Friday, December 4, 2020
Jessica Lai, Patents and Gender: A Contextual Analysis, 10(3) Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 283-305 (2020)
Patent law is considered to be an objective law, dealing with the objective subject matter of the “technical arts”. Yet, empirical studies show that patenting rates around the world are gendered. This article analyses the roots of the gender patent gap, and how this correlates to the invention and innovation processes. It shows that the gendered nature of the patent-regulated knowledge governance system forces women into traditionally male spaces and fields in order to partake in the extant patent game. Yet, when they enter those spaces and fields, they often find themselves unwelcome and subject to institutional, structural or organisational biases, which impinge upon their ability to invent, patent and commercialise.
The article re-frames the discourse around women inventors. It argues that we have to stop focusing on the “women in science, technology engineering and mathematics (STEM)” narrative, because it is a distraction from the underlying problem that the Western knowledge governance system reflects the hegemonic powers at play. Instead, we need to re-think the knowledge governance system and the ecosystem it creates, in order to ensure egalitarian knowledge production and protection.
Tuesday, December 1, 2020
New Book: Women and the Law (2020), Annual Edition of Selected Greatest Hits in Legal Scholarship on Women's Rights
I've just published the 2020 edition of Women and the Law (Thomson Reuters). It is an annual edition of selected works on women and the law likely to be of interest to practitioners in the field. Kind of a "greatest hits" if you will of the legal scholarship from the prior year.
Here is this year's Table of Contents:
Part A Special Issue: The Nineteenth Amendment
Chapter 1 More Than the Vote: The Nineteenth Amendment as Proxy for Gender Equality, Tracy A. Thomas
Chapter 2 The Nineteenth Amendment and the Democratization of the Family, Reva B. Siegel
Chapter 3 The Constitutional Development of the Nineteenth Amendment In the Decade Following Ratification, Paula A. Monopoli
Chapter 4 Thin and Thick Conceptions of the Nineteenth Amendment Right To Vote and Congress's Power To Enforce It, Richard Hasen and Leah M. Litman
Chapter 5 The “Welfare Queen” Goes to the Polls: Race Based Fractures in Gender Politics and Opportunities for Intersectional Coalitions, Catherine Powell and Camille Gear Rich
Part B Women in the Workplace
Chapter 6 Sexual Harassment Litigation with a Dose of Reality, Diane P. Wood
Chapter 7 What's Reasonable Now? Sexual Harassment Law After the Norm Cascade, Joan C. Williams, Jodi Short, Margot Brooks, Hilary Hardcastle, Tiffanie Ellis, and Rayna Saron
Chapter 8 Beyond the Bad Apple—Transforming the American Workplace for Women After #MeToo, Claudia Flores
Chapter 9 Knowledge Pays: Reversing Information Flows and the Future of Pay Equity, Orly Lobel
Part C Reproductive Rights
Chapter 10 The Continued Rise of the Reproductive Justice Lawyer, Leigh Creighton Bond and Monika Taliaferro
Chapter 11 Contracting Pregnancy, Rachel Rebouché
Part D Feminism and the Family
Chapter 12 Unsexing Pregnancy, David Fontana and Naomi Schoenbaum
Chapter 13 Settling in the Shadow of Sex: Gender Bias in Marital Asset Division, Jennifer Bennett Shinall
Part E Violence Against Women
Chapter 14 Straight Outta SCOTUS: Domestic Violence, True Threats, and Free Speech, Jessica Miles
Chapter 15 Retraumatized in Court, Negar Katirai
Chapter 16 #MeToo and Mass Incarceration, Aya Gruber
Part F Theory
Chapter 17 Sex in Public, Elizabeth Sepper and Deborah Dinner
Chapter 18 Leveling Down Gender Equality, Tracy A. Thomas
Chapter 19 Engendering Trust, Deborah S. Gordon
Chapter 20 The Body Politic: Federalism as Feminism in Health Reform, Elizabeth Y. McCuskey
Monday, November 30, 2020
Lesley Wexler, #MeToo and Law Talk, 29 Univ. Chicago Legal F (2019)
How Americans talk when they talk about #MeToo is often deeply rooted in the law—even in non-legal settings, participants in the #Me-Too conversation often deploy legal definitions of victims and perpetrators, reference legal standards of proof and the role of legal forums, draw explicit or implicit comparisons to legal punishments, and derive meaning from legal metaphors and legal myths. In this essay, I identify and assess the deployment of such law talk to help understand both how legal rhetoric may facilitate the national #MeToo conversation and related legal reforms, but may also simultaneously limit and obscure some of the #MeToo’s more transformative possibilities. Such critical engagement seeks to open space for selective pushback, including initial thoughts on the possibilities of reclaiming colloquial law talk to better match the interests at stake in non-legal settings as well as bringing to the forefront the therapeutic, informative, and structural issues law talk might crowd out.
