Thursday, November 1, 2018
Hello! I was away at a conference last week and then the Red Sox* decided to win the World Series, which threw off all productivity for a while. As I ease back into blogging, I thought I'd link you to this piece from Business Insider, analyzing some of the terms set forth in the 2011-era version of Major League Baseball's uniform contract. I find my students always love to look at real-life contracts, and this is a nice point in the year to do it, as it's a nice way to demonstrate that they are now able to (or should be able to!) understand more of the contract than they might have on the first day of class.
Of course, I always try to impress upon my students that contracts can be negotiated, so here's a list of some more unusual contract clauses baseball players were successful in getting teams to agree to.
Thursday, September 20, 2018
Above the Law has a write-up of a case involving charges of copyright infringement against the NFL for using photographs without permission, but the case has a very strong contract angle, as the allegations involve the scope and validity of the license that the AP granted to the NFL for the photos. The Second Circuit has a contract-interpretation-focused analysis that permits the photographers' lawsuit to go forward (the district court had dismissed the complaint). You can read the full decision here.
Wednesday, June 20, 2018
Recently a video went viral showing a 2016 altercation around an umpire ejecting Mets pitcher Noah Syndergaard after he threw a fastball behind the Dodgers' Chase Utley. Umpires wear microphones during Major LeagueBaseball games, and the resulting (often loud and profane) discussions with Mets players and especially Mets manager Terry Collins was recorded.
The video recently surfaced in an apparent leak, because MLB has announced its intention to try to scrub the video from the internet. MLB's reason for this is that it violates a "commitment" that "certain types of interactions" involving umpires during baseball games would not be made public, claiming it was "in the collective bargaining agreement" and that there was "no choice" but to scrub the video from the internet. Indeed, according to one report it had already been scrubbed.
Not so fast, though, because I found it still embedded in news reports about it. It's hard to get anything to vanish from the internet, especially once it's gone viral, but it's not that difficult to locate this video at all.
And it's not hard to see why it went viral. It's a fascinating glimpse into a part of the game fans seldom get to see. As others have pointed out, the umpire does a fantastic job in the clip, so it's hardly like he's being cast in a bad light. The manager doesn't even come across all that poorly. In fact, in my opinion, the party that comes out of the clip looking the worst is Major League Baseball and its confusing way of handling the explosive Chase Utley situation.
It's unclear what "interactions" were agreed to be withheld from the public, but this one is certainly an interesting one. I'd love to know what the contract terms actually are.
Wednesday, April 25, 2018
I fell down a rabbit hole recently looking at athletes who had lied about their ages. You can find a flurry of pieces about this online, from lists purporting to gather names together (I found some here and here and here) to more in-depth examinations of the phenomenon (see here and here and here and here). I fell down the rabbit hole courtesy of stumbling across a Baseball Prospectus piece on Albert Pujols. I discovered that there had been a flurry of discussion around Pujols's age when the prospect of his next (and last) baseball contract was looming, as you can see here and here and here. I'd never paid much attention to this issue before but it's interesting to contemplate how it intersects with contract law.
Monday, January 29, 2018
I’ve written many, many times now on the ways in which NDAs have been used to protect and enable systemic abuse of less empowered people, and they’re in the news again. USA Gymnastics has decided not to fine McKayla Maroney for violating her NDA and speaking out about the abuse she suffered at the hands of Larry Nassar, the Team USA doctor who recently pled guilty to sexual assault and has been accused by over 140 women. The women’s stories reveal how enforced silence can be used to obscure the full extent of harmful, abusive, and criminal conduct, making it seem as if each account was an isolated incident instead of a pattern of behavior.
A recent report from the Financial Times also makes this point. An expose on a men-only charity event in London, the article revealed that the hostesses hired for the event were asked to sign NDAs (which they were not allowed to read or take with them). Afterwards, during the event, they were subjected to multiple instances of groping, including hands up skirts, and one report of having a penis exposed to her. But we only know about this treatment because the NDAs meant to protect this behavior were broken.
Monday, October 2, 2017
A contract worth $11 b. Two such major parties as Yahoo!, Inc. and SCA Promotions, Inc. And still the contract does not specify precisely what the payments due are supposed to be for.
