Wednesday, December 12, 2018
A recent case out of Illinois, Pam's Academy of Dance/Forte Arts Center v. Marik, Appeal No. 3-17-0803 (behind paywall but you can listen to the oral argument here), highlights the weirdness of just throwing extra words into a contract without thinking through what they really mean.
The dispute concerned a noncompete between a dance studio and Marik, one of its employees. The covenant not to compete stated that Marik wouldn't engage in any similar business "for a period of not less than five (5) years," and wouldn't solicit any teachers or students "for a period of not less than three (3) years." The parties were arguing over whether this language meant "five years" and "three years," or whether it meant that the noncompete could extend past five and three years.
In a vacuum, the statement "not less than five years" reads as "at least five years" to me, meaning that the time period could last longer. But as a matter of contract interpretation, that makes no sense. Could the noncompete theoretically go on for 50 years? After all, that would be a period "not less than" five. On the other hand, as the defendants argued, interpreting the time periods as five and three years would render the "not less than" language as "mere surplusage" -- an interpretation courts usually strive to avoid.
The court noted that contract interpretation's goal is to discern the intent of the parties. "Not less than" has been interpreted by Illinois courts in a variety of ways, but never in the context of a noncompete. However, many out-of-state courts had come to the conclusion that, in a covenant not to compete, "not less than five years" should be construed as meaning five years. This would prevent the employer from arguing that the noncompete was violated six years later. Indeed, the court thought that arguing that it meant six years would amount to bad faith.
Whether the five- and three-year periods were reasonable was a fact-based inquiry that had to be determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances.
This is a situation where I'm sure the "not less than five years" language sounded fancy and official but it was truly pointless. I think the employee probably understood it to be five years and three years (to the extent that the employee read and understood the agreement), and to the extent the employer understood the language to mean otherwise and entitle it to set an indefinite time period, I'm with the court that that's an unreasonable interpretation.
Monday, December 10, 2018
I got really excited when I saw this case because it's always nice to have a recent parol evidence case to look at, and this one involves movies!
It's a recent case out of Mississippi, Rosenfelt v. Mississippi Development Authority, No. 2017-CA-01120-SCT (you can listen to the oral arguments here). The MDA had communications with Rosenfelt regarding his movie studios' attempt to make movies in Mississippi, eventually guaranteeing a loan through a term sheet signed by the MDA and by Rosenfelt on behalf of his two movie studios. When Rosenfelt wanted to make another movie and applied for another loan under the terms of the agreement, the MDA turned down the request. Rosenfelt then sued for specific performance and damages. Rosenfelt initially triumphed on a motion for partial summary judgment but then, during the specific performance debate in the case, the MDA filed a summary judgment motion challenging Rosenfelt's standing, which resulted in dismissal of Rosenfelt's complaint.
Rosenfelt appealed, alleging that there was an agreement between him personally and the MDA. However, the court noted that all communications from the MDA were directed explicitly to Rosenfelt as president of the relevant movie studio. The court's decision came down to contract interpretation: All of the written documents in the case unambiguously referred to Rosenfelt in his official corporate capacity or were signed by Rosenfelt in his official corporate capacity. Given the lack of ambiguity on the face of the documents, the court refused to consider parol evidence as to whether Rosenfelt was personally a party to any of the agreements. Because all of Rosenfelt's allegations concerned his personal agreement with the MDA, the court dismissed the suit.
This case serves as a reminder that, once you have set up corporate entities, you need to be careful to remember how those corporate entities impact not just your legal liabilities but also your legal rights.
Monday, December 3, 2018
Sorry for being absent lately. Blame exam season! So this is slightly old news but I plan to bring it up in my Entertainment Law class in the spring, so I was doing a sprint through the news reporting on it: Taylor Swift and her new contract.
Monday, November 12, 2018
I always tell my students that if you want people to promise to do something, you'd better make sure you don't phrase it as a condition in your contract, and a recent case out of the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Allen v. SWEPI, LP, No. 4:18-CV-01179 (behind paywall), carries just that lesson.