Monday, November 23, 2020
Despite the knowledge we might gain about COVID-19 and other infectious diseases from research on women, most medical research focuses on men.
- A study of heart disease—the leading cause of death among women—was undertaken on 22,000 men and no women.
- A federal study on health and aging proceeded for twenty years with only male subjects.
- Absurdly, even though women account for 80 percent of autoimmune disorder patients, the main research subjects are—you guessed it—men.
- Even basic biological research is done mainly with male mice!
Male-Centered Research is Killing Us
The dangers from male-centered research are profound. Even though women consume 80 percent of medications in the U.S., drug research is still predominantly conducted on men and fails to consider how drugs act over the course of a woman’s menstrual cycle. Consequently, drugs can reach the market that are actually harmful to women. In fact, eight of the ten dangerous drugs removed from the market between 1997 and 2000 caused greater harm and fatalities for women.
A wide range of medications, including some antihistamines, gastrointestinal drugs, antibiotics and antipsychotics trigger potentially fatal heart arrhythmias more often in women than men.
In 1993, Congress adopted a law designed to ensure that women were allowed to participate in medical research.
When discrimination persisted, the National Institutes of Health in 2016 announced guidelines requiring federally-funded scientists to enroll women in studies, to disaggregate medical research data by sex, and to study female animals and female cells as well.
Then along came COVID-19, with its tsunami of scientific articles. By May 13, 2020, there were more than 23,000 papers published on COVID-19 with the number of articles doubling every twenty days.
When I analyzed the burgeoning medical research literature about COVID-19 along with my team at the Institute for Science, Law and Technology at Chicago-Kent College of Law, we found that the historical discrimination against women in medical research still exists.
Only a few scientific articles about COVID-19 analyze the difference in symptoms between men and women. Most not only fail to break down the symptoms by sex, but also erroneously assume that the death rate of men and women is the same—ignoring the numerous studies that already demonstrated that men with COVID-19 die at a higher rate than women.
The fact that, in 2020, researchers would blindly assume women’s bodies behave like men’s is troubling.
Darren Rosenblum, Diversity and the Board of Directors: A Comparative Perspective"
Draft Chapter for Elgar's Research Handbook on Comparative Corporate Governance (Afsharipour & Gelter, eds.), Forthcoming
Upon Norway’s adoption of its corporate board quota, nobody would have predicted that, within fifteen years, most of the top ten economies would follow suit. When Norway adopted its corporate board quota in 2003, it took a clear, new direction for corporate governance and for equality law. In so doing, it recognized two things: 1) the central role that the private sector plays in determining questions of equality, and 2) the responsibility of the state to ensure that the private sector would rectify entrenched discrimination. These statutes effectively feminized boards across Europe and elsewhere. This Chapter maps the divergent directions these quota efforts have taken, in both civil and common law jurisdictions. Contrasts among these efforts reveal distinct frameworks for inclusion. As social science makes sense of the efficacy of these efforts, this Chapter suggests directions that future inclusion efforts may take.
