Thursday, June 30, 2022
That Other SCOTUS Arbitration Case: Viking River Cruises
We were ever so happy to report on the first two Supreme Court cases this term interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., and Southwest Airlines v. Saxon. They were short; they were unanimous; and they rejected motions by corporations to compel arbitration of their employees' claims. The third, Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, is more involved, generating a majority opinion from Justice Alito (left), a confusing flurry of concurrences, including one for the ages from Justice Barrett, and a quick dissent from Justice Thomas.
The challenge in Moriana is the interaction between the FAA and California's Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). California's legislature determined that its Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) lacked resources necessary to enforce California's labor laws. PAGA permits "aggrieved employees" to initiate actions against former employers on behalf of themselves and other current or former employees. They must first exhaust administrative remedies and give the LWDA an opportunity to act. If it does not do so, they may bring their claims. LWDA gets 75% of any award, and the employees split the remaining 25%. PAGA operates like a qui tam action. A PAGA suit is not a class action because the aggrieved employee is suing as an agent the state.
When Viking Cruises hired Moriana, you'll never guess what happened! She signed an arbitration agreement that included a class action waiver. After she left Viking, she sued under PAGA alleging that she had not received her final wages in a timely way but she also brought numerous PAGA claims on behalf of other current and former employees. Viking moved to compel arbitration of Moriana's claim brought on her own behalf and to dismiss her PAGA claims. The California courts refused to do so, relying on Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, in which California Supreme Court held that waivers of the right to bring "representative" PAGA claims violate public policy and are invalid. The specific issue in Moriana is which of her claims count as "representative."
As we have covered in earlier posts, the Supreme Court issued a number of pro-arbitration decisions, starting with Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen in 2010. The upshot of those and other cases was that courts must enforce class action waivers in arbitration agreements on the ground that "a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.” Viking, citing those cases, argued that California courts cannot rely on Iskanian to force them into class litigation to which they have not consented. The Court rejected that argument, because a PAGA claim is not a class claim. It is a claim brought on behalf of one party, the state, via a proxy.
Still there is a problem, from the perspective of the Court's decisions interpreting the FAA as requiring enforcement of class-action waivers in employment agreements. Iskanian does not permit the division of PAGA claims into individual actions (e.g., Moriana's claim brought on her own behalf) and non-individual claims (e.g., her claims brought on behalf of other current and former Viking employees). Justice Alito resolves the tension between the FAA and Iskanian using the severability provision in Viking's arbitration agreement. That agreement is invalid under Iskanian to the extent that it seeks to preclude Moriana's non-individual PAGA claims. However, she must arbitrate her individual PAGA claim.
As they did with their SMUGLER episode a few weeks back, Will Baude and Dan Epps' Divided Argument has again provided some helpful insights about the toughest aspects of the Moriana case in their COBRA episode. Justice Alito cannot cut through the Gordian knot that the case presents. PAGA claims must be brought by an "aggrieved employee." Once Moriana's individual claims are severed from her non-individual claims, she has no statutory standing to bring her non-individual claims, because she is not "aggrieved" by Viking's alleged misconduct that did not affect her. Not sure where to go from there, Justice Alito remands the case for "further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." Sucks to be that court.
Justice Sotomayor offers a little help in her concurrence. One option is that the California courts can offer a different interpretation of PAGA, perhaps somehow allowing non-individual PAGA claims to be brought after they have been severed from individual claims subject to arbitration. I'm not sure how they get there. The other option is that the state legislature can permit people other than "aggrieved workers" to bring PAGA claims. That seems like the more workable solution, if the California legislature has the will to actually fix a faulty statute.
And then comes the fun stuff. Justice Barrett wrote a concurrence, joined in full by Justice Kavanaugh. She joined only in Part III of Justice Alito's majority opinion. In her view, PAGA is just another means of aggregating claims, and those are all barred under the FAA if there is an arbitration agreement with a class action waiver. Stolt-Nielsen is right so let's compel arbitration. That's all the Court really needed to say. As to Parts II and IV, she wrote the following: "The discussion in Parts II and IV of the Court’s opinion is unnecessary to the result, and much of it addresses disputed state-law questions as well as arguments not pressed or passed upon in this case." Chief Justice Roberts joined up to there. Then, she dropped a footnote, saying that the same was true of Part I. That was too much for the Chief apparently, and it's quite comical, because Part I lays out the facts of the case. Visions of the Marx brothers.
It seems like a snide dissent, but it might not be as bad as it looks. If she were writing for herself, she could have just said that she signs on to Part III and nothing more. But it's late in the term, and CJ Roberts didn't want to have to write a separate concurrence about how I and III are fine, so we get what looks like the ultimate mean girl footnote. Justice Alito? He doesn't even go here!
And finally, we get a lone dissent from Justice Thomas, who, as he has explained before, does not think the FAA applies in state courts.
On the whole, this strikes me as progress. I would have predicted a 6-3 court reasoning along Justice Barrett's lines. At best, even if this case came through a federal court, she only has four votes. The Court seems willing to allow the people of California to rein in limitations on representative actions, and that seems to me a very good thing given the ubiquity of contracts of adhesion and gross disparities of bargaining power in the world of employment law.
