Sunday, May 8, 2022
It is Sunday, and I'm looking at a long list of things to do next week, with grading exams at the top of my list. Significantly, however, in the last six to eight months, at increasing rates, I'm hearing from current and prospective residents of Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs, also sometimes called Life Plan Communities). Here are examples of some of the most often asked questions:
- "The company that runs my CCRC is about to engage in development of a new CCRC. Is the money I've already paid in the form of an admission fee, or the money I continue to pay as monthly service fees, going to support this new development?"
- "During the lock-down associated with protecting residents and the public from COVID-19, we were asked to give up services that were the very reason we choose this community. But now that we are no longer locked down, the services either are not returning or the fees we are charged are actually increasing. Is there some effective way to object to this disconnect between the promises and the delivery of services?"
- "My parents are thinking about moving into a CCRC. On the one hand, I like the idea of the active community they are choosing. But on the other hand, the amount they are expected to pay in the form of an admission fee is astounding. Why are some communities calling this a refundable fee and others are saying it isn't a refundable fee? What are the protections for the 'refundable' fee?"
- "We have just learned that our nonprofit CCRC is being transferred to a for-profit company as the owner-operator. How is this likely to impact my wife and I as residents?"
Answers to many of these questions depend on the state's laws governing this form of senior living operation and, even more, on the particular contracts between the resident and the provider. State regulators have concerns here too. For those looking for legal assistance in their particular community, I sometimes recommend looking for attorneys in the caller's home state, someone who understands CCRCs from a resident perspective. I first wrote about the need for attorneys who understand resident perspectives in 2006.
Sometimes "elder law" attorneys have this expertise, but not always. Plus, it can be important to consult with an attorney who understands consumer protection laws, and not "just" CCRC law. Finally, if litigation is actually on the horizon, the choice for legal advice can depend on whether the attorneys have expertise in litigation or dispute resolution and not "just" contract law.
So, all of this is a short way of saying that even though, as an legal academic, I often write about the importance of resident rights in CCRCs, and even though I believe the future of CCRCs is very much tied to the answers, I'm not in a position to respond to individual questions. The very fact that I'm writing this Blog Post is a potential indication that something important could be going on in the industry. Perhaps that "something" should be addressed by the industry itself, especially if it wants the CCRC concept not just to survive, but thrive. In my opinion, it is not enough for the industry to say that "every CCRC is different."
Tuesday, May 3, 2022
RFP: Washington State Seeks Expert Consultation to Develop CCRC Regulations with Heightened Consumer Protections
I'm always interested when I start getting lots of calls or emails about a certain topic in aging. Today I was hearing from a lot of people wanting to talk about Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs, sometimes also called Life Plan Communities or LPCs). It is safe to say that all forms of senior living operations are facing new challenges after being hit hard by the lockdowns and staffing problems of the last two years with COVID-19.
But one of the most interesting set of calls was from the State of Washington, where residents have been using their time together during COVID to think carefully about the need for certain key protections for consumers who put their money and trust into CCRCs. The Washington Continuing Care Residents Association (WACCRA) has worked carefully, calmly and diligently to reach the ears of legislators and regulators in the state. I had the pleasure of hearing from members and residents of CCRCs in Washington last October and speaking at their annual meeting.
Today, I heard that the Office of Insurance Commissioner in Washington has initiated a Request for Proposals for a time-sensitive research project:
This project is designed to assess federal and state authorities regulating continuing care retirement communities (CCRCs) and provide a report with recommendations on creating a legal framework for shared regulatory oversight of CCRC products under Chapter 18.390 RCW, which may achieve heightened consumer protections.
Interested researchers -- with background in regulatory systems for CCRCS -- should act quickly as the deadline for submissions is May 23, 2022.
Friday, April 29, 2022
As is true with several U.S. states, Virginia has a filial support statute that can obligate adult children to support their parents. The key language of VA Code Ann. Section 20-88 provides:
It shall be the joint and several duty of all persons eighteen years of age or over, of sufficient earning capacity or income, after reasonably providing for his or her own immediate family, to assist in providing for the support and maintenance of his or her mother or father, he or she being then and there in necessitous circumstances.
If there be more than one person bound to support the same parent or parents, the persons so bound to support shall jointly and severally share equitably in the discharge of such duty. . . .
This section shall not apply if there is substantial evidence of desertion, neglect, abuse or willful failure to support any such child by the father or mother, as the case may be, prior to the child's emancipation or, except as provided hereafter in this section, if a parent is otherwise eligible for and is receiving public assistance or services under a federal or state program. . . .
There are few modern cases applying this law. In Peyton v. Peyton, an "unreported" Virginia chancery court decision from 40 years ago, the court applies the law to obligate one brother to reimburse another brother $8,000, representing half of the past out-of-pocket expenses for their mother's care in a nursing home. A careful reading of the Peyton case reveals one of the challenges of applying filial support laws when used to collect "back" expenses; here the second son was willing to pay a portion of their mother's monthly costs going forward but he was not successful in arguing a statute of limitations should apply to prevent liability for multiple years of back claims.
As with other American states that have had forms of filial support laws, Virginia's law was enacted as an alternative to public welfare laws because the common law generally found no legal duty for adult children to support indigent parents. But, in Virginia, again as in most American states, the filial support laws are largely dormant, misunderstood or ignored, especially after Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid laws were enacted on a federal level beginning in the 1960s.
Virginia's statute was amended decades ago to restrict use of the law by the state to seek reimbursement for its costs in providing public services (such as "medical assistance" a/k/a Medicaid). However, unlike the filial laws of most states, Virginia's law permits criminal prosecution as a misdemeanor for "any person violating the provisions of an order" of support under this statute, with a fine not exceeding $500 or imprisonment in jail for up to 12 months. I find no reported cases of criminal enforcement actions.
