Tuesday, June 30, 2020

SCOTUS Holds Free Exercise Clause Bars Application of State's No-Aid to Religious Institutions Clause in State Constitution

In its opinion in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue regarding a state tax credit scheme for student scholarships, the majority held that the scheme must be afforded to religious schools so that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated.

Recall that the Montana Supreme Court held that the tax credit program's application to religious schools was unconstitutional under its state constitution, Art. X §6 , which prohibits aid to sectarian schools. This type of no-aid provision is often referred to as (or similar to) a Blaine Amendment and frequently appears in state constitutions. 

In a closely-divided decision, the Court decided that the Montana Supreme Court's decision that the tax credit program could not be extended to religious schools should be subject to struct scrutiny under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and did not survive. (The Court therefore stated it need not reach the equal protection clause claims). The Court essentially found that this case was more like Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer (2017) (involving playground resurfacing) and less like Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), in which the Court upheld State of Washington statutes and constitutional provisions that barred public scholarship aid to post-secondary students pursuing a degree in theology. The Court distinguishes Locke v. Davey as pertaining to what Davey proposed "to do" (become a minister) and invoking a "historic and substantial” state interest in not funding the training of clergy. Instead, the Court opined that like Trinity Lutheran, Esponiza "turns expressly on religious status and not religious use."

The Court's opinion, by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, is relatively compact at 22 pages.  In addition to taking time to distinguish Locke v. Davey, the opinion devotes some discussion to federalism, invoking the Supremacy Clause and Marbury v. Madison in its final section. But the opinion also engages with the dissenting Justices' positions in its text and its footnotes. Along with the concurring opinions, the overall impression of Espinoza is a fragmented Court, despite the carefully crafted majority opinion.

The concurring opinion of Thomas — joined by Gorsuch — reiterates Thomas's view that the Establishment Clause should not apply to the states; the original meaning of the clause was to prevent the federal establishment of religion while allowing states to establish their own religions. While this concurring opinion criticizes the Court's Establishment Clause opinions, it does not confront why a state constitution would not be free to take an anti-establishment position.

Gorsuch also wrote separately, seemingly to emphasize that the record contained references to religious use (exercise) and not simply religious status. Gorsuch did not discuss the federalism issues he stressed in his opinion released yesterday in June Medical Services.

Alito's thirteen page concurring opinion is an exegesis on the origins of the Montana constitutional provision as biased. Alito interestingly invokes his dissenting opinion in Ramos v. Louisiana decided earlier this Term in which he argued that the original motivation of a state law should have no bearing on its present constitutionality: "But I lost, and Ramos is now precedent. If the original motivation for the laws mattered there, it certainly matters here." 
(Noteworthy perhaps is that Roberts joined Alito's dissenting opinion in Ramos and Roberts's opinion in Esponiza does spend about 3 pages discussing the Blaine amendments' problematical history, but apparently this was insufficient for Alito).

Ginsburg's dissenting opinion, joined by Kagan, pointed to an issue regarding the applicability of the Court's opinion:

By urging that it is impossible to apply the no-aid provision in harmony with the Free Exercise Clause, the Court seems to treat the no-aid provision itself as unconstitutional.  Petitioners, however, disavowed a facial First Amendment challenge, and the state courts were never asked to address the constitutionality of the no- aid provision divorced from its application to a specific government benefit.

Breyer, joined in part by Kagan, essentially argued that the majority gave short-shrift to Locke v. Davey and its "play-in-the-joints" concept authored by Rehnquist as expressing the relationship between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Breyer's opinion is almost as long as the majority opinion, and the majority takes several opportunities to express its disagreement with Breyer, including in a two paragraph discussion, his implicit departure from precedent (e.g., "building on his solo opinion in Trinity Lutheran").