June 30, 2022 in Recent Cases, Travel | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, June 28, 2022
Tuesday Top Ten - Contracts & Commercial Law Downloads for June 28, 2022
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Contracts & Commercial Law eJournalRecent Top Papers (60 days)
As of: 29 Apr 2022 - 28 Jun 2022Rank | Paper | Downloads |
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1. | 848 | |
2. | 187 | |
3. | 167 | |
4. | 120 | |
5. | 119 | |
6. | 111 | |
7. | 83 | |
8. | 73 | |
9. | 72 | |
10. | 70 |
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Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournalRecent Top Papers (60 days)
As of: 29 Apr 2022 - 28 Jun 2022Rank | Paper | Downloads |
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1. | 119 | |
2. | 70 | |
3. | 65 | |
4. | 48 | |
5. | 46 | |
6. | 45 | |
7. | 44 | |
8. | 32 | |
9. | 29 | |
10. | 27 |
June 28, 2022 in Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, June 27, 2022
At It Again: The First Amendment and Contracts
This week, I am putting the finishing touches on a law review article that grew out of this blog post. The article is the first in a planned series of articles in which I attempt to channel Jamal Greene's How Rights Went Wrong and argue that First Amendment rights are not absolute and that contractual rights and interests should also play a role in adjudication of constitutional disputes. I think our current First Amendment jurisprudence provides too much protection for dumb speech and thus renders insipid the values that the Constitution is supposed to protect. In short, I'm a jerk who doesn't support free speech.
But not really. I favor full-throated protection of political speech, and the Eighth Circuit has provided me a chance to prove it! The case is Arkansas Times, LP v. Waldrip. The Court, sitting en banc, upheld Arkansas Act 710 (Act 710), which requires that contractors seeking to work with the state provide a certification that they will not participate in a boycott of Israel. All parties seeking contracts with the state in excess of $1000 must provide a certification. If contractors refuse to file a certification, they can only be awarded a contract if their bid is 20% lower than the lowest certifying business. The Arkansas Times challenged the certification on First Amendment grounds, and I would have sided with the Arkansas Times, as did lone dissenter, Judge Jane Kelly.
In N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), the Supreme Court found that the state violated the First Amendment when it prohibited peaceful political activity, such as that involved in the NAACP's boycott of businesses owned by whites. The Arkansas Times argued that Claiborne governed its case.
Arkansas instead relied on Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 (2006), in which the Court held that First Amendment protection does not extend to non-expressive conduct. In FAIR, law schools denied military recruiters access to their campuses to protest the "don't ask, don't tell" policy. Congress responded with the Solomon Act, denying federal funds to schools that closed their campuses to military recruiters. In a baffling bit a sophistry, the unanimous court found that the First Amendment was not implicated in the law schools' challenge to the Solomon Amendment because the law schools' message was too unclear. Conduct that needs to be explained to a neutral observer in order for its political content to be understood gets no First Amendment protection.
Guess what! The Eight Circuit, sitting en banc, found that contractors that refuse to sign Act 710 certifications engaged in non-expressive conduct. The boycotts at issue in Act 710 are nothing like the boycotts at issue in Claiborne! It somehow reaches that conclusion not by looking into the possible messages business send by joining in boycotts of Israel but at the language and legislative history of Act 710.
Under Arkansas’s canons of statutory interpretation, we think the Arkansas Supreme Court would read Act 710 as prohibiting purely commercial, nonexpressive conduct. It does not ban Arkansas Times from publicly criticizing Israel, or even protesting the statute itself. It only prohibits economic decisions that discriminate against Israel. Because those commercial decisions are invisible to observers unless explained, they are not inherently expressive and do not implicate the First Amendment.
This makes sense only in a world in which one could look at Mr. Cohen's "Fuck the Draft" jacket or at other protestors from that era burning their draft cards (or bras) and think, "How odd! I wonder what these gestures are supposed to convey! Oh well, unless they explain them to me, I guess I'll never know." And really, what boycott sends a clear message? When I see a protest, the first thing I do is walk up to someone with a sign (the slogans are often opaque) and ask, "What's going on here? Why are you protesting." The FAIR test is not just unfair. It's absurd.
In any case, Judge Kelly's dissent makes mincemeat of the majority's selective account of the legislative intent, which was clearly directed at expressive conduct. "[T]he Act implicates the First Amendment rights of speech, assembly, association, and petition recognized to be constitutionally protected boycott activity."
But wait, what of the compelled speech that the certification entails? Well, that's just incidental to the permissible regulation of non-expressive conduct. Nobody is holding a gun to the would-be contractors' heads. They don't have to sign anything. It's just that if they don't certify their love for Israel, they can't compete for a state contract. Even I, who thinks our First Amendment jurisprudence is dumb, can see that Arkansas main goal is not commercial regulation but to use its economic power (the power of contracts!) to chill free expression.
An aside. Act 710, like its counterparts in other states, defines “boycott of Israel” to include any actions "intended to limit commercial relations with Israel, or persons or entities doing business in Israel or in Israeli-controlled territories . . . ” (emphasis added). The "Israeli-controlled territories" are not Israel. If they were, then there would be 5.3 million Palestinians entitled to Israeli citizenship. That ain't happening. The "Israeli-controlled territories" are occupied territories. Boycotting the occupation is not a boycott of Israel. These state acts punish entities not for boycotting Israel but for boycotting the occupation. There's a huge difference. Ask Ben & Jerry's, which is subject to divestment actions by Arkansas and other states for its refusal to sell its products in the occupied territories. But Ben & Jerry's has remained committed to selling its products in Israel.
