Thursday, June 1, 2023

SCOTUS Unwed Parents Cases Retain Anachronistic Gendered Hierarchies as a Matter of Constitutional Law

Albertina Antognini, Unwed Parents: The Limits of Constitution, 35 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 425 (2023)

As marriage has evolved to become a more egalitarian institution in both form and substance, nonmarriage remains full of antiquated norms and gendered hierarchies. In constitutional terms, while equality and due process considerations have forged an increasingly open and equal marital relation, these gains have largely been limited to marriage. The Constitution has failed to reform nonmarriage in similar ways and, as a consequence, it continues to contain “stunningly anachronistic” laws and principles.
 
Nonmarriage is by definition broad, encompassing the many activities and statuses that take place outside of marriage. The nonmarital cases this essay addresses involve unwed parents, which constitute a small but important slice of the legal issues that arise in the nonmarital domain. The Supreme Court has had occasion to interpret the Constitution's applicability to nonmarriage in a series of cases addressing unwed fathers; these decisions range from considering whether notice ought to be provided to an unwed father as a constitutional matter before placing his biological child for adoption, to whether disparate requirements for unwed fathers and unwed mothers in transmitting citizenship violate equal protection. Throughout, the Court has repeatedly upheld dissimilar treatment where it finds the existence of “real” differences between men and women. Reasoning from the “fact of conception” and “proof” of paternity, the Court has consistently concluded that men and women are not “similarly situated” when it comes to their roles as mothers and fathers. These facts that purportedly distinguish mothers from fathers as a general matter, gain legal significance only outside of the status of marriage.
 
The most recent of the unwed fathers cases, decided in 2017, is Sessions v. Morales-Santana. In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court struck down the different residency lengths required of unwed mothers and unwed fathers prior to transmitting citizenship to their children. The decision has been lauded for eliminating one of the few remaining facial sex-based distinctions, and criticized for the remedy it issued in response. This essay does neither. Instead, it argues that Morales-Santana signals a clear break from the unwed fathers cases by identifying the role that law plays in constructing what had previously been presented as unassailable fact. This essay engages in a close reading of Morales-Santana to show exactly how the Court exposes a set of ostensibly factual observations as legal judgments that rely on outdated notions of fathers and mothers, and which continue to prop up laws that differentiate between parents on the basis of sex to this day.
 
To be sure, analyzing the Court's reasoning is not necessarily important as a matter of predicting what the Court will do in future cases addressing the constitutional rights of nonmarital families - that has been largely pre-determined by the Court's most recent appointees. The opinion is also, in many ways, dated, part of a different legal landscape, one in which women and pregnant persons had more rights - to equality, to dignity, to bodily autonomy. The point of this essay then is to reveal the mechanisms by which value judgments become hardened into constitutional axioms in order to recover them as contingent, and therefore contestable, opinions. The nonmarital cases exist in the register of indisputable observation, yet they are based on archaic beliefs about the abilities of men and women that reflect, and continue to reproduce, gender inequality

June 1, 2023 in Constitutional, Family, Gender, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, May 25, 2023

The Limited Effect of SCOTUS' Decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana Five Years Later

John Vlahoplus, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, Five Years On, Charleston Law Review (Forthcoming)

The Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana was a landmark victory for equality over congressional power. For the first time the Court invoked equal protection principles to invalidate a citizenship statute despite Congress’s near-plenary power over immigration and naturalization. The Court’s remedy disappointed Morales-Santana, however. Rather than level up by recognizing that he acquired derivative citizenship as of birth from his unwed citizen father, the Court leveled down by striking a more favorable rule granting derivative citizenship at birth to children of unwed citizen mothers. Commentators recognized that the Court’s brief opinion left many questions open and that only subsequent developments would reveal whether or how it might affect equal protection and plenary power doctrines.

This essay examines the first five years of developments. It shows that Morales-Santana has had a significant but limited impact. Courts have relied on it to level up in citizenship litigation, to adjudicate claims of post-natal citizenship, and to secure some rights of non-traditional families and family members. Nevertheless, the majority’s insistence that contemporary evaluation governs equal protection analysis has not informed the development of gender-based equal protection more broadly. Courts continue to accept older precedents and rationalizations of gender discrimination at face value. An equal protection principle strong enough to defeat congressional power in an area as important as citizenship has failed to eliminate gender discrimination in other important areas like parental rights.

The essay also analyzes constitutional issues relating to citizenship and plenary power that the majority opinion glosses over, outlines defenses against potential circumvention, and identifies areas for further development that remain despite—or perhaps because of—the majority opinion’s theoretical uncertainties. How courts will continue to apply the decision in citizenship, immigration, and other cases remains to be seen.