Thursday, November 19, 2020
Mary Graw Leary, Is the #MeToo Movement for Real? Implications for Juror's Biases in Sexual Assault Cases, 81 Louisiana L. Rev. 1 (2020)
For decades the conventional wisdom asserted that law enforcement, the judiciary, and jurors were skeptical of claims of sexual violence and largely unsympathetic to the plight of victims. Many high profile cases highlighted this reality. These include the acquittal of R. Kelly for rape despite some video evidence, the sentencing of Brock Turner to less than a year incarceration for sexual assault of an unconscious woman, and the guilty plea of Jeffrey Epstein to minor charges despite significant evidence of the sex trafficking of minors. This perception of a lack of justice for sexual violence victims is also generally supported by the documented attrition rates of sexual violence cases as they progress through the criminal justice system. Scholars suggest many reasons for this bias against sex crime victims including victim blaming, discrimination, a desire to not want to believe the abuse occurred, stereotypes of the victims, acceptance of the rape myth, or the perceived credibility of the offenders.
In October of 2017, a public social movement against sexual harassment and sexual assault emerged on the national level (although it previously existed), entitled the “Me Too Movement.” This movement awakened a revelation in the United States of the prevalence of the sexual harassment and abuse experienced by women. By underscoring the frequency with which women are assaulted, the movement forced a reluctant public to face the breadth of the problem and the trauma experienced by these women.
A body of research exists regarding the lack of sympathy of jurors to victims of sexual violence. A new body of research is emerging documenting the effect of the #Me Too Movement on societal perceptions of rape and other forms of sexual violence. This article examines the latter focusing on the effect the movement could have on contemporary societal norms regarding sexual assault. It explores whether these effects may alter previously accepted assumptions regarding jurors, perhaps suggesting a shift not only in public perception, but jury perception of sexual violence. It argues that the Movement has significant potential to ameliorate the attrition problem in sexual assault cases, but not in expected ways. For this positive change to occur, it requires work of prosecutors and judges in these trials rethink evidence and jury selection and incorporate some of the lessons learned.
Friday, October 16, 2020
Amelia Miazad, Sex, Power, and Corporate Governance, 54 U.C. Davis L. Rev. (2020)
For decades, social scientists have warned us that sexual harassment training and compliance programs are ineffective. To mitigate the risk of sexual harassment, they insist that we must cure its root cause — power imbalances between men and women.
Gender-based power imbalances pervade our corporate governance and plague start-ups and billion-dollar companies across sectors and industries. These power imbalances start at the top, with the composition of the board and the identity of CEOs and executive management. Pay inequity and boilerplate contractual terms in employment contracts further cement these imbalances.
In response to the #MeToo movement, key stakeholders are shifting their focus from compliance to corporate culture for the first time. This influential group of stakeholders, which includes investors, employees, regulators, D&O insurance carriers, and board advisors, are asking companies to uproot gender-based power imbalances. As a result of mounting pressure, seismic corporate governance reforms are underway. Boards are becoming more gender diverse, companies are beginning to address pay inequity and abandon mandatory arbitration and non-disclosure agreements, and boards are holding CEOs to account for sexual harassment and misconduct.
While the “old boys’ club” is still thriving in corporate America, this Article is the first comprehensive account of how the power imbalances on which it depends are shifting.
Tuesday, October 13, 2020
Study Documents Gender Pay Disparities Among Tenured Law Faculty, Particularly Acute for Women of Color
CJ Ryan & Meghan Dawe, Mind the Gap: Gender Pay Disparities in the Legal Academy, Georgetown J. Legal Ethics (forthcoming)
Differences in pay between women and men in the same jobs have captured the public’s attention in recent years. However, public interest in and press coverage of salary differences on the basis of gender—or any other ascriptive class—in the learned professions are wanting. Moreover, few studies have spoken directly on the gender pay disparities in the legal academy, despite emerging evidence of it at multiple law schools. In this Article, we use a unique dataset, drawn from the only nationally representative survey to date of tenured law professors in the United States, to track how gender and race are tied to salary outcomes. But we look beyond the raw differences in salary, probing the mechanisms that undergird gendered pay inequities.
