Gender and the Law Prof Blog

Editor: Tracy A. Thomas
University of Akron School of Law

Tuesday, July 7, 2020

Women are Being Written Out of Abortion Jurisprudence

Dahlia Lithwick, Women are Being Written Out of Abortion Jurisprudence

It was hard not to miss that there were six separate opinions filed in June Medical Services v. Russothe major abortion litigation of this year’s Supreme Court term, and that every one of those six separate opinions was penned by a man. When Roe v. Wade was written in 1973, the majority opinion also came from the pen of a man, Justice Harry Blackmun, who was at pains to protect and shield the intimate and vital relationship between a doctor (“he”) and the pregnant women. Of course, there were no women on the Supreme Court in 1973, so one could hardly have expected a woman to write the decision, or even for a man to write it with the experience of women at front of mind. Oddly, almost half a century later, none of the three women on the high court wrote a word in June Medical.

 

In the interest of being perfectly clear, I herein lay my cards on the table: I’m not a huge fan of this kind of essentializing and almost four years ago to the day I did a little touchdown dance when the opinion in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Texas abortion ruling with facts virtually identical to those from this year’s, was assigned to Justice Stephen Breyer. At the time I found myself moved by the fact that, as I wrote then, there was “something about Breyer, the court’s sometimes underappreciated fourth feminist, reading patiently from his opinion about the eye-glazing standards that Texas would have required in constructing an ‘ambulatory surgical center,’ that makes the announcement of Whole Woman’s Health just fractionally more perfect. This isn’t just a women’s case about women’s rights and women’s health. ***

 

There are no women in the plurality opinion in June Medical. There are a lot of physicians (mostly male) seeking admitting privileges at hospitals, and there are a lot of judges (mostly male) substituting their own judgment for the women who desire to terminate a pregnancy. And now there are a whole lot of Supreme Court justices, every last one of them male, substituting their judgment for doctors who tried to get admitting privileges and for the judgment of the other men who have myriad and complicated feelings about women who seek to terminate a pregnancy. While the dissenters are voluble about bits of fetal tissue (Justice Neil Gorsuch) and concern for women as victims of greedy abortionists (Justice Samuel Alito), their complete and utter silence about actual women and their actual choices and their lived lives and their hardship is impossible to escape. All these years later, they are being read out of a theoretical dialogue about which kind of balancing tests the men prefer to administer. It is into this woman-shaped silence that Ginsburg has poured out her own life experience, in cases about wage discrimination, contraception, and harassment, in so many other cases over her career. But it is into this woman-shaped silence that we will now fight the next abortion battles, over a constitutional right—as laid out in Roe, reaffirmed in Casey, strengthened in Whole Woman’s Health—which now comes down to a sort of elaborate agency review of whether clinics and physicians acted “in good faith” to comply with laws whose efficacy doesn’t much matter. And one cannot escape the feeling that we have not come a very long way from Blackmun’s deep regard for the wisdom of the male physicians in Roeand  Justice Anthony Kennedy’s deep regard for the wisdom of male Supreme Court justices in 2007’s Gonzales v. Carhart, as we limp toward a celebration of Roberts’ deep regard for precedent and processThe regard for a woman’s right to choose itself? That doesn’t even register as material.

July 7, 2020 in Abortion, Constitutional, Judges, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 6, 2020

Law Professors File Amicus Arguing Question of Equal Rights Amendment Ratification is a Political Question

Julie Suk, Who Decides the Future of the Equal Rights Amendment?, Take Care blog.

In January 2020, the Virginia legislature voted to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, almost forty years after the ratification deadline.

 

Has the Constitution been amended? In a lawsuit filed in DC federal court, Virginia says that the ERA is now part of the Constitution. But the defendant National Archivist won’t publish the ERA in the Constitution, in deference to the Trump Administration’s opinion that the deadline for states to ratify the ERA expired in 1979.

 

Who is right, Virginia or the Archivist?  More importantly, who decides?

 

Last week, I filed an amicus brief in the case, joined by constitutional law colleagues Erwin Chemerinsky, Noah Feldman and Reva Siegel. Supporting none of the litigants, we argue that whether the ERA is part of the Constitution under these unprecedented circumstances is a political question for Congress in the first instance, not the courts or the Executive Branch.

 

Virginia, Nevada, and Illinois – the states that ratified after Congress’s deadline -- are asking a court to decide that the ERA was validly ratified and order the Archivist to publish it. Five states that did not ratify the ERA, or that ratified and rescinded their ratifications, have intervened. Their Answer tells the court that “[n]o state could have ‘ratified’ the Equal Rights Amendment in recent years because the deadlines for ratifying that amendment expired years ago.” The Archivist seems to think it’s up to the Executive Branch. If the court reaches the merits of the ERA’s validity, more members of the sitting federal judiciary, on the DC Circuit and the Roberts Court, will eventually decide the fate of the ERA.  But Congress should be the first mover on whether an amendment is ratified, particularly when states disagree.

 

The question of who decides matters, for the long-term legitimacy of the amendment in the eyes of the American people.  In Congress, the House passed a resolution lifting the deadline on ratification in February, and a similar resolution has been introduced in the Senate with 48 sponsors so far.  Thirty-five Senate seats are on the ballot this November. Consistent with Coleman v. Miller, which affirmed Congress’s power to determine reasonable time frames for the ratification of constitutional amendments, a court should not prematurely pronounce on whether the ERA has been or can yet be ratified.

 

Although the prospect of getting a federal judge to add the ERA to the Constitution now may have immediate appeal for ERA proponents, much can be gained by persuading Congress to lift the deadline, validate late ratifications, and reject rescissions.  An amendment’s procedural path makes a difference to its meaning and transformative potential.  The legislative process by which Congress is weighing the ERA’s timeliness provides opportunities for the ERA’s meaning to be updated for the twenty-first century.  These opportunities help legitimize a constitutional amendment after a generation has gone by.  Moreover, congressional debate about the broad range of issues implicated by the ERA– rather than court adjudication of the states’ Article V theory – is more likely to produce an ERA with the bite that its proponents seek.