Sotomayor's dissent, also criticized by the majority in text, argues that the Court is "wrong to decide the case at all" and furthermore decides it wrongly.  The Court's reframing incorrectly addressed (or seemingly addressed?) whether the longstanding state constitutional provision was constitutional. Thus, she argues, the Court has essentially issued an advisory opinion.  On the merits, she contends, "the Court’s answer to its hypothetical question is incorrect." She concludes that the majority's ruling is "perverse" because while the Court once held that "the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs,” it now departs from that balanced view.

The Court's opinion is much more divided than it seems at first blush. And the future of state constitutional provisions that prohibit taxpayer money from being used to support religious institutions remains in doubt.

 

June 30, 2020 in Courts and Judging, Equal Protection, Establishment Clause, Federalism, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Opinion Analysis, State Constitutional Law, Supreme Court (US), Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, January 9, 2020

Daily Read: NYC Bar Asks Congress to Scrutinize Attorney General

In a six page letter, the New York City Bar Association urged Congress to "commence formal inquiries into a pattern of conduct by Attorney General William P. Barr that threatens public confidence in the fair and impartial administration of justice." 

The bar association letter discusses four specific instances of public comments that were inconsistent with the duties of the Attorney General

to act impartially, to avoid even the appearance of partiality and impropriety, and to avoid manifesting bias, prejudice, or partisanship in the exercise of official responsibilities are bedrock obligations for government lawyers. In the context of pending investigations, government lawyers also are obliged to be circumspect in their public statements and to avoid prejudging the outcomes of those investigations.

The letter also remarks that the specific "comments follow and are reminiscent of Mr. Barr’s earlier mischaracterizations of the Mueller Report, prior to his release of a redacted version of it, in which Mr. Barr claimed the special counsel had found insufficient evidence of any obstruction of justice by President Trump—a material mischaracterization of the Mueller Report and a proposition rejected by more than 1,000 former federal prosecutors based on the facts set forth in the Mueller Report."

In brief, the four instances are:

  • On October 11, 2019, in an invitation-only speech at the University of Notre Dame, Mr. Barr launched a partisan attack against “so called ‘progressives’” for supposedly waging a “campaign to destroy the traditional moral order.”
  • On November 15, 2019, in a speech at the Federalist Society’s National Lawyers Convention, Mr. Barr again vilified “progressives” and “the Left” (characterizing as “the other side” those who “oppose this President”) in highly partisan terms.
  • On December 3, 2019, drawing from earlier remarks, Mr. Barr warned at a DOJ awards ceremony that “the American people have to . . . start showing, more than they do, the respect and support that law enforcement deserves,” and “if communities don’t give that support and respect, they might find themselves without the police protection they need.”
  • On December 10, 2019, in a television interview soon after DOJ’s Inspector General released a report finding no improper political motivation in the FBI’s commencement of a counterintelligence investigation into alleged ties between the Trump-Pence campaign and Russian officials in 2016, Mr. Barr publicly rejected the Inspector General’s findings, asserting instead that a separate ongoing investigation into the FBI’s actions that he personally had directed would likely reach a different conclusion.

The letter asks for Congressional oversight of Attorney General Barr because, in short,

In a troubling number of instances, Mr. Barr has spoken and acted in a manner communicating an impression that he views himself as serving as the Attorney General not for the entire nation, but more narrowly for certain segments of society—whether defined in terms of religion, ideology (his own “side,” to borrow the language of Mr. Barr’s Federalist Society speech) or party affiliation.

 

January 9, 2020 in Congressional Authority, Executive Authority, First Amendment, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 31, 2019

Daily Read: Lithwick on Kavanaugh

In commentary on Slate, Dahlia Lithwick assesses how or whether we should "turn the page" on the disturbing confirmation hearings of the newest SCOTUS Justice, Brett Kavanaugh.

She writes that two women Justices have  

hailed him as a mentor to his female clerks or as a collegial member of the Nine and urged us, in the case of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, to look to the future and turn the page. It is, of course, their actual job to get over it. They will spend the coming years doing whatever they can to pick off a vote of his, here and there, and the only way that can happen is through generosity and solicitude and the endless public performance of getting over it. I understand this.