May 25, 2023 in Constitutional, Gender, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 17, 2023

Dobbs, Plessy, and the New Jane Crow

Evan D. Bernick, Dobbs, Plessy, and the Constitution of the New Jane Crow,  Northern Illinois U. Law Rev. (2023)

Women and girls enter U.S. jails and prisons every year. Nearly a million are on probation, parole, or pretrial release. This carceral control is unevenly distributed, being primarily exercised over poor women of color. And it is growing. These realities are part of what has been conceptualized as “the New Jane Crow.”

This Essay contends that Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org. gives the New Jane Crow the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional blessing. In justifying its decision to overrule Roe v. Wade and hold that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect the right to terminate a pregnancy, Dobbs invokes Plessy v. Ferguson and its overruling by Brown v. Board of Education. The profound evil of Plessy’s constitutional endorsement of “separate but equal” railcars and its legitimation of Jim Crow segregation is said to illustrate the importance of overruling egregiously wrong precedents. But Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion for the Court in Dobbs has more in common with Plessy than its author recognizes.

Part I provides an overview of the New Jane Crow, tracing the genealogy of the phrase and describing the phenomenon that it names. Though provocative, I argue that the phrase fits the phenomenon, given substantive and functional continuities between state control of female reproduction past and present. Part II describes how Dobbs constitutionally legitimates key components of the New Jane Crow and encourages its expansion.

Part III analogizes Dobbs to Plessy in three respects. First, in its disregard of relevant history. Second, in its lack of attention to present socioeconomic realities. Third, in its capacity to provide constitutional legitimation to an entire political-economic order that perpetuates racialized and gendered subordination.

May 17, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Poverty, Pregnancy, Race, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

How the 19th Century Comstock Obscenity Law a the Key to the Abortion Fight

Emily Bazelon, NYT, How a 150-Year Old Law Against Lewdness Became a Key to the Abortion Fight

Anthony Comstock, a 19th-century crusader against sexual liberty, was mocked as a prude in his own time, but wielded real power. He persuaded Congress in 1873 to pass the Comstock Act, written by and named for him, making it a federal crime to send or deliver “obscene, lewd or lascivious” material through the mail or by other carriers, specifically including items used for abortion or birth control.

By the 1960s, the Comstock Act had fallen out of use — narrowed by court rulings, partly gutted by congressional repeals — and it was made an unconstitutional relic by the Supreme Court’s decision in 1973 in Roe v. Wade, recognizing a national right to abortion. But it stayed on the books.

Now, Comstock is back, once more being wielded as a weapon by social conservatives. Their arguments use the language of the act to target the mailing of abortion pills, and they are pushing judges and the Biden administration to reopen seemingly long-settled questions.

NYT, What to Know About the Comstock Act

The Comstock Act’s definition of what was lewd material would be “radically unfamiliar” to people living today, according to Mary Ziegler, professor of law at University of California, Davis. Examples she cited included “somebody writing a letter to somebody asking them for a date if they weren’t married,” and “somebody mentioning the existence of an abortion in a newspaper.”

“The early Comstock Act enforcement is extraordinarily broad, and gets broader and broader,” Professor Ziegler said.

I have written some about the origins of the Comstock law: See Tracy Thomas, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the Feminist Foundations of Family Law 91, 174-75 (NYU Press 2016); Tracy Thomas, Misappropriating Women's History in the Law and Politics of Abortion, 36 Seattle L. Rev. 1 (2012).

See also Gender & the Law Blog, Siegel and Ziegler on SCOTUS, Mifepristone, and the 19th Century Comstock Act

For a fictionalized story of the crusader Anthony Comstock and feminist activist Elizabeth Cady Stanton, see Marge Piercy, Sex Wars: A Novel of Gilded Age New York

May 17, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Legal History, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 8, 2023

Legal Challenge to Oklahoma's Ban on Gender-Affirming Care

Lambda Legal, the ACLU, and Jenner & Block have filed a suit challenging the constitutionality of Oklahoma's new law banning gender-affirming medical care for transgender youth. Excerpts of the Complaint reveal the key legal theories: 

13. The Health Care Ban not only gravely threatens the health and wellbeing of transgender adolescents in Oklahoma; it also is unconstitutional. The Health Care Ban violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminates against the Minor Plaintiffs on the basis of sex and transgender status by prohibiting any “health care provider” from “knowingly provid[ing] gender transition procedures to any child.”

