Wednesday, January 6, 2021
Southern District of West Virginia Finds Limited Daubert Analysis Appropriate at Class Certification Stage
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states that
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Clearly, this Rule and the accompanying Daubert test apply to determine whether an expert witness can testify at trial. But to what extent does Daubert apply at the class certification stage of a class action lawsuit? That was the question addressed by the Unites States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia in its recent opinion in Baxley v. Jividen, 2020 WL 7063596 (S.D.W.Va. 2020).
Tuesday, January 5, 2021
Superior Court of Pennsylvania Finds Jurors' Jokes About Italian and Irish People Inadmissible to Impeach Their Verdicts When Defendant Was Neither Italian Nor Irish
Similar to its federal counterpart, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 606(b) states that
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, including a sentencing verdict pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711 (relating to capital sentencing proceedings), a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions in reaching a decision upon the verdict or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, and a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror about any of these subjects may not be received. However, a juror may testify concerning whether prejudicial facts not of record, and beyond common knowledge and experience, were improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
That said, in Pena-Rodriguez v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "that where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee." But what happens when jurors make ethnic jokes about people of different ethnicities than the defendant, defense counsel, and the witnesses? That was the question addressed by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in its recent opinion in Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 233 A.3d 880 (Pa.Super. 2020).
Monday, January 4, 2021
Call for Papers for Prosecutors, Power, and Racial Injustice: Building an Anti-Racist Prosecutorial System, A Virtual Symposium by the Rutgers Law Review
Please see below the Call for Papers for Prosecutors, Power, and Racial Injustice: Building an Anti-Racist Prosecutorial System, A Virtual Symposium by the Rutgers Law Review:
Illinois Court Finds Prior Identification Hearsay Exclusion Applies to Witnesses Who Were Neither Victims Nor Eyewitnesses
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) provides an exclusion to the rule against hearsay for a statement that "identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier."
Similarly, Illinois Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) provides an exclusion to the rule against hearsay for a statement that is "one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person."
Typically, these rules would be used for statements by eyewitnesses and victims. For instance, assume that Victoria was assaulted at the corner of State and 5th Streets at 9:00pm, Edward saw the assault, and Elisa saw a man walking at the corner of State and 4th Streets (toward 5th Street) at about 8:55pm. If Victoria, Edward, or Elisa picked Doug out of a lineup or photo array, their prior statement of identification would be admissible at trial (assuming they testified). In its recent opinion in People v. Neal, 2020 WL 7779029 (Ill.App.2d 2020), the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, dealt with a question of first impression: Does Rule 801(d)(1)(B) apply to witnesses who witnesses who are neither eyewitnesses nor victims?
Sunday, January 3, 2021
Ninth Circuit Finds Jurors' Use of Bible to Give the Death Penalty to the Defendant Was Not Reversible Error
The Mattox-Remmer framework set forth by the Supreme Court governs juror misconduct claims involving consideration of extraneous evidence during deliberations:
At step one, the court asks whether the contact was “possibly prejudicial,” meaning it had a “tendency” to be “injurious to the defendant.” If so, the contact is “deemed presumptively prejudicial” and the court proceeds to step two, where the “burden rests heavily upon the [state] to establish” the contact was, in fact, “harmless.” Kipp v. Davis, 971 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 2020).
So, if a juror brings the Bible into the jury deliberation room and cited passages, are the first and/or second factors of the Mattox-Remmer framework satisfied?
Saturday, January 2, 2021
Friday, January 1, 2021
Court of Appeals of Texas Finds Judge Didn't Need to Declare a Mistrial After Spectator Shouted "That's All Lies" During Defense Counsel's Opening Statement
Assume that a defendant is charged with murder. Further, assume that, during defense counsel's opening statement, a spectator in the courtroom yells, “That's all lies!” Does the judge need to declare a mistrial, or will a curative instruction suffice? That was thee question addressed by the Court of Appeals of Texas in its recent opinion in Rankin v. State, 2020 WL 7702629 (Tex.App. 2020).
Thursday, December 31, 2020
On December 17, 2020 North Carolina Governor Roy Cooper issued a Pardon of Innocence for Ronnie Long. And yesterday, a settlement was reached, pursuant to which Chester Hollman III will be awarded $9.8 million for his 28 years of wrongful conviction.
Given this terrific turn of events, I wanted to do a final 2020 update on the status of all of the cases we've covered on Undisclosed.
Total cases covered: 23 cases.
Relief granted: 14 cases: 10 exonerations: (1) Shaurn Thomas; (2) Terrance Lewis; (3) Willie Veasy; (4) Chester Hollman III; (5) Charles Ray Finch; (6) Theophalis Wilson; (7) Jonathan Irons; (8) Dennis Perry; (9) Ronnie Long; and (10) Joseph Webster. 2 stays of execution: (1) Marcellus Williams; and (2) William Montgomery. 1 commutation: Cyntoia Brown. 1 grant of parole: Cyrus Wilson.