In 2014, Yahoo wanted to sponsor a perfect bracket contest in connection with the 2014 NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament, with a $1 billion prize for any contestant who correctly predicted the winner of all 63 games. SCA provides risk management for marketing and prize promotions. In return for a fee, SCA agreed to pay the $1 billion prize if any contestant won the contest.
Two invoices, dated December 27, 2013, were attached to the Contract with continuous pagination. According to the second invoice, the contract fee was $11 million. Yahoo owed an initial deposit of $1.1 million to SCA “[o]n or before December 31, 2013”; the remaining $9.9 million was due to SCA “[o]n or before February 15, 2014.”
The contract permitted Yahoo to cancel the contract with fees varying depending on when Yahoo cancelled. The relevant provision read as follows:
Cancellation fees: Upon notice to SCA to be provided no later than fifteen (15) minutes to Tip-Off of the initial game, Yahoo may cancel the contract. In the event the contract is cancelled, Yahoo will be entitled to a refund of all amounts paid to SCA subject to the cancellation fees set forth in this paragraph … Should the signed contract be cancelled between January 16, 2014 and February 15, 2014, a cancellation penalty of 50% of the fee will be paid to SCA by Sponsor (emphasis added).
Yahoo subsequently cancelled, but argued that it only owed SCA a cancellation fee of $550,000 because “50% of the fee” means 50% of the $1.1 million that Yahoo had already paid to Yahoo as an interim payment. SCA argued that the cancellation fee was $5.5 because “50% of the fee” means 50% of the $11 million total contract fee.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with SCA: “The district court determined that the Contract's terms do not expressly set an $11 million fee. According to the district court, nowhere does the Contract specify or identify the invoices, when they will be paid, or otherwise provide that the fee is $11 million. But the Contract references invoices several times, and it provides that “this contract, including exhibits and attachments, represents the entire final agreement between Sponsor [Yahoo] and SCA, and supersedes any prior agreement, oral or written.” Although the Contract does not explicitly identify the invoices to which it refers, two invoices are attached to the Contract with pagination continuous with the rest of the Contract … It is clear from the Contract's terms that the invoices are part of the Contract. See In re 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. 2010) (“Documents incorporated into a contract by reference become part of that contract.”). Accordingly, the district court's conclusion that the Contract does not specify an $11 million fee was in error.”
Once again, students and practitioners: be clear when you draft documents! Unambiguous language and specific references can be worth millions, if not billions, of dollars.
The case is SCA Promotions, Inc., v. Yahoo!, Inc., 868 F.3d 378 (Fifth Cir. 2017).
Wednesday, September 27, 2017
A recent case out of the Southern District of New York, Betty, Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., No. 16-CV-4215 (KMK) (behind paywall), tackles a fairly common issue: Often people make pitches based on ideas they have. Ideas aren't copyrightable, so often the only protection people have is contract-based. But, also often, they don't actually have a written contract, so they have to rely on an implied-in-fact contract theory. However, as this case reiterates, an implied-in-fact contract is more than just a conclusory allegation that "oh, we had an agreement that they'd pay me something for my pitch."
The case in question involves an advertising agency, Betty, who pitched a commercial to Pepsi for use in the Super Bowl. Pepsi invited Betty to participate in a telephone pitch meeting, during which Pepsi provided the "general outline of what it envisioned for the Super Bowl commercial," followed by a more formal face-to-face presentation. At the presentation, Betty presented eight different ideas and provided Pepsi with a USB drive with some concepts contained on it. Pepsi allegedly reacted favorably and asked for more details about some of the concepts.
About a month later, Pepsi informed Betty that it had decided to go in another direction with the commercial. However, when Betty saw the commercial during the Super Bowl, it thought it was substantially similar to one of the concepts it had pitched to Pepsi. The decision itself is behind a paywall but the lawsuit's filing was reported in some outlets.