The contract was for the purposes of exploring for oil and gas on the Allens' land and read that the agreement was "made on the condition that within sixty (60) days from the Effective Date of this lease, [the defendant] shall pay to the [Allens] the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2000.00) per acre for the first year." The defendant never paid the Allens this sum, and the Allens sued. However, the defendant argued that this was nothing but an option contract. It had the right to rent the land for oil and gas exploration if it paid the required sum. However, it was not required to pay that sum. Instead, the payment was a condition that had to be fulfilled before the contract would come into operation. The court agreed and dismissed the Allens' breach of contract causes of action.
The court then also dismissed the Allens' promissory estoppel claim, because it found that there had been a valid and enforceable contract between the parties -- it was just an option contract that the defendant chose not to exercise.
The Allens seem to have thought they had rented this land to the defendant. I think that what they wanted to accomplish (or thought they were getting) with the quoted clause was to make sure they were paid within 60 days. However, in phrasing it as a condition, what they got was no commitment from the defendant at all.
Friday, November 9, 2018
Another day, another arbitration compelled, this time in a recent case out of the Northern District of Illinois, Nitka v. ERJ Dining IV, LLC, Case No. 18 cv 3279. The plaintiff sued the defendant for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and assault and battery. The defendant countered that the plaintiff had signed an agreement to arbitrate disputes relating to her employment, which these were. The plaintiff stated she had no memory of signing the arbitration agreement, but the defendant's Vice President of People and Development testified that it required new employees to sign such agreements before entering employment and maintained them in the usual course of business. The plaintiff's arbitration agreement was located in her personnel file. Furthermore, the plaintiff had apparently affirmatively indicated on an electronic form that she had signed the agreement.
The plaintiff then argued that she had been a minor at the time of signing the agreement, but the court pointed out that she ratified the agreement by continuing to work for the defendant after her eighteenth birthday.
I believe that the plaintiff did not remember signing the arbitration agreement. To be honest, I believe that, even if she remembered, she probably had no idea what it really was. She was a minor trying to get a job at a Chili's. I'm sure she signed what she was told to sign and clicked the electronic check-boxes she was told to click -- exactly the way the vast majority of us do when getting a new job.
Thursday, November 8, 2018
Here's one for exam review.
A recent case out of the District of Oregon, Reed v. Ezelle Investment Properties Inc., Case No. 3:17-cv-01364-YY, contains an application of the mirror image rule.
The parties in the case were embroiled in a copyright infringement dispute. They had settlement discussions as follows:
- Reed's counsel sent Ezelle a cease and desist letter that included a settlement agreement proposing to settle the matter for $5,000.
- Negotiations followed.
- Ezelle's counsel sent Reed's counsel a thousand dollar check (stating that it was not a settlement offer, although that doesn't seem important to the analysis here).
- Reed's counsel responded saying that Reed accepted the thousand dollar offer and sending Ezelle's counsel a new proposed settlement agreement.
- Ezelle's counsel crossed out the proposed agreement's confidentiality clause and sent it back.
- Reed's counsel said the confidentiality clause was non-negotiable.
- There were further negotiations that fell apart, leading eventually to this lawsuit.
Ezelle argued that the parties had settled the case through the above series of events, but the court found there was never a binding settlement because Ezelle never accepted the settlement agreement. Under the mirror image rule, when Ezelle's counsel crossed out the confidentiality clause, that operated as a counteroffer that Reed would have needed to accept. Reed never did. Rather, Reed informed Ezelle that the proposed modification of the settlement agreement was unacceptable. Therefore, there was no binding settlement agreement between the parties.
Ezelle argued that the confidentiality clause should be classified as immaterial or unconscionable, so that the settlement agreement should be enforced just with the confidentiality clause struck, as Ezelle had desired. However, the court found no reason to strike the confidentiality clause.
The court went on to find copyright infringement and awarded $1500 in statutory damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs.
Thursday, November 1, 2018
Hello! I was away at a conference last week and then the Red Sox* decided to win the World Series, which threw off all productivity for a while. As I ease back into blogging, I thought I'd link you to this piece from Business Insider, analyzing some of the terms set forth in the 2011-era version of Major League Baseball's uniform contract. I find my students always love to look at real-life contracts, and this is a nice point in the year to do it, as it's a nice way to demonstrate that they are now able to (or should be able to!) understand more of the contract than they might have on the first day of class.