The inclusion of the language about the "Israeli-controlled territories" is, in my view, conclusive proof that Act 710 is not an economic measure. It is a political measure and compelled compliance with the state's political stance on the Israeli occupation violates the First Amendment. Even if I did not think Act 710 violated the First Amendment, I would still find it preposterous that any U.S. state would blur the lines between support for Israel and support of the occupation.
June 27, 2022 in Commentary, Current Affairs, Government Contracting, In the News, Recent Cases, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, June 22, 2022
This Is How We Will Get to Mars
According to The New York Times, SpaceX has confirmed that it has fired employees who circulated an open letter critical of SpaceX's Dear Leader, Elon Musk. The letter complained that Mr. Musk was a "frequent source of distraction and embarrassment." It is not entirely clear what action the company was being asked to take in response. A time out? No screens?
Apparently, no earnest but perhaps not-thought-through strategy goes unpunished in a company run by the leading proponent of unbridled free speech and chaining workers to their desks. The president and chief operating officer of SpaceX, Gwynne Shotwell (left), explained the decision to terminate the employees as follows:
The letter, solicitations and general process made employees feel uncomfortable, intimidated and bullied, and/or angry because the letter pressured them to sign onto something that did not reflect their views. . . . We have too much critical work to accomplish and no need for this kind of overreaching activism.
She went on to encourage SpaceX's remaining employees to focus on their mission. "This is how we will get to Mars," she implored them. What a fantastic sentence! It didn't even have an exclamation mark after it. It's just an ordinary thing you say, like "That's how you get to the nearest Starbucks." Exclamation points are for doubters. For people who acknowledge that doubts are a thing. I am going to incorporate that line into every pep talk I deliver to my students, and I'm not going to exclaim it; I'm just going to say it and walk away.
Ms. Shotwell has stated that SpaceX anticipates sending a manned crew to Mars by the end of the decade. You might think that a bit ambitious, but that is not the sort of thinking that will get us to Mars. Once SpaceX has sent a crew to Mars, she continued, "within five or six years, people will see that that will be a real place to go." Yes, Mars. A real place to go. That is exactly what I will be thinking in 2035 or so. Why should we have to wait that long, you might think? Well, I assume, that after we get to Mars, we also have to be able to get back from Mars. But frankly, come to think of it, Ms. Shotwell never said, "This is how we will get back from Mars." And she's right to leave that part out. If I ended my pep talks for my students with "This is how we will get back from Mars," that might confuse them and then they wouldn't be focused on our mission.
June 22, 2022 in Commentary, In the News, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, June 21, 2022
Tuesday Top Ten - Contracts & Commercial Law Downloads for June 21, 2022
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Contracts & Commercial Law eJournalRecent Top Papers (60 days)
As of: 22 Apr 2022 - 21 Jun 2022Rank | Paper | Downloads |
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1. | 776 | |
2. | 142 | |
3. | 110 | |
4. | 108 | |
5. | 105 | |
6. | 89 | |
7. | 81 | |
8. | 71 | |
9. | 68 | |
10. | 68 |
Top Downloads For:
Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournalRecent Top Papers (60 days)
As of: 22 Apr 2022 - 21 Jun 2022Rank | Paper | Downloads |
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1. | 105 | |
2. | 89 | |
3. | 68 | |
4. | 63 | |
5. | 50 | |
6. | 48 | |
7. | 46 | |
8. | 43 | |
9. | 38 | |
10. | 32 |
June 21, 2022 in Recent Scholarship | Permalink
The Future of Unions
Although this blog has a category called "Labor Contracts," we rarely use it. Labor unions have long been in decline, and there just haven't been many labor contracts to discuss outside of the context of collective bargaining in professional sports. Perhaps the tide has turned.
Over the weekend, The New York Times featured a story about Jaz Brisack, a Rhodes Scholar who decided that the best use of her time and talents was to become a union organizer and so she took a job as a Starbuck's barista. Hers was the first Starbucks-owned store to unionize; 150 others have since followed suit, and 275 have filed paperwork to hold elections. The are two unionized Starbucks shops in my fair city, Oklahoma City! I don't always drink Starbuck's Coffee, but when I do, I will henceforth prefer to purchase it at 36th & May or 23rd and Robinson!
It is such a great story, and it is an exciting moment in the history of the labor movement. The long slide in the percentage of the work force in labor unions seems to have stalled. There are even some signs of growth, such as this story about the first Apple Store to unionize.
Let us hope for a future when Americans are outraged that there are billionaires and not by a mandatory living wage for hourly workers.
June 21, 2022 in About this Blog, Current Affairs, In the News, Labor Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, June 15, 2022
Contracts Issues and the January 6th Hearings
The House Committee investigating the events of January 6th is pushing a breach of contract or fraud claim. We are surprised, because we thought we already covered these issues, but apparently, we merely broke the story, and there is more digging to be done.