This lawsuit followed, alleging copyright claims as well as a variety of contract-based claims. The breach of contract claim faltered, though. In the complaint, it consisted of just three paragraphs of conclusory allegations that didn't appear to rise to the level of an agreement. In the most generous reading, it sounded like an "agreement to agree" that can't be enforced. The complaint contained absolutely no terms of the contract. The fact that the contract was an implied-in-fact contract didn't excuse the plaintiff from having to allege facts sufficient to allow the court to draw an inference that the parties had entered into a contract based on their conduct and the surrounding facts and circumstances. That didn't happen here. Therefore, the court dismissed the breach of contract claims.
The copyright infringement claim, though, survived, and the court granted leave to amend on the breach of contract claim, so the plaintiff does live to fight another day.
(This post has been edited to correct a typo in the previous version. Pepsi provided the "general outline" over the phone, not Betty.)
Monday, June 12, 2017
On Monday June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, the United Arab Emirates and the Maldives all severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. While only a small period of time has passed, the small Arab nation has been left with some pressing issues. Almost immediately the people of Qatar rushed to supermarkets to stock up on food. Many fear that with their only land border shut (that between Qatar and Saudi Arabia), food supplies will run short and prices will skyrocket. The Philippines have already begun restricting migrant workers from going to Qatar for fear that migrant workers will be more marginalized if food shortages become an issue in a country that does not produce any of its own food. Migrant workers have been a source of conflict in Qatar for years and this current crisis could worsen or better the landscape.
On December 2, 2010, Qatar became the first Middle Eastern country to win a World Cup bid. That World Cup is set for 2022. In preparation, massive construction projects have begun in Doha and the surrounding area, including building new stadiums, renovating old ones, building new ports and rail systems, and renovating current city areas to make Qatar appear a modern metropolis in the heart of a desert. While all of that sounds good, it has come at a steep humanitarian cost. Many migrant workers have died and many modern governments have reprimanded Qatar for its inhumane treatment of people.
However, the current climate of Qatar is one of isolation from its neighbors—Emirates and Etihad airlines have ceased all travel to Qatar. Migrant workers are already starting to lose jobs. While FIFA, the governing body of soccer worldwide, has stated that the World Cup will continue as planned, if construction materials and workers cannot enter the country, the small country cannot hope to continue hosting the World Cup. No country has ever lost a FIFA World Cup contract after being awarded the bid, but the consequences could be astronomical. Qatar is looking to spend almost $200 billion for the World Cup, and while not all or even most of that money will be recovered by hosting the event, there is an expectation of gain for local businesses and hopefully an increase in tourism following the event. Without the World Cup, Qatar would be out the money and potentially enter a massive contract suit with FIFA. Currently, we can only wait and see how the situation works itself out, but it will be at the forefront of many people’s minds until the current diplomatic situation is resolved.
Sunday, February 19, 2017
In McNair v. Superior Court (6 Cal.App.5th 1227 (Cal. App. 2016), a college football coach brought suit against National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) for, among other issues, interference with and breach of contract. That’s hardly unusual. What is unusual is the fact that the case has so far been assigned to … eight judges in five years!
In 2011, for example, NCAA moved t
strike McNair’s complaint under the California anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied that motion. The NCAA appealed. The appellate court affirmed in “large part, but reversed a small portion.” The NCAA then filed a second peremptory challenge to the trial judge who had denied the anti-SLAPP motion. Without even giving McNair a chance to file an opposition but with full knowledge that an opposition was, in fact, forthcoming, the trial judge disqualified himself. McNair petitioned for a write of mandate contending that the trial court erred as a matter of law and asking the appellate court to issue a write directing the court to vacate its order accepting the postappeal peremptory challenge.
The appellate court this time pointed out that under California law, peremptory challenges to judges may only be filed following a “final judgment.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.6(a)(2). A denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is not a final judgment, said the court. NCAA argued that McNair’s writ petition should be denied because, among other things, McNair had not suffered prejudice. However, the court found that McNair had indeed been prejudiced by the trial court’s “abrupt decision” to accept the NCAA’s peremptory challenge before he could oppose it. The court granted McNair’s petition. The case was thus sent back to … the same judge who didn’t want it. Not very reassuring to any of the parties or the general public’s faith in a fair legal system, I am sure. Neither is the fact that our system allows for so many judges in the same case in one single case. Too much and too little… this case definitely seems to be one of too much.