Amicus Brief of Constitutional Law Professors Erwin Chemerinsky, Noah Feldman, Reva Siegel, in Virginia v. Ferriero (D.D.C.) is here.

July 6, 2020 in Constitutional, Courts, Legislation | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, July 2, 2020

Anti-LGBT Free Speech and Group Subordination

Luke A. Boso, Anti-LGBT Free Speech and Group Subordination

In 2020, the Supreme Court in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia held that Title VII, a federal workplace antidiscrimination law, prohibits discrimination against gay and transgender employees. The majority concluded by citing potential concerns from religious and conservative dissenters, and it suggested that Constitutional and statutory principles of religious freedom and free speech might override LGBT-inclusive antidiscrimination commands in appropriate cases.

This Article is about the tension between liberty and equality. It examines this tension in the context of disputes over Free Speech and LGBT rights. Today, dominant conceptions of both Equal Protection and Free Speech are informed by libertarian ideology, reflecting a commitment to limited government oversight and regulation. A pluralistic and progressive society must more adequately balance libertarian interests in the exercise of individual rights — like Free Speech — with the need for government action to promote equitable outcomes. This Article joins voices prominent in the field of Critical Race Theory who argue for an antisubordinating approach to both equality and liberty. Simply put, if the triumph of a Free Speech claim would enforce a status hierarchy that positions historically oppressed groups as inferior, that Free Speech claim should fail.

The moment is ripe to reconceptualize liberty and equality. In response to a shifting social and legal climate that is increasingly less tolerant of bullying, embraces liberal sexual and gender norms, and seeks to institute formal equality for formerly disfavored groups, many in the conservative movement have turned to the First Amendment to protect the status quo. A libertarian view of the Constitution ensures that meaningful liberty and equality exist only for some. The LGBT community and the backlash to its increasingly protected legal status sit at the epicenter of current court battles over the contours of equality and the breadth of the First Amendment, but equity for all marginalized groups is at stake.

July 2, 2020 in Constitutional, LGBT, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 1, 2020

The Context and Meaning of the Nineteenth Amendment--Implications for Immigration, Citizenship, and Gender Equality

Amalia Kessler, Introduction to Special Issue

The centennial offers an occasion to explore the amendment’s complex and contradictory legacies, including not only its achievements, but also its limitations and failures. With important contributions by Professors Felice Batlan and Tracy A. Thomas, this thought-provoking special issue contributes to the ongoing national conversation.


Both Batlan and Thomas situate the Nineteenth Amendment within a much longer struggle for women’s equality—one that began well before the Amendment’s ratification in 1920 and that has continued to this day. While recognizing the historic significance of the Amendment’s formal guarantee that the right to vote “shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of sex,” the authors also explore how and why the Amendment’s revolutionary potential to promote meaningful equality for women was, right from the get-go, significantly constrained and undermined.***

 

 

While Batlan and Thomas focus first and foremost on the question of history—on how we should understand the Nineteenth Amendment in relation to the struggles that led to its ratification and implementation—they also raise profound and difficult questions regarding the present and future. As Batlan notes, we are now living through a period of renewed xenophobia, as our current presidential administration fuels the flames of ant-immigrant hatred and seeks to curb immigration, including not least the “chain migration” that enables family reunification. The parallels between the experiences of the families served by the Chicago Immigrants’ Protective League a century ago, as detailed by Batlan, and those we encounter in the newspapers today are striking and chilling. As we read about U.S. citizens who are wrongfully detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement—with race often used as a proxy for citizenship—it is tempting to denounce these events as un-American. But both Batlan and Thomas remind us that, sadly, we have a long tradition of differentiating between the citizenship rights of different individuals on the basis of race, gender, and class.

 

Thomas, in turn, highlights the important parallels between the demands for comprehensive structural reform that lay at the core of first-wave feminism and those that we see renewed today, including in the recently reenergized campaign for ratification of the ERA. Today’s calls to remake the social, legal, and political
order, she suggests, “ask[] nothing different than what women have been asking for one hundred and seventy years.” As with Batlan’s emphasis on the parallels between anti-immigrant and anti-women sentiment and legislation a century ago and our present-day environment, Thomas’s emphasis on the continuous nature
of unsatisfied feminist demands is, to say the least, sobering. But at the same time, historical memory and lineage can be empowering. To be reminded that we walk in the shoes of others who have come before is to hear the call to pick up the baton. 

Felice Batlan, "She Was Surprised and Furious": Expatriation, Suffrage, Immigration, and the Fragility of Women's Citizenship, 1907-1940,  15 Stanford J. CR & CL 315 (2020)

Tracy Thomas, More Than the Vote: The Nineteenth Amendment as Proxy for Gender Equality, 15 Stanford J. CR & CL 349 (2020)

July 1, 2020 in Constitutional, Legal History | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 29, 2020

SCOTUS Upholds Right to Abortion, Strikes Down Physician Admitting Privileges Law

Today the US Supreme Court decided June Medical Services v. Russo striking down Louisiana's anti-abortion admitting privileges law.

The majority opinion by Justice Breyer reaffirms the legal standard of Whole Women's Health.  It is a process-heavy decision about third-party standing and a painfully detailed discussion of the district court findings.

Chief Justice Roberts joins the liberal justices in the majority on grounds of stare decisis.  This was essentially the same case as Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstadt (2016).  He also rejects the cost-benefit balancing test of Whole Women's Health, leaving only a plurality of the Court endorsing that standard and returning to the core undue burden standard of Casey.

There are multiple dissenting opinions by the remaining four justices.  Much of the debate devolves into a tangential discussion about deference to district court findings and as applied challenges. 

No woman justice wrote any opinion.  Every male justice wrote an opinion expressing his views.

June 29, 2020 in Abortion, Constitutional, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 24, 2020

More Than the Vote: The 19th Amendment as Proxy for Systemic Gender Equality

I have just published my article, More Than the Vote: The Nineteenth Amendment as Proxy for Gender Equality, 15 Stanford J. Civil Rights & Civil Liberties 349 (2020).