Recognizing that other states (including neighboring Maryland in 2017) had recently taken formal action to repeal filial support laws as outdated or impractical, Virginia Senator Adam Ebbin introduced 2022 Senate Bill 389 to repeal Virginia's law. Senator Ebbin's bill passed with no dissenting votes in the Virginia Senate. The final vote in the Virginia House, on March 11, 2022, supported repeal with 81 voting in favor, and only 16 members voting in opposition to repeal. In other words, repeal was not a controversial measure; rather it appeared to be part of an attempt to clean-up hoary laws, and it attracted strong bipartisan support.
Nonetheless, Virginia Governor Glenn Youngkin (sworn into office in January 2022) vetoed the repeal on April 11, 2022. His reasoning for preserving filial support laws is unique, at least in my 20-some years of experience researching filial support laws (see e.g., Filial Support Laws in the Modern Era: Domestic and International and International Comparison of Enforcement Practices for Laws Requiring Adult Children to Support Indigent Parents, 20 Elder Law Journal 269 (2013)).
The governor's veto statement explains:
"Primarily, the Commonwealth's filial responsibility law supports those who care for their elderly parents. In establishing a bankruptcy budget, the court allows for necessary and reasonable expenditures and the repeal of Section 20-88 could prevent an individual from covering these expenses within the budget of their debtor. For those undergoing bankruptcy proceedings, there is a grave risk of unforeseeable and unintended consequences, which may harm people going through some of the most difficult times in their lives."
On the one hand, in today's torn asunder political scene, no one should be surprised that a newly elected governor of one party would be vetoing legislation sponsored by a member of the other party -- and that is true here, with a Republican governor vetoing a bill proposed by a Democrat.
But what about the proffered reason for the veto? Virginia's law does not "primarily" support those who care for their elderly parents. Rather, it creates an obligation for adult children. Is there any precedent for a theory that Virginia's filial support law permits some type of sheltering of assets for a debtor in bankruptcy court, to provide a means of financial support for the (also) destitute parent? Certainly I find no modern cases on Lexis or Westlaw suggesting such use or even a need for such use.
There is a reported case from 1938 in Virginia. In Mitchell-Powers Hardware Co. v. Eaton, 198 S.E. 496 (Supreme Court of Appeals, VA 1938), the court addressed a question of whether a transfer of valuable stock by a debtor to his sister was voidable as an invalid gift. Was this an invalid attempt to defeat a legitimate creditor's lien against the asset? The court recognized that under Virginia's predecessor version of Statute 20-88, the debtor "could" have an obligation to assist his sister in the care of their elderly mother. The appellate court remanded the case for a jury determination of whether the mother was actually destitute and in need of the son's financial support. (The sister had further transferred the stock in question onward to the debtor's son). This hardly seems a persuasive case for characterizing filial support laws as necessary "support for those who care for their elderly parents."
April 29, 2022 in Crimes, Current Affairs, Estates and Trusts, Ethical Issues, Federal Statutes/Regulations, Health Care/Long Term Care, Medicaid, Medicare, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, February 25, 2022
Naomi Cahn of University of Virginia School of Law Law joins Clare Huntington, of Fordham Law and Elizabeth Scott, Emerita Professor at Columbia Law, to propose needed changes in family law to reflect the impact of aging. In their forthcoming article for Yale Law Journal (Vol. 132) titled Family Law for the One-Hundred Year Life, they contend family law must address the interests and needs of families across the life span, and not just those of younger people. They point to three areas for focus: the dignity and autonomy interests of older persons, structural inequalities, and the need for legal mechanisms that are efficient and accessible. An example of their calls for legal reform is the discussion of intrafamily personal care contracts:
The response of regulators and courts to intrafamily personal care contracts illustrates well the law’s failure to support family care, especially for low-income families. In arranging in-home care, older adults sometimes contract with service providers, but they also contract with family members. A care contract is especially helpful when an older adult wants to receive these services from a family member but the family member cannot provide care without compensation. But these agreements run into problems. If the older adult is trying to qualify for Medicaid, many states scrutinize the contracts to ensure they are not simply a means for transferring assets from the older adult to the younger relative, helping the older adult satisfy Medicaid’s means-tested eligibility requirements. Partly based on the assumption that familial care is provided altruistically, state regulators regularly find that the agreements are, indeed, fraudulent transfers. This is an example of class-based discrimination: intrafamilial contracts for care are not scrutinized by public authorities unless the care recipient seeks to qualify for public support through Medicaid.
Equally interesting is their discussion of "opt-in or opt-out" concepts for the definition of family. All-in-all, this article looks to the future of judicial, regulatory and legislative legal systems, while also offering ways to challenge our students in the classroom now.
Monday, February 14, 2022
The National Consumer Voice for Quality Long-Term Care is offering a podcast with Dr. Laura Mosqueda on Nursing Home Neglect: Preventing It and Getting Help. Here's a description of the podcast:
The pandemic has renewed concerns about the quality of care that residents receive in some nursing homes, and many family members have reported significant decline in the condition of their loved ones. Neglect and abuse of older adults is a long-standing problem that is under-reported and has not received the necessary attention and response from policymakers, yet it results in needless and preventable suffering and harm.
In this episode with Dr. Laura Mosqueda, a professor of Family Medicine and Geriatrics at the Keck School of Medicine at the University of Southern California, we talk about neglect, which is the failure to provide goods and services to an individual that are necessary to avoid physical harm, pain, mental anguish, or emotional distress. Neglect may or may not be intentional.
