Saturday, March 9, 2019
What Comes Next in the Adnan Syed Case?
So, after yesterday's opinion by the Court of Appeals of Maryland denying Adnan Syed a new trial, what's his next option? The next option is a motion for reconsideration under Maryland Rule 8-605. Such a motion must be filed within 30 days of the court's opinion, and, simply put, it asks the Court of Appeals to reconsider its opinion...with the goal of having the court issue a new or amended opinion. There are six possible grounds for a motion for reconsideration:
(1) whether the Court's opinion or order did not address a material factual or legal matter raised in the lower court and argued by a party in its submission to the Court, and if not raised or argued, a brief statement as to why it was not raised or argued;
(2) whether a material change in the law relevant to the appeal occurred after the case was submitted and was not addressed in the Court's opinion or order;
(3) whether the court's opinion determined the outcome of the appeal on an issue not raised in the briefs or proceedings below;
(4) whether there is a significant consequence of the decision that was not addressed in the opinion;
(5) if the motion or response is filed in the Court of Appeals, whether and how the Court's opinion or order is in material conflict with a decision of the United States Supreme Court or a decision of the Court of Appeals; or
(6) if the motion or response is filed in the Court of Special Appeals, whether and how the Court's opinion or order is in material conflict with a decision of the United States Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or a reported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals.
A motion for reconsideration is a huge long shot...because you're trying to get the court to admit they made an error. That said, there is one possible ground for such a motion in this case that makes a good deal of sense and another that at least has a chance of succeeding.
(4) whether there is a significant consequence of the decision that was not addressed in the opinion
It seems pretty clear that there is a significant consequence of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland that was not addressed in its opinion. That consequence is the potential of a few more years of Adnan's postconviction proceeding, entailing costs for the State, the defense, and the courts. Pursuant to Section 7-104 of the Maryland Code of Criminal Procedure,
The court may reopen a postconviction proceeding that was previously concluded if the court determines that the action is in the interests of justice
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has found that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel is grounds for reopening a postconviction proceeding. Gray v. State, 879 A.2d 1064 (Md. 2005). It's crystal clear what's going to happen if the Court of Appeals doesn't grant a defense motion to reconsider (and the United States Supreme Court doesn't agree to hear the case):
What's going to happen is that the defense is going to file a motion to reopen Adnan's postconviction proceeding based on a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. And the defense is going to have a really good argument. After all, both Judge Welch and the Court of Appeals found that the crux of the State's case against Adnan at trial was the Leakin Park pings:
Excerpt from the Court of Appeals's opinion
In turn, this finding led Judge Welch to conclude that Adnan had received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon his trial attorney's failure to cross-examine the State's cell tower expert with the AT&T disclaimer. Neither the Court of Special Appeals nor the Court of Appeals addressed the substance of this ruling because they both held that Adnan had waived this issue when his postconviction counsel failed to include it in his first PCR petition.
And it's that very finding (plus the finding that the Leakin Park pings were the "crux" of the State's case against Adnan) that makes a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel so viable: (1) we have a undisturbed substantive ruling after an evidentiary hearing that Adnan received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the AT&T disclaimer (which went to the "crux" of the State's case); and (2) we have a ruling that Adnan waived this claim because it wasn't included by his postconviction counsel in his first PCR proceeding (despite the claim going to the crux of the State's case).
Now, it's possible that the Court of Appeals of Maryland views this claim as less of a slam dunk than me...but that just means that resolution of this issue would likely take even longer and might even require a new evidentiary hearing.
This would be the argument for the Court of Appeals to grant the defense's motion to reconsider and either resolve this cell tower issue now or remand it to the Court of Special Appeals to resolve it. Both courts have the power to excuse waiver, and simply resolving the issue now could prevent years of additional litigation and costs to the courts, the State, and the defense.
(5) if the motion or response is filed in the Court of Appeals, whether and how the Court's opinion or order is in material conflict with a decision of the United States Supreme Court or a decision of the Court of Appeals
As noted above, there was a split in Adnan's appeal, with the Court of Special Appeals on one side and Judge Welch and the Court of Appeals majority on the other. The Court of Special Appeals held that the "crux" of the State's case against Adnan was the murder itself; Judge Welch and the Court of Appeals held that the "crux" was instead evidence connected to the Leakin Park pings.