Monday, October 31, 2016
A recent case out of the Western District of Pennsylvania, Douglas v. University of Pittsburgh, Civil Action No. 15-938 (behind paywall), found that there were factual disputes precluding summary judgment regarding whether or not a contract was in place between the plaintiff, an assistant football coach, and the University.
The plaintiff alleged that he was orally told by Pittsburgh's head football coach when he was offered the job that it would be a two-year-contract with $225,000 in the first year and $240,000 in the second year, with other perks. The plaintiff accepted the terms and began the job immediately upon receiving this alleged oral offer from the head coach.
A little more than a week later, the plaintiff received a proposed Employment Contract. The contract had his second-year salary as $235,000 instead of $240,000 and also stated that the University could terminate the plaintiff's employment if the head coach left the school. The plaintiff had concerns about these clauses and other parts of the contract and brought these concerns to the head coach, who allegedly told the plaintiff that he would take care of the issues.
A few months later, the plaintiff moved his wife and children to join him in Pittsburgh. Over the course of the next few months, the plaintiff claims to have periodically raised the issue that he had never signed a contract and was allegedly told by various people not to worry about it.
Less than a year after the plaintiff started the assistant coach job, the head coach left Pittsburgh to take a job at the University of Wisconsin. Pittsburgh then subsequently terminated the plaintiff and all of the other assistant football coaches. The University informed the plaintiff that, because he had never signed the Employment Contract, he was an "at-will" employee. The plaintiff, in the wake of losing his job, took a job at Florida State for $40,000 per year, necessitating more moving costs.
Not happy about how this all played out, the plaintiff sued the University of Pittsburgh. The plaintiff's allegation was that he was orally offered a contract for two years of employment that he accepted, and that the University breached that oral contract. The University responded that the conversation between the plaintiff and the head coach on which the plaintiff pins his hopes did not have enough essential terms to be considered a contract and that the essential terms were in the Employment Contract. Although the plaintiff refused to sign that written contract, the University maintained that he accepted the terms of the written contract when he continued to work for the University. The plaintiff, however, argued that the head coach's offer of employment was specific enough, giving job duties, term, and salary, to constitute a binding contract between the parties, and the plaintiff stated that he resigned from his job and moved his family in reliance on this.
The University moved for summary judgment but the court found that there was enough evidence that a jury could conclude that the plaintiff and the University had agreed to enough essential terms to form a contract. However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for fraud in the inducement and negligent misrepresentation as merely duplicating the surviving breach of contract claim. I'll keep you posted on what happens!
Law360 has an article about the filing of this lawsuit here.
Friday, August 26, 2016
I have witnessed with interest the evolving story of what exactly happened in Rio involving Ryan Lochte the morning of August 14. Initially Lochte claimed he had been robbed at gunpoint. I later heard through the gossip mill that that story was untrue and that Lochte had in fact beat up some security guards. That turned out, it seems, just to be rumor-mongering, but the story has continued to evolve from there, with both Lochte and the Rio police making statements that later seem untrue, or only partially true, or exaggerated. Slate has a good run-down of the changing versions of Lochte's story, although it's from a week ago. Now Lochte has been charged with filing a false police report, since it does seem clear at this point that no robbery happened. Even that, however, is confusing to parse if you read a lot of articles about it: It seems like the crime is more accurately making a false communication to police, as some articles have eventually stated, since there are conflicting reports about whether a police report was ever filed.
In the wake of this whole mess, Lochte has lost several of his sponsorship deals (although he's also picked one up). It's unclear, because the contracts don't seem to be public, whether this is a choice of just not renewing the contract (apparently that's the case with Ralph Lauren) or if a violation of a morals clause is being invoked to allow cancellation of the contract (which might be what's going on with Speedo). All of this provokes an interesting morals-clause conversation to me, and we had a bit of discussion about it on the Contracts Professors listserv. It seems clear that Lochte engaged in some sort of inappropriate behavior, and it seems also clear that whatever that behavior was, even the most minor version of the story is arguably a violation of any morals clause out there.