 

As a Supreme Court reporter, I am also expected to afford the new justice that same generosity and solicitude. As a journalist, I am finding it hard to do. After all, he is a man who has already publicly condemned his critics to suffer his wrath for embarrassing him. He is a man who has promised that his doubters and detractors will “reap the whirlwind.”

Lithwick raises the question of what we "owe" to the newest Justice — and the Court and the judiciary — a year later.

 

 

October 31, 2019 in Courts and Judging, Gender, Supreme Court (US), Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 17, 2019

Arizona Supreme Court Finds Religious Exemption for Same-Sex Wedding Invitations Despite Nondiscrimination Ordinance

In lengthy and sharply divided opinion in Brush & Nib Studio v. City of Phoenix, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that a custom wedding invitation company and its proprietors have a right to refuse to express to make invitations for same-sex weddings under article 2, section 6 of the Arizona Constitution, providing that "Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right," as well as Arizona’s Free Exercise of Religion Act (“FERA”), A.R.S. § 41-1493.01. This right prevailed over the City of Phoenix’s Ordinance, as amended in 2013, which prohibits public accommodations from discriminating against persons based on their status in a “protected” group, which includes a person’s sexual orientation.  Phx., Ariz., City Code (“PCC”) § 18-4(B). As the majority made clear, however, its holding was " limited to Plaintiffs’ creation of custom wedding invitations that are materially similar to those contained in the record," and did not "recognize a blanket exemption from the Ordinance for all of Plaintiffs’ business operations," or reach the question of other wedding services. The court appended illustrative samples in the appendix (and see below).

NibThe opinion rests on the independent ground of the state constitution and is thus insulated from federal review (given that no other constitutional right is at issue). The majority notes that the free expression provision of the state constitution "by its terms" "provides broader protections for free speech than the First Amendment."

Nevertheless, the majority extensively relies upon United States Supreme Court cases.  The citations include the Court's 2018 opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, although in Masterpiece there was a conclusion that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, enforcing its state nondiscrimination statute, expressed hostility on the basis of religion in its adjudication of the case - an issue that is not raised by the multiple opinions in Brush & Nib. The majority traces some of the rationales in the Masterpiece arguments: finding that the same-sex wedding invitations with their art and calligraphy (like the cake-baking) is "art" and speech, and finding that nondiscrimination ordinance seeks to compel their speech in support of beliefs they do not hold, such as same-sex marriage. The majority thus applies strict scrutiny, holding that a nondiscrimination public accommodations law is not a compelling governmental interest, and that such laws target conduct rather than speech and it is therefore not narrowly tailored.

Three of the seven Justices of the Arizona Supreme Court dissented. The dissenting opinion that all three Justices joined found that  there was a tension between "our fundamental values of liberty and equality," but because "the interest in preventing discrimination is compelling, equality prevails when we are dealing with public accommodations such as businesses serving the public." The dissenters also argued that "the majority implausibly characterizes a commercially prepared wedding invitation as “pure speech” on the part of the business selling the product and discounts the compelling public interest in preventing discrimination against disfavored customers."

And while this case is not suitable for certiorari to the Supreme Court, this issue will most likely recur in Arizona given the majority's attempt to limit the decision and the sharp divisions on the court; just as it will be recurring elsewhere.

September 17, 2019 in First Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Religion, Sexual Orientation, State Constitutional Law, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 19, 2019

Daily Read: 1619 Project

The 1619 Project is a unique and accessible look at slavery in the United States — starting in 1619 — and its aftermath.

The muli-faceted project, developed and curated by Nikole Hannah-Jones, appeared as the Sunday New York Times magazine (download here) and is also available as an interactive magazine website. Moreover, the Pulitzer Center’s education team has created curricula from over 30 visual and written pieces from historians, journalists, playwrights, poets, authors, and artists from the project, and although primarily aimed at secondary education, it nevertheless contains a wealth of ideas that could be useful in law school classrooms and scholarship. 