Part I of this Article introduces the concepts of human capital and social capital as important factors underpinning inequalities in outcomes for the legal profession. We then provide an overview of how careers in law—and particularly in the legal academy—are stratified by access to social capital and returns to human capital. In Part II, we introduce the After Tenure survey, from which our data originate. Next, we describe our analytical approach, examining the demography of the legal academy and the legal profession more broadly to discuss the ways in which law professors experience their jobs differently along lines of gender and race. In Part III, we provide evidence of gendered earnings disparities among tenured law professors that is particularly acute for women of color. We conclude by demonstrating how these disparities stem from the differential valuation of human capital.,
Brooke Coleman, #SoWhiteMostlyMale Federal Procedural Rulemaking Committees, UCLA L. Rev. Disc. (Forthcoming)
Of the 630 members of a specialized set of committees responsible for drafting the federal rules for civil and criminal litigation, 591 of them have been white. That’s 94% of the committee membership. Of that same group, 513—or 81%—have been white men. Decisionmaking bodies do better work when their members are diverse; these rulemaking committees are no exception. The Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure are not mere technical instructions, nor are they created by a neutral set of experts. To the contrary, the Rules embody normative judgments about what values trump others, and the rulemakers—while expert—are not disinterested actors. This essay examines racial and gender diversity across six different committees. The data tell a textured story of homogeneity, diversity, and power. Critically, the respective committees’ demographic compositions differ both historically and now. But there is one significant similarity across all committees: The Chief Justice can and should appoint a more diverse set of individuals to these committees, and the rulemaking committee members, the Judiciary, and the Bar should demand it.
Monday, October 12, 2020
Sarah Deer, (En)Gendering Indian Law: Indigenous Feminist Legal Theory in the United States, 31 Yale J. Law & Feminism 1 (2019)
In this Article, I argue that attorneys and legal scholars should intentionally think about gender in the context of Federal Indian law and tribal law to assess whether there are areas for closer consideration and attention. I am primarily interested in whether we can better address gender inequities in the lives of Native women, including gendered violence. As part of this analysis, I explore how attorneys and legal scholars can—and do—support the interests of Native women in their work.
As a self-identified Native feminist who is also an attorney, I am interested in asking hard questions about the shortcoming of the Indian Bar to adequately address the needs of Native women and Two-Spirit people. How do feminism and Indian law “meet”? What are the cross-sections of efforts to promote gender equity and the continued resilient existence of tribal nations? In order to answer these questions, I begin by defining the word “feminism” itself. There are multiple strands of schools of feminist thought—some entirely inconsistent with one another. Therefore, more scholars are now speaking of plural feminisms rather than a monolithic feminism. For the purposes of this Article, I consider feminisms to be legal and social responses to entrenched patriarchy. This simplified definition is, on the one hand, reductive, but on the other, a useful framework because it is broad enough to encompass different types and styles of patriarchy, along with different types and styles of responses. Patriarchy comes in different forms and can be modified to include terms like “hetero-patriarchy” and “settler colonial patriarchy,” which are both relevant for Native women. The thrust of most feminist movements is to
overturn sexist and misogynist laws and practices through legal and social action, which, again, can take many forms.
More specifically, in this Article, I approach Indian law using the lens of indigenous feminisms. I intentionally choose to use the fraught “f” word in this analysis, even though mainstream feminist movements and Native women have not always had an easy relationship. Indeed, mainstream feminism has historically failed Native women by ignoring or marginalizing issues like sovereignty and self-determination. Moreover, despite the fact that many early white American feminists were influenced by Native women, early American feminists were sometimes the instigators and supporters of horrific Federal Indian law policies, including the boarding school era and child removal. Thus, it makes sense that many indigenous women categorically reject the label of “feminist” because of its Western, colonial connotations, even while supporting Native women’s rights. Some Native women who reject the term “feminism” point out that patriarchy is a foreign concept to traditional tribal cultures. If feminism is a response to patriarchy, Native women have perhaps not needed it.