This latter conclusion seems in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's 2016 opinion in Wearry v. Cain. I wrote about this case in more detail in a prior blog post. The gist of Wearry v. Cain is that there was an alleged Brady violation, with the State having (1) weak evidence that tied the defendant to the actual murder; and (2) stronger evidence tying the defendant to the aftermath of the murder. In finding a Brady violation, the Wearry majority noted that
all of the evidence the dissent cites suggests, at most, that someone in Wearry’s group of friends may have committed the crime, and that Wearry may have been involved in events related to the murder after it occurred. Perhaps, on the basis of this evidence, Louisiana might have charged Wearry as an accessory after the fact....But Louisiana instead charged Wearry with capital murder, and the only evidence directly tying him to that crime was Scott’s dubious testimony, corroborated by the similarly suspect testimony of Brown.
Arguably, the Court of Appeals majority did the same thing by finding that failure to contact Asia McClain was not prejudicial because the "crux" of the State's case was the Leakin Park pings.
Conclusion
Maryland Rule 8-605(f) tells us that
A motion for reconsideration shall be granted only with the consent of at least half the judges who concurred in the opinion. If a motion for reconsideration is granted, the Court may make a final disposition of the appeal without reargument, restore the appeal to the calendar for argument, or make other orders, including modification or clarification of its opinion, as the Court finds appropriate.
I think it's exceedingly unlikely the Court of Appeals grants a defense motion to reconsider, but I think ground (4) is likelier to succeed than ground (5) (the defense can argue both).
And then, in the event the court denies the motion for reconsideration, it's highly likely that the defense will first file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, relying heavily on Wearry v. Cain and other pertinent cases. This petition will almost certainly be denied. Second, the defense will likely file a motion to reopen based on a claim on ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, with this motion almost certainly succeeding. And then, we'll have litigation stretching into 2020 and 2021, which is why the Court of Appeals should grant a motion for reconsideration. But it probably won't.
-CM
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2019/03/so-after-yesterdays-opinion-by-the-court-of-appeals-of-maryland-denying-adnan-syed-a-new-trial-whats-his-next-option.html
Comments
Colin,
As you know, I've commented for some time now that I thought Judge Welch's analysis was the most factually correct and I'm pleased to see Maryland's highest court reaffirm his logic. Syed was convicted due to the confluence of eyewitness testimony that he was possession of her dead body in Leakin park, plus technical location data that proved he was there at the relevant time and thus corroborated the eyewitness. It makes sense to order a new trial when the technical location data was brought into question.
The waiver issue, however, is confounding. It is not logical to reopen PCR proceedings in the "interest of justice" and then limit what can be considered in those reopened proceedings.
The comments you made re: Wearry. I struggle to understand how we could be this far along in the appellate process with this type of question left unsettled. As a matter of law, the state does not need to prove the precise mechanism of the defendant causing the death of another to convict them of homicide. It can present circumstantial evidence only. If the state was required to prove the precise mechanism, this case would not have survived summary judgment.
The jury asked themselves this very straightforward question: How did Syed come to be in possession of Hae's dead body? Is there *any* non-sinister explanation? They concluded there was not, and frankly that makes sense.
Posted by: Jonathan | Mar 9, 2019 3:44:34 PM
Kevin Rowe: Agreed. Adnan’s case looks a lot like Wearry v. Cain.
Jonathan: I agree on your waiver discussion…especially because I think it just means this will be repackaged as an ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim.
I also agree that the State doesn’t have to prove the exact mechanism of death. But I don’t see how to distinguish Adnan’s case from Wearry v. Cain. The whole point of that case was to say that the jury might find no non-sinister explanation for the defendant’s behavior in the aftermath of the crime…but that’s not enough to prove murder.
Posted by: Colin Miller | Mar 9, 2019 6:26:09 PM
Colin, this is really disheartening. I’m just shocked...