Elizabeth Cady Stanton, pioneering leader of the women’s rights movement in the nineteenth century, famously declared the right of women to vote in 1848 at a convention in Seneca Falls, New York. She alone initially appreciated the importance of the vote both for women’s political power and participation in the governance of the country, as well as its symbolic meaning for women’s full citizenship. Her abolitionist and religious colleagues, however, were suspicious and a bit outraged by the suffrage demand, as these moralistic reformers were opposed to politics, which they viewed as fundamentally corrupt due to bribery, patronage, and abuse of power. Stanton’s friend and co-organizer Lucretia Mott was worried the demand would make the meeting “look ridiculous” and Stanton’s husband, Henry, dismissed the suffrage claim as a “farce.”

 

Nevertheless, they persisted. For seventy-two more years, women activists would fight for the right to vote by organizing annual conventions, creating associations, petitioning legislatures and constitutional conventions, writing editorials, delivering speeches, and campaigning door-to-door for what would become the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

 

This nearly century-long movement for suffrage, however, was never just about the vote. It originated as part of a comprehensive plan for women’s equality as proclaimed at Seneca Falls in the women’s Declaration of Sentiments. Stanton, the intellectual driver of the first women’s rights movement, conceptualized the vote as only one of the needed rights of women to access the political process. The elective franchise was a key piece of reform to provide women access to the right to make the laws that governed them, but it was never the sole goal. Rather, Stanton’s first-wave movement envisioned a full-scale reform of law and society to bring about women’s freedom and equal opportunity. Change was needed, she argued, in four venues: the state, family, industry, and church. She described women’s oppression as “a fourfold bondage” with “many cords tightly twisted together, strong for one purpose” of woman’s subordination.

 

Despite these broad equality efforts targeting multiple systems, the vote emerged as the primary demand for women’s rights. The Civil War “effectively killed the initial collectivity behind the broadly based humanitarian goals of the Seneca Falls Convention.” After the war, Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Amendments focused the national conversation on federal constitutional change, and particularly on the power of the vote prioritized in the Fifteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment also highlighted the issue of the vote for women by explicitly inserting gender into the Constitution for the first time, enforcing the right to vote guaranteed to “male inhabitants” and “male citizens.” Women’s rights advocates were drawn into this constitutional debate, forced to
narrow their focus and react to the national dialogue on suffrage.***

 

Pulled into this national constitutional movement, women’s rights activists utilized the demand for the vote as a proxy for a greater comprehensive agenda of both equality and emancipation from oppression. As Stanton later recalled, the vote was not the central idea of Seneca Falls, but rather “the social wrongs of my sex occupied altogether the larger place” in the early movement.  Her advocacy for the vote thus came to represent full citizenship rights, defined as full equality in civil rights and emancipation from oppressive social and religious norms.

 

This essay first details the origins of women’s political demand for the vote as part of a comprehensive social reform. It then discusses the four strands of the comprehensive early women’s rights agenda for gender equality focused on the political state, domestic family, economic industry, and religious church. Finally, it connects the suffrage activism with demands for an equal rights amendment to realize the full civil rights of equality envisioned by and for women. This long view of women’s rights shows it was never only about the
vote; rather, the vote stood as a shorthand for a complete revolution of the interlocking systems supporting women’s oppression and denying women equal rights. 

June 24, 2020 in Constitutional, Legal History, Religion | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 9, 2020

How Courts Have Responded to Equal Protection Claims of Pregnant Citizens Since the Nineteenth Amendment

Reva Siegel, The Pregnant Citizen, from Suffrage to the Present, Georgetown L. J. (forthcoming)

This Article examines how courts have responded to the equal protection claims of pregnant citizens over the century women were enfranchised. The lost history it recovers shows how equal protection changed—initially allowing government to enforce traditional family roles by exempting laws regulating pregnancy from close review, then over time subjecting laws regulating pregnancy to heightened equal protection scrutiny.

It is generally assumed that the Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Geduldig v. Aiello insulates the regulation of pregnancy from equal protection scrutiny. The Article documents the traditional sex-role understandings Geduldig preserved and then demonstrates how the Supreme Court itself has limited the decision’s authority.

In particular, I show that the Rehnquist Court integrated laws regulating pregnancy into the equal protection sex-discrimination framework. In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court analyzed a law mandating the accommodation of pregnancy as classifying on the basis of sex and subject to heightened scrutiny; Virginia directs judges to look to history in enforcing the Equal Protection Clause to ensure that laws regulating pregnancy are not “used, as they once were . . . to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.” In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court then applied the antistereotyping principle to laws regulating pregnancy, as a growing number of commentators and courts have observed.

I conclude the Article by considering how courts and Congress might enforce the rights in Virginia and Hibbs in cases involving pregnancy under both the Fourteenth and the Nineteenth Amendments. To remedy law-driven sex-role stereotyping that has shaped the workplace, the household, and politics, the Article proposes that Congress adopt legislation mandating the reasonable accommodation of pregnant employees, such as the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act. These sex-role stereotypes affect all workers, but exact the greatest toll on low-wage workers and workers of color who are subject to rigid managerial supervision.

When we locate equal protection cases in history, we can see how an appeal to biology can enforce traditional sex roles as it did in Geduldig—and see why a court invoking Geduldig today to insulate the regulation of pregnancy from scrutiny under Virginia and Hibbs would not respect stare decisis, but instead retreat from core principles of the equal protection sex-discrimination case law.

June 9, 2020 in Constitutional, Legal History, Pregnancy, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 27, 2020

The Strong Public Support for the ERA, Except for the Insurance Industry

Carrie Baker, Ms., Reports of the ERA's Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated

This is the final installment in a six-part series examining the half-century fight to add women to the U.S. Constitution—and a game plan on where we go from here.

Get caught up:

But today, despite resistance from Republicans in Congress and from the Trump administration, public support for the ERA is currently sky-high: The American Bar Association’s (ABA) 2020 Survey of Civic Literacy showed that a wide majority of respondents—83 percent—believe the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) should be ratified and incorporated into the U.S. Constitution. Only 8 percent opposed.