Not suprisingly, the law runs throughout the pieces in the Project. There is an incredible section profiling Howard University School of Law students with their families and ancestors. 

Screen Shot 2019-08-19 at 2.05.09 PM

August 19, 2019 in Race, Scholarship, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 15, 2019

SCOTUS Theater Event NYC August 18

Theatrical Performance featuring readings from

Rucho v. Common Cause

Department of Commerce v. New York

&

Flowers v. Mississippi

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A panel discussion afterwards with Ari Ezra WaldmanPerry Grossman  &  Ruthann Robson
 
More info and benefit tix here

August 15, 2019 in Courts and Judging, Fourteenth Amendment, Supreme Court (US), Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 2, 2018

Daily Read: The President and Defamation on Twitter by McKechnie

Apropos of the defamation complaint filed by Stephanie Clifford a/k/a Stormy Daniels which we discussed here, an excellent read is the article @POTUS: Rethinking Presidential Immunity in the Time of Twitter by Professor Douglas McKenchnie  (United States Air Force Academy; pictured) published in the University of Miami Law Review.

Douglas_McKechnieMcKenchie's article, published in 2017, considers the President's use of Twitter.  McKenchie argues that malicious defamation falls outside the “outer perimeter” of official presidential duties and thus presidential immunity is inapplicable. 

This addresses a broader issue than whether a sitting president can be sued, but uses a number of doctrines - - -  presidential immunity; immunity for executive branch officials; the constitutional implications of defamation; and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition on government action motivated by animus - - - to support its conclusion.

Worth a read.

May 2, 2018 in Equal Protection, Executive Privilege, First Amendment, Scholarship, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 27, 2018

Daily Read: Janet Calvo on DACA and State Professional Licensing

Who needs a professional license? In California, anyone wishing to be an accountant, acupuncturist, cosmetologist, court reporter, bedding salesperson, landscape architect, pharmacist, teacher, real estate agent, pest control operator, or teacher, among many others. Yet the type of immigration status that should be a prerequisite for obtaining a state professional license has not been consistent, at least until California did implement a remedy. And in New York, with a different array of immigration regulations for professional licensing, a different type of remedy was eventually decided upon.

Delia_Boccardo_make-upIn her article Professional Licensing and Teacher Certification for Non-Citizens: Federalism, Equal Protection and a State’s Socio-Economic Interests, in Columbia Journal of Race and Law, Professor Janet Calvo analyzes the intersection of Equal Protection doctrine and the Tenth Amendment to argue that states have the constitutional responsibility as well as the constitutional power to remove immigration barriers to state licensing requirements. Distinguishing among categories of immigration status raises equal protection concerns and, as the Second Circuit has held, constitutional violations. Additionally, licensing is a traditional state function which Congress can regulate to some extent but not totally commandeer.

As Calvo argues, California and New York each took a unique path to solving the licensing issue, yet taken together, they offer a map to other states, organizations, and communities seeking to address similar problems.

 

March 27, 2018 in Equal Protection, Federalism, Fourteenth Amendment, Profiles in Con Law Teaching, Tenth Amendment, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 11, 2017

Daily Read: American Sociological Ass'n Takes Issue With CJ Roberts

 In an open letter to Chief Justice Roberts, the President of the American Sociological Association, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, responded to the Roberts's comment during the Gill v. Whitford oral argument that social science data regarding partisan gerrymandering was "sociological gobbledygook." 