What is most clear is that, no matter what really happened, this has definitely served to tarnish his reputation, and that's is what's striking to me. This story has taken on an enormous life of its own, with many differing versions of it floating around the Internet. This situation has been caused, of course, by Lochte's many differing stories, together with some apparent conflicting statements by the Rio police, coupled with reporting that may have been less than precise itself in describing what was going on. One online story details all the conflicting information and asks the individual reader what they believe about the story.
While this particular maelstrom seems to have some basis in fact, it's not difficult to imagine something like this getting out of control without such justifying behavior at the root of it. Morals clauses tend to be about perception, but does that mean you can manipulate the perception of someone, through no real fault of their own? Take, for instance, the "Ted Cruz is the Zodiac Killer" meme that was popular on the Internet earlier this year. Ted Cruz wasn't born until after some of the Zodiac killings had happened, so he obviously could not have been the Zodiac Killer, and in fact some people interviewed about the meme noted that was the point: what they were saying was impossible. Nevertheless, it was reported that polls indicated 38% of those surveyed thought he might, in fact, be the Zodiac Killer, despite the impossibility. If a substantial number of people start thinking you did something you absolutely did not do, is that enough for a morals clause to be violated, because of the perception that you did it?
Thursday, August 11, 2016
Which is exactly what Australia's swimming sisters Bronte and Cate Campbell have tried to do. Apparently after their father gave a number of effusive interviews to the press, the sisters turned to contract law in an attempt to protect them from further such events. As this article reports, the sisters entered into a contract with their father in which he promised, "to the best of [his] ability," "not to embarrass [his] daughters on national television."
No word on what their father received in exchange for this promise.
Monday, February 15, 2016
As a companion piece to the Delaware Planet Fitness case I discussed a few days ago, here's another case about negligence liability releases and gyms, this one involving a Gold's Gym in Pennsylvania: Hinkal v. Pardoe, No. 165 MDA 2014 (behind paywall).
In this case, the plaintiff was a member of Gold's Gym who used the personal trainer services offered by the gym. She was injured while working with weights under the direction of her Gold's Gym personal trainer. (Here, unlike in the Planet Fitness case, we get some details about her injury. It was a serious neck injury and required two separate surgeries, and it was alleged the injury resulted from there being too much weight on the equipment she was instructed to use and that she was told to continue using even after she complained of injury, because the personal trainer, it was alleged, didn't recognize the seriousness of the injury.) As in the Planet Fitness case, the Gold's Gym membership agreement that the plaintiff signed contained a release from liability for negligence.
The court went through an analysis of whether this release was enforceable, noting that in Pennsylvania such releases are enforceable where they do not contravene public policy, they entirely concern two private individuals and their private affairs, and both parties bargain freely and the contract is not one of adhesion. Here, the court found that this contract was between a private individual and an entity concerning the individual's private affairs, and it was not against public policy because it did not concern any matter of public interest, which the court defined as "employer-employee relationship, public service, public utilities, common carrier, and hospitals." In addition, the court found that the plaintiff was not required to enter into a membership with Gold's Gym, so the plaintiff could not complain that she did not have bargaining power, because her decision to sign the membership agreement was purely voluntary and she could have walked away.
Interestingly, the plaintiff didn't really seem to argue against any of those conclusions on the part of the court. What the plaintiff seemed to argue was that the release wasn't valid because she never read it and Gold's Gym never mentioned it to her or explained to her that she was exposing herself to the risk of being unable to sue based on negligence. She asserted that she signed the contract without reading it (as, let's face it, we almost all do) and without any in-depth discussion of it with Gold's Gym and that therefore the clause couldn't be enforced against her. The court, however, was unsympathetic. It pointed out that she had a duty to read the contract before she signed it and that her signature not only indicated that she knew she should have read it but also appeared directly after a line directing her to make sure she read both sides of the agreement. The release was written in ambiguous and straightforward language and she would have understood it had she read it, according to the court.
