The FTC's Rule Banning Non-Competes and the Response

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) this week announced a new Final Rule on non-competes.  I was hoping for a short document that clearly and concisely lays out the new rule.  Instead, we got a a 570-page document that, truth be told, I will never read.  Here's the summary, which I did mange to read:

The final rule provides that it is an unfair method of competition—and therefore a violation of section 5—for persons to, among other things, enter into non-compete clauses (“non-competes”) with workers on or after the final rule’s effective date. With respect to existing non-competes—i.e., non-competes entered into before the effective date—the final rule adopts a different approach for senior executives than for other workers. For senior executives, existing non-competes can remain in force, while existing non-competes with other workers are not enforceable after the effective date.

According to the FTC's website, the new rule will "will generate over 8,500 new businesses each year, raise worker wages, lower health care costs, and boost innovation."  

Well, that sounds great.  Surely, nobody would oppose all that.

Well, nobody except Ryan, LLC, which was the first to file a federal lawsuit challenging the new rule in Ryan, LLC v. FTC.  The main argument relies on a favored weapon in the anti-regulatory arsenal, the newly minted "major questions doctrine."  The FTC lacks the authority, Ryan argues, under congressional statutes, to issue so sweeping a regulation.  In fact, Ryan argues, the FTC lacks power to regulate unfair competition.  It did not do so until 1962, and it never sought to regulate non-competes until 2022.

As to substance, Ryan argues, "Workers, firms, and the economy all benefit from reasonable non-compete agreements."  The key term here is "reasonable."  Ryan contends that courts have long assessed the reasonableness of non-compete agreements.  Regulation here is unnecessary, as the courts have already struck the right balance among competing interests. 

The causes of action are predictable.  Count I, citing the major questions doctrine, alleges that the FTC lacks authority to adopt the new rule.  Count II, citing the non-delegation doctrine, Schechter Poultry (that old chestnut!), and Justice Gorsuch's dissent in Gundy, alleges that allowing the FTC to regulate in this area would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the executive branch.  Count III, citing the Vesting Clause thesis and the unitary executive, alleges that the FTC Act violates Article II, because its commissioners can only be terminated by the President for cause.  Count IV seeks a declaration: vacating the new rule; finding that the FTC has no authority to regulate unfair competition; that the FTC claim of authority to issue the rule violates the non-delegation doctrine; and that the structure of the FTC violates Article II.  

Sounds crazy right?  Not to these folks.

I mean, should the courts strike down an entire agency because they don't like one rule, for which the agency provided a 570-page explanation?  Needless to say, if an agency got out over its skis, Congress could yank it back by issuing its own clarifying instructions.  But in our world, apparently, the power to do so is vested not through Article I, and not through Article II, but through Article III.  We the people, in order to form a perfect juristocracy . . .