Already in December, we reported in this post about Fred Eshelman's suit seeking to recover $2.5 million from the Trump-affiliated True the Vote. Then in April, Nancy Kim reported on the Trump campaign's recurring charges strategy here. But there's more.
According to this report in The New York Times, committee member Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Democrat of California (right), is seeking to establish that Mr. Trump’s campaign and its allies used claims of election fraud to raise $250 million, purportedly for the purpose of pursing litigation to challenge the election. At the time they raised the money, however, the campaign and its allies knew that there was no evidence of actionable voter fraud. What allegations of fraud existed were either, in the considered opinion of Attorney General Bill Barr (left), "bullshit," or they were trivial instances that would not have come close to affecting the outcome of the election in any of the crucial five states where the election was close(ish) and Mr. Trump lost. Ms. Lofgren thus alleges a "big rip-off" that was the partner to the "big lie." Or who knows? Perhaps the theory is that the big lie was just a stratagem to fuel the big rip-off.
The House Committee has apparently determined that the Trump campaign and its allies raised nearly $250 million through representations that those funds would go to an "election defense fund." The fund did not exist, and the funds went to other purposes, including "a $1 million donation to the personal foundation of Mr. Trump’s chief of staff, Mark Meadows, and $204,857 to Trump hotels."
The Times suggests that Ms. Lofgren and the Committee are pursuing a dual strategy. First, they hope that even Mr. Trump's most loyal supporters will jump off the Trump train when they learn that their donations have been misappropriated. That seems unlikely. It's almost as if Ms. Lofgren were unaware that she is engaged in a partisan witch-hunt animated by her resentment of American greatness and her insatiable ambition to govern on behalf of woke capitalism, critical race theory and the LGBTQ+ agenda. She must also not know that Bill Barr is a RINO loser who was a terrible Attorney General and has had no credibility with Trump supporters since the day he said he could find no evidence of systemic voter fraud. In the alternative, the Committee may hope to excite some DoJ interest in pursuing criminal charges against Mr. Trump and his allies for the fraudulent fundraising schemes. That also seems pretty unlikely.
Mother Jones provides an excellent update on Mr. Eshelman's law suit against True the Vote here. A trial court dismissed the claim, saying it was in the purview of Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton. Gulp. Mr. Eshelman has appealed. As to the recurring charges scam that the Trump campaign was running, the New York Times reported that the Trump campaign refunded nearly 11% of what it raised. Apparently, people who felt they were defrauded by the campaign had a ready remedy. As to those who did not seek a refund despite ample evidence that the election was lost and that donations would not be used to pursue litigation, do they want a remedy?
June 15, 2022 in Commentary, Current Affairs, In the News | Permalink | Comments (3)
Tuesday, June 14, 2022
Tuesday Top Ten - Contracts & Commercial Law Downloads for June 14, 2022
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Contracts & Commercial Law eJournalRecent Top Papers (60 days)
As of: 15 Apr 2022 - 14 Jun 2022Rank | Paper | Downloads |
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1. | 1,174 | |
2. | 596 | |
3. | 574 | |
4. | 118 | |
5. | 107 | |
6. | 106 | |
7. | 80 | |
8. | 78 | |
9. | 76 | |
10. | 73 |
Top Downloads For:
Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournalRecent Top Papers (60 days)
As of: 15 Apr 2022 - 14 Jun 2022Rank | Paper | Downloads |
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1. | 80 | |
2. | 76 | |
3. | 62 | |
4. | 58 | |
5. | 53 | |
6. | 48 | |
7. | 45 | |
8. | 39 | |
9. | 39 | |
10. | 35 |
June 14, 2022 in Recent Scholarship | Permalink
SCOTUS Misses Another Opportunity to Address Contracts Issues
A mild case of COVID has given me even more opportunity than usual to indulge my taste for podcasts. I was catching up with Will Baude and Dan Epps' Divided Argument episode, SMUGLER, when a contracts issue unexpectedly arose.
In 1971, the Supreme Court recognized an implied right of action to bring a claim against a federal officer for violation of federal constitutional rights in Bivens v. Six Unkown Fed'l Narcotics Agents. The podcast hosts were discussing Egbert v. Boule, a case in which the Court, once again, refused to extend the Bivens remedy to a new factual situation, even though, as Dan Epps pointed out, this factual situation involved a 4th Amendment violation, precisely the factual situation that gave rise to the original Bivens action. Will Baude remarked that, while there is a doctrinal test for determining whether Bivens applies, if you apply that test and think the answer is yes, you need to check your work. Since the 1980s, the answer to the question of whether a Bivens remedy is available has always been no.
The facts of Egbert v. Boule are interesting and bizarre. Robert Boule, whose Washington State property actually extends five feet into Canada, marketed his home as a bed and breakfast called "The Smuggler's Inn." True to that name, Mr. Boule's establishment regularly served as a refuge for illegal cross-border traffic, including narcotics trafficking. He had, at times, acted as a confidential informant, for which the government paid him in excess of $60,000. Mr. Boule offered a service to people seeking illegal transit across the border. He would pick them up in Washington State and drive them to the border, charging $100-150/hour for his time. He would also charge them for one night's stay in The Smuggler's Inn, whether or not they indeed stayed overnight. The accommodations are reproduced in the opinion (and below). Justice Thomas includes the image in his majority opinion in order to show why Defendant Agent Egbert had grounds to suspect that Mr. Boule's Turkish client had not traveled from Turkey through New York to Washington State because he had read rave reviews of The Smuggler's Inn on TripAdvisor.