Currently pending: 4 cases. (1) Joey Watkins's successor habeas petition recently authorized to move forward by the Supreme Court of Georgia; (2) Pedro Reynoso's CIU petition; (3) Fred Freeman/Temujin Kensu's CIU petition; and (4) John Brookins's DNA petition and Board of Pardons hearing.
New appeals expected soon: 4 cases: (1) Adnan Syed; (2) Jamar Huggins; (3) Pam Lanier; and (4) Greg Lance.
Options being explored: 1 case: Rocky Myers
Wednesday, December 30, 2020
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(e) states that
A conviction that satisfies this rule is admissible even if an appeal is pending. Evidence of the pendency is also admissible.
Conversely, Texas Rule of Evidence 609(e) states that
A conviction for which an appeal is pending is not admissible under this rule.
So, what does this rule mean and what doesn't it mean?
Tuesday, December 29, 2020
Supreme Court of Illinois Finds Defendants Who Pleaded Guilty Can Bring Freestanding Claims of Actual Innocence
Illinois and a number of other states allow for a convicted defendant to bring a freestanding claim of actual innocence. The issue that has divided the states is whether such a claim can only be made by defendants convicted after trials or whether such a claim can also be made by a defendant after a guilty (or nolo contendere) plea. I wrote an article on the split among courts, and its title makes my position clear: Why States Must Consider Innocence Claims After Guilty Pleas. As far as I can tell, Illinois is the first state to consider the issue since that article, and...the news is good.
Monday, December 28, 2020
Supreme Court of Oregon Finds Jury Instructions Allowing for Nonunanimous Verdicts Are (Harmless) Error
In Ramos v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that "if the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in federal court, it requires no less in state court." In State v. Ulery, 464 P.3d 1123 (Oregon 2020), the Supreme Court of Oregon subsequently held that the receipt of a nonunanimous guilty verdict always entitles a defendant to reversal, meaning that defendants convicted on 11-1 or 10-2 jury verdicts are always entitled to new trials.
On Christmas Eve, in its opinion in State v. Ramos, 2020 WL 7654196 (Oregon 2020), the Supreme Court of Oregon added that "the Sixth Amendment [i]s violated when the jury was instructed that it could return a nonunanimous guilty verdict," but that such errors are subject to harmless error review. So what does that mean?
Sunday, December 27, 2020
7th Circuit Finds Jury Coercion When Juror Said During Post-Verdict Polling That He Was "Forced Into" Voting Guilty
It is well established that
“Any criminal defendant...being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body.”...Impermissible coercion occurs “when jurors surrender their honest opinions for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.” United States v. Banks, 2020 WL 7414646 (7th Cir. 2020).
So, what should a judge do when she believes that there might have been jury coercion? According to the Seventh Circuit, not what the district judge did in Banks.
Saturday, December 26, 2020
Federal Rule of Evidence 106 states that
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part — or any other writing or recorded statement — that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.
For years, there has been a debate raging about whether Rule 106 is a rule of timing or a rule of admissibility. The Fifth Circuit had its chance to address this debate in its recent opinion in United States v. Torres, 808 Fed.Appx. 270 (5th Cir. 2020).
Friday, December 25, 2020
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
In its recent opinion in Estate of Karen Burden v. Hardison, 2020 WL 7640000 (Ky.App. 2000), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky dealt with one element of this exception and left another element for another day.
Thursday, December 24, 2020
Should a defendant's rap lyrics be admissible against him at a murder or attempted murder trial? After a New Jersey court found that Vonte Skinner's rap lyrics were admissible against him at his attempted murder trial, I wrote an essay, Freedom of Character: Creating a Constitutional Character Evidence Test, arguing that such lyrics should be admissible due to a combination of First Amendment and character evidence concerns (and concerns regarding racism). Subsequently, as. noted in a blog post, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed Skinner's conviction, concluding in State v. Skinner, 2014 WL 3798993 (N.J. 2014) that the rap lyrics were improperly admitted.
Now, however, in Montague v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that rap lyrics by Lawrence Montague were properly admitted at his murder trial, allowing for his conviction to stand.
Wednesday, December 23, 2020
In a prosecution for homicide, [for] a statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death.
But there's a key difference between the federal and state rules.