February 14, 2022 in Consumer Information, Crimes, Current Affairs, Elder Abuse/Guardianship/Conservatorship, Federal Statutes/Regulations, Health Care/Long Term Care, Programs/CLEs, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations, Web/Tech | Permalink
Thursday, December 16, 2021
You may have already read about this, but just in case.... Kaiser Health News has reported about changes to California's aid-in-dying law. New California Law Eases Aid-in-Dying Process explains that "in October, Gov. Gavin Newsom signed a revised version of the law, extending it to January 2031 and loosening some restrictions in the 2015 version that proponents say have become barriers to dying people who wish to avail themselves of the law." This change becomes effective in 2022.
With the original law, as an example, "patients who want to die must make two oral requests for the medications at least 15 days apart. They also must request the drugs in writing, and two doctors must agree the patients are legally eligible. After receiving the medications, patients must confirm their intention to die by signing a form 48 hours before ingesting them."
Now, with the changes, "the revised law reduces the 15-day waiting period to just two days and eliminates the final attestation [and] requires health care facilities to post their aid-in-dying policies online. Doctors who decline to prescribe the drugs — whether on principle or because they don’t feel qualified — are obliged to document the patient’s request and transfer the record to any other doctor the patient designates."
The article offers poignant examples, provides statistics, and discusses the approach of insurance companies for coverage of the prescription ("[M]ore than 60% of those who take the drugs are on Medicare, which does not cover them. Effective life-ending drug combinations are available for as little as $400.")
December 16, 2021 in Advance Directives/End-of-Life, Consumer Information, Current Affairs, Health Care/Long Term Care, Medicare, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations, Statistics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, November 16, 2021
Yesterday, I pointed out to you an article about how state residency requirements limit those from accessing aid in dying. Today, I wanted to update you on litigation that had been filed some time ago against the California aid-in-dying statute. The AP ran a story noting the Lawsuit briefly blocking California assisted death law ends.
An appeals court ... formally ended a lawsuit that in 2018 temporarily suspended a California law that allows adults to obtain prescriptions for life-ending drugs, a gap that advocates blamed Thursday for a significant drop in its use that year.
California lawmakers made the lawsuit moot last month when they reauthorized and extended the law until 2031 while reducing the time until terminal patients projected to have six months or less to live can choose to be given fatal drugs.
The controversy started when "a ... judge... [ruled]in May 2018 that state legislators acted unconstitutionally when they passed the law during a special session that was devoted to health care in 2016."
A different ... judge last year ruled that lawmakers in fact did act properly and that physicians who sued to block it lacked legal standing to file the challenge. But the court allowed the opponents to refile their complaint if they could find patients to join the lawsuit.
Late last week the two sides agreed that the Legislature’s recent reauthorization and extension of the law, which had been set to sunset in another five years, effectively ended the legal challenge.
The law was also revised as part of the reauthorization, including shortening "the waiting period required between the time a patient makes separate oral requests for medication ...to 48 hours, down from the current minimum 15 days [as well as] eliminat[ing] the requirement that patients make final written attestations within 48 hours of taking the medication."
Monday, September 27, 2021
I was interested in this recent opinion from the Penn. Supreme Court. Not elder law specific, but interesting info none the less. In Penn. v. Purnell, the court was reviewing
the appropriate test to apply to a trial court’s determination concerning whether a witness in a criminal case may utilize a “comfort dog” for support during his or her trial testimony. We hold that a trial court should balance the degree to which the accommodation will assist the witness in testifying in a truthful manner against any possible prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Here, the trial court allowed a witness to testify with the assistance of a comfort dog, and the Superior Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. For the reasons stated below, we agree with the Superior Court and, therefore, affirm that court’s judgment."
The issue arose when one witness to a killing was concerned about her own safety, so the State sought
a “comfort dog” be present during [the witness'] testimony. ... The motion explained that a sheriff’s deputy would transport the comfort dog, Melody, to the court and that the dog would enter the courtroom before the jury’s entrance. According to the motion, the comfort dog would be placed in the witness stand outside the presence of the jury and would exit the courtroom after the jury left the room. (citations omitted).
After reviewing arguments and rulings from other states, the court determined "that trial courts have the discretion to permit a witness to testify with the assistance of a comfort dog. In exercising that discretion, courts should balance the degree to which the accommodation will assist the witness in
testifying in a truthful manner against any possible prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair
trial and employ means to mitigate any such prejudice."
The full opinion is available here.
Thursday, September 9, 2021
Colorado City Makes Public Apology & Pays $3 Million to Settle Lawsuit Over Violent Takedown and Arrest of Older Woman
In May of 2021, we linked to emerging information about a June 2020 arrest of a 73 year-old woman with dementia in Loveland Colorado.
The family of the older woman, Karen Garner, filed a civil suit. On September 8, 2021, the City of Loveland issued a press release announcing a $3 million dollar settlement and expressing an apology to the family:
“The settlement with Karen Garner will help bring some closure to an unfortunate event in our community but does not upend the work we have left to do. We extend a deep and heartfelt apology to Karen Garner and her family for what they have endured as a result of this arrest,” said Loveland City Manager Steve Adams. “We know we did not act in a manner that upholds the values, integrity, and policies of the City and police department, and we are taking the necessary steps to make sure these actions are never repeated.”
“There is no excuse, under any circumstances, for what happened to Ms. Garner. We have agreed on steps we need to take to begin building back trust. While these actions won’t change what Ms. Garner experienced, they will serve to improve this police department and hopefully restore faith that the LPD exists to serve those who live in and visit Loveland,” Chief Bob Ticer stated.
Criminal charges are still pending against the officers involved in the violent takedown, in her arrest, and for the detention of the injured woman who was then left without medical care in a holding cell while officers sat comfortably in a booking room, reviewing their own bodycam videos, appearing to laugh over the sound of her breaking arm. For more, read here and here.