Of course, I always try to impress upon my students that contracts can be negotiated, so here's a list of some more unusual contract clauses baseball players were successful in getting teams to agree to.
Friday, October 26, 2018
The California anti-SLAPP provisions state that “[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. An act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue includes ... any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a ... judicial body....”
A client alleged that his attorney misrepresented his labor law expertize when negotiating the retention agreement between the two and that the attorney conducted settlement negotiations with the opposing party in order to drive up fees. When the attorney sued his client to collect his fees, the client cross-complained for fraud and breach of contract. The attorney then moved to strike the cross-complaint under the California anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16.
The court found that merely because attorneys occur as part of litigation – the client’slitigation – a malpractice claim such as this is not subject to anti-SLAPP. Said the court, “[i]t is the principal thrust or gravamen of the plaintiff's cause of actionthat determines whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies, and when the allegations referring to arguably protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on non-protected activity, collateral allusions to protected activity should not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute.”
“Although attorney retention negotiations may in a sense be ‘connected’ with judicial proceedings involving the client, they in no way relate to the substance of an issue under review in the proceedings or further the attorney's petition or free speech rights in them. If they did, then every communication between an attorney and a client who is or may become involved in judicial proceedings would constitute an exercise of the attorney's petition and free speech rights, and every lawsuit for malpractice would be required to undergo a second-prong anti-SLAPP analysis. No principle or authority supports such a proposition.
The case is Mostafavi Law Group v. Ershadi, 2018 WL 4690887, (Cal.App. 2 Dist., 2018)
Tuesday, October 16, 2018
As the Hollywood Reporter reports, the license agreement expired between Dish Network and Univision more than three months ago, and the parties are fighting it out in federal court, pointing fingers at which of them (if any, I suppose) breached the license agreement, and whether there are any additional IP claims in play. It's a high-profile case with a real impact for Hispanic viewers, who probably just would like to get Univision back on Dish. Given the litigation, that might take a while.
Monday, October 15, 2018
Currently in the midst of teaching consideration, I found the following case curious not so much because of its somewhat questionable facts, but because of the court’s puzzling reasoning.
Plaintiff Jose Torrez, a skilled laborer, agreed to renovate some buildings owned by defendant Koray Ergur and his companies. Torrez was promised a bonus of $150,000 for nine months’ worth of work if he would work for the “reduced hourly wage” of $10 per hour. He did. At some point in time, his hourly pay was increased to $11 per hour. After completing a total of 18 months of labor, Torrez was terminated and – you guessed it – denied the bonus. He brought suit claiming, among other things, breach of oral contract and the bonus $150,000 in damages.
The court rejected the latter. Of course, since the contract was for the completion of nine months of labor, the Statute of Frauds was not implicated and the oral promise was thus enforceable if the court had wanted to do so. It did not, however. Instead, it found that Torrez had, during the legal proceedings, “contractict[ed] his allegation of reduced wages as the consideration for the $150,000 bonus.” The court concluded that “while Torrez recited facts in his pleading to support the element of consideration for the promised bonus [i.e. the low pay of $10 per hour], the evidence presented by deposition and at Hearing [i.e. the “non-reduced” hourly wage of $11 per hour] refutes the existence of consideration … Therefore … it is clear that no consideration existed for the promise to pay a bonus.”
The court apparently found that because Torrez actually received one single dollar more per hour over nine months, there was no consideration for the original promise of working for a “reduced salary.” However, consideration is measured at the point of contract formation, not after the subsequent turn of events. Receiving only $10 or even $11 per hour instead of what skilled, manual laborers could get is a “reduced wage” given the market for such work. It is puzzling why the court found that “no consideration existed for the promise to pay a bonus” when such consideration was fairly clearly present from the outset, namely the promise to work for not much with a promise of a bonus upon completion of the work.
