com/products/practical-guide-to-us-transfer-pricing-skuusSku60720
[download entire Apple State Aid CJEU decision 15 July 2020]
Friday, July 10, 2020
New OECD CbCR corporate tax statistics data crunch with analysis of activities of multinational enterprises
New data, released today, provides aggregated information on the global tax and economic activities of nearly 4,000 multinational enterprise (MNE) groups headquartered in 26 jurisdictions and operating across more than 100 jurisdictions worldwide.
The data, released in the OECD’s annual Corporate Tax Statistics publication, is a major output based on the Country-by-Country Reporting requirements for MNEs under the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project.
The BEPS Project has seen more than 135 jurisdictions collaborating to tackle tax avoidance strategies by MNEs that exploit gaps and mismatches in international tax rules to avoid paying tax. Under Country-by-Country Reporting, large MNEs are required to disclose important information about their profits, tangible assets, employees as well as where they pay their taxes, in every country in which they operate. Country-by-Country reports (CbCRs) provide tax authorities with the information needed to analyse MNE behaviour for risk assessment purposes, and with the release of today’s anonymised and aggregated statistics will support the improved measurement and monitoring of BEPS.
The anonymised and aggregated CbCR statistics for 2016 have been provided to the OECD by member jurisdictions of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS. This new dataset contains a vast array of aggregated data on the global tax and economic activities of MNEs, including profit before income tax, income tax paid (on a cash basis), current year income tax accrued, unrelated and related party revenues, number of employees, tangible assets and the main business activity (or activities) of MNEs.
While the data contain some limitations and it is not possible to detect trends in BEPS behaviour from a single year of data, the new statistics suggest a number of preliminary insights:
- There is a misalignment between the location where profits are reported and the location where economic activities occur, with MNEs in investment hubs reporting a relatively high share of profits compared to their share of employees and tangible assets.
- Revenues per employee tend to be higher where statutory CIT rates are zero and in investment hubs.
- On average, the share of related party revenues in total revenues is higher for MNEs in investment hubs.
- The composition of business activity differs across jurisdiction groups, with the predominant business activity in investment hubs being “holding shares and other equity instruments”.
Noting the limitations of the data and that these observations could also reflect some commercial considerations, they are indicative of the existence of BEPS behaviour and reinforce the need to continue to address remaining BEPS issues as part of the Inclusive Framework’s work on Pillar 2 of the ongoing international efforts to address the tax challenges arising from digitalisation.
The new OECD analysis also shows that corporate income tax remains a significant source of tax revenues for governments across the globe, accounting for 14.6% of total tax revenues on average across the 93 jurisdictions in 2017, compared to 12.1% in 2000. Corporate taxation is even more important in developing countries, comprising on average 18.6% of all tax revenues in Africa and 15.5% in Latin America and the Caribbean, compared to 9.3% in the OECD.
This second edition of Corporate Tax Statistics also collects for the first time, information on controlled foreign company (CFC) rules, which are designed to ensure the taxation of certain categories of MNE income in the jurisdiction of the parent company in order to counter certain offshore structures that result in no or indefinite deferral of taxation (BEPS Action 3); as well as new data on interest limitation rules, which can assist in understanding progress related to the implementation of BEPS Action 4.
The publication and data are accessible at: https//oe.cd/corporate-tax-stats
A list of Frequently Asked Questions on CbCR is available at https://oe.cd/corporate-tax-stats-CbCR-FAQ
Texas A&M University School of Law has launched its online international tax risk management graduate curricula for industry professionals.
Texas A&M University is a public university, ranked in the top 20 universities by the Wall Street Journal / Times Higher Education university rankings, and is ranked 1st among public universities for its superior education at an affordable cost (Fiske, 2018) and ranked 1st of Texas public universities for best value (Money, 2018).
Friday, June 5, 2020
Platform for Collaboration on Tax releases toolkit to help developing countries tackle the complex issues around taxing offshore indirect transfers of assets
The Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT) released a Toolkit on the Taxation of Offshore Indirect Transfers (OIT) providing guidance on the design and implementation issues when one country seeks to tax gains on the sale of interests in an entity owning assets located in that country by an entity which is a tax resident in another country. This is the third Toolkit1 published by the PCT to provide guidance on areas of international taxation of particular concern to developing countries.
This toolkit addresses a concern of particular significance to developing countries, mostly but not exclusively natural resource rich countries—primarily from the perspective of the country where the underlying assets are located. Taxation of the indirect transfer of assets such as mineral rights, and other assets generating location specific such as licensing rights for telecommunications, has been the subject of protracted public interest. This topic is a concern in many developing countries, magnified by the revenue challenges that governments around the world face as a consequence of the COVID-19 crisis.
The significance of this issue was recognised in the development of the OECD led Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS (the "MLI"). The MLI includes a provision based upon the OECD and UN model tax conventions, for purposes of extending the reach of existing tax treaties to allocate rights to tax such indirect transfers to location countries, should treaty partners so choose.
The toolkit assesses the economic rationale for such an allocation of taxing rights on such transfers to the country where the underlying assets are located. The toolkit proposes that location countries may wish to tax offshore indirect transfers of at least those assets which are immovable—within the meaning of current UN and OECD model treaties—and perhaps additional assets that also generate location specific rents. If location countries do wish to extend taxing rights to such transfers the toolkit suggests two models for domestic legislation which such countries may adopt.