There is a lot of work still ahead for so many police and detention units.
September 9, 2021 in Cognitive Impairment, Consumer Information, Crimes, Current Affairs, Dementia/Alzheimer’s, Discrimination, Elder Abuse/Guardianship/Conservatorship, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, September 6, 2021
Massachusetts Supreme Court Holds Conservator Entitled to Absolute Immunity for Conduct "Authorized or Approved" by Probate Court
In a case of first impression for the high court in Massachusetts and decided in August 2021, the Supreme Court concluded that where a conservator acts on behalf of an elderly woman "pursuant to judicial approval as a quasi-judicial officer," the conservator is entitled to "absolute immunity for conduct that is authorized or approved by the probate court."
In Hornibrook v. Richard, the plaintiff is one of two sons of a woman in her "mid-eighties and suffering from progressive dementia due to Alzheimer's Disease." He was appointed by a Massachusetts probate court to serve as guardian for his mother, but when his allegedly neglectful brother objected to his appointment as a permanent guardian for their mother, the probate court appointed a Massachusetts licensed attorney, selected from a list of qualified attorneys, to serve separately as the conservator. The dual appointments occurred in the context of a serious, ongoing dispute between the woman's two sons. It seems clear the court appointed the nonfamily-member conservator in an effort to diffuse the family dynamics.
Instead, attempts by the conservator to evict or negotiate with the resident-son from the mother's home appear to have dragged on for months, and the mother was never able to return to home. The guardian-son eventually sued the conservator, alleging (1) breach of fiduciary duty, (2) malpractice, (3) conversion, and (4) fraud.
The Supreme Court used Massachusetts' "functional analysis" for determining whether an individual performs a quasi-judicial function that entitles the officer to "absolute immunity." The court compared the case to prior Massachusetts immunity decisions involving a court-appointed psychiatrist, court clerks, guardian ad litem in family court, and a personal representative in an estate, concluding that where individuals are appointed to perform "essential judicial functions" they are entitled to absolute immunity.
Facts that appeared to be key to this ruling included the conservator's formal request for court authority to take specific, disputed actions, such as renovating the house and placing it on the market for sale.
The court issued a de-facto caution, however, that immunity may not be granted for all actions taken by a conservator:
"Because the plaintiff here does not allege that the defendant was acting outside the express authorization of the probate court, we do not address the extent to which the conservator may be liable personally when acting within his or her statutory authority but without express authorization or approval of the probate court."
One can anticipate more motions and probate hearings being sought by guardians -- at least the cautious guardians -- as a result of this ruling. But one can also expect that family members resentful of slow-moving protective-probate proceedings will not be reassured by this ruling.
Thursday, September 2, 2021
I'm a fan of Star Trek. I'm not a hard core Trekkie, but I enjoy all the variations of Star Trek, whether movie or TV. I was saddened to read about a conservatorship battle surrounding the trailblazing actor Nichelle Nichols, our beloved Lieutenant Uhura. Inside the heartbreaking conservatorship battle of a 'Star Trek' legend explains that "[a] three-way fight over Nichols’ fate involves her only child, Kyle Johnson, who is also her conservator; her former manager Gilbert Bell; and a concerned friend, Angelique Fawcette." Here's a brief summary. "In 2018, Johnson filed a petition for conservatorship, arguing that his mother’s dementia made her susceptible to exploitation. In 2019, Bell filed a lawsuit against Johnson, alleging attempts to remove him from Nichols’ guest home, where he has lived since 2010, and 'aggressive and combative behavior.'" Here's how the neighbor came into the suit. "Fawcette, a producer and actress who met Nichols in 2012, entered the legal fight opposing Johnson’s conservatorship petition. Fawcette pushed for visitation rights to spend time with her friend, and she argued for Nichols to stay in Woodland Hills — a scenario that has looked increasingly improbable."
The article goes in depth into her life and career and how the current litigation came to be, including declining health, a power of attorney, transfers of assets, a conversation about marriage and more. Ms. Nichols is not the first famous person to be in the center of a conservatorship fight, nor will she be the last.
Thanks to Julie Kitzmiller for sending me the link to the story.
September 2, 2021 in Cognitive Impairment, Consumer Information, Current Affairs, Dementia/Alzheimer’s, Elder Abuse/Guardianship/Conservatorship, Film, Health Care/Long Term Care, State Cases | Permalink | Comments (1)
Thursday, July 29, 2021
With the eviction moratorium expiring in just a couple of days, we need to realize that housing insecurities impacts all age groups. It's timely that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) just released The Rental Assistance Finder. The website allows one to search for housing assistance by location, provides info on various topics, including about help in paying rent, payment agreements, and renter rights.
In addition, the National Center on Law and Elder Rights recently offered a training, Emergency Rental Assistance Programs and Other Tools to Prevent Evictions of Older Adult Tenants. Accompanying this training is the materials, Emergency Rental Assistance Programs & Other Tools to Prevent Evictions of Older Adult Tenants, CHAPTER SUMMARY • June 2021. This will be extremely helpful with the eviction moratorium expiring in days.
Filial Friday? Court Holds Son Liable for Attorneys Fees Incurred While Securing Medicaid Coverage for Father's NH Care
Pennsylvania courts use "filial" responsibility laws in, shall we say, creative ways, especially when they catch any whiff that children helped themselves to their parent's money rather than using that money to pay for their parents' nursing home care. One of the key modern-era cases for filial support law in Pennsylvania is Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066 (Pa. Superior Ct, 2003), where the court remanded a case for decision on filial support law grounds, in the absence of other viable theories, in order to hold a daughter liable for her mother's costs of nursing home care. The court was clearly annoyed by the evidence the daughter had transferred some $100k of her mother's funds to herself using a "valid" power of attorney, instead of paying the nursing home.