Tuesday, December 22, 2020
Appellate Court of Illinois Finds Victim's Use of a Service Dog While Testifying Did Not Create Undue Sympathy For Her
The Americans With Disabilities Act defines a "service animal" as
any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition. The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly related to the individual's disability. Examples of work or tasks include, but are not limited to, assisting individuals who are blind or have low vision with navigation and other tasks, alerting individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people or sounds, providing non-violent protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, assisting an individual during a seizure, alerting individuals to the presence of allergens, retrieving items such as medicine or the telephone, providing physical support and assistance with balance and stability to individuals with mobility disabilities, and helping persons with psychiatric and neurological disabilities by preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive behaviors. The crime deterrent effects of an animal's presence and the provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this definition.
So, assume that a trial judge allows a victim/witness to testify with a service dog sitting with him in the service box. Would this create undue sympathy for the victim and prejudice the defendant? This was the question addressed by the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, in its recent opinion in People v. Tapley, 2020 WL 7417620
Monday, December 21, 2020
Supreme Court of North Dakota Finds Designation of a Witness as a Party Representative Doesn't Obviate the Need to Prove Personal Knowledge
At a party's request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses' testimony, or the court may do so on its own. This rule does not authorize excluding:
(a) a party who is a natural person;
(b) an officer or employee of a party that is not a natural person, after being designated as the party's representative by its attorney;
(c) a person whose presence a party shows to be essential to presenting the party's claim or defense; or
(d) a person authorized by law to be present.
A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness's own testimony. This rule does not apply to a witness's expert testimony under Rule 703.
So, does designating a witness as a party representative under Rule 615(b) obviate the need to establish their personal knowledge under Rule 602? This was the question of first impression addressed by the Supreme Court of North Dakota in its recent decision in Rentz v. BNSF Railway Company, 2020 WL 7395389 (N.D. 2020).
Sunday, December 20, 2020
Supreme Court of Texas Finds Exoneree Alfred Dewayne Brown is Entitled to Compensation Under the Tim Cole Act
In April 2003, three men robbed a check-cashing store in Houston, TX, where they fatally shot the store clerk and the police officer who responded to the scene. The following day, police arrested three men on capital murder charges: 21-year-old Alfred Dewayne Brown, 21-year-old Dashan Glaspie and 23-year-old Elijah Joubert.
When Brown was arrested, he told police he was asleep on his girlfriend’s couch at the time of the crime. Brown’s girlfriend, Ericka Dockery, corroborated his alibi at the grand jury proceedings. She also corroborated Brown’s statement that he’d called Dockery from her home phone at the same time police believed he was with Joubert and Glaspie.
In 2013, a homicide detective found records from the case in his garage and notified Brown’s attorneys. In the records was a telephone log showing that a call was made from Dockery’s home telephone to her workplace at 10:08 a.m. — just as Brown had said from the beginning.
Subsequently, "[i]n November 2014, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals vacated Brown's conviction and ordered a new trial because the “State withheld evidence that was both favorable and material to [Brown]'s case in violation of Brady [v. Maryland].” The State then declined to retry Brown, and he was set free.
Next, Brown filed for compensation for his wrongful conviction under the Tim Cole Act (named for posthumous exoneree Tim Cole), but "[t]he Comptroller denied Brown's first application for wrongful-incarceration compensation under the Tim Cole Act because habeas relief was not based on his actual innocence."
In the meantime, the Harris County District Attorney appointed a special prosecutor to “analyze  whether Brown should be re-indicted,  whether he should be declared actually innocent, or  whether the status quo of dismissed charges with no formal declaration of innocence should continue.” The special prosecutor's ten-month investigation culminated in a detailed 179-page report in which he concluded Brown “could not physically have been at the crime scene.” The report further added that Brown “[met] the legal definition of ‘actual innocence,’ ” because “[b]y clear and convincing evidence, no reasonable juror would fail to have a reasonable doubt about whether Brown is guilty of murder.”
Agreeing this report, "the District Attorney filed an amended motion to dismiss in March 2019, stating (1) no credible evidence inculpates Brown in the capital murder crime for which he was convicted and sentenced to death, and (2) he 'is actually innocent' of that crime." The district court granted this motion, and "[t]he court's formal declaration of actual innocence became final when no appeal was taken."
And yet, the Comptroller still found that Brown was not entitled to compensation under the Tim Cole Act. Why?
Saturday, December 19, 2020
Supreme Court of Kansas Finds Prosecutor's "Self-Deprecating Lawyer Joke" at Murder Trial Wasn't Prosecutorial Error
Although you may disagree with their methodology, social psychologists have found that it takes 36 days after a tragedy before jokes about it become funny. What about jokes by a lawyer at a murder trial? Well, who knows about whether jokes by a prosecutors at such a trial are funny, but are they objectionable? That was the question that the Supreme Court of Kansas referenced in its recent opinion in State v. Willis, 475 P.3d 324 (Kan. 2020).