Is something else at play here? I think so. It strikes me as odd that, pardon me, a manual laborer would be promised a bonus of no less than $150,000 for nine months of work. That is $16,999 per month or, working 40 hours a week, $104 per hour. Skilled workers can and do demand high fees in some locales, and maybe in Ohio as well. But $150,000 does seem high. Was the court simply trying to protect the defendant from what may have been an attempted fraud by Torrez?
The truth will probably never be known here. Regardless, this case nicely demonstrates how the consideration doctrine is still relevant and, as always, the importance of getting contracts in writing even though they do not haveto be. Even if Torrez had been promised the asserted bonus, it is also wise to remember the old adage that if something seems too good to be true, it might be. Maybe Torrez was the one fooled in this case.
The case is Jose Torrez v. Koray Ergur, et al., Case No. G-4801-CI-201604375-000 (Court of Common Pleas, Ohio, Aug. 31, 2018).
H/t to colleagues on Contracts listserv for bringing this case to the attention of all of us.
Friday, October 12, 2018
I just gave a midterm in my contracts class, which is always so useful to crystallize the places where the students are having consistent understanding issues. For me this year, one of the tricky parts seems to be the statute of frauds, so it was nice to see this recent case out of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Northern Group, Inc. v. Tech 4 Kids Inc., Case No. 17-C-1367 (behind paywall), that deals with a fairly straightforward statute of frauds issue.
In the case, Northern Group alleged that the parties had an oral agreement for commissions for sales and brought causes of action related to the breach of this agreement. Tech 4 Kids argued that the claims should be dismissed, in part because the oral agreement should have been in writing under the statute of frauds. However, as the court noted, the statute of frauds does not require a contract to be in writing unless it cannot be performed within a year. While it was true that the sales agreements required to be formed to result in commissions under the contract could sometimes taje years to finalize, Northern Group could conceivably have arranged some sales agreements within a year. Moreover, the agreement was terminable at will by either party, so either party could have decided within a year not to continue with the arrangement. Therefore, the oral agreement was capable of being performed within one year and so was not void under the statute of frauds.
Monday, October 8, 2018
When you've been stuck in an airport for hours, boarded the plane, un-boarded the plane, and have several more hours of airport waiting time in front of you, you're allowed to randomly make a Fall Out Boy reference if your Fall Out Boy playlist is what's getting you through the delay.
As far as the case goes: a recent case out of New Jersey, Gross v. Fotinos Enterprises, Docket No. A-2058-17T4, involved a dispute over a landlord's duty to inspect, which the court decided did not exist. The landlord rented to a pancake house restaurant (I have a habit of blogging about pancake houses, I happen to like pancakes) who used a cinder block to prop open an exterior door. The plaintiff was a restaurant employee who tripped over the cinder block and sued for injuries she sustained.
The lease stated that the tenant should not obstruct the entrances, and the parties agreed that the lease imposed liability on the tenant for all charges associated with the property. The plaintiff argued, though, that the landlord had a duty to ensure the tenant's compliance with all terms of the lease.
The court disagreed. The lease explicitly delegated responsibility for maintenance of the premises to the tenant, and the landlord was not aware that the tenant was using the cinder block to prop open the door. The landlord therefore owed no duty to inspect the premises or enforce compliance with the lease.
A new Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case demonstrates the importance of filing suit in a timely manner in order to retain one’s contractual rights. It also shows just how nasty contractual parties may act towards each other in violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
JTE distributed products in Chicago for Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution Company (“Bimbo”) for over a decade. The contract had no duration, but stipulated that it could be terminated in cases of non-curable breaches by one of the parties. Bimbo sought to force JTE to forfeit its contractual rights so that Bimbo could start working with a new distributor that would accept a smaller slice of the pie: 18% instead of 20%. But because JTE had performed the contract as required, Bimbo
"began fabricating curable breaches in the spring of 2008 as part of a scheme to force JTE out as its distributor. Bimbo Foods employees filed false reports of poor customer service and out-of-stock products at stores in JTE’s distribution area. Even more egregiously, Bimbo employees would sometimes remove JTE-delivered products from grocery store shelves, photograph the empty shelves as “proof” of a breach, and then return the products to their initial location. On one occasion, in 2008, a distributor caught a Bimbo Foods manager in the act of fabricating a photograph and reported him. Bimbo assured JTE that this misconduct would never happen again. Nevertheless, unbeknownst to JTE, Bimbo Foods continued these scurrilous tactics … When JTE refused to sell its distribution rights in January 2011, Bimbo Foods breached the distribution agreement and unilaterally terminated JTE’s agreement, citing the fabricated breaches as cause. Several months later ... Bimbo Foods forced JTE to sell its rights to new distributors."