It probably doesn't make the court any happier if the defendant/child is also a lawyer.
In the latest Pennsylvania decision decided by the Court of Common Pleas in Montgomery County, Coates v. Salmon, No. 2018-16878, both the plaintiffs and the defendant are lawyers. The trial court was asked to determine whether a son was personally liable for attorneys fees incurred when the son "engaged" another attorney, one experienced in Medicaid issues, regarding a penalty period assessed against his father. The penalty made his father ineligible for 296 days in Medicaid funding for his nursing home care. The lawyer was able to negotiate a reduced penalty period, with a successful argument that certain pre-admission transfers were not made in anticipation of applying for Medicaid. The settlement reduced the dollar effect of the penalty by more than $68,000.
Nonetheless, the son declined to pay the attorney his requested fee of $7,606, arguing there was no contract as the attorney had failed to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.5(b) that requires "the basis or rate of the fee" to be "communicated to the client in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation." The lawyer-son seemed to be arguing, at least indirectly, that the only fee he'd "agreed" to pay was a $500 up-front "consultation" fee.
The court agreed with the defendant-son on the contract issue, but granted the full sum of the requested fees as "reasonable" under a theory of quantum meruit. And that's where Pennsylvania's filial support law came into play to support the court's decision on the son's liability:
Mr. Salmon [the defendant/son] contended, however, that any claim in quantum meruit could be asserted only against his Father, and not against Mr. Salmon personally. The argument was that Father was liable to the Nursing Home for any services not reimbursed by Medicaid and Father was therefore the sole beneficiary of the substantial reduction in the penalty. It is true that to establish a claim in quantum meruit against Mr. Salmon, Plaintiffs [the Elder Law attorney and his firm] were required to show that he benefited from Mr. Coates's services. . . . Plaintiffs clearly met that requirement, however, because Mr. Salmon himself would have been liable to the Nursing Home for the $86,786 penalty if it had not been successfully diminished by Mr. Coates.
The doctrine of filial responsibility is codified in Section 4603(a)(1)(ii) of the Domestic Relations Code, 23 Pa. C.A. Section 4603(a)(1)(ii). . . .
This provision and its predecessor statute have been repeatedly cited as authorizing a suit by a nursing home or other medical provider to recover fees for the care of an indigent patient from the patient's adult child with the means to make payment. . . . It is thus clear that without the reduction of the penalty to a relatively trivial sum, Mr. Salmon would have been liable for -- or, at the least, substantially at risk of liability for -- the amount of Nursing Home fees denied by Medicaid.
Further, the imposition of liability on Mr. Salmon in quantum meruit is fully consistent with principles of equity. The evidence clearly showed that Mr. Salmon, in engaging Plaintiffs' services, understood his obligation to pay for those services. . . . And, most significantly, in Mr. Salmon's letter of May 6, 2016, responding to Plaintiffs' bill, he disputed the reasonableness of Mr. Coates's fees and the quality of his services, but he never suggested that Plaintiffs were billing the wrong person. . . . [I]t was compelling evidence that Mr. Salmon understood his responsibility to pay Plaintiffs' legal fees and that his later contention that only his Father was responsible was a post hoc excuse for his unwillingness to pay.
The detailed, well-written opinion dated June 23, 2021 is available at the link above, and the case is on appeal to Pennsylvania's intermediate court of appeals, the Superior Court. In Pennsylvania, trial judges have the opportunity to write their full opinion, rather than just their final decision, after a party has appealed the ruling and after that party has identified all claims of errors. In my experience, a detailed, well-written Pennsylvania trial court opinion has a good chance of being affirmed on appeal. For an additional perspective on this case, see the Elder Law Answer summary here.
Sunday, July 11, 2021
Analyzing Britney Spears' Conservatorship: How Should Courts Respond to Allegations of a Toxic Guardianship?
This summer, J. Collin Fulton, a rising 2L student at Dickinson Law, with a prelaw background in journalism, has been doing a fantastic job while working on projects with me. He put together this very thoughtful overview of how Britney Spears' concerns, arising in the context of the California-based proceeding, may be relevant to the larger analysis of guardianships and conservatorships across the nation.
In the areas of guardianship and conservatorship law, perhaps no recent case has captured the attention of the American public as thoroughly as the conservatorship of Britney Spears. The Pop singer’s conservatorship was established in California in 2008 and has become one of the best-known examples of how, under U.S. law, a person can have the management of both their personal life and financial affairs placed under the control of a court-appointed guardian/conservator, typically as a result of mental or physical conditions or advanced age.
While a legion of Ms. Spears’ fans has routinely called into question both the necessity and nature of the singer’s conservatorship, it was the release of the New York Times' 2019 documentary “Framing Britney Spears” which brought the details of Ms. Spears conservatorship to the attention of the broader public. I personally became aware following the Times’ publication on June 22nd of an article detailing how Ms. Spears herself feels about the conservatorship. Based on court records acquired by the NYTimes, the article details both Ms. Spears opposition to the continuance of her conservatorship in its present form as well as Ms. Spears claims concerning some of the effects the conservatorship has had on her life. Based on court documents going back to 2014, the NYTimes article reports that:
- Spears “feels the conservatorship has become an oppressive and controlling tool against her.”
- Spears has informed the court that, as a result of the conservatorship, she felt compelled to perform against her will and compelled to stay at a mental health facility against her will.
- The conservatorship restricted a broad range of Ms. Spears decision making, ranging from who she was allowed to date to the manner in which she could decorate her home.