“That’s a powerful statement about what the public believes in,” said ABA president Judy Perry Martinez, for it “tells us is that Americans believe in equal rights for women and they know that until those words are in our Constitution, those equal rights will not in fact be believed and achieved by all.”

But, just like in the initial push for the ERA in the 1970s, opposition from business interests, especially the insurance industry, are ERA enemy number one.

“‘Women’s equality’ is not just words,” Smeal says. “It means real things, especially in the area of money. It means you have to stop discriminating against women in employment and in annuities, life insurance and health insurance. It involves billions and billions of dollars.”

Of course, earlier this year, under the leadership of Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), the House of Representatives voted to remove the arbitrary time line for the ERA with a bipartisan 232–183 vote.

“With this resolution, we take a giant step toward equality for women, progress for families and a stronger America—because we know when women succeed, America succeeds,” Pelosi said at a press conference ahead of the vote.

Meaning this fall, all eyes will be on the Senate.

May 27, 2020 in Constitutional, Legal History, Pop Culture | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 26, 2020

Court Strikes Down Florida Felon Pay-to-Vote Law, but Rejects 19th Amendment Claim of Gender Discrimination

Press Release, In a Victory for Voting Rights, Federal Court Rules that Florida's Pay-to-Vote System is Unconstitutional 

The full opinion is here: Jones v. DeSantis (N.D. Fla. 2020)

I want to think more about the new opinion from a federal district court dismissing women voters claims under the 19th Amendment.  Two issues strike me on an initial read.

1.  The court says there is no reason to treat the 19th differently from the 15th or 14th.  This conclusion results in requiring an intentional state of mind for gender discrimination under the 19th Amendment.  The standard of discriminatory purpose is a requirement of proving gender discrimination under the 14th Amendment, and the court says also for the 15th.  However, reading in the historical context may raise a question here.  SCOTUS explicitly held in Minor v. Happersett (1874) that the 14th Amendment did not apply to women's state voting rights.  Reading the 14th Amendment standards into the 19th, seems to do just this.  There is also some significant history on the 19th A itself that might suggest a different conclusion.

2.  It is troubling the court discounts the gender discrimination claim by focusing on the impact on men.   The court notes that more men than women are felons, so more men generally are impacted by the law.  Rather than comparing the two groups similarly situated -- felons -- and then addressing the discrimination against those women felons.  This focus on men, rather than the women plaintiffs in a case, was also seen recently in the US Women's Soccer pay discrimination case.  It may represent an emerging litigation trend of dismissing, both legally and socially, women's claims of disparate impact.  

Here is the court's 19th Amendment claim analysis:

XII. Gender Discrimination


The McCoy plaintiffs assert the pay-to-vote requirement discriminates against women in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and violates the Nineteenth Amendment, which provides that a citizen’s right to vote “shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of sex.”

 

To prevail under the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiffs must show intentional gender discrimination—that is, the plaintiffs must show that gender was a motivating factor in the adoption of the pay-to-vote system. This is the same standard that applies to race discrimination, as addressed above.


The plaintiffs assert the Nineteenth Amendment should be read more liberally, but the better view is that the standards are the same. The Nineteenth Amendment was an effort to put women on the same level as men with respect to voting, just as the Fifteenth Amendment was an effort to put African American men on the same level as white men. Indeed, the Nineteenth Amendment copied critical language from the Fifteenth, which provides that a citizen’s right to vote “shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” As is settled, a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment requires the same showing of intentional discrimination as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 n.8 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating “vote dilution, vote denial, and traditional race discrimination claims arising under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments all require proof of intentional discrimination”). In sum, there is no reason to read the Nineteenth Amendment differently from the Fifteenth.

 

On the facts, the plaintiffs’ theory is that women with felony convictions, especially those who have served prison sentences, are less likely than men to obtain employment and, when employed at all, are likely to be paid substantially less than men.  The problem is even worse for African American women. This pattern is not limited to felons; it is true in the economy at large.

 

As a result, a woman with LFOs is less likely than a man with the same LFOs to be able to pay them. This means the pay-to-vote requirement is more likely to render a given woman ineligible to vote than an identically situated man.

 

This does not, however, establish intentional discrimination. Instead, this is in effect, an assertion that the pay-to-vote requirement has a disparate impact on women. For gender discrimination, as for race discrimination, see supra Section IX, disparate impact is relevant to, but without more does not establish, intentional discrimination. Here there is nothing more—no direct or circumstantial evidence of gender bias, and no reason to believe gender had anything to do with the adoption of Amendment 4, the enactment of SB7066, or the State’s implementation of this system.

 

Moreover, the pay-to-vote requirement renders many more men than women ineligible to vote. This is so because men are disproportionately represented among felons. As a result, even though the impact on a given woman with LFOs is likely to be greater than the impact on a given man with the same LFOs, the pay-to-vote
requirement overall has a disparate impact on men, not women. Even if disparate impact was sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, the plaintiffs would not prevail on their gender claim.

 

May 26, 2020 in Constitutional, Legislation | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, May 22, 2020

"Jane Roe" from Roe v. Wade Retracts Anti-Abortion Conversion in Posthumous Documentary, "AKA Jane Roe"

Michelle Goldberg, Jane Roe's Pro-Life Conversion Was a Con

It was a cultural coup for the right when McCorvey publicly turned against legal abortion. Jane Roe rejecting Roe v. Wade was something abortion opponents could throw in the faces of pro-choice activists. So it is a bombshell that McCorvey has revealed, in the posthumous new documentary “AKA Jane Roe,” that it was, at least in some sense, an act. “I am a good actress,” she said.

 

The movie, which debuts on Friday on FX, also makes clear that anti-abortion leaders understood this. They’ve been perpetrating a scam on us all for 25 years.

 
In the documentary’s final 20 minutes, McCorvey, who died of heart failure in 2017, gives what she calls her “deathbed confession.” She and the pro-life movement, she said, were using each other: “I took their money, and they put me out in front of the cameras and told me what to say, and that’s what I’d say.”
 