As he neared the border, Mr. Boule would then contact the authorities, who would arrest Mr. Boule's clients. As Justice Thomas dryly notes in his majority opinion, "Boule would decline to offer his erstwhile customers a refund. In his view, this practice was 'nothing any different than [the] normal policies of any hotel/motel.'” Will Baude picks up on this and mentions that the case he would really like to see is the one where one of Boule's clients sues for breach of contract. Will, you are not alone.
That case would be interesting, I think. I don't know if this would be a case of an illegal contract. If so, of course, the court could not intervene on behalf of either party but would leave them as it found them. It might, however, refer the matter to prosecutors, leaving the parties somewhat worse off than they started. The court in question would not be the Supreme Court but a state court, and thus Divided Argument does not consider the contracts issue.
Perhaps this would be a case where the illegal components of the contract can be disentangled from the legal components. Mr. Boule is charging for his time, for transportation services, and for lodgings. There is nothing illegal about any of that. Mr. Boule could defend himself on the ground that he had provided precisely the services he contracted for, at least insofar as he provided transportation. As to the overnight lodging, as the quotation above makes clear, Mr. Boule's view is that hotels and motels routinely charge people whether or not those people actually lodge overnight. They charge for taking the reservation and, we hope, for holding it. The tough and interesting part of the case would be the challenge plaintiffs' attorneys would face in attempting to thread the needle so as to argue that their clients were fraudulently induced into accepting Mr. Boule's services without conceding the illegality underlying the entire transaction.
But the Court was not concerned with such quotidian matters. For whatever reason, when Agent Egbert confronted Mr. Boule and his Turkish client, Mr. Boule refused to cooperate. Agent Egbert allegedly responded with excessive force. Later, after Mr. Boule filed a grievance and an administrative claim against Agent Egbert, the latter allegedly retaliated against Mr. Boule in various ways that violated the First Amendment. In a predictable 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court denied Mr. Boule's Bivens action because the conservative majority denies all Bivens actions. Only Justice Gorsuch had the intellectual honesty to separately concur. He observed that the case was not meaningfully distinguishable from Bivens, and he called upon the Court to stop the charade and overrule Bivens.
June 14, 2022 in Commentary, Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, June 13, 2022
GEICO to Pay $5.2 Million to Woman Who Contracted STD in Insured's Car
Last week, a Missouri court of appeals decided M.O. v. GEICO, upholding a $5.2 million arbitral award to M.O. who contracted human papillomavirus (HPV) while having unprotected sex with GEICO's insured (Insured) in Insured's car. M.O. filed a claim with GEICO, and an arbiter awarded her $5.2 million. When M.O. tried to have that award enforced, GEICO intervened and challenged the award, alleging collusion fraud and undue means, and arguing that it had been denied a reasonable opportunity to defend its interests.
M.O. first offered to settle with GEICO for $1 million, but GEICO rejected that offer and denied coverage. GEICO then sought declaratory judgment in federal court. Meanwhile, M.O. proceeded with her arbitration. Prior to their arbitration, Insured and M.O. entered into an agreement pursuant to Missouri Statute Section 537.065, providing that neither party would appeal or seek to modify the arbitral award in any way.
The arbiter found that Insured knew that his throat cancer was HPV positive and that he therefore could transmit it through unprotected sex. The arbiter thus concluded that Insured was negligent and that the sex in Insured's car caused or contributed to M.O's infection.
Under the version Section 537.065 in force at the time, GEICO was entitled to notice that M.O. would be seeking to enforce the arbitral award. Upon notice, GEICO was entitled to intervene, which it did. However, that right of intervention entailed no right to review of the arbitral decision. As the court explained,
[W]hen GEICO intervened, liability and damages had already been determined and judgment had been entered. Rule 52.12 did not bestow upon GEICO the right to relitigate those issues, nor did it provide GEICO with a right to intervene prior to judgment.
GEICO argued that it was being unfairly denied its right to appeal under Missouri Statutes Section 435.405, which gives parties 90 days to seek to vacate an arbitral award. Unfortunately for GEICO, it was not a party to the arbitration at the time it sought to vacate the award, and so Section 435.405 did not apply.
Finally, GEICO alleged that it was denied its due process rights under the U.S. Constitution and the Missouri constitution because it never had an opportunity to litigate and defend its rights. The court flatly rejected this argument, as GEICO had passed on the chance to defend its when it denied coverage and refused to defend Insured. GEICO also filed its federal claim for declaratory judgment, which gives it a second opportunity to vindicate its rights.
The Missouri opinion does not address the grounds for finding that this incident was covered under Insured's policy. The key contractual language was that the damages incurred must arise from the "ordinary use of the vehicle.' The car in question, according to NPR, was a 2014 Hyundai Genesis. Ordinary use? NPR also suggests that a jury may address that question when it hears GEICO's declaratory judgment claim in October.