A review of my recent paper, Tracy Thomas, The Jurisprudence of the First Woman Judge, Florence Allen: Challenging the Myth of Women Judging Differently, forthcoming, William & Mary J. Race, Gender & Social Justice.
Sixth Circuit Appellate Blog, New Paper Reexamines Judge Florence Allen, Sixth Circuit Trailblazer
An old clerk’s tale refers to the arrival of Florence Allen (1884-1996) to her Sixth Circuit chambers in 1934. “It’s a Girl!” read a banner in the courthouse where Judge Allen would henceforth sit as the first female appellate judge in the U.S. judiciary.
That was but one of many firsts for the late judge, whose remarkable career was capped with a twenty-five-year tenure on the Sixth Circuit. Among other feats, Judge Allen was the first woman in America appointed prosecutor (1919), elected to a general trial court (1920), elected to a state supreme court (1922), and shortlisted for nomination to the United States Supreme Court (1938).
Judge Allen’s place in history has recently come under reexamination in an academic paper by University of Akron law professor Tracy A. Thomas. Released via SSRN on July 28, the paper chronologically surveys the life of Judge Allen, from her upbringing in a progressive and anti-polygamist Utahn family to her leadership in the women’s suffrage movement and onto her career in public office, which also featured unsuccessful campaigns for the U.S. Senate (1926) and House (1932).
Thomas ultimately concludes that Judge Allen “became a token” for the women’s movement by choosing to assimilate to a male-centric legal world, rather than challenge its foundations. Inadvertently, the law professor argues, this approach may have slowed the advance of women in the legal profession.
“She . . . molded herself in the male norm to prove that women could ‘think like a man,’ which to her meant crafting clear, objective, authoritative decisions unencumbered by emotion or her former pro-woman idealism,” Thomas writes. The paper later states that “[a]t the end of the day, more than tokenism then is needed in diversifying the bench.” ***
In her jurisprudence, Judge Allen defied simple labels. She called herself “liberal conservative” and issued opinions that at times pleased unions and other times employers. In a case involving the film The Birth of a Nation, Judge Allen received plaudits from the NAACP. She then lost the group’s support over Weaver v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State University (1933), a case in which Judge Allen declined to dissent from a per curiam holding that discrimination laws did not reach roommate relations.
Judge Allen’s moderate approach on the bench elicits reproach from Thomas, who notes that the judge’s example did not pave the way for more female judges: a second female appellate judge would not be appointed until 1968, and not until 1979 on the Sixth Circuit. Perhaps Thomas is right that more “zealous advocacy” or a more gender-centric approach would have helped accelerate this process, but perhaps not.
Whatever the merits of Judge Allen’s jurisprudence and character, the paper serves as a useful reminder of her captivating and colorful contributions to the judiciary, as well as the Sixth Circuit’s exceptionalism. A judicial pioneer whose sole biography is out-of-print and autobiography unavailable on Amazon, Judge Allen—thanks to Thomas—once again gets her day in the sun.
Friday, October 2, 2020
Chan Tov McNamarah, Misgendering, 109 California L. Rev. (forthcoming)
Pronouns are en vogue. Not long ago, introductions were limited exchanges of names. Today, however, they are increasingly enhanced with a recitation of the speaker’s appropriate gendered forms of address: he/him/his, she/her/hers, they/them/theirs, or perhaps even less common neopronouns like zie/zir/zirs, xe/xem/xir, or sie/hir/hirs. This development — like every other dimension of progress for LGBTQ+ people — has been met with fierce resistance. In particular, three prominent objections have surfaced:
(1) calls for pronoun respect are a fraught demand for “special rights” from a vocal queer minority;
(2) semantically, gendered pronouns, honorifics, and titles cannot constitute slurs or epithets; and
(3) that these gendered labels are “just words,” and the consequences of their misuse, if any, are trivial and legally in-cognizable.