Ms. Spears’s June 23 public testimony further cast the conservatorship in a negative light. In the testimony, the singer claimed that, against her will, she was forced to take mood-altering drugs and forced onto contraception. Ms. Spears again called for her conservatorship to be ended and generally for the laws surrounding conservatorships to be changed. This call has been echoed by numerous other singers in support of Ms. Spears, including Justin Timberlake, Halsey, Brandy, and Mariah Carrey, as reported by the BBC.
Given what Ms. Spears claims has transpired as a result of her conservatorship and the public support she has received, I became deeply curious about how a conservatorship can actually be terminated. Given the complexity of guardianship/conservatorship laws, this is a question without a simple answer.
First, state laws vary significantly regarding who, how, and why a person can be placed under a guardianship/conservatorship. As Ms. Spears’s case takes place in California, I focus there.
There are two types of conservatorships under California law: Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) and Probate conservatorships, the latter of which is exemplified by Ms. Spears’s situation.
Such conservatorships are typically permanent affairs in California; however, they can be terminated in the following ways:
- The conservatorship ends due to the death of the conservatee.
- A judge may end the conservatorship upon petition to do so resulting from the conservatee regaining the ability to manage their own affairs (The argument Ms. Spears appears to be currently making).
- A conservatorship of the estate can be ended if the conservatee ceases to possess any assets to protect.
Learning this raised a new question for me: why would a court allow a conservatorship such as Ms. Spears’s to continue given her allegations? I believe the answer to this question lies in the purpose of guardianship/conservatorship laws.
This purpose is perhaps best exemplified in the California “Handbook for Conservators,” which the state mandates for conservator cases. The Handbook has a clear message for every new conservator: “You have been appointed conservator because someone – your parent, spouse, child, or other relative or friend – needs help, and you are willing to lend a hand.” This simple message, in my opinion, captures the thought behind guardianship and conservatorship laws. There are, sadly, situations in which a person is unable to manage their affairs. Guardianships and conservatorships allow for a legal redress to such situations, enabling courts to appoint a trusted individual to provide assistance in such circumstances.
The California Handbook also highlights another important fact central to the functionality of conservatorships: “The position of conservator is one of great trust and responsibility. The court and conservatee are trusting you to follow the law and to act in the conservatee’s best interests.” Given the incredible responsibilities assumed by a guardian/conservator, it is indeed imperative that guardians/conservators execute their duties with the utmost understanding and respect for the individual's own values and goals, while also complying with the legal obligation to make decisions in the best interest of the individual they have been appointed to protect.
With the purpose of guardianships/conservatorships now understood, I turn back to Ms. Spears and the question of why, given her allegations, her conservatorship still remains. The answer is, simply, that legal process such as this take time.
Just as a court needed to consider a multitude of factors in determining that Ms. Spears should become a conservatee, the court must now perform proper inquiries into the allegations that Ms. Spears has raised and then determine an appropriate response to take based on the validity of these allegations. This is true not only for Ms. Spears, but for any person in a guardianship/conservatorship situation. Guardianships/conservatorships are serious affairs, ones in which a person’s ability to control their own lives have been taken from them and handed to another individual, hopefully one who is trustworthy and will act in their best interest. Should doubts emerge about the actions of a guardian/conservator, or indeed the necessity of an established guardianship/conservatorship itself, investigating the situation thoroughly is paramount to the integrity of not only the guardianship/conservatorship in question but also the legal system of guardianships/conservatorships at large.
Mr. Fulton concludes: I thus believe that while a quick response from the court may satiate the immediate public outcry for change, a proper inquiry which establishes the truth and, in turn, enables the court to act based on the facts will not only improve Ms. Spears' situation but enhance public knowledge on the current state of guardianship/conservatorship laws in the United States.
July 11, 2021 in Cognitive Impairment, Consumer Information, Current Affairs, Elder Abuse/Guardianship/Conservatorship, Estates and Trusts, Ethical Issues, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, July 5, 2021
Florida adopted eldercaring coordination legislation that went into effect last week on July 1. Here's a brief description: "Elder-focused Dispute Resolution Process; Authorizes courts to appoint eldercaring coordinators & refer parties to eldercaring coordination; specifies duration of appointments; requires courts to conduct review hearings; provides for qualifications, disqualifications, removal, & suspension of coordinators; authorizes courts to award certain fees & costs of eldercaring coordination; provides immunity from liability for certain parties; requires Florida Supreme Court to establish minimum standards & procedures."
The summary of the bill expands:
The bill creates an alternative dispute resolution process for persons 60 years of age and older who are involved in certain legal proceedings. Specifically, the bill allows a court to appoint an eldercaring coordinator to assist in disputes that can impact an elder’s safety and autonomy. The court must specifically define the scope of an eldercaring coordinator’s authority in its order of appointment.
An eldercaring coordinator may be appointed for up to 2 years, although a court has discretion to extend or suspend the appointment as needed. In order to be appointed as an eldercaring coordinator, an applicant must:
- Meet a specified professional licensing requirement, such as membership in The Florida Bar or being a licensed nurse;
- Complete 3 years of post-licensing or post-certification practice;
- Receive training in family and elder mediation;
- Receive 44 hours in eldercare coordinator training, which must offer training on topics including, among other things:
- Elder, guardianship, and incapacity law;
- Family dynamics;
- Multicultural competency; and
- Elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation.
- Successfully pass a background check; and
- Have not been a respondent in a final order granting an injunction for protection against domestic, dating, sexual, or repeat violence or stalking or exploitation of an elder or a disabled person.
The bill provides that an eldercaring coordinator may be removed or disqualified if the coordinator no longer meets the minimum qualifications or upon court order.