The first model seeks to tax the resident asset owner under the deemed disposal model- treating it as having realised the gain on the assets in question immediately before the transfer and reacquired the asset immediately after the transfer. The second model seeks to tax instead the non-resident seller of the asset. The toolkit also suggests a model definition of immovable property for the purposes of such domestic legislation and provides further guidance to support enforcement and collection.
This toolkit takes into account extensive comments received during two rounds of public consultation in 2017 and 2018 from numerous groups representing country authorities, civil society organisation and the private sector.
The launch of this toolkit will be complemented with a launch webinar in the coming weeks. French and Spanish versions of the toolkit will follow, as well as virtual learning opportunities based on the toolkit.
The PCT is a joint initiative of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank Group (WBG). More information can be found on the PCT's official website.
1 The PCT released a toolkit on Options for Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment in 2015, and another for Addressing Difficulties in Accessing Comparables Data for Transfer Pricing Analyses in 2017. Others are in varying stages of development and public comment.
Thursday, May 14, 2020
to prohibit the use of tax flow-through entities and the provision of trust services to high-risk third countries and EU Blacklisted jurisdictions
Loyens & Loeff writes that the Netherlands government proposal entails the following prohibitions:
- The prohibition to facilitate the use of a flow-through entity, which currently is one of the trust services under the Wtt 2018.
- It will be prohibited to enter into a business relationship or provide a trust service in case a client, object company or the UBO of a client or object company resides in or has its seat in (a) a high-risk third country or (b) a non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes. The original list of high-risk third countries adopted by the European Commission may be found here, more countries were added to the list in October 2017, December 2017 and July 2018. A list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes is kept by the EU Council and can be found here.
Proposals in Dutch from Dutch Ministry here
Tuesday, February 11, 2020
Final OECD Transfer Pricing Guidance on Financial Transactions: Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Actions 4, 8-10
The report is significant because it is the first time the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines include guidance on the transfer pricing aspects of financial transactions, which will contribute to consistency in the interpretation of the arm’s length principle and help avoid transfer pricing disputes and double taxation.
The guidance in this report describes the transfer pricing aspects of financial transactions. It also includes a number of examples to illustrate the principles discussed in the report. Section B provides guidance on the application of the principles contained in Section D.1 of Chapter I of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines to financial transactions. In particular, Section B.1 of this report elaborates on how the accurate delineation analysis under Chapter I applies to the capital structure of an MNE within an MNE group. It also clarifies that the guidance included in that section does not prevent countries from implementing approaches to address capital structure and interest deductibility under their domestic legislation. Section B.2 outlines the economically relevant characteristics that inform the analysis of the terms and conditions of financial transactions. Sections C, D and E address specific issues related to the pricing of financial transactions (e.g. treasury functions, intra-group loans, cash pooling, hedging, guarantees and captive insurance). This analysis elaborates on both the accurate delineation and the pricing of the controlled financial transactions. Finally, Section F provides guidance on how to determine a risk-free rate of return and a risk-adjusted rate of return.
Sections A to E of this report are included in the Guidelines as Chapter X. Section F is added to Section D.1.2.1 in Chapter I of the Guidelines, immediately following paragraph 1.106. The guidance describes the transfer pricing aspects of financial transactions and includes a number of examples to illustrate the principles discussed in this report.
Saturday, February 1, 2020
International community renews commitment to multilateral efforts to address tax challenges from digitalisation of the economy
The international community reaffirmed its commitment to reach a consensus-based long-term solution to the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy, and will continue working toward an agreement by the end of 2020, according to the Statement by the Inclusive Framework on BEPS released by the OECD Friday. Download Statement-by-the-oecd-g20-inclusive-framework-on-beps-january-2020
The Inclusive Framework on BEPS, which groups 137 countries and jurisdictions on an equal footing for multilateral negotiation of international tax rules, decided during its Jan. 29-30 meeting to move ahead with a two-pillar negotiation to address the tax challenges of digitalisation.
Participants agreed to pursue the negotiation of new rules on where tax should be paid ("nexus" rules) and on what portion of profits they should be taxed ("profit allocation" rules), on the basis of a "Unified Approach" on Pillar One, to ensure that MNEs conducting sustained and significant business in places where they may not have a physical presence can be taxed in such jurisdictions. The Unified Approach agreed by the Inclusive Framework draws heavily on the Unified Approach released by the OECD Secretariat in October 2019.
Endorsement of the Unified Approach is a significant step, as until now Inclusive Framework members have been considering three competing proposals to address the tax challenges of digitalisation. A Programme of Work agreed in May 2019 has been replaced with a revised Programme of Work under Pillar One, which outlines the remaining technical work and political challenges to deliver a consensus-based solution by the end of 2020, as mandated by the G20. Inclusive Framework members will next meet in July in Berlin, at which time political agreement will be sought on the detailed architecture of this proposal.
