Sunday, February 17, 2019
There's a lot of really interesting things at stake in this recent case out of the Northern District of California, Batra v. POPSUGAR, Inc., Case No. 18-cv-03752-HSG, including a contract angle. The case concerns an alleged class of influencers suing POPSUGAR for altering their postings in various ways. In addition to copyright and publicity right violations, the purported class alleges contract interference, because influencers can enter into contracts to receive a cut of the revenue generated by the links on their sites, but POPSUGAR's alleged alterations stripped the monetized links from the postings. Therefore, the class alleged that POPSUGAR was interfering with their contracts with the website linked to. The court found that the class's allegations on this count (and every other count in the complaint) were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
I'm fascinated by this case and can't wait to see where it goes, especially as we get further into the class action allegations. (But probably it'll settle before we get to the good stuff.)
Monday, February 4, 2019
Keeping records on when and how your employees sign their arbitration agreements could be helpful if there's ever a dispute over them
I just blogged about an arbitration case, and here's another one out of California, Garcia v. Tropicale Foods, Inc., E069024. In the last case I blogged about, arbitration was compelled, but in this one, the court reaches a different conclusion, finding that the employer Tropicale failed to prove that Garcia signed the arbitration agreement. The case serves as a lesson to employers hoping to enforce arbitration agreements against their employees: They need to be able to offer information about the circumstances of the employee signing the agreement. Garcia maintained that she never signed the agreement, and in response Tropicale offered a declaration of an employee saying that Garcia did sign the agreement. But that bare declaration wasn't enough, according to the court. It did not offer any sense of the timing or circumstances of the signature, which were important in this case, since the date on the agreement looked like September 2015, but Garcia had been terminated in August 2015. Therefore, the court did not compel arbitration.
Wednesday, January 9, 2019
In a recent case out of the District of Arizona, Brittain v. Twitter Inc., No. CV-18-01714-PHX-DG (behind paywall), a court finds Twitter's terms enforceable as neither illusory nor unconscionable. The plaintiffs admitted that they agreed to Twitter's terms of service, but they argued the terms were illusory and unconscionable.
The illusory argument depended on the assertion that Twitter could unilaterally modify the terms at its discretion. But, unlike other cases where the terms were found to be illusory, Twitter did not try to retroactively modify the terms, and it mutually bound itself to the forum selection clause.
Brittain's unconscionability argument weirdly revolved around the fact that Twitter's terms don't contain an arbitration provision. I found this curious because I've read lots of cases where people want to get out of arbitration clauses, so complaining that the lack of one means the terms are unconscionable isn't an argument I quite follow. Neither did the court, which found that Twitter was not required to include an arbitration clause in its terms and that the terms weren't otherwise unconscionable.
Sunday, December 23, 2018
The below guest blog was shared with us by Oren Gross, the Irving Younger Professor of Law with the University of Minnesota Law School:
Who amongst us has not taught the 1864 case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus, a.k.a. the two ships Peerless? The story of the ships (by some accounts there have been up to eleven ships bearing the same name!) has tantalized and captured the imagination of numerous generations of students learning about meeting of the minds.
You can imagine my delight when, taking a much-needed break from grading exams, I came across a modern version of the story involving three NBA teams and two players named Brooks.
The Washington Wizards, it seems, wanted to strengthen their roster by adding the Phoenix Suns forward Trevor Ariza. For its part, Phoenix was interested in Memphis Grizzlies players and the Grizzlies – in Wizards players. And so, the Wizards’ general-manager concocted a three-team trade and served as the go-between the Suns and the Grizzlies. As part of that trade, the Suns were to get two players from Memphis, namely Selden and Brooks.
Simple enough. Or so it seems. However, as Chris Herrington reported in the Daily Memphian on December 15, 2018, the deal fell apart or, in an insight worthy of contracts’ scholars, “maybe never quite was.”