In her career as a pro-life icon, she collected nearly half a million dollars. But at the end of her life, she once again affirmed a belief in the right to abortion, and evinced pride in Roe v. Wade. “Roe isn’t going anywhere,” she said early on election night in 2016, when she thought Hillary Clinton was going to win. “They can try, but it’s not happening, baby.”***

 

Given the political damage done by her cynical about-face, it’s surprising how sympathetic McCorvey — campy, foul-mouthed and irreverent — comes off. She was a lost soul from a traumatic background. Her father was absent and her mother beat her, and she ended up in reform school after running away from home at 10. She entered an abusive marriage at 16, became addicted to drugs and alcohol, and lost custody of her first child.

 
As she’s told the story, she signed up as the plaintiff in Roe v. Wade not because she wanted to make history but because she was desperate for an abortion. She never got one: By the time the case was decided, she’d given birth and put the baby up for adoption.

 

Later, McCorvey resented not being given a more prominent role as a pro-choice activist. The movement found her embarrassing, especially when, in 1987, she admitted that she’d lied when she’d said the pregnancy at the heart of Roe was a result of rape.***

 

“She was not the poster girl that would have been helpful to the pro-choice movement,” Charlotte Taft, a former director of the Abortion Care Network, says in the film. “However, an articulate, educated person could not have been the plaintiff in Roe v. Wade.” It was women like McCorvey — those without the resources to travel to pro-choice states — who endured forced childbirth in the years before Roe was decided. “People who are plaintiffs in cases are usually messy people,” said Kissling.

 

Many of the headlines about “AKA Jane Roe” have emphasized that McCorvey was paid to renounce abortion rights, but after watching it I don’t think it was all about money. McCorvey wanted respect and attention, to be honored and cherished. At times, people in the pro-choice movement tried to help her; for a while she was represented by the feminist superlawyer Gloria Allred. She made money giving speeches and selling the rights to her story, including for an Emmy-winning made-for-TV movie.

May 22, 2020 in Abortion, Constitutional, Pop Culture, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 20, 2020

Papers from the Feminist Legal Theory Research Network at Next Week's Law & Society Association Virtual Meeting

I am probably one of the few people in the world who is thrilled that the Law & Society Annual Conference is virtual -- since I will now be able to attend.  In general virtual conferences open up access to some barriers to participation due to finances,  travel, family, disability, and health issues.

You can register for the virtual conference here at the Law & Society Association website.  

Scheduled papers to be presented from the Feminist Legal Theory Research Network:

 

Time

Title

Type

Wed, 5/27
1:00 PM - 2:45 PM

#MeToo: The Narrative of Resistance Meets the Rule of Law

Plenary Session 

Thu, 5/28
11:00 AM - 12:45 PM

Moving Rules: Struggles for Reproductive Justice on Uneven Terrain

Paper Session 

Thu, 5/28
11:00 AM - 12:45 PM

Sexual Harassment: Victims and Survivors

Paper Session 

Thu, 5/28
1:00 PM - 2:00 PM

CRN07: Feminist Legal Theory Business Meeting

Business Meeting 

Thu, 5/28
2:15 PM - 4:00 PM

Families, Laws, and Institutions

Paper Session 

Thu, 5/28
2:15 PM - 4:00 PM

The State and Violence: New Proposals for Stopping the Cycle

Paper Session 

Fri, 5/29
11:00 AM - 12:45 PM

Normativity in Men, Women, and Bodies

Paper Session 

Fri, 5/29
11:00 AM - 12:45 PM

The Politicization of Safety: Critical Perspectives on Domestic Violence Responses

Roundtable Session 

Fri, 5/29
1:00 PM - 2:15 PM

Sexual Harassers, Sex Crimes, and Accountability

Paper Session 

Fri, 5/29
4:00 PM - 5:45 PM

Women's Rights in the Shadow of the Constitution

Paper Session 

Sat, 5/30
11:00 AM - 12:45 PM

Perspectives on Sex, Work and New Legal Orders

Paper Session 

Sat, 5/30
1:00 PM - 2:45 PM

Trans and Queer Life in Private and Public

Paper Session 

Sat, 5/30
4:00 PM - 5:45 PM

Human Rights in an Unequal World: Autonomy, Status, and Other Stories

Paper Session 

Sun, 5/31
11:00 AM - 12:45 PM

Feminist Legal Theory in a Public/Private World

Paper Session 

Sun, 5/31
11:00 AM - 12:45 PM

Laws of Social Reproduction

Paper Session 

Sun, 5/31
1:00 PM - 2:00 PM

Intimate Lies and the Law

Author Meets Reader (AMR) Session 

Sun, 5/31
2:15 PM - 4:00 PM

Feminist Judgments on Reproductive Justice and Family Law

Roundtable Session 

Sun, 5/31
2:15 PM - 4:00 PM

Women and Gender in Private, Public, and Places in Between: Old Doctrines Meet New Realities in the Twenty-First Century

Paper Session 

May 20, 2020 in Conferences, Constitutional, Equal Employment, Family, Masculinities, Reproductive Rights, Theory, Violence Against Women | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 12, 2020

Video: Voting Rights in a Time of Pandemic, Thinking About Women's Suffrage and the 1918 Spanish Flu

Kimberly Hamlin, Laptop Lecture Series: Voting Rights in a Time of Pandemic

Have a minute? Check out today’s Laptop Lecture “Voting Rights in a Time of Pandemic” by Kimberly Hamlin, Associate Professor of History and American Studies, which explores how the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic complicated suffragist efforts to pass the 19th Amendment in the House.

 

May 12, 2020 in Constitutional, Legal History | Permalink | Comments (0)

Trump Administration Seeks to Dismiss Lawsuit to Certify ERA

Trump Administration Asks Court to Toss Lawsuit Over ERA

The Trump administration has asked a judge to throw out a lawsuit filed by three Democratic state attorneys general seeking to force the U.S. archivist to recognize Virginia’s vote to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment and adopt it in the U.S. Constitution.