The Statement by the Inclusive Framework on BEPS takes note of a proposal to implement Pillar One on a "safe harbour" basis, as proposed in a December 3, 2019 letter from US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría. It recognises that many Inclusive Framework members have expressed concerns about the proposed "safe harbour" approach. The Statement also highlights other critical policy issues that must be agreed under Pillar One before a decision can be taken. The "safe harbour" issue is included in the list of remaining work, but a final decision on this issue will be deferred until the architecture of Pillar One has been agreed upon.
The Inclusive Framework also welcomed the significant progress made on the technical design of Pillar Two, which aims to address remaining BEPS issues and ensure that international businesses pay a minimum level of tax. They noted the further work that needs to be done on Pillar Two.
"It is more urgent than ever that countries address the tax challenges arising from digitalisation of the economy, and the only effective way to do that is to continue advancing toward a consensus-based multilateral solution to overhaul the international tax system," said OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría. "We welcome the Inclusive Framework’s decision to move forward in this arduous undertaking, but we also recognise that there are technical challenges to developing a workable solution as well as critical policy differences that need to be resolved in the coming months."
"The OECD will do everything it can to facilitate consensus, because we are convinced that failure to reach agreement would greatly increase the risk that countries will act unilaterally, with negative consequences on an already fragile global economy," Mr Gurría said.
The Inclusive Framework’s tax work on the digitalisation of the economy is part of wider efforts to restore stability and increase certainty in the international tax system, address possible overlaps with existing rules and mitigate the risks of double taxation.
The ongoing work will be presented in a new OECD Secretary-General Tax Report during the next meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 22-23 February.
Friday, December 20, 2019
Six new tables presenting data from Form 8975, Country-by-Country Report, and Form 8975 Schedule A, Tax Jurisdiction and Constituent Entity Information, are now available on SOI's Tax Stats Web page. The tables present data from the estimated population of corporate and partnership returns filed for Tax Year 2017. Five tables display the number of filers, revenues, profit, income taxes, earnings, number of employees, and tangible assets. The first three tables are classified by major geographic region and selected tax jurisdiction. The fourth table is classified by major industry group, geographic region, and select tax jurisdiction. The fifth table is classified by effective tax rate of multinational enterprise subgroups. A sixth table displays number of constituent entities classified by major geographic region, selected tax jurisdiction, and main business activities.
The following tables are available as Microsoft Excel® files.
Country-by-Country Report: Tax Jurisdiction Information
Data Presented: Number of Filers, Revenues, Profit, Income Taxes, Earnings, Number of Employees, Tangible Assets
|Classified by:||Major Geographic Region and Selected Tax Jurisdiction|
|Tax Years:||2017 | 2016|
|Classified by:||Major Geographic Region and Selected Tax Jurisdiction with Positive Profit Before Income Tax|
|Tax Years:||2017 | 2016|
|Classified by:||Major Geographic Region and Selected Tax Jurisdiction with Negative or Zero Profit Before Income Tax|
|Tax Years:||2017 | 2016|
|Classified by:||Major Industry Group, Geographic Region, and Selected Tax Jurisdiction|
|Tax Years:||2017 | 2016|
|Classified by:||Effective Tax Rate of Multinational Enterprise Sub-groups|
|Tax Years:||2017 | 2016|
Country-by-Country Report: Constituent Entities
Data Presented: Number of Constituent Entities
|Classified by:||Major Geographic Region, Selected Tax Jurisdiction, and Main Business Activities|
|Tax Years:||2017 | 2016|
William Byrnes’ 4th Edition of his industry-leading Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing treatise was published on December 19, 2019 by Matthew Bender LexisNexis. William Byrnes is the author or co-author of nine Lexis titles and an advisory board member of Law360’s International Tax journal.
William Byrnes’ completely revised 4th Edition Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing (2020) has been expanded to 2,000 pages of analyses and practice notes, 47 chapters divided over six parts: Part I: U.S. regulatory analysis, application of transfer pricing methods, and jurisprudence; Part II: OECD; Part III: United Nations; Part IV: European Union; Part V: Industry topics; and Part VI: Country practice and tax risk management. Professor Byrnes brings together 50 of the industry’s eminent transfer pricing counsel, economists, and financial accountants to provide a comprehensive two-volume “go-to” resource for tax risk management.
William Byrnes explained, “I am fortunate to be able to call upon and work with the industry’s leading transfer pricing professionals from firms such as Alston, Covington, Pillsbury, Jones Day, McDermott, Duff & Phelps, Miller Chevalier, PwC, KPMG, and multinational companies like Vertex and Veritas.” Sixty contributors add subject matter expertise on technical issues faced by tax and risk management counsel.
Last chance to join one of the case study teams for TRANSFER PRICING taught live online, using Zoom, by Dr. Lorraine Eden, Prof. William Byrnes, and many industry experts… The courses are for tax attorneys, accountants, or economists and count toward the Texas A&M’s INTERNATIONAL TAX Master degree (taught online).
The class of a maximum of 18 students will be grouped into teams of 3 students each. The 6 teams meet using Zoom to prepare a weekly presentation to respond to a real-world post-BEPS client study. Then all teams meet together online via Zoom twice each week at 8:00am Dallas time Wednesdays and Sundays to discuss and present the case study solutions. Students are provided without charge textbook materials, videos with PPT, and podcasts, and granted access to a large online law & business database library including Lexis, Bloomberg, IBFD, Kluwer/CCH, Thomson, among many other tax resources.