The problem is that Memphis currently has not one, but two, players on its roster whose last name is Brooks. And whereas the Suns thought they were getting Dillon Brooks, the Grizzlies intended to trade MarShon Brooks. Thus, while “two Grizzlies sources confirmed to The Daily Memphian that it was MarShon Brooks, not Dillon Brooks in the deal. Media in Phoenix, however, insisted it was Dillon, not MarShon.”
As the two teams negotiated through the Wizards as the go-between, the miscommunication as to the identity of the player actually to be traded was not revealed until news of the deal leaked to the media.
The outcome? The three-team deal collapsed. As Herrington put it “the deal that never really was was nixed.”
Tuesday, December 18, 2018
A past consideration case reminds us that being recognized for your past hard work isn't good for your breach of contract claim
I don't know about everyone else but my casebook teaches past consideration using very old cases. Here's past consideration raised as an issue with a recent case out of the Southern District of California, Wright v. Old Gringo Inc., Case No. 17-cv-1996-BAS-MSB (behind paywall).
The case is really interesting, because the court acknowledged that the complaint had proper consideration allegations: ownership interest, salary, and performance bonuses in exchange for providing "expertise and services." The problem came from the deposition testimony, all of which seemed to establish that in fact the ownership interest had been provided as a reward for previous work. The plaintiff herself testified that the ownership interest was effective even if she immediately quit the job, indicating it wasn't in exchange for future services. Plaintiff's friends and relatives provided similar testimony, that the ownership interest was given "to show . . . appreciation" and "for . . . recognition of her hard work." There was no evidence presented that the ownership interest was offered on the condition of future work in exchange. For that reason, the court granted summary judgment for failure of consideration.
The plaintiff's remaining claims were permitted to go forward, including promissory estoppel and tort claims. Those claims (as I remind my students!) don't require consideration.
I find this case really interesting because I'm sure the plaintiff's friends only thought they were helping her with their testimony. This is the kind of thing that I think makes instinctive sense to non-lawyers: the plaintiff did something awesome and they recognized it by giving her an amazing gift. But lawyers know that consideration doctrine makes that a bad thing, not a good one.
(The decision also contains a statute of limitations and damages discussion.)
Wednesday, December 12, 2018
A recent case out of Illinois, Pam's Academy of Dance/Forte Arts Center v. Marik, Appeal No. 3-17-0803 (behind paywall but you can listen to the oral argument here), highlights the weirdness of just throwing extra words into a contract without thinking through what they really mean.
The dispute concerned a noncompete between a dance studio and Marik, one of its employees. The covenant not to compete stated that Marik wouldn't engage in any similar business "for a period of not less than five (5) years," and wouldn't solicit any teachers or students "for a period of not less than three (3) years." The parties were arguing over whether this language meant "five years" and "three years," or whether it meant that the noncompete could extend past five and three years.
In a vacuum, the statement "not less than five years" reads as "at least five years" to me, meaning that the time period could last longer. But as a matter of contract interpretation, that makes no sense. Could the noncompete theoretically go on for 50 years? After all, that would be a period "not less than" five. On the other hand, as the defendants argued, interpreting the time periods as five and three years would render the "not less than" language as "mere surplusage" -- an interpretation courts usually strive to avoid.
The court noted that contract interpretation's goal is to discern the intent of the parties. "Not less than" has been interpreted by Illinois courts in a variety of ways, but never in the context of a noncompete. However, many out-of-state courts had come to the conclusion that, in a covenant not to compete, "not less than five years" should be construed as meaning five years. This would prevent the employer from arguing that the noncompete was violated six years later. Indeed, the court thought that arguing that it meant six years would amount to bad faith.
Whether the five- and three-year periods were reasonable was a fact-based inquiry that had to be determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances.
This is a situation where I'm sure the "not less than five years" language sounded fancy and official but it was truly pointless. I think the employee probably understood it to be five years and three years (to the extent that the employee read and understood the agreement), and to the extent the employer understood the language to mean otherwise and entitle it to set an indefinite time period, I'm with the court that that's an unreasonable interpretation.