This Article explains why these arguments fail without exception. The first two, it counters by placing mis-gendering in its historical context. Recovering the history of verbal practices meant to express social inferiority, exclusion, and caste, this Article demonstrates that mis-gendering is simply the latest link in a concatenation of disparaging modes of reference and address. From addressing Black persons by only their first names, the intentional omission of women’s professional titles, and the deliberate butchering of the ethnically-marked names of minorities, these verbal slights have long been used to symbolize the subordination of societally disfavored groups.
Next, the Article articulates the injuries of mis-gendering to the legal academy, the judiciary and, ultimately, to the law. Until now, scholarship has largely overlooked mis-gendering as a pernicious socio-linguistic practice. To fill this gap, the Article identifies and examines the injuries of mis-gendering by looking to the stories of those who experience it. Drawing on a range of sources, including first-hand accounts, the Article presents, for the first time, a layered account of the harms caused by the mis-attribution of gender. It then closes by exploring the implications of these harms for law and legal practice, and laying the groundwork for potential reforms.
All told, the Article makes at least four contributions. First, contextually, it places mis-gendering in its historical milieu; along a continuum of verbal practices designed and deployed to harm the socially subordinated. Second, descriptively, by consulting original interviews, collected accounts, case law, philosophical scholarship, medical literature, and social science research, the Article offers a sustained discussion of mis-gendering’s injuries to gender minorities’ autonomy, dignity, privacy, and self-identity. Even while making the latter two contributions, the Article makes a third, corrective one, as well: It takes up the necessary work of challenging and dispelling mistaken narratives on the wrongfulness and harmfulness of gender mis-attributions, and replaces them with ones that center the lived realities of gender diverse persons. Fourth, prescriptively, the Article ends by outlining concrete illustrations of how the law must adapt to respond to and recognize the discriminatory harms it identifies.
Catharine MacKinnon's Sexual Harassment Work as Invention of a New Form of Common Law Legal Reasoning
Charles Barzun, Catharine MacKinnon and the Common Law
Few scholars have influenced an area of law more profoundly than Catharine MacKinnon. In Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979), MacKinnon virtually invented the law of sexual harassment by arguing that it constitutes a form of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Her argument was in some ways quite radical. She argued, in effect, that sexual harassment was not what it appeared to be. Behavior that judges at the time had thought was explained by the particular desires (and lack thereof) of individuals was better understood as a form of social domination of women by men. Judges, she argued, had failed to see that such conduct was a form of oppression because the social and legal categories through which they interpreted it was itself the product of male power.
This argument is not your typical legal argument. It may not even seem like a legal argument at all. But this article explains why on one, but only one, model of legal reasoning, MacKinnon’s argument properly qualifies as a form of legal reasoning. Neither the rationalist nor the empiricist tradition of common-law adjudication can explain the rational force of her argument. But a third, holistic tradition of the common law captures its logic well. It does so because, like MacKinnon’s argument (but unlike the other two traditions), it treats judgments of fact and value as interdependent. This structural compatibility between MacKinnon’s argument about gender oppression, on the one hand, and the holistic tradition of the common law, on the other, has theoretical and practical implications. It not only tells us something about the nature of law; it also suggests that critical theorists (like MacKinnon) may have more resources within the common law tradition to make arguments in court than has been assumed.
Tuesday, September 29, 2020
Erika Bachiochi, Amy Coney Barrett: A New Feminist Icon, Politico
National Review, Why Left Wing Feminists Hate Amy Coney Barrett
Amy Coney Barrett is Not a Feminist Icon, Huff Post
My own view is the same as that I explained years ago when asked similarly whether then-VP candidate Sarah Palin was a feminist. No. Feminism is not just girl power, or women doing things traditionally reserved for men. Individual achievement in a field or profession (sometimes called "I-feminism") whether Vice Presidential candidate or Supreme Court Justice is not feminism. But it is a consequence of feminism and the work it has done to eradicate barriers to women's achievement. Feminism is the understanding of the gendered hierarchies and stereotypes of law and society, a commitment to reforming those gender injustices, with the goal of women's full and equal autonomy, agency, and opportunity. Under this definition, Barrett is not a feminist.
