Thursday, June 1, 2023

Analyzing the Privatization of Family Leave Through Insurance

Deborah A. Widiss, Privatizing Family Leave Policy: Assessing the New Opt-in Insurance Model, Seton Hall L. Review (forthcoming)

Federal law fails to guarantee new parents or family caregivers paid time off from work. A growing number of blue-leaning states have addressed this gap by enacting comprehensive, paid family and medical leave laws, typically funded by a small payroll tax. A new—and quite different—approach is expanding rapidly in red-leaning states: authorization of commercial “Family Leave Insurance” to be marketed to employers. In other words, this is an opt-in privatized approach to family leave policy.

This Article, written for a symposium held by the Seton Hall Law Review, offers the first analysis in the legal literature of opt-in Family Leave Insurance laws. These laws anticipate that insurance companies will likely add “family leave” to group short-term disability policies (an existing insurance product that provides partial salary reimbursement to employees who take time off work for medical needs). However, only about 40% of American workers, and just 22% of low-wage workers, receive short-term disability benefits from their employers—and most policies replace only 50-60% of regular wages. Providing paid leave at the low reimbursement rate typical of short-term disability policies can actually exacerbate inequality by making it easier for relatively affluent workers to take extended time off but still failing to provide sufficient support for low-wage workers to do so. By contrast, states that have enacted comprehensive paid leave laws, funded by a payroll tax, typically cover virtually all workers, and most replace 80-95% of regular wages, up to a cap set around the median wage.

This Article analyzes the new privatized Family Leave Insurance model, then suggests provisions that would help opt-in policies actually meet the needs of new parents and family caregivers. These include specifying a reasonably ample period of benefits and level of wage replacement, and ensuring that definitions of “family” reflect the diversity of contemporary families. The Article also explores potential adverse selection challenges—both within workplaces and across workplaces—that may arise under an opt-in approach. Because the risk pool will almost certainly be less varied than under a public program, private Family Leave Insurance may well provide less generous benefits at a higher per-person cost than fully-public policies. Authorization of opt-in insurance is better than nothing, but, as this Article demonstrates, it is likely that both workers and businesses are better served by comprehensive paid leave laws.

June 1, 2023 in Business, Equal Employment, Family, Pregnancy, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, May 26, 2023

Reclaiming Tort Law to Protect Reproductive Rights

Yvonne Lindgren & Nancy Levit, Reclaiming Tort Law to Protect Reproductive Rights, 75 Alabama L.Rev. (2023)  

In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, the Supreme Court overruled Roe v. Wade, the constitutional floor that had protected the abortion right for nearly fifty years, and returned the issue of abortion to the states to regulate, restrict, criminalize, or protect at the state-level. In the post-Roe era, states are increasingly turning to private law to restrict travel, access to medical care, and undermine privacy of individuals seeking abortion. Three states have passed antiabortion civil enforcement “bounty” provisions patterned on Texas’s SB8 that allows private citizens to sue providers or third parties who aid and abet an abortion that violates the state’s six-week ban. At least half a dozen states have signaled that they will pass their own civil bounty antiabortion provisions. Other states, such as Missouri, have introduced legislation that would permit any private citizen to sue anyone who helps a pregnant person travel out of state to obtain an abortion. Aggressive protesting at abortion clinics and surveillance of out-of-state license plates and people entering abortion clinics have also been on the rise as private citizens take up the charge of enforcing state antiabortion laws. Under this private law scheme, pregnant bodies become politicized legal subjects to be disciplined and surveilled by the public to enforce a state’s policy agenda without constitutional and civil law protections.

This Article argues that the use of private law to enforce abortion bans — a function that had been previously exclusively patrolled through public law — is antithetical to the purpose and function of private law to protect individuals from tortious harms by third parties. Private law is designed to compensate individuals for harms and to protect the community more broadly by discouraging individuals from engaging in harmful behavior through the deterrent force of damage awards. However, civil enforcement regimes are eroding the boundary between public and private law and exposing people to private harms through state capture of private law. These civil provisions are often coupled with criminal enforcement regimes that deprive pregnant persons of necessary medical care. Rather than protect individuals from privacy invasions by third parties, these laws incentivize the surveillance and privacy intrusions that will necessarily result from the regime of private enforcement and aggressive protesting at abortion clinics. Thus, in the post-Roe landscape, abortion patients and providers have lost both constitutional protection and private law’s protection against harms inflicted by private actors. This Article sets forth a framework to both reassert tort law’s function to offer protection against privacy invasions by third parties and restore private law’s role in expressing normative values of the community — rather than of the state — that rests at the heart of a private law regime.