Monday, December 10, 2018
I got really excited when I saw this case because it's always nice to have a recent parol evidence case to look at, and this one involves movies!
It's a recent case out of Mississippi, Rosenfelt v. Mississippi Development Authority, No. 2017-CA-01120-SCT (you can listen to the oral arguments here). The MDA had communications with Rosenfelt regarding his movie studios' attempt to make movies in Mississippi, eventually guaranteeing a loan through a term sheet signed by the MDA and by Rosenfelt on behalf of his two movie studios. When Rosenfelt wanted to make another movie and applied for another loan under the terms of the agreement, the MDA turned down the request. Rosenfelt then sued for specific performance and damages. Rosenfelt initially triumphed on a motion for partial summary judgment but then, during the specific performance debate in the case, the MDA filed a summary judgment motion challenging Rosenfelt's standing, which resulted in dismissal of Rosenfelt's complaint.
Rosenfelt appealed, alleging that there was an agreement between him personally and the MDA. However, the court noted that all communications from the MDA were directed explicitly to Rosenfelt as president of the relevant movie studio. The court's decision came down to contract interpretation: All of the written documents in the case unambiguously referred to Rosenfelt in his official corporate capacity or were signed by Rosenfelt in his official corporate capacity. Given the lack of ambiguity on the face of the documents, the court refused to consider parol evidence as to whether Rosenfelt was personally a party to any of the agreements. Because all of Rosenfelt's allegations concerned his personal agreement with the MDA, the court dismissed the suit.
This case serves as a reminder that, once you have set up corporate entities, you need to be careful to remember how those corporate entities impact not just your legal liabilities but also your legal rights.
Monday, November 12, 2018
I always tell my students that if you want people to promise to do something, you'd better make sure you don't phrase it as a condition in your contract, and a recent case out of the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Allen v. SWEPI, LP, No. 4:18-CV-01179 (behind paywall), carries just that lesson.
The contract was for the purposes of exploring for oil and gas on the Allens' land and read that the agreement was "made on the condition that within sixty (60) days from the Effective Date of this lease, [the defendant] shall pay to the [Allens] the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2000.00) per acre for the first year." The defendant never paid the Allens this sum, and the Allens sued. However, the defendant argued that this was nothing but an option contract. It had the right to rent the land for oil and gas exploration if it paid the required sum. However, it was not required to pay that sum. Instead, the payment was a condition that had to be fulfilled before the contract would come into operation. The court agreed and dismissed the Allens' breach of contract causes of action.
The court then also dismissed the Allens' promissory estoppel claim, because it found that there had been a valid and enforceable contract between the parties -- it was just an option contract that the defendant chose not to exercise.
The Allens seem to have thought they had rented this land to the defendant. I think that what they wanted to accomplish (or thought they were getting) with the quoted clause was to make sure they were paid within 60 days. However, in phrasing it as a condition, what they got was no commitment from the defendant at all.
Sunday, November 11, 2018
In a recent case, employment agency Robert Half International, Inc. (“Robert Half”) brought suit against a former employee, Nicholas Billingham, and Billingham’s current employer, Beacon Hill Staffing (a competitor of Robert Half) for actual and anticipatory breach of contract. Billingham’s contract with Robert Half included the agreement that Billingham would not compete with or solicit clients from Robert Half if leaving the company. Nonetheless, Billingham accepted employment with Robert Half’s direct competitor where he stated that he intended to “add to my team quickly and take market share from Beacon Hill’s competitors.” Robert Half brought suit. Billingham and Beacon Hill moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.