There was, however, a dissent in this case, and while that dissent wasn't on the plaintiff's side with regard to not reading the contract, it did believe that allowing a release of liability for negligence in this situation was against public policy. As far as the dissent was concerned, gyms "implicate health and safety concerns," and so should therefore be a matter of public concern in the same way hospitals are. In fact, there was precedent that Pennsylvania had refused to allow a waiver of negligence liability in a case involving health treatments at a spa under the reasoning that it involved health and safety, and the dissent thought this case should fall under the same umbrella. Because Gold's Gym purported to provide for the physical health of its members, the dissent thought the public had an interest in ensuring that the services offered by Gold's Gym were qualified and held to a duty of care. The dissent also pointed out that other states would reach this same public policy conclusion, pointing specifically to New York as a state that would have held this release invalid, which we just saw in the trampoline park case.
So there you have it: Another gym case, and another opinion supporting the release of liability for negligence, but this one with a dissent raising the question that such releases might be against public policy.
Wednesday, February 10, 2016
On the subject of, again, releases for liability for negligence, a recent Delaware case, Ketler v. PFPA, LLC, No. 319 2015, examined one in the context of a Planet Fitness gym. The plaintiff was a member at Planet Fitness and had signed a membership agreement that contained a release for liability from negligence. The plaintiff was later injured while working out at Planet Fitness when the rowing machine he was using broke. He tired to argue that the release from liability for negligence was unenforceable. The court disagreed.
Under Delaware law, a release is enforceable if it is unambiguous, not unconscionable, and not against public policy. Here, the language of the release was straightforward and unambiguous. Furthermore, the court found the release wasn't unconscionable. It was true that the plaintiff had no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract but that wasn't enough on its own to find unconscionability. The court noted that the plaintiff was free to not join Planet Fitness so the release wasn't unconscionable. Finally, the release wasn't against public policy because the Delaware legislature has never spoken on the issue of releases of liability and it is the legislature that establishes public policy. So the release was enforceable and the plaintiff's claims were barred.
Wednesday, February 3, 2016
A recent case out of New York, Gosh v. RJMK Park LLC, No. 155024/2015 (thanks to reader Frank for the non-paywall link!), tackled the familiar issue of negligence liability release provisions, this time in the context of a trampoline park that the plaintiffs' child was injured at while playing "trampoline dodgeball." I had no idea what this was, so I looked it up. Here's a video:
It mainly looks like something people who don't get motion-sick should play (i.e., people who are not me).
The plaintiffs had signed an agreement with the trampoline park with a clause under which they waived all claims against the trampoline park arising out of negligence. Under New York law, such a clause is unenforceable when "a place of amusement or recreation" with an entry fee is involved as against public policy.
However, that didn't mean the plaintiffs got everything they wanted in this case. The plaintiffs' argument was that the presence of the negligence liability release clause rendered the entire agreement with the trampoline park unenforceable, including the venue provision that required them to bring suit in Westchester County. The court disagreed: Just because that one provision was unenforceable didn't mean the entire agreement got thrown out. Rather, the court severed the negligence liability release provision as "unrelated" to the main goal of the agreement. It didn't actually clarify what the main objective of the agreement was, just dismissed the release provision as being related to "legal stuff," basically. At any rate, the agreement had contained the standard boilerplate provision stating that any illegal clause should be severed from the agreement and the rest of the agreement enforced, which also supported the court's conclusion. So venue was transferred to Westchester County.
Wednesday, January 20, 2016
When I was in law school, I remember starting to be really struck by how often I had to sign liability releases: going to play paintball, renting skis, etc. A recent case out of the Tenth Circuit, Espinoza v. Arkansas Valley Adventures, had to deal with just such a release in the context of a tragic whitewater rafting accident.
The plaintiff's mother drowned when her raft capsized during a rafting trip organized by the defendant. She had signed a contract that released the defendant from liability for negligence. The plaintiff agreed that his mother had signed the release but tried to argue that the release was unenforceable. As a matter of Colorado law, though, he lost. The court found the release enforceable both as a matter of public policy and under the particular circumstances of the mother's signing.
The court explained that Colorado uses four facts to determine whether a release of liability for negligence is enforceable:
(1) the existence [or nonexistence] of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.