Monday, September 28, 2020
Executive Order Against Training Federal Employees, Contractors and Military on Racism Applies to Sexism Too
Executive Order on Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping, White House (Sept. 22, 2020)
This executive order is an expression not only of white fragility, but also of male fragility. It reads as a defense of the oppressors. It embodies defensiveness in the face of illustrations of racial and gender privilege, while it reacts to perceived affronts to white men's moral character. While titled as an order about "stereotyping," it is most concerned with what the order calls "race and sex scapegoating."
The prohibitions on addressing racism in federal employment training and contractors have been mentioned in the media and challenged by scholars.
Less discussed have been the provisions that also prevent teaching about sexism. The Order prohibits federal workplaces, unions, military, and federal contractors from teaching about such "divisive concepts" as sexism, male privilege, or systemic sexism.
It decries "sex scapegoating," defined as: "assigning fault, blame, or bias to a race or sex, or to members of a race or sex because of their race or sex. It similarly encompasses any claim that, consciously or unconsciously, and by virtue of his or her race or sex, members of any race are inherently racist or are inherently inclined to oppress others, or that members of a sex are inherently sexist or inclined to oppress others."
The order provides an example of a training of concern: "Materials from Sandia National Laboratories, also a Federal entity, for non-minority males stated that an emphasis on “rationality over emotionality” was a characteristic of “white male[s],” and asked those present to “acknowledge” their “privilege” to each other."
Tuesday, September 22, 2020
Naomi Cahn & Linda McClain, Gendered Complications of Covid-19: Towards a Feminist Recovery Plan, Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law, 2020
Gendered inequalities are on the frontlines of Covid-19. The catalogue of Covid-19’s impact covers all aspects of women’s lives: work, family, education, health, reproduction, mental and physical well-being, and leisure. The pandemic has exposed the limitations in the current economic system on public and private support for gender equity and the intersecting impact of gender, race, and class in that lack of support. Women of color, particularly Black, Latina, and Native American, are at the intersection of the inequities in the emerging stay-at-home economy. This Article argues that Covid-19 is likely to have complex implications for gender equality and gender equity as state and local governments, the federal government, and private actors focus on recovery plans. The negative impact includes hundreds of thousands of deaths, lingering health complications for many among the several million people who have already contracted the virus, massive economic disruption and loss for individuals, families, and communities and the exacerbation of structural inequalities. The creative policy responses prompted by the devastating impact of Covid-19 provide promise for building a more transformative and equitable future. Indeed, any roadmap to resilience is incomplete without addressing the gender inequities in our social infrastructure. Proposing a feminist recovery plan, this Article focuses on a set of issues relating to gender inequities concerning work and family, including the gender pay gap, the child care crisis, and the disproportionate role of women—particularly, women of color— in providing essential but undervalued care work.
Tuesday, September 15, 2020
The United States Supreme Court's historic June 15 decision about LGBTQ workers' rights had its first impact on how courts define sex discrimination at colleges.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit concluded that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the law prohibiting sex discrimination at federally funded institutions, also protects transgender students from discrimination based on their identity, said the court's Aug. 7 decision, written by Judge Beverly Martin.
"We conclude that Title IX … prohibits discrimination against a person because he is transgender, because this constitutes discrimination based on sex," Martin wrote.
Martin drew upon the Supreme Court's new interpretation of "sex," which includes sexual orientation and gender identity, and decided a transgender high school student in Florida could sue his former school district for its bathroom policy. The policy blocked the student, who identifies as male, from using the boys' bathroom because he was not biologically male and required him to use a female or gender-neutral bathroom, court documents said.
The decision could impact how colleges in the 11th Circuit, which encompasses Alabama, Florida and Georgia, implement bathroom policies and could subject colleges within the states to Title IX lawsuits related to discrimination against transgender students more broadly
A new Pew Research study shows a clear majority of women, across all ages and education levels, identify as feminists. Overall, 61 percent of female respondents said “feminist” describes them “very” or “somewhat well.”