 

14. The Health Care Ban also discriminates against the Parent Plaintiffs in the exercise of their fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children by prohibiting them from seeking and following medical advice to protect the health and wellbeing of their minor children. By preventing parents from seeking the medical care for their children that medical and mental health providers have recommended, the Health Care Ban violates the right to parental autonomy guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  

Read the full complaint here

May 8, 2023 in Constitutional, Family, Healthcare, Legislation | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, May 5, 2023

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Architect of Roe's Demise Argues SCOTUS History and Tradition Test is Wrong and Distinguishes Other Substantive Due Process Rights

The architect of Roe's demise argues that the Supreme Court's history and tradition test is wrong and distinguishes other substantive due process rights.

Jonathan Mitchell, Why Was Roe v. Wade Wrong?, forthcoming Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee Bollinger, eds., Roe v. Dobbs: The Past, Present, and Future of a Constitutional Right to Abortion (Oxford 2023)

The conventional critique of Roe v. Wade is both undertheorized and unsatisfying. Critics of Roe—such as John Hart Ely and Justice Scalia—have hammered the Court’s opinion for recognizing a supposed right to abortion that lacks a clear textual foundation in the Constitution’s language. Yet Roe was hardly the first time that the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional right that lacks textual support—and it is not immediately apparent what makes Roe more egregious than the other court-created rights that have won broad acceptance across the political and jurisprudential spectrum. Roe’s critics have tried to respond to this challenge by invoking a history-and-tradition test for distinguishing the “good” substantive-due-process rights from the “bad” ones. Yet there are many problems with using history and tradition as the touchstone for unenumerated constitutional rights. One problem is that the history-and-tradition test does nothing to salvage the constitutional holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a right to contraception, and Loving v. Virginia, which established a right to interracial marriage. There are also many unenumerated rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” yet have never been recognized as constitutional entitlements by the Supreme Court. And the history-and-tradition test has no account for why traditional rights and practices should be entrenched as constitutional mandates when they were never formally incorporated into constitutional text.

Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.

May 5, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, April 28, 2023

Senate Republicans Block Vote on Equal Rights Amendment, One Hundred Years After Its Introduction

The Hill, Senate GOP Blocks Equal Rights Amendment

Senate Republicans on Thursday blocked a measure that would have allowed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to be added to the Constitution.

Senators voted 51 to 47 to invoke cloture on a motion to proceed, falling short of the 60 votes it it needed. 

Sens. Lisa Murkowski (Alaska) and Susan Collins (Maine) were the lone Republicans to vote with every Democrat. 

The ERA passed Congress in 1972, having been first proposed in 1923. Constitutional amendments, under U.S. law, must be ratified by three-quarters of all state legislatures, meaning 38 states. 

In 2020, Virginia became the 38th state to ratify the ERA, but it did so after the 1982 deadline to ratify the amendment had passed.

The Senate resolution would have removed the deadline so that the ERA could become the 28th Amendment. Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.) and Murkowski were the resolution’s lead co-sponsors.

Reuters, US Equal Rights Amendment Blocked Again, A Century After Introduction

With a 51-47 vote in favor, Senate Democrats and supporters were nine votes shy of the 60 needed for a resolution to clear the 100-member chamber's filibuster hurdle.

The resolution would have removed a 1982 deadline for state ratification that prevented the Equal Rights Amendment from going into effect. Three states -- Nevada, Illinois and Virginia -- approved it after 1982.

 

Ms., Republicans Block Senate Vote on ERA

The Senate on Thursday had its first vote on the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in 40 years. 

Republican opposition meant that S.J. Res. 4, which would declare the ERA ratified and valid, failed to clear the 60-vote threshold needed to bring it to the floor for debate and a vote. Polls that show 83 percent of Americans believe the ERA should be incorporated into the U.S. Constitution (including 90 percent of 18- to 24-year-olds).

S.J. Res. 4 would declare the ERA, “which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, was ratified by three-fourths of the states, and is therefore a valid constitutional amendment, regardless of any time limit that was in the original proposal.” (The ERA has satisfied all Article V requirements to amend the Constitution: a two-thirds vote in the House and the Senate, achieved in 1971 and 1972, and ratification by three-fourths of the states, after Virginia became the 38th and final state in January of 2020.)

“The resolution is simple,” said Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-New York). “It removes the arbitrary deadline for state ratification of the ERA that was imposed in the 1970s. … That is why the Senate today should vote in favor of advancing this ERA resolution, so we can bring our nation one step closer to greater justice, greater equality, and a more perfect union. Let that great march towards equality take the next bold step today.”