Billingham first defended himself arguing that unilateral contracts cannot be anticipatorily breached since they technically seen do not arise until the actual performance has been rendered. He argued that his contract was unilateral since his remaining obligations were not yet due. (Strangely, he did so although he had already terminated the relationship himself.) The court corrected him on this point, noting that a unilateral contract is one that “occurs when there is only one promisor and the other party accepts, not by mutual promise, but by actual performance or forbearance.” (Quoting Williston § 1:17). To help my students distinguish accepting by beginning of performance in bilateral contracts from offers for unilateral contracts, which is sometimes confusing for them, I tell them that they must scrutinize what type of acceptance is sought by the offeror: if onlythe actual performance, then there is a truly an offer for a unilateral contract. If this is not clearly the case, there is an offer for a “regular” bilateral contract. In this instance, the contract between Billingham and Plaintiff was bilateral, not unilateral. Robert Half promised to employ Billingham in exchange for Billingham's promise to abide by the restrictive covenants in the Agreement. Billingham's promise included the prospectiveagreement that he would refrain from certain activities upon departing the company. Billingham was thus not correct that the agreement “became unilateral” after his resignation. That is a legal impossibility. His obligations to forbear from the non-competitive agreements became due the moment he left Robert Half. As with many other contractual issues, unilaterality and bilaterality are examined at the point of contract formation, not by looking at what actually happened thereafter.
The court thus found that plaintiffs had sufficiently pled a claim of anticipatory, if not actual, breach of contract.
Plaintiffs also stated a claim for unjust enrichment. Defendants argued that Robert Half has not actually “conferred” any benefits on Beacon Hill and would thus not be liable for compensation under that theory. The court noted that this is wrong. Beacon Hill received a “benefit” from Billingham's employment through the revenue that he generates, his professional training, his relationships with customers and candidates, and his industry knowledge. Beacon Hill's retention of these benefits is “unjust” as they are benefits that Billingham is barred, by the agreement, from conferring on Beacon Hill.
The case is Robert Half International Inc. v. Billingham, 317 F.Supp.3d 379, 385 (D.D.C., 2018).
Friday, November 9, 2018
Another day, another arbitration compelled, this time in a recent case out of the Northern District of Illinois, Nitka v. ERJ Dining IV, LLC, Case No. 18 cv 3279. The plaintiff sued the defendant for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and assault and battery. The defendant countered that the plaintiff had signed an agreement to arbitrate disputes relating to her employment, which these were. The plaintiff stated she had no memory of signing the arbitration agreement, but the defendant's Vice President of People and Development testified that it required new employees to sign such agreements before entering employment and maintained them in the usual course of business. The plaintiff's arbitration agreement was located in her personnel file. Furthermore, the plaintiff had apparently affirmatively indicated on an electronic form that she had signed the agreement.
The plaintiff then argued that she had been a minor at the time of signing the agreement, but the court pointed out that she ratified the agreement by continuing to work for the defendant after her eighteenth birthday.
I believe that the plaintiff did not remember signing the arbitration agreement. To be honest, I believe that, even if she remembered, she probably had no idea what it really was. She was a minor trying to get a job at a Chili's. I'm sure she signed what she was told to sign and clicked the electronic check-boxes she was told to click -- exactly the way the vast majority of us do when getting a new job.
Saturday, September 22, 2018
There comes a time in every teaching semester (usually very early on...) where you have to coax your students to be comfortable with courts contradicting each other. You have to teach them to distinguish the cases, to make sense of it, but sometimes I feel like the answer to the contradictions is "the parties didn't argue that point and it just got missed and now we just have to deal."
I was thinking about this as I read a recent case out of the Third Circuit, Cook v. General Nutrition Corp., No. 17-3216 (behind paywall), which affirmed a failed lawsuit against GNC for, among other things, breach of contract. The appellants made several arguments for why their claims should not have been dismissed, one of them that GNC's termination of the contract was a breach. But the Third Circuit noted that termination was permitted by the contract: "[The contract] expressly permit[ted] GNC to unilaterally modify or cancel the agreement at any time, with or without notice."
That was the line that gave me pause, because I only recently taught Harris v. Blockbuster, which holds a contractual provision illusory precisely because it permitted Blockbuster to unilaterally change the contract at any time without even having to provide any notice. Other courts have definitely agreed with Harris, and while it's been distinguished I didn't really see any courts disagreeing with the conclusion. Third Circuit courts do seem to apply the illusory promise doctrine, so it doesn't seem like they've just decided to do without this doctrine in the Third Circuit.