After noting that during the oral argument "Justices Kagan and Sotomayor subsequently expressed concern about your statement and spoke to the value of social science measures," President Bonilla-Silva continued:

In an era when facts are often dismissed as “fake news,” we are particularly concerned about a person of your stature suggesting to the public that scientific measurement is not valid or reliable and that expertise should not be trusted.  What you call “gobbledygook” is rigorous and empirical.  The following are just a few examples of the contributions of sociological research to American society that our members offered in response to your comment:

  • Clear evidence that separate is not equal
  • Early algorithms for detecting credit card fraud
  • Mapped connections between racism and physiologic stress response
  • Network analysis to identify and thwart terror structures and capture terrorists
  • Pay grades and reward systems that improve retention among enlisted soldiers
  • Modern public opinion polling
  • Evidence of gender discrimination in the workplace
  • Understanding of the family factors that impact outcomes for children
  • Guidance for police in defusing high-risk encounters
  • Strategies for combatting the public health challenge of drug abuse

ExplorePresident Bonilla-Silva also offered additional training for Chief Justice Roberts:

Should you be interested in enhancing your education in this area, we would be glad to put together a group of nationally and internationally renowned sociologists to meet with you and your staff. Given the important ways in which sociological data can and has informed thoughtful decision-making from the bench, such time would be well spent.

Indeed, during the oral argument Chief Justice Roberts did comment that his "goobledygook" perspective might be attributable to "simply my educational background." 

There has not yet been a reported response from the Chief Justice.

October 11, 2017 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), Elections and Voting, Supreme Court (US), Teaching Tips, Theory | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, October 9, 2017

Daily Read: Columbus/Indigenous Peoples Day

 The second Monday in October is designated as Columbus Day, the day that Italian mariner Christopher Columbus allegedly first saw the "New World," but is increasingly commemorated as Indigenous Peoples Day, recognizing that Native Americans did not necessarily benefit from European colonization.

A good read is Oneida Nation scholar Doug Kiel's article, Bleeding Out: Histories and Legacies of Indian Blood ” in  The Great Vanishing Act: Blood Quantum and the Future of Native Nations (2017).  Kiel writes of the European preoccupation with "blood" as a source of identity - - - and white supremacy - - -  tracing it to the Spanish Inquisition and anxieties about"Christian blood" being contaminated by Jewish and Muslim blood. Moreover, he contrasts Native racial status to the "one-drop rule” of "African American hypodescent, according to which individuals of mixed ancestry only inherit the status of their black kin, with “African blood” polluting all other types of 'blood.'" On the other hand,  “white blood” has the capacity to fully absorb “Indian blood" according to early cases, as well as more recent ones. For example, Kiel notes that Justice Alito's opinion for the Court in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (the "Baby Veronica" case), begins by describing the blood quantum of the child: " (Baby Girl) who is classified as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee."  Other possibilities for identity, including nationality and culture, are flattened.

The erasure of Native identity is one argument against the celebration of Columbus Day.  Last year, in the Presidential Proclamation for Columbus Day, then-President Obama expressed recognition for the rationales of Indigenous People's Day:

As we mark this rich history, we must also acknowledge the pain and suffering reflected in the stories of Native Americans who had long resided on this land prior to the arrival of European newcomers. The past we share is marked by too many broken promises, as well as violence, deprivation, and disease. It is a history that we must recognize as we seek to build a brighter future -- side by side and with cooperation and mutual respect. We have made great progress together in recent years, and we will keep striving to maintain strong nation-to-nation relationships, strengthen tribal sovereignty, and help all our communities thrive.

 In the Presidential Proclamation for Columbus Day this year, current-President Trump does not acknowledge Native or Indigenous peoples.

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 image: "My World is Not Flat,"

by Margaret Bagshaw

via

 

October 9, 2017 in Current Affairs, Race, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 28, 2017

Lawsuits Filed Against Transgender Troop Ban

 Late Friday August 25, President Trump issued a Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland Security through the Office of the Press Secretary directing the halt of accession of transgender individuals into the military and the halt of all resources "to fund sex-reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel, except to the extent necessary to protect the health of an individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex."  By Monday, there were at least three lawsuits challenging the action on constitutional grounds.

A month before, Trump had tweeted his thoughts regarding transgender individuals in the military, reportedly taking military officials by surprise.