April 28, 2023 in Constitutional, Legislation | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 26, 2023

The Supreme Court's Gaslight Docket and the Anti-Equality Effects

Kyle Velte, The Supreme Court's Gaslight Docket, Temple L. Rev. (forthcoming) 

The U.S. Supreme Court’s new conservative supermajority is gaslighting the American public. This article take a systematic look at key cases from the Court’s October Term 2021 through the lens of gaslighting. It describes these case as being part of what it dubs the Court’s “gaslight docket,” a descriptor that provides a useful and potentially unifying theoretical framework for analyzing and understanding the Court’s recent onslaught of rights-diminishing precedents.

The concept of gaslighting gained cultural purchase in the 1944 film Gaslight. Since then, the concept has become to subject of academic and theoretical inquiry. This article identifies gaslighting in the Court’s civil rights cases in both oral arguments and written decisions. It reveals that this gaslighting is trans-substantive, spanning cases involving voting rights, race discrimination/affirmative action, reproductive rights, LGBTQ rights, and the First Amendment’s religion clauses.

Because gaslighting has epistemic dimensions — knowledge production and gaslighting are connected — gaslighters instill epistemic doubt in their victims as a way to have the gaslighter’s production of knowledge “count” and to dismiss as unfounded other understandings of the world. The U.S. Supreme Court is an especially powerful “knower” — indeed, it is given the position of ultimate “knower” of the meaning and application of the U.S. Constitution. With each case it decides, the Court produces legal knowledge in the form of rules that must be followed in similar subsequent cases.

The results of the October 2021 term were astounding. Across multiple substantive areas, the Court issued decidedly anti-equality and anti-democratic decisions that threaten the promise of equal citizenship for women, people of color, and LGBTQ people. In so doing, the Court elevated the interests of the white Christian nationalism movement, declaring that those interests are not co-equal with the interests of marginalized groups but instead are interests that will be treated as “most favored” by the Court.

After describing the academic literature on gaslighting, the article applies the gaslighting analytical frame to a sampling of recent Supreme Court civil rights cases. It argues that the gaslighting framework does important work in revealing an alarming trend of privileging white Christian nationalism ideals at the expense of the rights of marginalized communities. It explains why the gaslighting framing matters for civil rights advocates across causes and proposes ways in which movement lawyers and movement judges can expose this oppressive move by the Court, learn from it, and counter it.

April 26, 2023 in Constitutional, LGBT, Race, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 25, 2023

Senate Will Vote on Equal Rights Amendment This Week, 100 Years After it was First Introduced

Wash Post, Schumer Announces Senate Will Vote on the Equal Rights Amendment This Week

The Senate will vote on the Equal Rights Amendment this week — 100 years after it was first introduced in Congress — Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer said Monday.

Schumer, speaking at Hunter College in New York, argued that the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade and efforts to limit access to the abortion pill mifepristone, as well as state-level actions to roll back women’s rights, have made the ERA and its protections more critical than ever.

“In this ominous hour of American history, the Equal Rights Amendment has never been as necessary and urgent as it is today,” Schumer (D-N.Y.) said in a statement Monday.

The proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution would guarantee equal rights under the law regardless of sex — meaning the Constitution would clearly state that women have equal rights as men. While the amendment was introduced in Congress in 1923 by leaders of the suffrage movement, it only passed in March 1972.

Ms, Ahead of the First ERA Senate Vote in 40 Years, a Nationwide Petition Launches

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) just announced the first vote on the Equal Rights Amendment in the Senate in 40 years.

“The founding document has never been interpreted to guarantee that the rights of women and the rights of men as a class are simply equal,” said Schumer on Monday at a press conference at Hunter College in New York City. “That’s why I am calling for a vote on the Equal Rights Amendment.” The senator said the vote will happen “this week,” with floor debate on Wednesday and a vote on Thursday.

For more on the history of the ERA, see Tracy Thomas & TJ Boisseau, After Suffrage Comes Equal Rights? ERA as the Next Logical Step, in 100 Years of the Nineteenth Amendment (Holly McCammon & Lee Ann Banaszak, eds. Oxford Press 2018).