It does seem like Harris can be read as only applying in the context of agreements to arbitrate and not all agreements (although there was apparently an arbitration clause in the GNC contract). Unfortunately, this is just me guessing as to how you can distinguish Harris, because there is zero discussion of illusory promises in the Third Circuit's very brief opinion. The court asserts that the contract gave GNC this right, and that while it might be "unfortunate," it was permissible and therefore not a breach.
Monday, August 27, 2018
Revitch received an automated advertising call from DirecTV to his cell phone, and sued alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Revitch was a wireless customer of AT&T, so DirecTV moved to compel arbitration under its sibling corporation's wireless service contract with Revitch. This recent case out of the Northern District of California, Revitch v. DirecTV, LLC, No. 18-cv-01127-JCS, denied the motion, finding that the arbitration clause did not cover claims with DirecTV completely unrelated to the wireless services provided under the AT&T contract.
It was true that the arbitration provision covered affiliates, and it was also true that DirecTV was an affiliate of AT&T, having become sibling companies a few years after Revitch entered into the contract with AT&T. But the court characterized the establishment of this relationship as a "completely fortuitous fact." The court noted that the intention for wording the clause broadly and including affiliates was typically to cover situations regarding assignments or successors. Nothing of the sort had happened here. No benefits under the contract had been assigned to DirecTV, nor had DirecTV undertaken any obligations under the contract. The calls Revitch was complaining about had nothing at all to do with the wireless service covered by the contract. So the precedent DirecTV tried to rely on was all distinguishable in the view of the court: "The Court concludes that Adams and Andermann, at most, support the conclusion that an entity may become an affiliate subject to the arbitration contract after the time of contracting where that relationship arises from an assignment of the underlying agreement or a related entity becomes a successor to the original contracting entity. That is not the case here."
The court interpreted the arbitration clause of the contract according to ordinary rules of contract interpretation that required the avoidance of absurd results and also that contracts be construed against the drafter. DirecTV argued that the presumption in favor of arbitration established by the Federal Arbitration Act meant that arbitration clauses should trump such rules of contractual interpretation, but the court disagreed. The court stated that, according to Ninth Circuit precedent, the FAA requires arbitration agreements to be placed on equal footing with other contracts. Allowing the suspension of ordinary contract rules of interpretation when arbitration agreements were involved would be placing arbitration agreements on favored footing; on equal footing, the same rules ought to apply to arbitration agreements as apply to all other contracts. Arbitration, the court emphasized, "is a matter of consent."
This is an interesting case. Due to the consolidation of most of our forms of communication under massive umbrella corporations, a relationship with one subsidiary can be used to assert a relationship with all companies under the same corporate umbrella, as DirecTV tried to do here. This court's view feels rooted in a common-sense understanding that the arbitration agreement Revitch entered into when he decided to sign up for AT&T wireless service shouldn't also cover completely unrelated television services provided by a company that hadn't been affiliated with AT&T when Revitch entered into the contract. Only a few months ago, though, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit for refusing to enforce an arbitration clause, re-affirming the trump-card nature of the Federal Arbitration Act over many other public policies. This case seems like another display of Ninth Circuit courts' skeptical views toward arbitration clauses -- which the Supreme Court has just reminded the Ninth Circuit it doesn't share.
Wednesday, August 22, 2018
We have blogged several times before about the confusing and often tragic state of health care and health insurance in this country. Now we have another case out of the Eighth Circuit to add to the tally, Ferrell v. Air EVAC EMS, Inc., No. 17-2554.