The bill requires an equal amount of fees and costs for eldercaring coordination to be paid by each party, subject to an exception. If a court finds that a party is indigent, the bill prohibits the court from ordering the party to eldercaring coordination unless funds are available to pay the indigent party’s allocated portion. Likewise, cases involving exploitation of an elder or domestic violence are ineligible for a referral without the consent of the parties involved. The court must offer each party the opportunity to consult with either an attorney or a domestic violence advocate prior to accepting consent of the referral and the court is required to determine whether each party has given their consent freely and voluntarily.
When a court is determining whether to refer parties that may have an above-mentioned history that would otherwise preclude the referral, the court must consider whether a party has:
- Committed an act of exploitation or domestic violence against another party or any member of another party’s family;
- Engaged in a behavioral pattern where power and control are used against another party and that could jeopardize another party’s ability to negotiate fairly; or
- Behaved in a way that leads another party to reasonably believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence.
If the court refers a case to eldercaring coordination that involves a party who has any history of domestic violence or exploitation of an elder, the court must order necessary precautions to ensure safety of specified persons and property.
The bill provides that all communications that meet specified requirements and are made during eldercaring coordination must be kept confidential. The bill provides that parties to the eldercaring coordination, including the coordinator, may not testify unless one of the enumerated exceptions applies. The bill also provides remedies for breaches of confidentiality.
The bill provides legislative findings and requires the Florida Supreme Court to establish minimum standards and procedures for training, qualifications, discipline, and education of eldercaring coordinators....
The full text of the new law can be accessed here.
Thursday, June 17, 2021
The New York courts have released a new Elder Justice Resource Guide, "the result of collaboration between The Harry and Jeanette Weinberg Center for Elder Justice at the Hebrew Home at Riverdale and the New York State Unified Court System’s Division of Policy and Planning, and ... provide[s] a list of resources, information and support for New York’s judges, court personnel, and other legal professionals."
The 136 page guide is available online or as a pdf, and covers various topics. "The Elder Justice Resource Guide includes information about elder abuse, accessible courtrooms for older adults, capacity and confusion, effective communication, and available resources for older adults experiencing abuse. The Guide also includes a comprehensive directory of national, state, and local services available to older adults." (I particularly was interested in pages 12, 16-18 where Stetson's own Eleazer Courtroom is mentioned!)
Friday, June 4, 2021
Early in my career, I had a ringside seat for was supposed to be a "big" trial for F. Lee Bailey, who passed away at the age of 87 earlier this week. Reading about his career has brought back memories.
In 1983, Mr. Bailey represented one of New Mexico's most prominent criminal defense lawyers of the time, William Marchiando, on libel allegations against the state's largest newspaper, The Albuquerque Journal. My firm represented the Journal. During the trial I was a mere "helper" (although I had a surprising opportunity to handle aspects of a post-trial motion). The trial focused on an article where Mr. Marchiando's photo appeared prominently, just below a provocative headline, "Organized Crime Showing Interest in New Mexico."
One consequence of suing a newspaper for libel is that every minute of the trial was covered by media, and that meant weeks of news coverage, a fact not lost on Mr. Bailey, who was premiering his new television show that same year, a program called "Lie Detector."
The 8-week trial took place in the southern New Mexico city of Las Cruces (on a change of venue from Albuquerque). After 4 days of deliberations, the locally-selected jury voted, 10 to 2, that there was no defamation. The jurors included retired military, members of local farming and ranching families, and several hard-working school teachers.
The newspaper took the position that truth was their defense, a decision that probably startled the plaintiff. I recall hearings about admissibility of tape recordings of the plaintiff meeting with prisoners at New York City's infamous "Tombs," allegedly discussing organized crime-related "business," rather than matters pertaining to any representation of the defendants in their criminal cases. One of the Journal's trial witnesses, via video-recording, was "Jimmy the Weasel" Fratianno, who was a confessed hitman for "the mob." (I was flown one night, via a private jet, to conduct a pretrial interview of "Jimmy" at an undisclosed location, one of the spookier events of my early career).
Some of Mr. Bailey's obituaries mention his "photographic memory" and I saw that in action. He handled direct and cross examination of witnesses without any notes, and, perhaps most impressively, would accurately quote lengthy sections of depositions when seeking to "impeach" a witness, again without any paper in his hand. His oratory was delivered with a deep voice that had a touch of gravel in it, and he was always impeccably dressed.
In contrast, the Journal's primary trial attorney (and my boss), Eric Lanphere, was much less showy. Indeed, the publisher of the paper ruefully shook his head as his attorney crossed the courtroom one afternoon during trial, trailed by a floating, long piece of toilet paper stuck to one heel. "That's my attorney -- sort of looks like Columbo, doesn't he?," he mused. But Mr. Lanphere also had his own talents, and the key talent was being down-to-earth, rational, and equally oriented to details, albeit not necessarily delivered from memory.
My real lessons came during preparation for the post-trial hearings. We were responding to the plaintiff's attempts to reverse the verdict, claiming there was juror misconduct (ultimately an unsuccessful effort). My task began with interviewing as many of the 12 jurors (and the alternates) as would speak to me, to get their take on the trial and deliberations. Along the way, I asked them what they thought of Mr. Bailey's flair in the courtroom. Usually the juror would smile and give me an account of some especially impressive detail of Mr. Bailey's performance.
Then I would ask, "how did Mr. Bailey affect your vote in the case?" And each juror, regardless of their vote, quickly responded that as much as they enjoyed Mr. Bailey's "tricks," (their frequent label), they knew their job was to evaluate the evidence presented by witnesses and exhibits. The trial judge had delivered those instructions with a very firm voice. The jurors made it clear to me they weren't going to allow themselves to be swayed by the performance of any attorney. The "facts" mattered, and mattered especially, it seemed, when presented by the more humble attorney in the room.