June 13, 2022 in Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (3)
Thursday, June 9, 2022
Weekend Frivolity: Oh, This Is Even Better than "No Vehicles"
What if Wittgenstein had come up with the "No vehicles in the park" hypothetical?
H/t Richard L. Jolly, via Stephen Mouritsen via Twitter.
June 9, 2022 in Miscellaneous | Permalink | Comments (2)
Wednesday, June 8, 2022
Another Unanimous SCOTUS Opinion Limiting Mandatory Arbitration
Still reeling from Justice Kagan's opinion for the unanimous Supreme Court last month limiting employers' ability to compel arbitration, such employers got hit again by another unanimous opinion (except that Justice Barrett was recused). This time the author is Justice Thomas, in Southwest Airlines v. Saxon. The issue was whether Saxon, a ramp supervisor for ❤️Southwest❤️, is exempt from arbitration provisions under § 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
According to § 1 of the FAA, workers who engage in foreign or interstate commerce are exempt from its provisions. Ms. Saxon's employment "requires her to load and unload baggage, airmail, and commercial cargo on and off airplanes that travel across the country." For that reason, the Court agreed with Ms. Saxon, and she cannot be compelled to arbitrate her claims.
The victory is a limited one. Ms. Saxon argued that because airlines engage in interstate commerce, all airline employees should be covered under § 1. The Court disagreed. Whether a worker is covered depends on the conduct in which that worker is required to engage. The Seventh Circuit had reserved judgment on whether Ms. Saxon, as a ramp supervisor, would be exempt had she been restricted to a supervisory role. However, the Seventh Circuit ruled that she was exempt from the FAA because she was personally required to load and unload aircraft. The Supreme Court agreed. It's a pretty simple case.
Because of the new fashion for textualism, Justice Thomas could not reach that pretty obvious conclusion without consulting a dictionary.
The word “workers” directs the interpreter’s attention to “the performance of work.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (emphasis altered); see also Webster’s New International Dictionary 2350 (1922) (Webster’s) (worker: “One that works”); Funk & Wagnall’s New Standard Dictionary 2731 (1913) (worker: “One who or that which performs work”). Further, the word “engaged”—meaning “[o]ccupied,” “employed,” or “[i]nvolved,” Webster’s 725; see also, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 661 (3d ed. 1933) (defining “engage”)—similarly emphasizes the actual work that the members of the class, as a whole, typically carry out. Saxon is therefore a member of a “class of workers” based on what she does at Southwest, not what Southwest does generally.
Goodness.
Justice Thomas performed a similar service, resorting to dictionaries in rejecting an argument from ❤️Southwest❤️ that people who load cargo onto airplanes that fly between states are engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. Yes, we need to look up "engaged" and "commerce," don't we? Ugh.
The opinion provides an extended discussion of the ejusdem generis canon of construction, on which both sides relied. This is perhaps not the best advertisement for the utility of the canons. The Court rejects both sides' ejusdem generis arguments, and it's generally not great when both sides rely on the same canon, but perhaps Karl Llewellyn would have a good chuckle over it.
It was nice to see Justice Thomas picking up on a theme from Justice Kagan's opinion from last month. In Concepcion and other cases, the Court relied on Congress's pro-arbitration purposes in giving expansive scope to employers' and vendors' abilities to impose mandatory arbitration on workers and consumers. In Morgan v. Sundance, Justice Kagan stressed that Congress's pro-arbitration purposes extends only far enough to make arbitration provisions every bit as enforceable as other contractual provisions, but no more so. Justice Thomas will not construe ambiguous language in the FAA to favor arbitration:
[W]e are not “free to pave over bumpy statutory texts in the name of more expeditiously advancing a policy goal.” New Prime, 586 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). Here, §1’s plain text suffices to show that airplane cargo loaders are exempt from the FAA’s scope, and we have no warrant to elevate vague invocations of statutory purpose over the words Congress chose.
Still confused about how class-action waivers fit into all of this, but that is a matter for another time.
This case could have afforded the perfect opportunity for a one-paragraph opinion, consisting of Justice Thomas's conclusion:
Latrice Saxon frequently loads and unloads cargo on and off airplanes that travel in interstate commerce. She therefore belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” to which §1’s exemption applies. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
What more is there to say, really?
Well, I'm glad ❤️Southwest❤️ lost, and I'm a bit disappointed in them for even trying to argue that § 1 should not apply to people who load cargo. But I still ❤️ Southwest. No fees for bags, no fees for changes, a sense of humor about itself, but most of all, a classless society.
I hope the reader found this blog post persuasive despite the fact that no dictionaries were consulted in its composition.