The court concluded that, while other states were free to disagree on this, Colorado had decided that corporations providing recreational activities are allowed to protect themselves from liability for negligence. The court stated that this is a valid policy choice for Colorado to make because it arguably encourages the active, outdoorsy lifestyle that the state of Colorado cherishes and wants to protect and promote. Without such ability to protect themselves, companies might be discouraged from offering recreational activities like horseback riding, snowboarding, or whitewater rafting. And in fact other courts in Colorado had explicitly found that companies offering whitewater rafting trips can protect themselves from liability for negligence using a contractual release. The court stated that the Colorado legislature was free to introduce a statute that would change this legal precedent, but, as it stood, the court was bound to follow the precedent.
Having decided that the release was not against public policy according to the first two factors of the balancing test, the court then further decided that the plaintiff's mother had fairly entered into the contract with full knowledge of the risks at stake. The court dismissed the plaintiff's expert testimony that the rapids his mother was exposed to were too advanced for a beginner (in contrast to what the defendant had assured her) by pointing to the fact that the defendant had expert testimony that the rapids were suitable for beginners. Finally, the court noted that the release had the typical all-caps language that you see on these sorts of contracts. You know: "HAZARDOUS AND INVOLVES THE RISK OF PHYSICAL INJURY AND/OR DEATH" and "THIS IS A RELEASE OF LIABILITY & WAIVER OF LEGAL RIGHTS." The truth is, seldom does any consumer seeing that stuff really take it a serious communication of a great risk of death, I think. Especially not when there was some evidence that the consumer has been assured the trip in question was suitable for families with children. Nonetheless, the court found that the language of the release unambiguously informed the plaintiff's mother of the risks of the activity and the fact that she was releasing the defendant from liability should those risks come to pass.
There was a dissent in this case, however, who agreed that the release wasn't against public policy but disagreed on the conclusion that the contract had been fairly entered into. In the dissent's view, the contradictory testimony about the level of difficulty of the rapids meant that the question should have gone to the jury.
I don't spend a lot of time in my Contracts class talking in detail about liability releases for negligence, but this case made me think that I should talk about them more, because they really do seem to arise in the context of so many activities.
Monday, August 17, 2015
I often begin my course by telling students that contracts facilitate mutually beneficial transactions. So, if they want to be the kind of attorneys who make the world a better place, transactional work is the place to be. But sometimes one-sided contracts drawn up in a context of vastly unequal bargaining power can prevent mutually beneficial transactions from taking place. This seems to be occurring in the case of Nick Symmonds, a six-time U.S. outdoor champion at 800 meters who won a silver medal at the 2013 World Championships. According to this story in the New York Times, Symmonds has been left off the U.S. team for the 2015 Worlds taking place later this month because he refused to sign a contract.
Symmonds refused to sign a vaguely-worded document that seemed to require that athletes wear Nike gear exclusively, even in their free time. Nike, according to the Times, has committed to sponsoring U.S. Track & Field to the tune of $20 million per year through 2040. But that contract might interfere with Symmonds' contractual obligations with his own sponsor, the running-shoe company, Brooks. According to the Times, athletes were instructed to pack only Nike-branded or non-branded apparel for the World Championships. Symmonds points out that Brooks is paying for him to wear its brand at important events. If he is prohibited from doing so, why would Brooks continue to sponsor him. Symmonds is all for the Stars and Stripes, but he also has to worry about dollars and cents. He estimates that 75% of his income comes through sponsorships.
Symmonds does not object to wearing Nike apparel at official events. He objects to the vague language that seems to preclude him from supporting his sponsor when he is not at official events. Some are saying that Symmonds is taking this position because he has no chance to medal at the Worlds anyway, so he has nothing to lose. The photo above shows him winning the US championships in 2010. He won again in 2015. If that guy has no chance, what does it say about the rest of the team?
Thursday, August 13, 2015
According to this report in the Chicago Sun Times, The Chicago Teachers' Union (CTU) is calling "strikeworthy" a proposal by Chicago Public Schools (CPS) CEO Forrest Claypool that teachers pay their full pension contributions. The proposal would result in a seven percent pay cut according to CTU PresidentKaren Lewis. The CTU had previously agreed to a seven percent "pension pick-up" in lieu of a pay raise. Claypool now claims that there is no solution to CPS's $9.5 billion pension crisis that does not involve an end to the pick-up. Chicago teachers will likely return to work without a contract and could strike at any time. Mayor Rahm Emanuel (pictured) has proposed phasing out the pick-up over a period of years in an attempt to ease the blow.