To apply for the transfer pricing courses and international tax courses, contact Jeff Green, Graduate Programs Coordinator, T: +1 (817) 212-3866, E: email@example.com or contact David Dye, Assistant Dean of Graduate Programs, T (817) 212-3954, E: firstname.lastname@example.org. Texas A&M Admissions website: https://law.tamu.edu/distance-education/international-tax (applications and previous university transcripts must be received by Admissions before Wednesday, January 8th at 5pm Texas time). Note that the university is closed for the holidays from Dec. 20 until Jan. 2, 2020.
Wednesday, December 18, 2019
Brazil has identified a clear pathway for bringing its existing transfer pricing framework into alignment with the international consensus, and is
weighing two options – immediate or gradual implementation, according to a new joint report by the OECD and Receita Federal, Brazil's federal revenue authority (RFB) .Convergence with the OECD transfer pricing standard requires full alignment with the OECD Guidelines, with a focus on the key areas outlined in Part I, but bearing in mind the need to retain and ensure simplicity, limit tax compliance costs and to ensure effective tax administration. The key consideration is how alignment should occur – immediately or gradually – and the related implications with respect to each option.
The main difference between the two options relates to the timing of the implementation. A similar amount of preparatory work will be necessary to achieve full alignment, but if alignment is achieved under the first option, the new rules will become applicable for all taxpayers immediately, meaning that the leadup to the entry into force of the new system will need to occur within a short timeframe with all different aspects of the system being rolled out simultaneously.
It is envisaged under the first scenario that the adoption of the new system in conformity with the OECD standard will occur in one time and replace in whole the existing framework with a directly effective and operational framework, as opposed to a staged approach in the second scenario.
Transfer Pricing in Brazil: Towards Convergence with the OECD Standard assesses the similarities and differences between Brazil's transfer pricing rules and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, which is the international consensus on transfer pricing.
Wednesday, September 25, 2019
The General Court annuls the Commission’s decision on the aid measure implemented by the Netherlands in favor of Starbucks (released by the Court)
For William Byrnes analysis of this State Aid controversy, see William Byrnes’ Starbucks State Aid Commentary: Boiling Down to the Essence of the Residual
The Commission was unable to demonstrate the existence of an advantage in favor of Starbucks
In 2008, the Netherlands tax authorities concluded an advance pricing arrangement (APA) with Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV (SMBV), part of the Starbucks group, which, inter alia, roasts coffees. The objective of that arrangement was to determine SMBV’s remuneration for its production and distribution activities within the group. Thereafter, SMBV’s remuneration served to determine annually its taxable profit on the basis of Netherlands corporate income tax. In addition, the APA endorsed the amount of the royalty paid by SMBV to Alki, another entity of the same group, for the use of Starbucks’ roasting IP. More specifically, the APA provided that the amount of the royalty to be paid to Alki corresponded to SMBV’s residual profit. The amount was determined by deducting SMBV’s remuneration, calculated in accordance with the APA, from SMBV’s operating profit.
In 2015, the Commission found that the APA constituted aid incompatible with the internal market and ordered the recovery of that aid.
The Netherlands and Starbucks brought an action before the General Court for annulment of the Commission’s decision. They principally dispute the finding that the APA conferred a selective advantage on SMBV.
More specifically, they criticize the Commission for (1) having used an erroneous reference system for the examination of the selectivity of the APA; (2) having erroneously examined whether there was an advantage in relation to an arm’s length principle particular to EU law and thereby violated the Member States’ fiscal autonomy; (3) having erroneously considered the choice of the transactional net margin method (TNMM) for determining SMBV’s remuneration to constitute an advantage; and (4) having erroneously considered the detailed rules for the application of that method as validated in the APA to confer an advantage on SMBV.
In today’s judgment, the General Court annuls the Commission’s decision.
First, the Court examined whether, for a finding of an advantage, the Commission was entitled to analyze the tax ruling at issue in the light of the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision.
In that regard, the Court notes in particular that, in the case of tax measures, the very existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation and that, in order to determine whether there is a tax advantage, the position of the recipient as a result of the application of the measure at issue must be compared with his position in the absence of the measure at issue and under the normal rules of taxation.
The Court goes on to note that the pricing of intra-group transactions is not determined under market conditions. It states that where national tax law does not make a distinction between integrated undertakings and stand-alone undertakings for the purposes of their liability to corporate income tax, that law is intended to tax the profit arising from the economic activity of such an integrated undertaking as though it had arisen from transactions carried out at market prices. The Court holds that, in those circumstances, when examining, pursuant to the power conferred on it by Article 107(1) TFEU, a fiscal measure granted to such an integrated company, the Commission may compare the fiscal burden of such an integrated undertaking resulting from the application of that fiscal measure with the fiscal burden resulting from the application of the normal rules of taxation under the national law of an undertaking placed in a comparable factual situation, carrying on its activities under market conditions.
The Court makes clear that the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision is a tool that allows it to check that intra-group transactions are remunerated as if they had been negotiated between independent companies. Thus, in the light of Netherlands tax law, that tool falls within the exercise of the Commission’s powers under Article 107 TFEU. The Commission was therefore, in the present case, in a position to verify whether the pricing for intragroup transactions accepted by the APA corresponds to prices that would have been negotiated under market conditions.