April 25, 2023 in Constitutional, Legal History, Legislation | Permalink | Comments (0)

Understanding the Supreme Court's Past Balanced Approach to Abortion

Carlos A. Ball, Balancing Abortion, 63 Santa Clara L.Rev. (forthcoming)  

Critics of Roe v. Wade and its progeny repeatedly contended that, in recognizing a fundamental right to choose an abortion, the Supreme Court ignored or significantly undervalued the state’s interests in regulating abortions. This Article’s examination of the Court’s abortion jurisprudence during the Roe era, however, shows how it called for a meaningful balancing of the interests of both sides in ways that led the justices to uphold roughly as many abortion laws as they struck down between 1973 and 2020. In exploring the crucial role that the balancing of the interests of both the state and pregnant individuals played in the Roe constitutional regime, the Article contends that the Court deserves more credit than it received for attempting, for decades, to accommodate the claimed interests of both sides while trying to find compromises on abortion-related questions that are deeply contested and controversial. The Article also examines why neither the antiabortion nor the pro-choice movement believed it advanced its political and legal priorities to emphasize and praise the fundamental role that the balancing of interests of both sides played in Roe and its progeny.

A well-informed understanding of this crucial aspect of the Roe constitutional regime is essential because it provides a stark contrast to the one-sided and uncompromising weighing-of-interests approach followed by the five-justice majority in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. In overturning Roe, the Dobbs Court deemed the state’s claimed interests in regulating abortions to be constitutionally dispositive and the pregnant individual’s equality and liberty interests in choosing an abortion to be constitutionally irrelevant. In doing so, the Court did not avoid, as it apparently hoped, the need to balance interests; instead, Dobbs engaged in its own form of ex-ante or categorical balancing by reasoning that the state’s claimed interest in protecting fetal life is so important and so impacted by the decision to have an abortion that it requires that all future courts give the equality and liberty interests of pregnant individuals in not being forced to carry pregnancies to term against their will a constitutional value of precisely zero. Although the Dobbs Court may have believed that it was, in the name of judicial restraint, dispensing with the need to balance the interests of both sides, the Article explains why it is not possible to decide the constitutionality of abortion bans such as the one at issue in Dobbs without pitting the claimed interests of the state against those of pregnant individuals after assigning constitutional weight (even if it is only zero) to them.

April 25, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 19, 2023

Challenging Dobbs' Faulty Originalist History

Miranda McGowan, The Democratic Deficit of Dobbs, Loyola U. Chicago L.J. (forthcoming 2023). 

Overturning the fifty-year old constitutional right to abortion, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization wrapped itself in the mantle of the rule of law. The Dobbs Court claimed that Roe and Casey had lawlessly departed from the Court’s established history and tradition test for determining whether an unenumerated right is fundamental and protected by the Constitution. The actual history and tradition test, Dobbs said, only protects a claimed right as fundamental if positive law had affirmatively protected it when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. Seeing only abortion restrictions in the relevant time period, Dobbs concluded that the right to abortion is not a fundamental right.

Rule of law values, however, condemn rather than justify Dobbs’s method and holding. Dobbs turns on an act of judicial discretion, one it neither acknowledges nor justifies. This Article reveals that, since the 1960s, the Court has relied upon least three versions of the history and tradition test for identifying fundamental rights. Dobbs created a fourth overtly originalist test that dates back only to the 2010 Second Amendment incorporation case, McDonald v. City of Chicago. The original and most established version from Griswold v. Connecticut, however, is dynamic, not originalist: this test draws on recent precedents as much as longer-standing legal traditions and acknowledges that any new fundamental right creates a precedent for future fundamental rights claims.

Stripped of its rule of law veneer, Dobbs can only justify its originalist methods and result by reference to the originalist, normative justification of popular sovereignty. But on that ground, too, Dobbs fails. Dobbs’s originalist history and tradition approach is fundamentally undemocratic and at war with the ideal of popular sovereignty. This Article demonstrates that the history surrounding women and abortion in the nineteenth century makes any popular sovereignty justification for Dobbs’s originalism impossible—as well as anachronistic and incoherent. The positive law protections for abortion or contraception that Dobbs demands never would have existed in the nineteenth century for reasons having nothing to do with “the people’s” views on abortion. Robust social norms about gender and sexuality guaranteed both women and men’s quiescence to the mid-nineteenth century wave of abortion restrictions. Without legal penalty, “the people,” in fact, obtained abortions and used contraceptives throughout the nineteenth century. Dobbs’s originalist error cannot remain confined to abortion if its methods are applied consistently. The Court claimed that Dobbs does not portend a reversal of other fundamental rights cases. If true, that fact condemns Dobbs as a selective application of its supposed premise—which is to say as a political act of judicial hypocrisy. Dobbs’s methods put contraceptive access right on the chopping block.

h/t Legal Theory Blog

April 19, 2023 in Abortion, Constitutional, Legal History, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0)