 

Virginia became the 38th and final state needed to make the ERA part of the Constitution in January, after the General Assembly passed and ratified the amendment.

 

Attorney General Mark Herring sued David Ferriero, the archivist of the United States, after the National Archives and Record Administration said Ferriero would “take no action” to certify the adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment. Herring was joined in the lawsuit by Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul and Nevada Attorney General Aaron Ford, the attorneys general of ratifying states number 36 and 37.**

 

On Thursday, the Trump administration asked the court to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that ratification is not an issue to be decided by the courts.

 

In a memo supporting the motion to dismiss, Assistant Attorney General Joseph Hunt said the Supreme Court held nearly a century ago that Congress may set a deadline for the ratification of constitutional amendments so that the contemporaneous will of the people is reflected in the amendments.

 

Herring and other attorneys general argue that the deadline — first set for 1979 and later extended to 1982 — is not binding.

 

The administration argues that the three states ratified the ERA decades after Congress’ ratification deadline and are asking the court to mandate that the archivist certify the ERA.

 

“But that request is contrary to Supreme Court precedent prohibiting courts from second-guessing the legislature’s inclusion of a deadline for ratification,” they argued.

 

In the lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the attorneys general argue that a proposed constitutional amendment automatically becomes valid as part of the Constitution as soon as it is ratified by the legislatures of three-quarters of the states, or 38. They also argue that the archivist’s duty to certify the amendment is “mandatory and purely ministerial.”

May 12, 2020 in Constitutional, Legislation | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 11, 2020

The Women of the Supreme Court are Sick of These Nonsense Objections to Birth Control

The Women of the Supreme Court are Sick of These Nonsense Objections to Birth Control

Conservatives have been trying to unwind the birth control benefit in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) for nearly a decade now, and the women justices on the U.S Supreme Court are over it.

 

That much was apparent during oral arguments Wednesday in Trump v. Pennsylvania and its companion case, Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania.

 

It’s the third time the Court has heard a challenge to the birth control benefit, which guarantees access to FDA-approved contraception methods at no additional cost or co-pay in most employer-sponsored health plans. But this case is the most absurd and dangerous challenge yet

 

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg drove that point home from the hospital, where she was recovering from a gallbladder procedure while defending the rights of hundreds of thousands of employees the Trump administration is trying to “toss to the winds entirely,” to use her words. Justice Sonia Sotomayor reminded Solicitor General Noel Francisco that should the Court side with the Trump administration, the benefits of around a hundred thousand employees (by even the most conservative estimate) would be in jeopardy. And Justice Elena Kagan appeared to be searching for a compromise she could get the chief justice to sign onto.

 

At its core is the same central question: Can your boss deny you health insurance coverage for contraception based on a religious objection? But these cases take that question and, like everything in the Trump years, extend it to absurd lengths by asking if your boss can deny you those same benefits based on a moral objection as well.

 

The moral exemption to the birth control benefit is a toxic addition inserted by the Trump administration three years ago after conservative efforts to upend the benefit in court fell flat. Trump announced the exemption in a Rose Garden ceremony flanked by the Little Sisters of the Poor, the nuns who would continue on as the face of the administration’s efforts to undermine the benefit. It was the kind of reality-TV spectacle that has come to define this administration—full of pomp, empty on substance, but with the potential to unleash an unfathomable amount of chaos in its wake.

 

And that’s precisely why the administration brought the nuns along. Someone has to sell this pile of garbage to the Roberts Court, and the nuns have proven more than willing to play along.

 

There is no world in which the nuns would have to provide contraception coverage for their employees. None. Not a single one. They are covered by exemptions, court orders, and a provision of employee benefits law that guarantees the federal government mostly stay out of their business. So when Paul Clement, the attorney representing the Little Sisters, suggested that the nuns would stop providing care to the elderly and poor should they have to simply fill out a form noting their objection to the benefit, I was glad to be covering the arguments from home. Had I been at the Court, I definitely would have been ejected for the spontaneous, “OH COME THE FUCK ON, PAUL” that response requires.

 

Turns out, I’m as fed up with these cases as the women justices of the Court.

May 11, 2020 in Constitutional, Religion, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 5, 2020

Call for Authors Feminist Judgments -- Rewritten Criminal Law Opinions

Call for Authors

Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Criminal Law Opinions

The U.S. Feminist Judgments Project seeks contributors of rewritten judicial opinions and commentary on those opinions for an edited collection entitled Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Criminal Law Opinions. This edited volume is part of a collaborative project among law professors and others to rewrite, from a feminist perspective, key judicial decisions. The initial volume, Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court, edited by Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger, and Bridget J. Crawford, was published in 2016 by Cambridge University Press. Subsequent volumes in the series have focused on different courts and different subjects. This call is for contributions to a volume of criminal law decisions rewritten from a feminist perspective.

Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Criminal Law Opinion editors Sarah Deer, Corey Rayburn Yung, and Bennett Capers seek prospective authors to rewrite criminal law opinions covering a range of topics. With the help of an Advisory Committee, the editors have chosen a list of cases to be rewritten (as noted below). Potential authors are welcome to suggest other cases, though certain constraints (including a preference for avoiding cases that have already been or soon will be rewritten for other volumes in this series) may preclude their addition to the volume. We also seek authors to provide brief commentary on the original and rewritten cases.

Rewritten opinions may be reimagined majority opinions, dissents, or concurrences, as appropriate to the court. Feminist judgment writers will be bound by law and precedent in effect at the time of the original decision (with a 10,000-word maximum for the rewritten judgment). Commentators will explain the original court decision, how the feminist judgment differs from the original judgment, and what difference the feminist judgment might have made going forward (4,000-word maximum for the commentary). The volume editors conceive of feminism broadly and invite applications that seek to advance, complicate, or critique feminist ideas and advocacy. We are “big tent” and welcome all types of feminism, from liberal feminism to abolitionist feminism. We certainly welcome an intersectional analysis of cases where sex or gender played a role alongside racism, ableism, classism, and other concerns.