It is a critical moment to challenge the emerging trend of state capture of private law and reestablish private law’s traditional role to guard against privacy intrusions by third parties. Torts such as intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, infliction of emotional distress, and federal civil rights violations, as well as tort claims for providers such as interference with prospective business relations and civil RICO to name only a few may serve to reclaim private law’s primary purpose to protect individuals from infringement by third parties. Shielding abortion patients and providers from surveillance, detection, and violations of medical privacy may limit overreach by bounty hunters and protestors. More importantly, it will reclaim private law’s role to protect individuals and providers in the constitutional vacuum left in the wake of Dobbs.

May 26, 2023 in Abortion, Reproductive Rights, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 22, 2023

Center for Reproductive Rights publishes report on "Failures to guarantee the sexual and reproductive health and rights of refugees from Ukraine"

The Center for Reproductive Rights published a report on "Care in Crisis: Failures to guarantee the sexual and reproductive health and rights of refugees from Ukraine in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia."  The report chronicles how millions of people, mostly women and children, have migrated from Ukraine to the EU, including Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. 

However, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia are some of the most challenging contexts in Europe when it comes to sexual and reproductive healthcare and gender-based violence support services. Decades long failures by national governments to invest in and prioritize these forms of care and support, combined with restrictive and unclear legal and policy frameworks and ongoing stigma and rollbacks on sexual and reproductive rights, heavily constrain access to good quality care.

 

As millions of women and girls from Ukraine arrived in Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, serious concerns arose regarding their ability to obtain essential forms of healthcare, services and support. It became clear that violations of fundamental rights within Ukraine were being compounded by rights violations outside of the country. There was particular concern for refugees who had suffered conflict related sexual and gender-based violence in Ukraine, including rape and other gender-based crimes.

 

Between July 2022 and April 2023, our organizations undertook in-depth, multi-country fact-finding to examine the gaps and barriers in access to sexual and reproductive healthcare and gender-based violence support services that are faced by refugees from Ukraine in Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Over nine months, we collected information from semi-structured interviews with over 80 experts, professional stakeholders and refugees from Ukraine based across these four countries.

The article describes the legal barriers, cost barriers, and information barriers, as well as the poor quality care, stigma, and discrimination that these refugees faced in each country. The report offers concrete recommendations to each of the countries.

May 22, 2023 in Abortion, Healthcare, International, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 17, 2023

Rethinking the Infrastructure of Childbirth and Perinatal Health Inequity

Elizabeth Kukura, Rethinking the Infrastructure of Childbirth, 91 UMKC L. Rev. 497 (2023)

This Article applies the concept of infrastructure to analyze gaps in the maternity care system that shape where and how people give birth in the United States. It argues that we must understand how structural factors, including law and regulation, shape modern childbirth in order to advance perinatal health equity and improve health outcomes.

Specifically, the Article unpacks the concept of maternity care deserts as an infrastructure problem in three distinct but related ways. First, it describes the OB/GYN workforce shortage, including how the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization is likely to compound this shortage in certain areas of the country.

Next, the Article describes the limited access to midwifery care in the United States and the current regulatory barriers to increasing the midwifery workforce and making midwifery care more available. It argues that greater midwife involvement in United States perinatal care will be essential in order to address the deepening gaps in access to care, and that the medical profession should abandon its opposition to liberalized midwifery licensure and regulation in favor of both midwifery promotion and greater interprofessional collaboration to meet the needs of pregnant people. Experimentation during the COVID-19 crisis with relaxed interstate licensure rules and interprofessional collaboration among physicians, midwives, nurses, and doulas to ensure safe childbirth provide examples for reimagining the relationships among birth professionals in ways that promote positive health outcomes.

Finally, the Article addresses existing barriers to community birth—meaning birth at home and in freestanding birth centers—and how lack of access to community birth, which is typically attended by midwives, both contributes to maternity care deserts and forces some people to birth in hospitals where their needs are not adequately met. Drawing on experiences during the pandemic, when record numbers of pregnant people sought community birth options in order to avoid delivering in hospitals overwhelmed by COVID-19, the Article argues that investing in more freestanding birth centers and reducing barriers to home birth are sensible, necessary strategies for closing gaps in access to maternity care and ensuring that pregnant people who do not feel safe or cannot have their needs addressed in hospitals have options for delivering in a community setting.

May 17, 2023 in Family, Pregnancy, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0)

How the 19th Century Comstock Obscenity Law a the Key to the Abortion Fight

Emily Bazelon, NYT, How a 150-Year Old Law Against Lewdness Became a Key to the Abortion Fight

Anthony Comstock, a 19th-century crusader against sexual liberty, was mocked as a prude in his own time, but wielded real power. He persuaded Congress in 1873 to pass the Comstock Act, written by and named for him, making it a federal crime to send or deliver “obscene, lewd or lascivious” material through the mail or by other carriers, specifically including items used for abortion or birth control.