The Court therefore rejects the claim that the Commission erred in identifying an arm’s length principle as a criterion for assessing the existence of State aid.
Second, the Court reviewed the merits of the various lines of reasoning set out in the contested decision to demonstrate that, by endorsing a method for determining transfer pricing that did not result in an arm’s length outcome, the APA conferred an advantage on SMBV.
The Court began by examining the dispute as to the Commission’s principal reasoning. It notes that, in the context of its principal reasoning, the Commission found that the APA had erroneously endorsed the use of the TNMM. The Commission first stated that the transfer pricing report on the basis of which the APA had been concluded did not contain an analysis of the royalty which SMBV paid to Alki or of the price of coffee beans purchased by SMBV from SCTC, another entity of the group. Next, in examining the arm’s length nature of the royalty, the Commission applied the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP method). As a result of that analysis, the Commission considered that the amount of the royalty should have been zero. Last, the Commission considered, on the basis of SCTC’s financial data, that SMBV had overpaid for the coffee beans in the period between 2011 and 2014.
The Court holds that mere non-compliance with methodological requirements does not necessarily lead to a reduction of the tax burden and that the Commission would have had to demonstrate that the methodological errors identified in the APA did not allow a reliable approximation of an arm’s length outcome to be reached and that they led to a reduction of the tax burden.
As regards the error identified by the Commission in respect of the choice of the TNMM and not of the CUP method, the Court finds that the Commission did not invoke any element to support as such the conclusion that that choice had necessarily led to a result that was too low, without a comparison being carried out with the result that would have been obtained using the CUP method. The Commission therefore wrongly found that the mere choice of the TNMM, in the present case, conferred an advantage on SMBV.
Likewise, the Court states that the mere finding by the Commission that the APA did not analyze the royalty does not suffice to demonstrate that that royalty was not actually in conformity with the arm’s length principle.
As regards the amount of the royalty paid by SMBV to Alki, according to an analysis of SMBV’s functions in relation to the royalty and an analysis of comparable roasting agreements considered by the Commission in the contested decision, the Court finds that the Commission failed to demonstrate that the level of the royalty should have been zero or that it resulted in an advantage within the meaning of the Treaty.
As regards the price of green coffee beans, the Court notes that the price of those beans was an element of SMBV’s costs that was outside the scope of the APA and that, in any event, the Commission’s findings did not suffice to demonstrate the existence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU. The Court notes, in particular, that the Commission was not entitled to rely on matters subsequent to the conclusion of the APA.
The Court then examined the dispute as to the Commission’s subsidiary reasoning whereby the APA allegedly conferred an advantage on SMBV because the detailed rules for the application of the TNMM, as endorsed by the APA, were erroneous.
It finds that the Commission did not demonstrate that the various errors it identified in the detailed rules for the application of the TNMM conferred an advantage on SMBV, whether as regards the validation by the APA of the identification of SMBV as the tested entity for the purposes of the application of the TNMM, the choice of profit level indicator or the working capital adjustment and the exclusion of the costs of the unaffiliated manufacturing company.
Consequently, according to the Court, the Commission has not managed to demonstrate the existence of an economic advantage within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU.
For William Byrnes analysis of this State Aid controversy, see William Byrnes’ Starbucks State Aid Commentary: Boiling Down to the Essence of the Residual
Wednesday, July 24, 2019
Where does the residual value for "Just Do it" and the 'cool kids' retro branding of All Stars belong? I have received several requests in the U.S. about my initial thoughts on the EU Commission’s 56-page published (public version) State Aid preliminary decision with the reasoning that The Netherlands government provided Nike an anti-competitive subsidy via the tax system. My paraphrasing of the following EU Commission statement [para. 87] sums up the situation:
The Netherlands operational companies are remunerated with a low, but stable level of profit based on a limited margin on their total revenues reflecting those companies’ allegedly “routine” distribution functions. The residual profit generated by those companies in excess of that level of profit is then entirely allocated to Nike Bermuda as an alleged arm’s length royalty in return for the license of the Nike brands and other related IP”
The question that comes to my mind is: "Would I pay $100 for a canvas sneaker designed the 20's that I know is $12 to manufacture, distribute, and have enough markup for the discount shoe store to provide it shelf space?" My answer is: "Yes, I own two pair of Converse's Chuck Taylor All Stars." So why did I spend much more than I know them to be worth (albeit, I wait until heavily discounted and then only on clearance). From a global value chain perspective: "To which Nike function and unit does the residual value for the 'cool kids' retro branding of All Stars belong?"
U.S. international tax professionals operating in the nineties know that The Netherlands is a royalty conduit intermediary country because of its good tax treaty system and favorable domestic tax system, with the intangible profits deposited to take advantage of the U.S. tax deferral regime that existed until the TCJA of 2017 (via the Bermuda IP company). Nike U.S., but for the deferral regime, could have done all this directly from its U.S. operations to each country that Nike operates in. No other country could object, pre-BEPs, because profit split and marketing intangibles were not pushed by governments during transfer pricing audits.