Those who are interested in rewriting an opinion or providing the commentary on one of the rewritten criminal law cases should email the volume editors (sarah.deer@ku.edu, coreyyung@ku.edu, and capers@fordham.edu) and put “Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Criminal Law Opinions” in the subject line. In the body of the email, please indicate whether you are interested in writing an opinion or providing a commentary, and specify one or more of the cases from the list below that you would like to rewrite or comment on. You are also free to suggest a case not listed.

Please note that the editors are committed to diversity in all of its forms, and committed to including a diverse group of authors in this volume. If you feel an aspect of your personal identity is important to your participation in this volume, please feel free to include that in your expression of interest.

Applications are due by June 1, 2020. The editors expect to notify accepted authors and commentators no later than July 1, 2020. First drafts of rewritten opinions will be due on October 1, 2020. First drafts of commentaries will be due on November 1, 2020.

List of cases:

  1. Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (tribal criminal jurisdiction)
  2. Winnebago v. BigFire, 25 Indian L. Rptr 6229 (1998) (strict scrutiny for gender cases)
  3. Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015) (threatening communications case)
  4. U.S. v. Nwoye, 824 F.3d 1129 (2016) (domestic violence/duress)
  5. Keeler v. Superior Ct of Amador Cnty, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (killing of fetus)
  6. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (1977) (criminalizing prenatal activity)
  7. Coker v. Georgia, 433 US. 584 (1977) (death penalty and rape)
  8. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (death penalty and race)
  9. People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (1976) (provocation)
  10. Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718 (Md. 1991) (provocation)
  11. People v. Helen Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1991) (cultural defense)
  12. State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253 (1989) (self-defense)
  13. State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (1981) (acquaintance rape)
  14. Massachusetts v. Blache, 880 N.E.2d 736 (Mass. 2008) (rape/intoxication)
  15. McQuirter v. State, 36 Ala. 707 (1953) (rape/race)
  16. State re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992) (juveniles/rape)

May 5, 2020 in Books, Call for Papers, Constitutional | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, April 17, 2020

New Series "Mrs. America" Showcases Feminist Leaders and the 1970 Fight for the ERA, While Featuring Staunch Opponent, Phyllis Schlafly

NYT, "Mrs. America Review: The Voice of an ERA"

FX on Hulu’s breathtaking “Mrs. America,” from the “Mad Men” writer Dahvi Waller, picks up in 1971. . . . The story of the fight for and against the Equal Rights Amendment, it’s not a sequel, either literally or in format: It’s a nine-part series following real historical figures.***

 

Like “Mad Men,” “Mrs. America” finds a fresh angle on a much-observed age of revolution by focusing, first, on a counterrevolutionary: Phyllis Schlafly (Cate Blanchett), the cold warrior who, in Waller’s telling, seized on the culture war over women’s rights to raise her political profile and advance a broader conservative agenda.***

 

The insight of “Mrs. America,” in the punchy words of Representative Bella Abzug (Margo Martindale), is that Schlafly “is a goddamn feminist. She may be the most liberated woman in America.” She just chooses not to see herself that way.***

 

Parallel to Schlafly’s story is an ensemble series about the 1970s feminist movement. Its principals aren’t introduced until the end of the first episode: among them, Abzug, Gloria Steinem (Rose Byrne), Representative Shirley Chisholm (Uzo Aduba), Betty Friedan (Tracey Ullman) and some less-celebrated E.R.A. warriors, including the G.O.P. activist Jill Ruckelshaus (Elizabeth Banks).***

 

The decade-long fight that unfolds is epic and swaggering, bubbling with cultural ferment and bouncing along on a soul-laced soundtrack. There is an “Avengers Assemble” feeling here, both in the gathering of historical figures — a young Ruth Bader Ginsburg even appears, briefly — and the bumper crop of acting talent. Waller is producing feminism’s most ambitious crossover event, and she relishes it.***

 

While Schlafly is the driving force of the series — it is not, after all, called “Ms. America” — the show spotlights one character at a time. The third episode, about Chisholm’s 1972 run for the presidency, rings familiar not just in the story of an outsider fighting what she calls a “rigged” party machine, but in the intra-movement clashes over whether race and gender are equal priorities. (Chisholm, whom Aduba gives a fierce magnetism, gets this from black politicians, too, who see her more as a “women’s” candidate. “I don’t look black to you?” she asks.)

April 17, 2020 in Constitutional, Legal History, Pop Culture, Women lawyers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 6, 2020

Divorce as a Substantive Gender-Equality Right

Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Substantive Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. Penn J. Const'l L. 455 (2020)

This Article—the first half of a diptych that continues with Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right,
22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming April 2020)—draws on the insight that the position of women in society
is nowhere better reflected and constituted than in a nation’s personal status laws. Contemporary feminist and
constitutional scholars have devoted much attention to how the laws of marriage affect women’s status in society,
but they have largely ignored the potential for divorce to vindicate gender equality norms—and many have
overlooked recent political and legal developments that threaten to substantially restrict dissolution rights.

This diptych seeks to fill in the academic void in feminist and constitutional scholarship by developing the
constitutional argument for divorce as a gender equality right. Recognizing that there are competing conceptions
of what constitutional gender equality means, the thesis is that every interpretation of equal protection must
guarantee a right of unilateral, no-fault exit from matrimonial chains. This Article establishes the status of
marital freedom as a gender-equality right under various substantive visions of constitutional equality. The
subsequent Article, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming
April 2020), establishes the status of marital freedom as a gender-equality right under a formal understanding
of constitutional equality.

To expose the gender-equality implications of divorce law, this diptych unearths the lineage and function of divorce
restrictions as gender-status regulation and outlines the gender-specific burdens they impose on women. It further
unveils contemporary attempts to restrict divorce as reflecting impermissible status-based judgments about women’s
capacities, roles, and destinies. All in all, this diptych concludes that divorce restrictions coerce women to perform
the work of wifehood without altering the conditions that continue to make such work a principal cause of their
subordination. This makes unilateral no-fault divorce a fundamental right for women attempting to navigate the
world as equals and an imperative for a constitutional system committed to disestablishing gender hierarchy.