June 8, 2022 in Labor Contracts, Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, June 7, 2022
Tuesday Top Ten - Contracts & Commercial Law Downloads for June 7, 2022
This week, we revert to plain meaning for the Top Ten: Tuesday means Tuesday, and we will admit no extrinsic evidence to suggest otherwise! Enjoy this gathering of current top downloads on SSRN:
Top Downloads For:
Contracts & Commercial Law eJournalRecent Top Papers (60 days)
As of: 08 Apr 2022 - 07 Jun 2022Rank | Paper | Downloads |
---|---|---|
1. | 1,147 | |
2. | 563 | |
3. | 552 | |
4. | 181 | |
5. | 102 | |
6. | 102 | |
7. | 86 | |
8. | 80 | |
9. | 74 | |
10. | 71 |
Top Downloads For:
Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournalRecent Top Papers (60 days)
As of: 08 Apr 2022 - 07 Jun 2022Rank | Paper | Downloads |
---|---|---|
1. | 181 | |
2. | 85 | |
3. | 80 | |
4. | 57 | |
5. | 57 | |
6. | 56 | |
7. | 56 | |
8. | 47 | |
9. | 45 | |
10. | 45 |
June 7, 2022 in Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)
A Dose of Reality about Reality Television
Every time I am in the gym, at least one of the television monitors is showing a show about home remodeling. This is a disease. I believe a steady dose of Stoic, or even Epicurean, philosophy might be a cure. Or perhaps some Eastern philosophy. Wanting material things is not the way to happiness. These television shows encourage us to want things that we likely will not get or to want things better than what we currently have. I prefer the life of the Cynic. Better to be satisfied with some water and a pot of lentils. This blog is my pot of lentils, but if I were to be stripped of it, I should make my way through life as an ordinary contracts prof.
But I could be wrong about much of this (add Skepticism to the mix). Still, as recounted in The New York Times, there are worse things than unfulfilled fantasies of white oak cabinetry, soapstone counters, a black slate backsplash, and a glass-enclosed shower, or a renovation that makes it possible to flip a house and make some money. Increasingly, participants in home renovation shows are suing production companies, alleging "fraud, misrepresentation and faulty workmanship," which leave homeowners with properties "riddled with code violations as well as safety and health hazards." We will never know the true extent of these problems, because all of these transactions are covered by sweeping non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). If you think NDAs are a good thing, I recommend watching Hulu's The Dropout.
On television, we see a couple meeting with some construction experts. They discuss various options, and the couple's excitement increases as they begin to imagine their home re-made. Then we see early scenes of demolition, usually played for comic effect, as the homeowners struggle to wield a sledgehammer, but sometimes played for dramatic effect, as when the homeowners discover mold behind some boards. Next comes the transformation, with the homeowners conveniently out of the way. Finally, there is the reveal, at which the homeowners flip cartwheels or engage in otherwise conspicuous displays of joy and gratitude. I mean, it's the gym, so the sound is off, but my impression is that these shows are about as formulaic as Dora the Explorer and Blues Clues.
In reality, the narrative is similarly fixed. The homeowners now claim that they were dissatisfied with the remodel, but they were contractually obligated to go through with the shoot. At this point, of course, the production company has them over the barrel. They were awarded a discount on labor and materials and had the advice of experts, but those baubles can be removed at the first sign of contractual breach. Then comes the lawsuit brought by the homeowners, alleging fraud and breach of contract, followed by the predictable counter-suit for breach of the NDA. The homeowners now claim that they were given very little time to review the contract and that its terms contradict things that they were told.
According to the Times, the scope of the NDAs can be extremely broad:
Nearly all contestants are required, when signing onto a program, to agree to a strict waiver that prevents them from speaking to the press or posting on social media, about not just the show itself, but also, according to one waiver reviewed by The New York Times, “any nonpublic information or trade secrets obtained or learned in connection with the program.”
Disputes between contractors and homeowners are not rare. In one case that is a focus of the Times story, Nevada has a process for resolving them short of litigation. The reality television shows weight the scales in favor of the contractors, however, because pursuing litigation now comes with the added threat of a countersuit for violation of the NDA. And in some cases, the homeowners face claims not only for violation of the NDA, but for libel, slander, and product disparagement.
June 7, 2022 in In the News, Television, True Contracts | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, June 6, 2022
Man Angered that He Got $300,000 for a Piece of Hideous Pop Art
In the latest story taking a chink out of the armor of NFTs, the New York Times reports that a hacker exploited a flaw in OpenSea's platform to purchase an NFT of a Bored Ape. The flaw reset the purchase price to a price from an earlier transaction involving the same NFT. As a result, Chris Chapman's virtual object sold for $300,000, rather than the $1 million that he was seeking. This is yet more evidence that this secure mode of exchange is not secure.
According to the Times, the glitch that allowed a hacker to make off with Mr. Chapman's ape has forced the company to pay out $6 million to NFT traders. Mr. Chapman is still seeking compensation and reportedly rejected OpenSea's first offer of $30,000. I'm not sure who holds the cards here. NFT sales have dropped by 90 percent since September. Can we hope for a day when Bored Apes are about as valuable as Beanie Babies?
But there's more. There is a widespread problem of hackers using phishing scams to swipe NFTs. You can listen to one such story here. According to the Times, OpenSea has been slow to freeze the accounts of such hackers, allowing the platform to profit from trafficking in stolen goods, as OpenSea takes a 2.5% cut each time an NFT is sold on its site.
Still, the crypto enthusiasts howl, there is nothing safer or more secure than the blockchain. It's an electronic ledger! Surely a tool as boring as a ledger is too nerdy to become a tool for massive fraud. And yet, the Times also reports that OpenSea is awash in "plagiarized" "art." So, not secure, not reliable. Why does every story about NFTs seem like it is, at best, only a few mouse clicks away from criminality?