Posted by: Teeter | Mar 10, 2019 4:24:11 AM
Jonathan—wearry v Cain doesn’t suggest there must be no sinister explanation. It states that the state could easily have gotten a conviction of assistance after the fact, which the state in this case could have done also.
Posted by: Paul | Mar 10, 2019 3:01:05 PM
Paul-
I don't see that Wearry is applicable to how the State charged Syed. Throughout this entire trial/appellate process, no one has argued that the State should not have been permitted to bring 1st degree homicide charges against Syed because it offered no direct evidence of how Syed caused Lee's death. There is broad agreement that the State does not need to prove the exact mechanism of Syed causing Lee's death to charge him with her homicide. That is a basic, settled matter of law.
Also, I don't see how Wearry is applicable to Syed's post conviction proceedings. In Wearry, the State only had witness testimony implicating Wearry as the killer. Witnesses lie and misremember. And in Wearry, they did lie. But in Syed, the State had unimpeachable technical location data. They *knew* he was in the immediate vicinity of the park that day at or around 7pm. Syed has never offered any explanation for why his cell phone pinged the park that day.
You should consider that the State *did* charge someone with accessory after the fact - Jay Wilds. He confessed to that felony openly and freely to the police and later entered a plea deal with Urick on that charge. Charging Jay as an accessory makes sense - he stated to police that he came to be in possession of Lee's body through Syed.
To charge Syed with accessory after the fact, police would need to feel confident in how Syed came to be in possession of Lee's body. But there is no scenario that's been discussed by *anyone* in which Syed doesn't kill her but has possession of her body transferred to him by ... someone else?
And let's be honest with ourselves, a terrified 17 year boy who *hadn't* strangled his ex-girlfriend and had truly only been an accessory after the fact would have sung like a songbird under pressure. Life in prison vs. a maximum of 5 years ... oh yes, he would have named that "someone else" in a heartbeat.
Posted by: Jonathan | Mar 11, 2019 5:37:31 AM
Jonathan - If this is not willful blindness I do not know what is. 50% of the appeal over the past several YEARS is literally about the cell tower pings. To say no explanation has been offered when the defense's position is that AT&T themselves stated that is not reliable information is either stupidity or deliberate trolling. I will let you pick which.
"Also, I don't see how Wearry is applicable to Syed's post conviction proceedings. In Wearry, the State only had witness testimony implicating Wearry as the killer. Witnesses lie and misremember. And in Wearry, they did lie. But in Syed, the State had unimpeachable technical location data. They *knew* he was in the immediate vicinity of the park that day at or around 7pm. Syed has never offered any explanation for why his cell phone pinged the park that day."
Posted by: Robert | Mar 11, 2019 12:20:43 PM
Robert,
I'll agree with the willful blindness comment, but on your part rather than mine.
From my earlier post in this thread:
"As you know, I've commented for some time now that I thought Judge Welch's analysis was the most factually correct and I'm pleased to see Maryland's highest court reaffirm his logic ... It makes sense to order a new trial when the technical location data was brought into question."
So, to be crystal clear - I think Syed deserves a new trial and I've been consistent there.
However, I think you (and to be fair, many others as well) overstate the meaning of the AT&T disclaimer. It is standard, corporate boilerplate that is actually quite ambiguous as to its precise meaning - and that is done on purpose, because its function isn't to make the document as broadly applicable to as many scenarios as possible, but rather to insulate AT&T against any insinuation that there was an inaccuracy for whatever reason in whatever scenario.
For example: an AT&T attorney poses the following question to the lead engineer: Is there *any* scenario in which this report wouldn't be 100% accurate? If the engineer responds yes, then no matter what that scenario is or how rarely it would occur (and for the purposes of our conversation, *whether it applies to Syed's circumstances or not*), the attorney will add that blanket disclaimer to the report.
So - the disclaimer certainly has *legal* value, but it is questionable and I think unknowable whether it has "factual* value.
As I said, I think Syed deserves a new trial. Not because I somehow have some strange emotional urge to correct an injustice that I *know* has occurred (I don't know, and neither do you), but because on careful re-examination we conclude that the State did not actually prove his guilt.