Ferrell went to an emergency room with chest pain. Emergency room staff arranged for an air ambulance operated by AIR EVAC to transport him to another hospital. Ferrell's health insurance only covered a thousand dollars of this helicopter flight, so Ferrell was billed over $29,000. Ferrell then sued on behalf of a class of those similarly situated, alleging that there was no enforceable contract with the air-ambulance provider because he was not informed of the price of the helicopter flight before taking it. The problem, though, is that the federal Airline Deregulation Act (the "ADA") comes into play here, as this is about air travel. The ADA, among other things, prohibits states from regulating the cost of air transportation.
Ferrell argued that the ADA should not apply to air-ambulance services, which are unique from other forms of air transportation. But the plain language of the ADA is broad enough to include air-ambulance services, so the court refused to exclude them from the preemption. Because Ferrell was bringing a class action, this doomed all of his claims.
The court did find that Air EVAC could potentially bring a breach of contract claim if Ferrell refuses to pay, and that Ferrell could then assert there was no enforceable contract in defense. In that case, Air EVAC could then possibly rely on equity to recover the value of the services provided, and then the court would be able to determine that value without ADA preemption.
Which is a pretty complicated analysis and decision. Surely this is not the most efficient way we can think of to handle health care in this country. But I suppose there is something poetic about having to lump in health care with the air transportation industry: They often are both perplexing in their treatment of their customers.
Friday, July 27, 2018
23andMe, one of the services that takes your saliva and analyzes your DNA for you, has announced a partnership with GlaxoSmithKline to use its DNA database to develop targeted drugs. I've written before about the fairly broad consent Ancestry.com's similar home DNA service elicited under its terms and conditions, which 23andMe also enjoyed. According to the article, 23andMe considers itself to have gained consent from its users, and is allowing users to opt out if you wish.
I think most of us have little problem with our DNA being used to find cures for terrible diseases and afflictions. If my DNA could be used to cure cancer, I am happy to line right up. (And, in fact, when my father had cancer, we did provide express consent to his doctors for us to assist in their DNA research.) But I think most of us, if asked, would have said something like, "I want my DNA to be used to cure cancer so people with cancer can be cured."
However, the way the pharmaceutical industry works in this country, that's not exactly what happens. The cure, as we know because we talk about health insurance A LOT, is then available to those who can afford it. Many of Wikipedia's drug entries keep track of the cost of pharmaceuticals in the U.S. against the cost of producing the drug, as can be seen here. So I don't want to sound like a terrible person trying to stall progress, but, well, the users in the database paid to use 23andMe, and now their DNA is being sold to a pharmaceutical company, so 23andMe has now made money off of the DNA twice, and then it's going to get used to develop into medications that will then be sold again, back to the people who need the medications, who may be the same people whose DNA was used to develop the drug. At that point your DNA has been profited off of three times, and never by you, and possibly twice at your own personal expense. And, if history is anything to go by, that pharmaceutical is your DNA coming back to you at a tremendous mark-up. So you could find yourself in a position where you paid to have a pharmaceutical company take your DNA, turn it into the drug that could save your life, and then ask you to pay, again, much more money than you have, to gain access to the drug. You paid to donate your DNA so they could charge you for the benefits it provides. And, according to the terms and conditions, you consented to that.
Friday, July 20, 2018
A recent case out of the Southern District of New York, Garcia v. Good for Life by 81, Inc., 17-CV-07228 (BCM) (behind paywall), is an examination of a settlement agreement implicating the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). It's interesting for the language it's willing to approve vs. the language it says should not be contained in the agreement.
First, the court expresses concern about the contract's releases being overly broad and rewrites them, concerned that the language as written would have attempted to bar claims by a "second cousin once removed." Upon revision, the court is comfortable with the releases, but the court declares unenforceable the no-assistance and no-media provisions. The court finds it a violation of the FLSA to bar the plaintiff from assisting other individuals who might have a claim against the employer. The court also states that the effective "partial confidentiality clause" preventing the plaintiff from contacting the media is "contrary to well-established public policy." I found this last ruling especially interesting in our age of widepsread NDAs, which I've blogged about a bunch. I agree that such a clause would "prevent the spread of information" in a way that would be harmful to other wronged victims trying to vindicate their rights; we should keep talking about that when it comes to NDAs.