The substantial value of Nike (that from which its profits derive) is neither the routine services provided by The Netherlands nor local wholesalers/distributors. The value is the intangible brand created via R&D and marketing/promotion. That brand allows a $10 – $20 retail price sneaker to sell retail for $90 – $200, depending on the country. Converse All-Stars case in point. Same $10 shoe as when I was growing up now sold for $50 – $60 because Converse branded All-Stars as cool kid retro fashion.
Nike has centralized, for purposes of U.S. tax deferral leveraging a good tax treaty network, the revenue flows through NL. The royalty agreement looks non-traditional because instead of a fixed price (e.g. 8%), it sweeps the NL profit account of everything but for the routine rate of return for the grouping of operational services mentioned in the State Aid opinion. If Nike was an actual Dutch public company, or German (like Addidas), or French – then Nike would have a similar result from its home country base because of the way its tax system allows exemption from tax for the operational foreign-sourced income of branches. [Having worked back in the mid-nineties on similar type companies that were European, this is what I recall but I will need to research to determine if this has been the case since the nineties.]
I suspect that when I research this issue above that the NL operations will have been compensated within an allowable range based on all other similar situated 3rd parties. I could examine this service by service but that would require much more information and data analysis about the services, and lead to a lesser required margin by Nike. The NL functions include [para 33]: “…regional headquarter functions, such as marketing, management, sales management (ordering and warehousing), establishing product pricing and discount policies, adapting designs to local market needs, and distribution activities, as well as bearing the inventory risk, marketing risk and other business risks.”
By example, the EU Commission states in its initial Nike news announcement:
Nike European Operations Netherlands BV and Converse Netherlands BV have more than 1,000 employees and are involved in the development, management and exploitation of the intellectual property. For example, Nike European Operations Netherlands BV actively advertises and promotes Nike products in the EMEA region, and bears its own costs for the associated marketing and sales activities.
Nike’s internal Advertising, Marketing, and Promotion (AMP) services can be benchmarked to its 3rd party AMP providers. But by no means do the local NL AMP services rise to the level of Nike’s chief AMP partner (and arguably a central key to its brand build) Wieden + Kennedy (renown for creating many industry branding campaigns but perhaps most famously for Nike’s “Just Do it” – inspired by the last words of death row inmate Gary Gilmore before his execution by firing squad).
There is some value that should be allocated for the headquarters management of the combination of services on top of the service by service approach. Plenty of competing retail industry distributors to examine though. If by example the profit margin range was a low of 2% to a high of 8% for the margin return for the combination of services, then Nike based on the EU Commission’s public information falls within that range, being around 5%.
The Commission contends that Nike designed its transfer pricing study to achieve a result to justify the residual sweep to its Bermuda deferral subsidiary. The EU Commission states an interesting piece of evidence that may support its decision [at para 89]: “To the contrary, those documents indicate that comparable uncontrolled transactions may have existed as a result of which the arm’s length level of the royalty payment would have been lower…”. If it is correct that 3rd party royalty agreements for major brand overly compensate local distributors, by example provide 15% or 20% profit margin for local operations, then Nike must also. [I just made these numbers up to illustrate the issue]
All the services seem, on the face of the EU Commission’s public document, routine to me but for “adapting designs to local market needs”. That, I think, goes directly to product design which falls under the R&D and Branding. There are 3rd parties that do exactly this service so it can be benchmarked, but its value I suspect is higher than by example ‘inventory risk management’. We do not know from the EU document whether this ‘adapting product designs to local market’ service was consistent with a team of product engineers and market specialists, or was it merely occasional and outsourced. The EU Commission wants, like with Starbucks, Nike to use a profit split method. “…a transfer pricing arrangement based on the Profit Split Method would have been more appropriate to price…”. Finally, the EU Commission asserts [para. 90]: “…even if the TNMM was the most appropriate transfer pricing method…. Had a profit level indicator been chosen that properly reflected the functional analysis of NEON and CN BV, that would have led to a lower royalty payment…”.
But for the potential product design issue, recognizing I have not yet researched this issue yet, based on what I know about the fashion industry, seems rather implausible to me that a major brand would give up part of its brand residual to a 3rd party local distributor. In essence, that would be like the parent company of a well-established fashion brand stating “Let me split the brand’s value with you for local distribution, even though you have not borne any inputs of creating the value”. Perhaps at the onset of a startup trying to create and build a brand? But not Nike in the 1990s. I think that the words of the dissenting Judge in Altera (9th Cir June 2019) are appropriate:
An ‘arm’s length result is not simply any result that maximizes one’s tax obligations’.
The EU Commission obviously does not like the Bermuda IP holding subsidiary arrangement that the U.S. tax deferral regime allows (the same issue of its Starbucks state aid attack), but that does not take away from the reality that legally and economically, Bermuda for purposes of the NL companies owns the Nike brand and its associated IP. The new U.S. GILTI regime combined with the FDII export incentive regime addresses the Bermuda structure, making it much somewhat less comparably attractive to operating directly from the U.S. (albeit still produces some tax arbitrage benefit). Perhaps the U.S. tax regime if it survives, in combination with the need for the protection of the IRS Competent Authority for foreign transfer pricing adjustments will lead to fewer Bermuda IP holding subsidiaries and more Delaware ones.