The group most likely to identify as feminist was among women ages 18-29, at 68 percent. The 50-64 cohort was least likely to, at 57 percent—nevertheless, still a healthy majority.
In terms of education, having a bachelor’s degree or higher drove higher feminist self-identification—72 percent, versus high school-educated at 54 percent.
Additionally, feminist identification plays a role in political party affiliation: Women who are Democrats or lean toward the Democratic party are significantly more likely to identify as feminists than their Republican or Republican-leaning counterparts—75 percent, compared to 42 percent.
In addition, a majority of Americans (64 percent) say feminism is empowering, and 42 percent see it as inclusive. Nevertheless, although a majority of both men and women consider feminism to be “empowering,” a majority of men (52 percent) consider it to also be “polarizing.”
Friday, September 11, 2020
Lesley Wexner, Law and Non-Legal Entitlements: Kate Manne's Entitled: How Male Privilege Hurts Women, Verdict
Philosopher Kate Manne’s first book Down Girl exploded into the popular consciousness just a few years ago. She rejected a simplistic view of misogyny as simply men who hate women and instead developed a broader view that misogyny serves “primarily a property of social environments in which women are liable to encounter hostility due to the enforcement and policing of patriarchal norms and expectations. . . . Misogyny functions to enforce and police women’s subordination and to uphold male dominance.” Given Manne’s sharp analytic approach, I eagerly awaited her follow-up, Entitled, just now published. This new work focuses on how “privileged men’s sense of entitlement. . . is a pervasive social problem with often devastating consequences.”
Coming to Manne’s new work as a law professor, I thought about how Entitled might fit within the property literature. It reminded me, in a good way, of Robert Ellickson’s infamous article on Shasta County and the role of informal norms in managing property rights. Ellickson’s investigation of ranchers and farmers was seminal in challenging the Coasean intuition that in the absence of transaction costs, initial property entitlements are irrelevant since parties will simply bargain their way to the efficient outcome. He urged law and economics to think about and account for the development and the enforcement of informal norms and what those might tell us about the recourse to the law to enforce legal entitlements. Manne makes a similar move, but one step earlier. She suggests that to successfully challenge both the law and the informal norms, more of society needs to first clearly see and understand the original underlying entitlements. Her book identifies, names, and explores a whole universe of entitlements that often benefit men at the expense of women. While many of the entitlements Manne identifies are not legal entitlements provided for by the state, they are pervasive, they shape a great deal of human interaction, their use as the social default disfavors women, and society is having a difficult time bartering to what I see as the appropriate socially optimal egalitarian outcome. I found her entitlement framework illuminating and will spend the rest of this post explaining how the framework exposes different entitlements in American society.
Wednesday, September 9, 2020
Judge Mary Pat Gunderson, Gender and the Language of Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 Geo. J. Gender & Law 1 (2019)
The "#MeToo" Movement has forced corporations and the entertainment industry, as well as state and federal executive and legislative branch officials, to take a hard look at gender inequities and sexual harassment in the workplace. But, how does our judicial system fare? Is the one branch of government charged with being fair and impartial in the interpretation and application of our laws truly fair and impartial? Between 2010 and 2018, the Iowa Supreme Court was the only state supreme court in the country that did not include any women or people of color. Does it matter? Is there an institutional bias when only one gender reviews, decides and writes opinions? Is the lack of female perspective on the court detrimental to women?
This piece considers the real possibility of implicit gender bias in judicial opinion writing by deconstructing four recent Iowa Supreme Court ethics opinions written by an all-male Court wherein the survivors were female clients and/or intimate partners of the male attorney/abuser. Not only do the case results themselves raise questions but also the language those results are wrapped in may be even more revealing. This article examines both these results and language through the eyes of an Iowa woman who served as a trial court judge in Iowa's largest judicial district.