Wednesday, July 18, 2018
I blogged about the issue of emergency room and hospital “surprise charges” before, but this important issue is well worth re-addressing in the context of a new case. Many court decisions and articles are still generated about the topic, but with no good solution yet from a patient/consumer point of view.
Here is the classic scenario: A person receives urgent medical care in an emergency room. Upon admission, he or she is presented with a contract stating, for example, that he or she will pay for the services “in accordance with the regular rates and terms” of the hospital or emergency room. But how does one ever know what those charges will be? Does that make them an open price term? If so, is the medical provider under an obligation to pay only the reasonable value of the services provided or can they charge pre-posted list rates? Who decides what is “reasonable” and not in a market marked by, for most of us, very high prices? If the provider charges what appears to be a very high amount, is the entire contract void for unconscionability?
A current case I came across addresses these issues (class certification was granted). The uninsured “self-pay” patient, Mr. Cesar Solorio, signed a three-page admissions contract stating the above. Once released, he got an un-itemized bill for $7,812. He filed suit for breach of contract asking the court to, among other things, clarify how the contractual language “in accordance with the regular rates and terms of [medical center] should be interpreted and applied. Mr. Solorio alleges that the language constitutes an open price term that, under applicable law, is an agreement to pay only the reasonable value of the items received and not the posted rates by the medical center. Solorio also alleges that the medical charges were artificially inflated and more than four times higher than the actual fees and charges collected by the medical center.
I still find these types of contracts highly problematic seen from a consumer/patient point of view. I have myself been subjected to a similar treatment (so to speak) by an emergency room that also, after the fact, sent me a much higher bill than what I was initially “promised” (orally and probably non-binding, but still). Several items were double if not triple billed. Patients can complain and complain, but what can we really do? Not much, it seems, as these types of cases keep re-appearing.
Yes, of course we want urgent medical treatment if we need it. Yes, that is expensive. But clearly, we also have a contractual (and moral) right notto be ripped off. And maybe some services that might initially seem urgent could actually wait… In my own case and, I know, that of many others, medical providers are very eager to promote their treatment as highly necessary and urgent/”a good idea.” That may, I hate to say, simply be a way for the medical providers to make more money.
As it is now, the burden seems to be on the patient seeking services to bargain for and document having received a promise that is limited in scope to … what? Is this just an impossible issue to solve from a contractual point of view? It seems to be. That’s where health insurance comes into play, but reality remains that not everyone has that. The “free market” takes over, but, in my opinion, that is far from optimum in this particular context.
The case is Cesar Solorio v. Fresno Community Hospital and Medical Center, Ca. Super. Ct. NO. 15CECG03165, 2018 WL 3373411.
A recent decision out of Ohio, Whitt v. The Vindicator Printing Company, Case No. 15 MA 0168, discusses the limits of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In the case, the contract contained a provision permitting termination of the contract for "malfeasance . . . , or at the will of either party for any reason or no reason" upon thirty days written notice. Vindicator terminated the contract with Whitt after an altercation between Whitt and a temp employee working for Vindicator. Whitt sued for, among other things, breach of contract, complaining that Vindictor had wrongfully terminated the contract only seven months into its three-year term. Whitt alleged that Vindictor violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because it terminated the contract after Whitt was a victim of criminal assault at the hands of Vindicator's employee.
The court noted, though, that the requirement of good faith should not give a court the ability to second-guess decisions made within the context of the contract. The termination provision of the contract did not require just cause, which was what Whitt was trying to read in. Rather, the contract permitted Vindicator to terminate it for no reason whatsoever, so the exact circumstances of the termination did not matter.
I think many people assume that contracts provide a level of reliability and predictability that doesn't exist if those contracts permit termination for any reason, or for no reason. I think Whitt assumed that this contract would stay in effect unless he did something terrible, but that's not how the termination clause was worded.