JTE filed suit in 2017. Under the Illinois law, the statute of limitations for breaches of common law contracts is ten years whereas under the UCC, it is four years. The question thus became whether the parties had entered a contract for sale of goods. They had. Said the court: “Under the primary-purpose test, the distribution agreement between JTE and Bimbo Foods easily qualifies as a contract for the sale of goods. We have previously pointed out that ‘virtually every jurisdiction that has addressed this issue’ has concluded that dealership and distributorship agreements are predominantly for the sale of goods.” The suit was thus untimely filed.
JTE’s additional claim for tortious interference with contract fared no better as a five-year statute of limitation governed that. The court did, however, comment on the merits of the alleged tort. It found that “a party cannot tortiously interfere with its own contract, nor can it tortiously interfere with any business expectancies created by that contract. As the Illinois courts have noted, ‘[t]o allow such claims to be litigated would invite tort law to absorb contract law.’” Thus, because JTE was one of the parties to the suit, it could not assert that claim even thought it was Bimbo, not JTE, that had acted in a highly unwarranted manner.
None of the parties asserted the duty of good faith and fair dealing under UCC §1-304 which states that “[e]very contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.” “Good faith” is defined as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” UCC § 1-201.
What Bimbo allegedly did clearly did not meet this standard. However, because the four-year statute of limitations had run, JTE could still not have asserted that argument. The moral of this story is for your clients to monitor the contractual performance by the other party closely and, if anything seems awry, bring this up and resolve the issue as soon as possible.
The case is Heiman v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution Co., 902 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2018).
Sunday, October 7, 2018
Here's me poking my head out from a weekend of midterm grading to thank Banksy for a situation right out of a contracts hypothetical.
Thank you to Eric Chiappinelli and Jennifer Taub for the heads-up!
Monday, October 1, 2018
A recent decision out of the District of Oregon, Summit Foods, Inc. v. Viking Packaging Technologies, Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-1470-SI, debated whether a forum selection clause was mandatory or permissive, and so provides some lessons if you're trying to draft one of these.
The defendant was arguing that the forum selection clause was mandatory, but the court found that was reading the clause "through rose-colored glasses." The clause said that "[t]he courts of Sheboygan County Wisconsin will have jurisdiction." The court, however, noted that the clause was silent as to whether any other jurisdiction might also have jurisdiction. There was no language indicating that Sheboygan County would have exclusive jurisdiction. A mandatory forum selection one is one that contains such language of exclusivity. The forum selection clause in this case was therefore held to be permissive.
Friday, September 28, 2018
If you're looking for a recent accord and satisfaction case, look no further! I've got one for you out of the Northern District of California, TSI USA LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. 17-cv-03536-HSG (behind paywall). In the case, Uber and TSI had a contract that Uber terminated. TSI received a termination notice and a check for a little over $200,000. TSI responded to Uber with outstanding invoices Uber owed payment on, amounting to more than $1.4 million. TSI eventually sued Uber for, inter alia, breach of contract, and Uber moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that that TSI's cashing of the $200,000 check operated as an accord and satisfaction, prohibiting TSI's breach of contract claim.
The court disagreed. Accord and satisfaction requires that the check be presented in good faith and with a conspicuous statement that it is meant to satisfy the entire debt. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to TSI, Uber could not establish that its check of $200,000 met "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing," given that TSI alleged Uber owed over $1.4 million. In addition, while the termination notice stated "by executing below you acknowledge and agree that such payment constitutes full and final payment," it was followed by a line for signature labeled "Chief Executive Officer." TSI asserted that it thought the signature of the CEO was required for the payment to constitute full and final payment, not that the cashing of the check by itself. The court agreed with TSI that the language was not so "explicit and unequivocal as a matter of law so as to preclude TSI from asserting its breach of contract claim." Therefore, the breach of contract claim survived.