By the 1960s, the Comstock Act had fallen out of use — narrowed by court rulings, partly gutted by congressional repeals — and it was made an unconstitutional relic by the Supreme Court’s decision in 1973 in Roe v. Wade, recognizing a national right to abortion. But it stayed on the books.

Now, Comstock is back, once more being wielded as a weapon by social conservatives. Their arguments use the language of the act to target the mailing of abortion pills, and they are pushing judges and the Biden administration to reopen seemingly long-settled questions.

NYT, What to Know About the Comstock Act

The Comstock Act’s definition of what was lewd material would be “radically unfamiliar” to people living today, according to Mary Ziegler, professor of law at University of California, Davis. Examples she cited included “somebody writing a letter to somebody asking them for a date if they weren’t married,” and “somebody mentioning the existence of an abortion in a newspaper.”

“The early Comstock Act enforcement is extraordinarily broad, and gets broader and broader,” Professor Ziegler said.

I have written some about the origins of the Comstock law: See Tracy Thomas, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the Feminist Foundations of Family Law 91, 174-75 (NYU Press 2016); Tracy Thomas, Misappropriating Women's History in the Law and Politics of Abortion, 36 Seattle L. Rev. 1 (2012).

See also Gender & the Law Blog, Siegel and Ziegler on SCOTUS, Mifepristone, and the 19th Century Comstock Act

For a fictionalized story of the crusader Anthony Comstock and feminist activist Elizabeth Cady Stanton, see Marge Piercy, Sex Wars: A Novel of Gilded Age New York

May 17, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Legal History, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 9, 2023

Federal PUMP Act for Nursing Parents Goes Into Effect

The 19th, The Full Pump Act is Now in Effect. Here's What it Does for Lactating Parents

The PUMP Act, a bill designed to extend workplace protections to an additional 9 million nursing parents, goes into full effect on Friday. 

Now, workers will be able to sue their employers if they are not compliant with the law, which requires businesses to provide a private space that’s not a bathroom and adequate break time for workers to express breastmilk. The bill passed Congress with bipartisan support in December.

The PUMP Act will close loopholes and “unintentional” mistakes in a 2010 bill, the Break Time for Nursing Mothers Act, said Liz Morris, the deputy director of the Center for WorkLife Law, which helped draft the model legislation the PUMP Act is based on. Previously, protections only extended to hourly workers who qualified for overtime, but even then, it restricted any restitution workers could seek. If workers wanted to sue their employer, there was no legal mechanism to do so. Now, the majority of those covered has expanded to also include salaried workers, such as teachers and nurses, most of whom are women. 

May 9, 2023 in Business, Family, Legislation, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 8, 2023

New Report on Accessing Emergency Obstetrics Information in Oklahoma

A recent report was published on "Accessing Emergency Obstetrics Information as a Prospective Prenatal Patient in Post-Roe Oklahoma." The report was jointly authored by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), the Oklahoma Call for Reproductive Justice (OCRJ), and the Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR). The Executive Summary provides: 

In the wake of the 2022 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, Oklahoma residents are currently living under three overlapping and inconsistent state abortion bans that, if violated, impose severe civil and criminal penalties on health care providers. * * * Because the exceptions drafted by legislators are often conflicting and use non-medical terminology, they sow confusion around what kinds of care and procedures health care providers can legally offer when a pregnancy threatens a person’s health or life. These challenges, combined with the significant penalties under these bans, constitute a situation of “dual loyalty”: health professionals are forced to balance their obligation to provide ethical, high-quality medical care against the threat of legal and professional sanctions. The decision to provide emergency medical care risks becoming a legal question – determined by lawyers – rather than a question of clinical judgment and the duty of care to the patient – determined by health care professionals.

 

In light of the extensive anti-abortion legal framework newly in place in the state, Oklahoma offers an important insight into the potential effects of near-total abortion bans on pregnant patients and the clinicians who care for them. 

 

* * *

 

The results of this research are alarming. Not a single hospital in Oklahoma appeared to be able to articulate clear, consistent policies for emergency obstetric care that supported their clinicians’ ability to make decisions based solely on their clinical judgement and pregnant patients’ stated preferences and needs. Of the 34 out of 37 hospitals offering obstetric care across the state of Oklahoma that were reached, 65 percent (22 hospitals) were unable to provide information about procedures, policies, or support provided to doctors when the clinical decision is that it is necessary to terminate a pregnancy to save the life of a pregnant patient; only two hospitals described providing legal support for clinicians in such situations. In 14 cases (41 percent), hospital representatives provided unclear and/or incomplete answers about whether doctors require approval to perform a medically necessary abortion. Three hospitals indicated that they have policies for these situations but refused to share any information about them; four stated they have approval processes that clinicians must go through if they deem it necessary to terminate a pregnancy; and three stated that their hospitals do not provide abortions at all.

