First Circuit Reverses Firearms Convictions Because Trial Judge Improperly Allowed Case Agent to Present Firearms to Jurors During Deliberations

Jurors are supposed to deliberate in private, without the presence of any non-jurors in the deliberation room. So, what should an appellate court do when the trial judge "allow[s] the case agent to present...firearms and ammunition to the jury during its deliberations"? In United States v. Matta-Quiñones, 2025 WL 1622228 (1st Cir. 2025), the First Circuit concluded that the answer was to reverse the defendant's convictions.

In Matta-Quiñones, 

Luis Javier Matta Quiñones (“Matta”) appeal[ed] his convictions for possession of firearms and ammunition as a prohibited person and possession of a machinegun. At trial, Matta claimed that he was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time and that police officers looking for a success story pinned nearby contraband on him. To boost his claim, he attempted to cast doubt on police officers’ testimony that he threw a feed sack containing guns and ammunition, among other items, onto the roof of a building as he fled.

At the end of Matta's trial,

On the second day of deliberations, the jury sent a note with several questions to the district judge, including a request to have “all the physical evidence be brought to the deliberating room.” The district court shared the note with the parties and announced its intent to have “all the physical evidence...brought to the deliberating room except for the weapons and the ammunition.” As to the guns and ammunition, the court determined the jurors could “come to the courtroom and take a look at it in the presence of the agent.”

Multiple times during this conference, Matta requested that the district court modify the in-court procedure it had settled upon regarding the jurors’ viewing of the firearms and ammunition. First, the defense asked that the jury be allowed to “carry the ammunition in the presence, obviously, of the agent or of the CSO.” (The abbreviation “CSO,” which we'll also use throughout this opinion, stands for the court security officer). In response to this request, the district court drafted and shared with counsel a proposed note which informed jurors that they could “view and handle the firearms and the ammunition in the courtroom with the case agent present.” After hearing the revised instruction, Matta objected, saying that “our request would be for the firearms and ammunition also to be brought to the deliberating room.” The district court denied the request, saying “the case agent has to be present when they view and handle the firearms. The case agent cannot say a word.” The district court further clarified that only the CSO, a United States marshal, and the case agent would be allowed in the courtroom while the jury examined the firearm and ammunition.

On appeal, the First Circuit reversed Matta's convictions, concluding, inter alia, that

The potential prejudice in this case arose not only from the interaction between the case agent and jury, but also from the district judge's role in allowing an individual distinctly associated with one of the adversary parties to act as a neutral officer of the court and assistant to the jury. Although we have not squarely addressed this subcategory of juror contact claim, several of our sister Circuits have. In particular, we are persuaded by the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Pittman, which examined the propriety of sending the government's case agent into the jury room to assist the jury in playing a tape recording. 449 F.2d 1284, 1285 (9th Cir. 1971). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the case agent was thus presented “in a trustworthy, friend-of-the-jury capacity wholly at odds with the adversary posture in which [he] should be regarded by the jury if the credibility of [the prosecution's] factual assertions is to be decided fairly.”...Here, as in Pittman, the case agent's affiliation with the prosecution was known to the jury: he was introduced as a member of the prosecution team at the beginning of trial, sat at the prosecution table throughout the trial, and assisted prosecutors with the presentation of at least one exhibit. The district court nevertheless allowed the case agent to take on a trusted role outside the presence of the other adversaries, ostensibly to ensure the jurors’ physical safety....As a result, the jury might have viewed the prosecution as more objective and deserving of trust when assessing the parties’ competing theories of the case.

At least three of our sister Circuits have severely restricted a district court's discretion to use an individual affiliated with an adversary party to assist a deliberating jury with its review of the evidence. These decisions recognize that the district judge's seal of approval enhances the risk that the interaction between the adversary and the jury will be prejudicial, but that such prejudice will be difficult to establish after the fact. For instance, Pittman opined that “the potential for prejudice inherent in any adversary's intrusion into the jury room and the uncertainties in ascertaining the extent of such prejudice require the extreme measure of a new trial in cases where the invasion was at the direction of the court and not inadvertent.”...Confronted with a similar set of facts in United States v. Florea, the Sixth Circuit set forth a prospective “per se rule” that “without prior stipulation a trial court should not permit any unauthorized person especially one associated with either prosecution or defense to communicate with or otherwise have any contact with a jury in any proceeding.” 541 F.2d 568, 570, 572 (6th Cir. 1976).,,,This rule was “necessary...because although the danger of improper influence inheres in every contact between an interested party and a jury, actual prejudice may be difficult to establish.”...The Tenth Circuit has also vacated a conviction and remanded for a new trial under similar circumstances, ruling that “[a]bsent a stipulation by the parties and the approval of that stipulation by the court, the [FBI] agent should not have been in the jury room.” Freeman, 634 F.2d at 1269....

In short, we find that the district court erred by refusing to investigate Matta's colorable claim of juror misconduct, thereby depriving Matta of any ability to show prejudicial effect. Given the passage of time, we do not think remanding for an investigation into this matter is viable....Accordingly, we believe the most prudent course of action is to vacate Matta's convictions and sentence on the possession and remand for a new trial. See Gastón-Brito, 64 F.3d at 13 (vacating convictions and remanding for new trial). And as we've already explained, a new trial will not implicate any double jeopardy issue because there was sufficient evidence to support the vacated convictions.

-CM