Wednesday, September 26, 2018
I just blogged about the ministerial exception of the First Amendment, and now here's another case discussing it! This recent case out of California, Sumner v. Simpson University, C077302, was a dispute over Sumner's dismissal for insubordination. Sumner sued for breach of her employment contract. Simpson argued that the ministerial exception of the First Amendment protected its contractual decision from judicial examination. The court agreed that Simpson was a religious group and also found that Sumner was a ministerial employee even though she wasn't technically titled a minister. Her job duties at the university required her to have a doctorate in ministry or a related field and included promoting the university through preaching appearances.
However, the court still permitted Sumner's breach of contract claim to go forward, based on the fact that the ministerial exception should not bar all contract actions involving a religious group and its ministerial employees. Rather, it should only operate to bar those causes of action that would require the court to decide religious matters. Sumner was purportedly terminated for insubordination, which was defined by the faculty handbook incorporated into Sumner's contract. The alleged insubordination involved Sumner's violation of the university's written protocol. Sumner, however, alleged that she was never provided with the written protocol and so her conduct could not be found to be insubordinate. Resolving this dispute would not require "wad[ing] into doctrinal waters," because Sumner's religious qualifications weren't at issue and the dispute didn't concern Simpson's religious autonomy.
Saturday, September 22, 2018
There comes a time in every teaching semester (usually very early on...) where you have to coax your students to be comfortable with courts contradicting each other. You have to teach them to distinguish the cases, to make sense of it, but sometimes I feel like the answer to the contradictions is "the parties didn't argue that point and it just got missed and now we just have to deal."
I was thinking about this as I read a recent case out of the Third Circuit, Cook v. General Nutrition Corp., No. 17-3216 (behind paywall), which affirmed a failed lawsuit against GNC for, among other things, breach of contract. The appellants made several arguments for why their claims should not have been dismissed, one of them that GNC's termination of the contract was a breach. But the Third Circuit noted that termination was permitted by the contract: "[The contract] expressly permit[ted] GNC to unilaterally modify or cancel the agreement at any time, with or without notice."
That was the line that gave me pause, because I only recently taught Harris v. Blockbuster, which holds a contractual provision illusory precisely because it permitted Blockbuster to unilaterally change the contract at any time without even having to provide any notice. Other courts have definitely agreed with Harris, and while it's been distinguished I didn't really see any courts disagreeing with the conclusion. Third Circuit courts do seem to apply the illusory promise doctrine, so it doesn't seem like they've just decided to do without this doctrine in the Third Circuit.
It does seem like Harris can be read as only applying in the context of agreements to arbitrate and not all agreements (although there was apparently an arbitration clause in the GNC contract). Unfortunately, this is just me guessing as to how you can distinguish Harris, because there is zero discussion of illusory promises in the Third Circuit's very brief opinion. The court asserts that the contract gave GNC this right, and that while it might be "unfortunate," it was permissible and therefore not a breach.
Thursday, September 20, 2018
Above the Law has a write-up of a case involving charges of copyright infringement against the NFL for using photographs without permission, but the case has a very strong contract angle, as the allegations involve the scope and validity of the license that the AP granted to the NFL for the photos. The Second Circuit has a contract-interpretation-focused analysis that permits the photographers' lawsuit to go forward (the district court had dismissed the complaint). You can read the full decision here.
Wednesday, September 12, 2018
A recent case out of the Third Circuit, Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion Baptist Church of Pittsburgh, No. 17-3086, applies the ministerial exception of the First Amendment and refuses to entangle the court in a breach of contract dispute between a pastor and his former church. The parties had entered into a contract providing that Lee would serve as the Church's pastor for a twenty-year term. The contract provided for termination if its terms were breached. The Church terminated Lee's employment and alleged that he had failed to provide adequate spiritual leadership, as he was required to do by the terms of the contract. Lee disputed this, but the court refused to get involved, citing the ministerial exception. Courts aren't supposed to get entangled in "religious governance and doctrine," and asking the court to judge the quality of Lee's spiritual leadership under the contract would be just such an entanglement.