May 8, 2023 in Abortion, Healthcare, Pregnancy, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, May 5, 2023

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, May 4, 2023

CFP AALS Teaching Reproductive Justice in a Post-Dobb World

The panel will be held during the AALS Annual Meeting in early January 2024 in Washington, DC. The goal of the session is to discuss and share our ideas about teaching reproductive justice, both in regards to the  Dobbs decision and related developments as well as how to create a separate course on reproductive justice.  The panel will show how family and juvenile law professors are integrating these teaching methods into their courses and the overall family and juvenile law curriculum. Presenters will be asked to share relevant materials in advance of the Annual Meeting.

If you are interested in participating, please send a 400-600 word description of what you'd like to discuss. Submissions should be sent to Naomi Cahn, [email protected] and Jeffrey Dodge, [email protected]. The due date for submissions is June 23, 2023.  We will notify the selected presenters by July 1, 2023. 

May 4, 2023 in Abortion, Call for Papers, Conferences, Law schools, Pregnancy, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0)

Justice Alito's Contempt as Seen in the Abortion Pill Dissent

Jennifer Rubin, Washington Post, Opinion, The Supreme Court Delivers a Sign of Relief -- and an Outrageous Dissent

Amy Davidson Sorkin, What's Going on With Samuel Alito?, New Yorker

How many people and organizations can Justice Samuel Alito accuse of having bad will or dishonest motives in a short dissent—fewer than nine hundred words—to a Supreme Court order granting a stay? Let’s try to count.

As a preface, the case involves a lawsuit brought by the Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, an advocacy group whose members vow, “in the presence of the Almighty,” that they “will not help a woman obtain an abortion.” The A.H.M. is attempting to block access to mifepristone, or RU-486, a drug used in medication abortions, in a suit against the Food and Drug Administration, which was joined in the case by a manufacturer of the drug, Danco Laboratories. ***

Even beyond this case, there is something troubling and unsettling about Alito’s tone and approach. As I’ve written before, observers of the Court have come to expect notes of scornfulness in Alito’s opinions. He may not be the most conservative of his colleagues—Thomas is another contender—but he’s looking like the Court’s sourest Justice. His approach to legal argument is a sad reflection of the state of political discourse generally, as well as a contributor to it. Contempt is a guiding principle of what might now, with a right-wing super-majority, be called the Alito Court—at least until Alito turns on the rest of his colleagues, too

May 4, 2023 in Abortion, Judges, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 25, 2023

Understanding the Supreme Court's Past Balanced Approach to Abortion

Carlos A. Ball, Balancing Abortion, 63 Santa Clara L.Rev. (forthcoming)  

Critics of Roe v. Wade and its progeny repeatedly contended that, in recognizing a fundamental right to choose an abortion, the Supreme Court ignored or significantly undervalued the state’s interests in regulating abortions. This Article’s examination of the Court’s abortion jurisprudence during the Roe era, however, shows how it called for a meaningful balancing of the interests of both sides in ways that led the justices to uphold roughly as many abortion laws as they struck down between 1973 and 2020. In exploring the crucial role that the balancing of the interests of both the state and pregnant individuals played in the Roe constitutional regime, the Article contends that the Court deserves more credit than it received for attempting, for decades, to accommodate the claimed interests of both sides while trying to find compromises on abortion-related questions that are deeply contested and controversial. The Article also examines why neither the antiabortion nor the pro-choice movement believed it advanced its political and legal priorities to emphasize and praise the fundamental role that the balancing of interests of both sides played in Roe and its progeny.

A well-informed understanding of this crucial aspect of the Roe constitutional regime is essential because it provides a stark contrast to the one-sided and uncompromising weighing-of-interests approach followed by the five-justice majority in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. In overturning Roe, the Dobbs Court deemed the state’s claimed interests in regulating abortions to be constitutionally dispositive and the pregnant individual’s equality and liberty interests in choosing an abortion to be constitutionally irrelevant. In doing so, the Court did not avoid, as it apparently hoped, the need to balance interests; instead, Dobbs engaged in its own form of ex-ante or categorical balancing by reasoning that the state’s claimed interest in protecting fetal life is so important and so impacted by the decision to have an abortion that it requires that all future courts give the equality and liberty interests of pregnant individuals in not being forced to carry pregnancies to term against their will a constitutional value of precisely zero. Although the Dobbs Court may have believed that it was, in the name of judicial restraint, dispensing with the need to balance the interests of both sides, the Article explains why it is not possible to decide the constitutionality of abortion bans such as the one at issue in Dobbs without pitting the claimed interests of the state against those of pregnant individuals after assigning constitutional weight (even if it is only zero) to them.

April 25, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)