Posted by: Jonathan | Mar 11, 2019 1:16:18 PM
Jonathan you are flat out making up what ATT meant by that disclaimer, your don't understand the physics of the situation and the small area involved in this case. Far from being boilerplate, the statement is fact, that data does not have the meaning the prosecution stated. Period.
And of course in more recent statements, Jay also recasts that anything happened at 7:00 anyway. He is off to the late night burial story now....
Posted by: John bocum | Mar 12, 2019 11:40:43 PM
Hi John-
Sure, I freely admit that I don't know the factual implication of the waiver. That was the essence of my earlier post, really. I don't know it, both the State and defense teams don't know it. No one does, aside from select AT&T engineers.
But - I'm an engineer professionally and I work with attorneys (among many others, of course) and I'm familiar with the thought process and how attorneys use disclaimers to reduce risk and legal liability. It's a tool. In this case it helps Syed.
Here's an alternate way to think about it. If the location data for inbound calls is *always* inaccurate, why would it *ever* be placed on the report? That simply makes no sense. At worst, the location data for inbound calls would be almost always correct with just a few edge cases where it is not. That's what the waiver is for.
You mention the "small area involved in this case" - presumably the relatively small area covered by the cell tower servicing the Leakin Park area. That's curious to me because it cuts against your argument. The smaller the area, the worse for Syed. It sharply decreases the likelihood of his phone entering that service area for a benign reason.
Posted by: Jonathan | Mar 13, 2019 9:15:33 AM
Johnathan - the reports were never created to locate cell phones, but as tools to evaluate cell coverage and usage. Normally the process would be to correlate and analyze the actual known location of the phone to the tower antenna used to evaluate coverage and signal propagation. Not the opposite.
The small area is not the tower coverage, but the area of jay and Adnans travels. This is a dense area with widely overlapping zones. We also have issues of the network reporting towers based on different criteria as in the case of the "Adnan doesn't have a helicopter" scenario.
And again, Jay now says that they were not in leakin park at the seven o clock hour.
So yeah, the killing time is totally unsupported, the trunk pop is unsupported, the burial is unsupported due to conflicting stories and no physical evidence , but Adnan did it because he is unable to defend against random theories made up to cover other made up theories as they are shot down or recanted.
Posted by: John bocum | Mar 14, 2019 11:34:27 AM
Thank you for your analysis. Could you please address how the Court of Appeals dealt with the alleged Brady violation?
Posted by: Mark Faasse | Mar 15, 2019 4:34:39 AM
Mark: They didn't. Judge Welch found the AT&T disclaimer issue was an ineffective assistance issue and not a Brady issue.
Posted by: Colin Miller | Mar 15, 2019 5:49:58 AM
It was very disheartening to me to hear the Court's decision in this case. I truly hope this is atypical of "normal" criminal justice, but I have a feeling it is not. :(
Incidentally, your mention of the Wearry v. Cain case sounds strikingly similar to my own thoughts about Adnan's case, which I have mentioned in comments here before: that basically, proving that one was involved in events immediately preceding and following a crime is not in any way proof that one was necessarily involved in the crime itself... and that seems like this is exactly the case with Adnan's trial. There is zero evidence that he was involved in the crime of murder.
At best, if we assume the evidence actually presented is factual and meaningful at all (which I don't, btw) then it proves he was involved in the act of disposing of the victim's remains. But whether or not someone is involved in burying a body has no bearing on that same person's involvement in creating said body by murdering someone. Sure, it would seem to follow common sense, and if the average person were to see someone burying a body, they would probably assume that person had something to do with the preceding murder...
But, I was under the impression that courts deal in facts and evidence, not common sense and assumptions.. so, there is just no way in my mind that the State offered even a modicum of evidence that Adnan was involved in anyone's murder, and it completely boggles the mind how any court could read into the same facts that I see and come away with the conclusion that it somehow offers multiple paths for Adnan to be guilty of murder due to the abundance of evidence, when I can't even see a single path that leads to his guilt in any form.
Posted by: Kevin Rowe | Mar 9, 2019 1:26:12 PM