(h/t to D. C. Toedt for the free link!)
Wednesday, July 4, 2018
Here's a short case out of the District of New Jersey, Hall v. Revolt Media & TV, LLC, Civil Action No. 17-2217 (JMV) (MF), in which the plaintiff failed to adequately plead his breach of contract claim. I'm blogging it because I don't spend a lot of time teaching my students about complaint-drafting; there are always just so many other things I'm quickly trying to discuss. But this case strikes me as a nice straightforward way to talk about it. The claim fails because all of the plaintiff's allegations were about contract negotiations: He contacted the defendant to discuss a contract, he sent the defendant a contract that was never signed, he continued to attempt to contact the defendant to negotiate the contract, etc. The court said there was never an allegation that any contract had actually been finalized. Nor did the complaint contain any details about the terms of the contract, such that the court could not tell what had allegedly been breached. I think this can be used as a way to focus the students on what they do need to be sure to include in breach of contract allegations.
And being sure to also plead promissory estoppel would be a good idea. The complaint did adequately plead unjust enrichment, so this case can act as a good way to teach the distinctions of that cause of action as well.
Monday, July 2, 2018
An "exceedingly rare" case where a court discounted testimony, relying in part on the witness's admitted "habit of routinely lying" in the course of business
A recent case out of Michigan, Strategy and Execution Inc. v. LXR Biotech LLC, No. 337105, speaks to the perils of not putting agreements in writing (or doing so and subsequently losing the writing). The parties had a written contract that stated that they would arrive at performance criteria at a later time. But the parties disputed ever entering into a later agreement over the performance criteria. No party produced any written document. LXR's principal testified that the parties reached an oral agreement that he memorialized in writing but the writing was later lost. However, this testimony was not corroborated by any other witness except for one who gave "conflicting testimony" regarding the document. LXR's principal had admitted to "routinely lying" because he apparently thought it to be "good business practice." Furthermore, none of the "voluminous" emails exchanged between the parties ever referenced any agreement on the performance criteria. The court therefore agreed that "this is one of the exceedingly rare cases in which a witness's testimony is insufficient to find a jury question." Despite the testimony, the court was permitted to enter a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim.
Written contracts are not always required, but this case is an example of why they are often desirable to have, and to keep safe!
(There were other points of appeal in the case relating to other clauses of the contract and some jury instruction issues.)
Friday, June 29, 2018
A recent case out of the Second Circuit, Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics Bermuda Co. Ltd. v. FMC, LLC, No. 17-2400-cv (behind paywall), is another case about interpretation of contract terms -- twice over. Because here the parties entered into a contract, fought over breach of that contract, and then entered into a settlement agreement, which they were also fighting over. The moral is that, if you want something specific, you should ask for it rather than relying on unspoken industry practices.
The initial agreement between the parties was about an IT operating system. Although the system was going to cost $70 million, the contract wasn't very detailed, with no technical specifications or description of building methods. The parties' relationship deteriorated and they eventually entered into a Settlement Agreement to terminate the project. Under these new terms, FCM would be released from its obligation to provide the system to Ortho, while providing assistance while Ortho transitioned to a different contractor. After execution of the Settlement Agreement, Ortho apparently realized that FCM was not as far along as Ortho had thought and had not prepared certain items that Ortho had assumed it had prepared, and so Ortho claimed that as a result the IT system cost more and took longer.
The court, however, noted that there was nothing in the contract requiring FCM to produce the certain deliverables Ortho had been looking for. Ortho claimed it was "standard practice in the industry," but the court said that wasn't the equivalent of it being a contractual obligation. FCM was contractually required to provide assistance -- no more, no less. There was nothing in the contract about the job having to be at a particular stage of completion, or that any particular deliverables or documentation had to exist.
The court also pointed out that Ortho had released its claims regarding the original agreement in the Settlement Agreement. Ortho tried to argue that it had released claims but not damages but the court called that "a nonsensical reading."