Thursday, June 3, 2021
In Carlisle, a classic college town in Central Pennsylvania, the hottest topic at the moment is, surprisingly enough, the "county" nursing home.
"Save Claremont" signs outnumbered the political signs in the recent primary election.
A robust advocacy movement seeks to prevent the sale of Claremont Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, a publicly-administered facility with 282-beds to private enterprise. In a detailed story carried by local newspaper, The Patriot News, both sides of the issue are making their pitches:
The members of Citizens Saving Claremont are arguing the county not only can keep Claremont afloat, but with some effort, investment and leadership, they can make it thrive.
"It has been sustained for 192 years," said Tim Potts, one of the founding members of Citizens Saving Claremont. "This year, 2021, is the first year that we've had to use county money to support Claremont, and that's only on a temporary basis because of the impact of COVID." . . .
But that doesn't change the fact that Claremont is hemorrhaging money, Cumberland County Commissioner Gary Eichelberger said. Projections show it will only get worse and will have to be propped up by taxpayer dollars.
And the completion of a sales agreement could be just days away.
For some advocates, keeping the facility in public hands is about maintaining a commitment to citizens of all income levels, and they point out that Claremont's Medicare "star" rating has usually been higher than private enterprise nursing homes in the region. As recently as 2002, as many as 40 of Pennsylvania's 67 counties had "public homes"; but, currently just 21 remain in county hands.
For more see Citizens Group Pushes to Save Claremont, published online behind a paywall on June 1, 2021 and on the front page of the traditional newspaper format on June 4, 2021.
With lockdowns being lifted in commercial arenas, I'm once again hearing from residents in Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs), also sometimes called Life Plan Communities, as well as other similar senior living settings. The most frequently raised concern is "how can management of my community make major changes in services and amenities without asking us if we agree to a new contract?" Sometimes I am able to recommend local legal counsel for the callers.
As a matter of theory, there's a traditional "law-based" answer to this question, with state-specific tweaks. And then there is what happens all too often in real life.
Generally speaking, the law provides that unilateral attempts by one party to make significant changes in the parties' duties under a contract are not legally effective. Here's one state Supreme Court's typical statement of the rule of law (written in the context of considering an employer's unilateral attempt to change an employment contract):
The cases dealing with employment contracts are merely part of the general rule that recognizes no difference between an express and an implied contract.... As a result, to effectively modify a contract, whether implied-in-fact or express, there must be: (1) an offer to modify the contract, (2) assent to or acceptance of that offer, and (3) consideration."
Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Az. 1999). As my law students know, "consideration" is a legal term of art, and generally means a "bargained for exchange." In the context of modification of existing agreements, this often involves new financial terms or mutual concessions in the parties' respective duties.
But, the real-life situation is that the party with the greater bargaining power simply ignores the bargaining process altogether. In employment contexts, that's the employer. They treat their notice of major changes as "the new agreement" simply because no one objected. That's not how the rule of law is supposed to work, but it does, all too often. Indeed, I will confess that the very reason I started teaching Contract law was my growing familiarity with disputes in senior living scenarios that made me wonder if there was something about contract law I'd missed back in my own days as a law student. There wasn't (although the full explanation would require a law review article) -- but the world keeps spinning along with the more powerful party in many commercial contexts able to avoid the contract because they are "in charge."
Residents don't, however, have to put up with this. Resident groups in individual CCRCs and those living in states where there are regional organizations have learned to flex their considerable muscle, both in negotiations with management and with state regulators or legislators. I'm also hearing from more attorneys who are representing residents in negotiations, or when necessary, in arbitrations or on lawsuits alleging breaches of contract and fiduciary duties. Plus, I'm hearing from more states officials who are asking good questions.
It not a secret that I like CCRCs and I like them a lot. I've visited CCRCs throughout the U.S. and they tend to be vital examples of senior living, offering community engagement, social networks, friendly-settings, caring service providers, and the reassurance of assistance if needed. Many forms of senior living options are struggling with the impact of the pandemic, with enhanced pressures on facilities to balance their budgets. This is probably triggering a new upswing in attempts to make unilateral changes.
I have worried, long before the pandemic, that an episodic history of paternalistic or peremptory changes by management in CCRCs can undermine public confidence in this format as a viable alternative for seniors. CCRCs have their highest value for consumers when residents are making the transition before becoming too frail to appreciated the amenities and services. New residents may be unlikely to "invest" in CCRCs if they lack confidence that promised services will be available when needed.
June 3, 2021 in Consumer Information, Current Affairs, Estates and Trusts, Ethical Issues, Health Care/Long Term Care, Housing, Property Management, Retirement, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations, Statistics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, May 20, 2021
Colorado: "Former Police Officers" Facing Criminal Charges For Conduct in Arrest of Woman with Dementia
On May 19, 2021, the District Attorney's Office covering Loveland Colorado announced criminal charges against two officers who had already been removed from the force after details became public about their June 2020 arrest of a 73 year-old woman with dementia. The primary arresting officer was charged with second degree assault causing bodily injury, attempt to influence a public servant (both being felony charges) and official misconduct, a misdemeanor, while a second officer who arrived midstream, was charged with misdemeanors, of "failing to intervene" in a case of excessive force, failing to report the use of force, and official misconduct, according to records from the DA's office.
More details here:
May 20, 2021 in Cognitive Impairment, Crimes, Current Affairs, Discrimination, Elder Abuse/Guardianship/Conservatorship, Ethical Issues, State Cases, State Statutes/Regulations | Permalink | Comments (0)