April 6, 2020 in Constitutional, Family | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, April 3, 2020

Sex Segregation and Economic Opportunity in the Supreme Court's Decision in Roberts

Elizabeth Sepper, Sex Segregation, Economic Opportunity, and Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 28 William & Mary Bill of Rights J. (2020)  

This symposium on the intersections, synergies, and conflicts between rights largely focuses on constitutional rights and their relationships in judicial decisions. From this perspective, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees—and the issue of sex-segregated clubs more generally—stands at the intersection of First Amendment rights to association, expression, assembly, and privacy. But rights construction, or dynamism, is not so neatly bounded by the Constitution.

In this essay, I argue that what was dynamic and synergistic in Roberts was not the Jaycees’ constitutional interests, but rather women’s statutory rights to economic opportunity and to equal membership. Litigation came to set mere statute against constitutional freedom of association. But the statutory and cultural commitments of the time influenced the construction of those constitutional rights. In a decade-long movement culminating in the Supreme Court, working women, local Jaycee chapters, and feminist groups forged connections between legal frameworks—federal and state, statute and constitution—that the law holds separate. Public accommodations equality under state statutes coalesced with landmark employment law protections under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The movement shifted public discourse and, eventually, governmental and judicial perspectives from unexamined acceptance of a pervasively sex-segregated public to the integration of clubs once thought private. It highlighted dual harms of the U.S. Jaycees’ treatment of women—an affront to fair play in the business world and the maintenance of gender hierarchy within the organization and society-wide. Justice O’Connor’s noted concurrence and Justice Brennan’s majority opinion respectively adopt these frames. Although the Jaycees might seem a relic of a time long past, the social and legal movement leading to the Supreme Court proves relevant for ongoing debates about the permissibility of segregated organizations, the emergence of #MeToo, and the tactics of effective social movements.

April 3, 2020 in Constitutional | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Map Strategy of State Adoption of Women's Suffrage as Critical to Passage of the 19th Amendment

Really enjoyed the talk by historian Dr. Susan Schulten this morning at the virtual conference, Women's Enfranchisement Beyond the 19th Amendment

Here is a written essay that summarizes some of Dr. Schulten's points.  Susan Schulten, The Crooked Path to Women's Suffrage, Wash. Post.

Schulten discussed the "map strategy" of women's suffrage leaders during primarily the 19 teens.  Leaders used visuals and media to illustrate the acceptance of women's suffrage in the West.  The geographical maps boldly displayed the evolution of thought and the wave of progress moving from west to east. 

This map strategy supports a thesis that the suffrage state strategy was critical to the passage of the federal constitutional amendment.   We often dismiss this state strategy - dominant from 1885 to 1918, - as ineffective.  But Schulten's talk showed the converse.  That not only did the state by state approach work for full or partial suffrage in many states, but that it was this state success that provide the evidence for a federal amendment.  The state progress demonstrated the state experimentation with the issue and decision in favor of such rights as a foundation to bolster the legitimacy of the federal amendment.

As an aside, Schulten also added some facts to the historical question of why President Woodrow Wilson switched from anti suffrage to pro suffrage.  Schulten suggests it was the National American Women's Suffrage Associations (NAWSA's) support of Wilson and WWI  that swayed him to support it.  This was in contrast to Alice Paul and her National Women Party's (NWP) opposition to both Wilson and the war and her militant pickets of the White House in support of women's suffrage.  Kimberly Hamlin also tracks the active lobbying work of Helen Hamilton Gardender, NAWSA's lead lobbyist, as critical to Wilson's shift.  See Free Thinker: Sex, Suffrage, and the Extraordinary Life of Helen Hamilton Gardener (Norton 2020).  Schulten notes that Wilson wrangled the final vote for the 19th Amendment from peace talks at Versailles and as he battled the pandemic Spanish flu. 

April 3, 2020 in Constitutional, Legal History | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 2, 2020

CFP: Pandemics and the Constitution (Deadline 4/19)

Call for Papers

Pandemics and the Constitution

In response to the COVID-19 outbreak, governments have rapidly imposed restrictions on everyday life that would have seemed unthinkable only a few weeks ago. While as late as mid-March media was repeating the line that draconian measures to contain the virus like those taken in Wuhan, China, could not occur in the United States, Americans have very quickly adjusted to tight restrictions on daily life. Commentary about the constitutionality of coronavirus-related restrictions by legal scholars has just begun to appear in the popular media. Existing jurisprudence has been characterized as recognizing a “seemingly unlimited power to quarantine” on the parts of states.  Much of this legal precedent, however, is over a century old, predating many shifts in thinking in legal thinking and constitutional law on civil liberties, procedural due process, and the role of the federal government.

Because scholarship on this subject will be a vital guide to the public and legal community in the months ahead, ConLawNOW is seeking to publish, on an expedited timeline, a written symposium of short essays (preferably 5–10,000 words, about 10 published pages) on the constitutional boundaries of government response to pandemics.  Topics may include, but are not limited to, constitutional permissibility of restrictions on movement and travel, legitimacy of closing and limits on commerce, the proper scope of state power to act for the public health, constitutionality of the suspension of fundamental rights like abortion or gun rights, constitutional implications of delays in courts, trials, and juries, First Amendment parameters of restrictions on gatherings and religious services, permissibility of mandated medical testing, surveillance, and tracking, government ability to delay or cancel elections, and Eighth Amendment implications for inmates.

Submissions will be considered and published on a rolling basis.  Papers submitted prior to April 19 will receive priority consideration.  To submit, please email your manuscript to conlawjournal@uakron.edu.  Questions may be directed to conlawjournal@uakron.edu or editor David Belfiglio at dsb82@zips.uakron.edu.

 ConLawNOW is an online journal sponsored by the Congressionally-established Center for Constitutional Law and the Akron Law Review.   It is an open access journal, also indexed in Westlaw, Lexis, and Hein.

April 2, 2020 in Call for Papers, Constitutional, Healthcare, Pop Culture | Permalink | Comments (0)