I use scare quotes above because an NFT is just code. Owning an NFT does not convey intellectual property rights, as Juliet Moringiello and Chris Odinet have explained. Often, the NFT is a digital copy of an original object, and owning the NFT conveys no ownership of the original. In this context, it is not clear what it means to call something "plagiarized," but I suppose what it means is that people generate fake NFTs of "valuable" NFTs and then sell them as if they were the "valuable" NFTs, and here the only problem is that NFTs should not be valuable. Or, at least, the NFTs that are valuable, especially the Naked Ape series, are really bad art. Hence "art."
OpenSea is trying to up its game. It is freezing listings of stolen NFTs and screening for "plagiarized" content. C'mon. It's the Internet. The NFT pirates will leave the open sea and find smooth sailing in a less regulated cove, inlet, or electronic bay. And then OpenSea will lose its edge and there will be a new platform that will go through the same cycle and then the next and the next, until we all grow up or just grow tired and move on to the next thing.
June 6, 2022 in Conferences, Current Affairs, In the News, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, June 3, 2022
New Journal of Law Teaching and Learning
We bring you news from the world of law publishing:
The Institute for Law Teaching and Learning is thrilled to be launching a new scholarly journal. The Journal of Law Teaching and Learning will publish scholarly articles about pedagogy and will provide authors with rigorous peer review. We hope to publish our first issue in Fall 2023.
If you have a scholarly article that might fit the needs of The Journal of Law Teaching and Learning, please consider submitting it directly to us via email at [email protected] or through the Scholastica platform.
June 3, 2022 in Law Schools, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, June 2, 2022
Tesla's Motion to Compel Arbitration Denied
This is probably not Elon Musk's top concern these days, but last week a California court denied his company's motion to compel arbitration in a case involving a Tesla worker who alleges in her complaint "nightmarish conditions of rampant sexual harassment" at the company. Jessica Barazza alleges that she experienced a "pervasive culture of sexual harassment, which includes a daily barrage of sexist language and behavior, including frequent groping on the factory floor." She claims that she complained to managers and the company human resources department about what she described as a "frat house" environment, but the company failed to protect her.
At this point in the proceedings, Tesla is simply trying to get the case dismissed and sent to arbitration. Ms. Barazza claims that Tesla's arbitration agreement with her is unenforceable due to procedural and substantive unconscionability. The alleged ground for substantive unconscionability is the agreement's one-sidedness. Ms. Barazza must arbitrate its claims against Tesla, but Tesla can sue her. The procedural unconscionability relates to the take-it-or-leave it nature of Ms. Barazza's employment agreement.
According to Bloomberg.com, Alameda County Judge Stephen Kaus agreed with Ms. Barazza, finding that Tesla's arbitration agreement was unconscionable and denying Tesla's motion to compel arbitration. Judge Kaus's key procedural finding was the Telsa did not present Ms. Barazza with the arbitration agreement until she had already quit her previous job in expectation of starting work at Tesla.
New federal legislation bars employers from requiring arbitration of sexual harassment claims, but that law did not apply to claims that arose prior to its enactment.
June 2, 2022 in Current Affairs, In the News, Labor Contracts, Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, June 1, 2022
(Quasi) Tuesday Top Ten - Contracts & Commercial Law Downloads for June 1, 2022
The "Tuesday" Top Ten returns after a short stint away—one that regrettably included, well, yesterday's Tuesday. Undaunted by such gossamer constraints as contractual plain meaning, the blog declares today to be quasi-Tuesday. Enjoy the latest, courtesy of our friends at SSRN:
Top Downloads For:
Contracts & Commercial Law eJournalRecent Top Papers (60 days)
As of: 02 Apr 2022 - 01 Jun 2022Rank | Paper | Downloads |
---|---|---|
1. | 1,139 | |
2. | 543 | |
3. | 511 | |
4. | 316 | |
5. | 242 | |
6. | 235 | |
7. | 181 | |
8. | 104 | |
9. | 100 | |
10. | 98 |
Top Downloads For:
Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournalRecent Top Papers (60 days)
As of: 02 Apr 2022 - 01 Jun 2022Rank | Paper | Downloads |
---|---|---|
1. | 181 | |
2. | 83 | |
3. | 78 | |
4. | 64 | |
5. | 58 | |
6. | 56 | |
7. | 55 | |
8. | 49 | |
9. | 49 | |
10. | 49 |
June 1, 2022 in Recent Scholarship | Permalink
A Dream UCC Article 2 Hypo
According to UCC, § 2-105(1), a good is anything "which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale." So here, my friends, courtesy of The New York Times, is the hypo of a lifetime.
According to The Times, the developer of a 46-story building hoisted the Beaux Arts Palace Theater (above, in 1913) 30 feet in the air in order to make room for three floors of shopping space. The repurposing of the space is a much more cost-effective use of the property, which is on Times Square.
The hypo runs as follows. First we have to ask the question: how do you move a 14 million pound, 1700 seat, landmark protected theater? The answer: very slowly. It took months to complete the process. So imagine if, during that time, the theater had been sold. Would that sale be governed by Article 2?
Don't like my hypo? How about the earlier case of the Empire Theater (above, in 1912), which in 1998 was placed on rollers and moved 170 feet up the street? A good?
June 1, 2022 in Current Affairs, In the News, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (4)