My inevitable problem with the Starbucks and Nike (U.S. IP deferral structures) state aid cases is that looking backward, even if the EU Commission is correct, it is a de minimis amount (the EU Commission already alleged a de minimis amount for Starbucks but the actual amount will be even less if any amount at all). Post-BEPS, the concept and understanding of marketing intangibles including brands is changing, as well as allowable corporate fiscal operational structures based on look-through (GILTI type) regimes. More effective in the long term for these type of U.S. IP deferral structures is for the EU Commission is to spend its compliance resources on a go-forward basis from 2015 BEPS to assist the restructuring of corporations and renegotiation of APAs, BAPAs, Multilateral PAs to fit in the new BEPS reality. These two cases seem more about an EU – U.S. tax policy dispute than the actual underlying facts of the cases. And if as I suspect that EU companies pre-BEPS had the same outcome based on domestic tax policy foreign source income exemptions, then the EU Commission’s tax policy dispute would appear two-faced.
I’ll need to undertake a research project or hear back from readers and then I will follow up with Nike Part 2 as a did with Starbucks on this Kluwer blog previously. See Application of TNMM to Starbucks Roasting Operation: Seeking Comparables Through Understanding the Market and then My Starbucks’ State Aid Transfer Pricing Analysis: Part II. See also my comments about Altera: An ‘arm’s length result is not simply any result that maximizes one’s tax obligations’.
Want to help me in this research or have great analytical content for my transfer pricing treatise published by LexisNexis? Reach out on email@example.com
Prof. William Byrnes (Texas A&M) is the author of a 3,000 page treatise on transfer pricing that is a leading analytical resource for advisors.
Monday, June 3, 2019
OECD Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy
The international community has agreed on a road map for resolving the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy, and committed to continue working toward a consensus-based long-term solution by the end of 2020, the OECD announced today.
The 129 members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) adopted a Programme of Work laying out a process for reaching a new global agreement for taxing multinational enterprises.
The document, which calls for intensifying international discussions around two main pillars, was approved during the May 28-29 plenary meeting of the Inclusive Framework, which brought together 289 delegates from 99 member countries and jurisdictions and 10 observer Organisations. It will be presented by OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría to G20 Finance Ministers for endorsement during their 8-9 June ministerial meeting in Fukuoka, Japan.
Drawing on analysis from a Policy Note published in January 2019 and informed by a public consultation held in March 2019, the Programme of Work will explore the technical issues to be resolved through the two main pillars. The first pillar will explore potential solutions for determining where tax should be paid and on what basis ("nexus"), as well as what portion of profits could or should be taxed in the jurisdictions where clients or users are located ("profit allocation").
The second pillar will explore the design of a system to ensure that multinational enterprises – in the digital economy and beyond – pay a minimum level of tax. This pillar would provide countries with a new tool to protect their tax base from profit shifting to low/no-tax jurisdictions, and is intended to address remaining issues identified by the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative.
In 2015 the OECD estimated revenue losses from BEPS of up to USD 240 billion, equivalent to 10% of global corporate tax revenues, and created the Inclusive Forum to co-ordinate international measures to fight BEPS and improve the international tax rules.
"Important progress has been made through the adoption of this new Programme of Work, but there is still a tremendous amount of work to do as we seek to reach, by the end of 2020, a unified long-term solution to the tax challenges posed by digitalisation of the economy," Mr Gurría said. "Today’s broad agreement on the technical roadmap must be followed by a strong political support toward a solution that maintains, reinforces and improves the international tax system. The health of all our economies depends on it."
The Inclusive Framework agreed that the technical work must be complemented by an impact assessment of how the proposals will affect government revenue, growth and investment. While countries have organised a series of working groups to address the technical issues, they also recognise that political agreement on a comprehensive and unified solution should be reached as soon as possible, ideally before year-end, to ensure adequate time for completion of the work during 2020.
Monday, April 29, 2019
Proposed India profit attribution rules reject OECD approach, add “sales” and “users” as apportionment factors
India’s Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) on April 18 asked for public feedback on proposed new rules for attributing profits to Indian permanent establishments (PEs) that differ from the authorized OECD approach (AOA).
read the full analysis here at MNE Tax News
Thursday, April 11, 2019
Georgia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Luxembourg deposit instruments of acceptance or ratification for the Multilateral BEPS Convention
The Kingdom of the Netherlands has deposited its instrument of acceptance and Georgia and Luxembourg have deposited their instruments of ratification for the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (multilateral convention or MLI) with the OECD’s Secretary-General, Angel Gurría, underlining their strong commitments to prevent the abuse of tax treaties and base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) by multinational enterprises. With its instrument of acceptance, the Kingdom of the Netherlands covers Curaçao and the (European and Caribbean parts of the) Netherlands.
In November 2016, over 100 jurisdictions concluded negotiations on the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting ("Multilateral Instrument" or "MLI") that will swiftly implement a series of tax treaty measures to update international tax rules and lessen the opportunity for tax avoidance by multinational enterprises. The MLI already covers 87 jurisdictions and entered into force on 1st July 2018. Signatories include jurisdictions from all continents and all levels of development and other jurisdictions are also actively working towards signature.