The Los Angeles Times reports that UC San Diego and the University of Southern California (USC) have filed competing lawsuits in a battle over control of a long term research project that seeks to develop treatments for Alzheimer's. A researcher at UC San Diego switched his affiliation to USC and has sought to take some of the project's funding with him. In early rounds, a San Diego judge has sided with UC San Diego on ownership of the project, including databases relevant to the project's ongoing research. Eli Lilly & Co. had pledged up to $76 million to UC San Diego to test a new Alzheimer's medication that the company is developing. Lilly now plans to move those fund to USC's new institute. The future of this research project seems caught in the cross-hairs of competing claims to contractual entitlement to both funding sources and intellectual property.
The Business Insider reported last week that Fox Sports analyst Craig James is suing the network, alleging that he was fired for voicing his opposition to gay marriage. James alleges breach of contract and discrimination. His termination, days after he was hired, allegedly relates to a statement he made in 2012 when he was running for U.S. Senate that gays and lesbians would have "to answer to the Lord for their actions."
Wednesday, August 5, 2015
Yesterday's New York Times included a report on the odd case of Jason Pierre-Paul (pictured), a New York Giants lineman who injured himself in a fireworks accident last month. The injury came while Pierre-Paul and the Giants were negotiating his contract, and right now the player is in a contractual limbo. The Giants named Pierre-Paul as a "franchise player" and offered him a one-year $14.8 million contract. Pierre-Paul refused that offer, holding out for a multi-year deal.
Pierre-Paul is part of the team but he currently has no contract and thus can refuse to allow visits from team doctors. Apparently, he has elected to do so, and so the Giants do not know the extent of his injury or how it will affect his play. The Times reports that Pierre-Paul had to have his right finger amputated and that there was other damage to his hand, but that is all we and presumably all the Giants know for now. There seems to be a lot of brinksmanship involved, but it also seems likely that in the end, Pierre-Paul will accept the one-year deal. The Giants may then invoke their right to dock Pierre-Paul's pay if he misses games due to "non-football injury."
The Times speculates that Pierre-Paul may be holding out so that he has time to recover and avoid a loss of pay. I'm not sure how that works. What if he misses practices (training camp has already begun)? Why would the Giants agree to his return before they have been permitted to thoroughly test his playing ability? One answer is that Pierre-Paul would then become a free agent who could jump to a rival. Perhaps a realistic possibility, but the Times also notes that Pierre-Paul has underperformed in two of the last three seasons. NFL football is a high-risk game.
Monday, July 13, 2015
We have some news from the world of hockey, that is, the sport of the 2015 Stanley Cup Champion Chicago Blackhawks (logo pictured). While elite teams (like the Blackhawks) struggle to keep their rosters under the salary camp (Goodbye Patrick Sharp; Goodbye Brandon Saad -- thanks for the memories and the Cups!), as reported on ESPN.com, the L.A. Kings used an alleged "material" breach of contract to terminate center Mike Richards rather than buying him out to evade the cap. The alleged material breach was at first mysterious, but it has now bee reported, e.g., here on Forbes.com, that Richards was detained at the Canadian border in illegal possession of OxyContin. But the Forbes report also indicates that Richards' mere arrest is not grounds for termination, and even if he is convicted, the NHL's drug policy does not call for termination. It calls for substance abuse treatment. Go Blackhawks!
The Bangor Daily News reports that author Tess Gerritsen has dropped her $10 million law suit against Warner Bros. for breach of contract in connection with the film "Gravity." As we reported previously, a District Court in California dismissed her complaint but allowed her twenty days to amend and refile. The complaint is based on a $1 million contract Gerritsen signed in 1999 to sell the book’s feature film rights to a company that was eventually purchased by Warner Bros. Gerritsen has admitted that the film "is not based on" her book, but she asserts that the book clearly inspired the film.