The MLI offers concrete solutions for governments to close the gaps in existing international tax rules by transposing results from the OECD/G20 BEPS Project into bilateral tax treaties worldwide. The MLI modifies the application of thousands of bilateral tax treaties concluded to eliminate double taxation. It also implements agreed minimum standards to counter treaty abuse and to improve dispute resolution mechanisms while providing flexibility to accommodate specific tax treaty policies.
Sunday, February 24, 2019
Thursday, February 21, 2019
- The International Tax Co-operation (Economic Substance) Bill, 2018
PASSED : By the House for the Third Meeting of the 2018/2019 Session of the Legislative Assembly on December 17th 2018.[A Bill For A Law To Provide For An Economic Substance Test To Be Satisfied By Certain Entities; And For Incidental And Connected Purposes.]
- The Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill, 2018
PASSED : By the House for the Third Meeting of the 2018/2019 Session of the Legislative Assembly on December 17th 2018.[A Bill For A Law To Amend The Companies Law (2018 Revision) To Make Miscellaneous Changes To The Provisions Relating To Accounting Records And Exempted Companies; And To Provide For Incidental And Connected Purposes.]
- The Local Companies (Control) (Amendment) Bill, 2018
PASSED: By the House for the Third Meeting of the 2018/2019 Session of the Legislative Assembly on December 17th 2018.[A Bill For A Law To Amend The Local Companies (Control) Law (2015 Revision) To Provide For Exempted Companies Carrying On Business In The Islands; And For Incidental And Connected Purposes.]
British Virgin Islands Law - VIRGIN ISLANDS ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE (COMPANIES AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS) ACT, 2018
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
1. Short title and commencement.
3. Meaning of finance and leasing business.
4. Meaning of financial period.
5. General obligations.
6. Meaning of relevant activities.
7. Meaning of Core income-generating activities.
8. Economic substance requirements.
9. Presumptions of non-compliance for intellectual property business.
10. Assessment of compliance.
11. Requirement to provide information.
12. Penalties for non-compliance with economic substance requirements.
13. Right of appeal.
14. Procedure on appeal.
15. Time for compliance with section 12 notice.
16. Amendments to the 2017 Act.
17. Regulations and Rules.
Monday, February 18, 2019
As part of the ongoing work of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS, the OECD is seeking public comments on key issues identified in a public consultation document on possible solutions to the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy. The publication of the consultation document was foreshadowed with the release of a Policy Note by the Inclusive Framework on 29 January 2019 and follows the agreement of members of the Inclusive Framework to examine proposals involving two pillars; one pillar that focusses on the allocation of taxing rights and a second pillar that addresses remaining BEPS issues. The work will be carried out as the Inclusive Framework continues to work towards a consensus-based long-term solution in 2020.
Following a mandate by G20 Finance Ministers in March 2017, the Inclusive Framework on BEPS, working through its Task Force on the Digital Economy (TFDE), delivered an Interim Report in March 2018, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018. One of the important conclusions of this report is that members agreed to review the impact of digitalisation on nexus and profit allocation rules and committed to continue working together towards a final report in 2020 aimed at providing a consensus-based long-term solution, with an update in 2019.
Since the delivery of the Interim Report, the Inclusive Framework further intensified its work and several proposals emerged that could form part of a long-term solution to the broader challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy and the remaining BEPS issues. The work on these proposals is being conducted on a “without prejudice” basis; their examination does not represent a commitment of any member of the Inclusive Framework beyond exploring these proposals. In this context, the Inclusive Framework agreed to hold a public consultation on possible solutions to the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy on 13 and 14 March 2019 at the OECD Conference Centre in Paris, France. The objective of the public consultation is to provide external stakeholders an opportunity to provide input early in the process and to benefit from that input.
As part of this public consultation, this consultation document describes the proposals discussed by the Inclusive Framework at a high level and seeks comments from the public on a number of policy issues and technical aspects. The comments provided will assist members of the Inclusive Framework in the development of a solution for its final report to the G20 in 2020.
Interested parties are invited to send their comments on this consultation document. Comments should be sent by no later than Friday, 1 March 2019 to TFDE@oecd.org in Word format (in order to facilitate their distribution to government officials). All comments submitted should be addressed to the Tax Policy and Statistics Division, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration.
Please note that all comments on this consultation document will be made publicly available. Comments submitted in the name of a collective “grouping” or “coalition”, or by any person submitting comments on behalf of another person or group of persons, should identify all enterprises or individuals who are members of that collective group, or the person(s) on whose behalf the commentator(s) are acting. Speakers and other participants at the upcoming public consultation in Paris will be selected from among those providing timely written comments on this consultation document.
The proposals included in this consultation document do not represent the consensus views of the Inclusive Framework, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) or their subsidiary bodies. Instead, they intend to provide stakeholders with substantive proposals for analysis and comment.
A public consultation meeting will be held at the OECD Conference Centre in Paris on Wednesday, 13 March and Thursday morning, 14 March 2019. Further information about attending the public consultation is available online. Those wishing to attend are invited to register by no later than Friday, 1 March 2019.
Media queries should be directed to Pascal Saint-Amans (+33 1 45 24 91 08), Director of the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration (CTPA) or Grace Perez-Navarro (+33 1 45 24 18 80), Deputy-Director of the CTPA.