TWEETS

Soon after the tweets, the complaint in Doe v. Trump was filed by lawyers for the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR) and GLBTQ Legal Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) in the District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging any military action on the basis of a violation of equal protection, due process, and a nonconstitutional argument of equitable estoppel.

This complaint is now joined by two others: The complaint in Stone v. Trump was filed by lawyers for the ACLU in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, challenging the 3 policies of the military ban - - - existing troops, enlistment of new troops, and medical care - - - as well as the policies taken as a whole.  Again, the two constitutional issues are equal protection and due process. The complaint in Karnoski v. Trump was filed by lawyers for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging the policy on the basis of equal protection, due process, as well as the First Amendment's free speech clause.

On the core challenge of equal protection - - - as applied to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment - - - the complaints vary in their detail and possible theories.  In Doe, the NCLR and GLAD complaint, paragraph 71 reads: "The categorical exclusion of transgender people from military service lacks a rational basis, is arbitrary, and cannot be justified by sufficient federal interests." In Stone, the ACLU complaint, paragraph 140 contends that transgender classifications should be treated as sex classifications, deserving heightened scrutiny, and additionally in the next paragraph that transgender status itself warrants heightened scrutiny because "men and women who are transgender, as a class" have historically been subject to discrimination, have a defining characteristic that frequently bears no relation to an ability to contribute to society, exhibit immutable or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group, and are a minority with relatively little political power.  In Karnoski, the complaint contends that in addition to sex-discrimination, discrimination on the basis of transgender status "bears all the indicia of a suspect classification requiring strict scrutiny by the courts," enumerating similar criteria including history of discrimination, discrete and insular minority, no relation to ability to contribute to society, and arguing the characteristic sometimes expressed as immutability in stating that "gender identity is a core, defining trait" so "fundamental to one's identity and conscience that a person should not be required to abandon it as a condition of equal treatment."

However, whatever standard of scrutiny is applied, all the complaints contend that there is not a sufficient government interest in the policy - - - an argument that may well lead into judicial inquiry into Trump's unorthodox announcement on Twitter as well as any details of thoughtful decision-making.

While there has been some reporting that military officials have discretion in implementing Trump's directives, professors of military law have issued a worth-reading policy statement that the discretion is quite limited; they also argue that the directives are discriminatory and based on inaccuracies.

This litigation is certain to accelerate. Expect more action from the NCLR and GLAD action filed before the Friday policy announcement and requests for preliminary relief. 

 

August 28, 2017 in Current Affairs, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, First Amendment, Gender, Sexuality, Speech, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, November 16, 2016

CFP: Loving v Virginia Symposium

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

50 YEARS OF LOVING:

SEEKING JUSTICE THROUGH LOVE AND RELATIONSHIPS

Symposium, March 23-24, 2017

Creighton School of Law, Omaha, Nebraska

The Creighton Law Review, Creighton’s 2040 Initiative, and the Werner Institute invite you to contribute to the Law Review’s June 2017 issue and/or to attend the 50 Years of Loving symposium hosted by the 2040 Initiative and the Werner Institute at the Creighton School of Law. The symposium will explore how the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Loving v. Virginia has influenced U.S society institutionally, demographically, and relationally.

Race in the United States has historically been socially constructed through interlocking cultural narratives, including law, and cultural practice, including institutions. Racism is a social system enacted and perpetuated by the interactions and relationships of individual people. Exploring the disruptive effects of the interracial “mixing” protected by Loving v. Virginia offers an opportunity to deepen understanding of systemic racism and to develop systems-based strategies for continuing the struggle for social justice. At a time when the demographics of the U.S. are shifting away from a white majority, deconstructing systemic racism is an essential project.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), ended legal prohibitions against interracial marriage in the U.S. By eliminating of longstanding legal sanctions against “miscegenation,” Loving disrupted the pre-existing social system. Loving rejected racial separation and hierarchy and endorsed relationships across previously uncrossable racial lines. Since Loving, the number of interracial marriages has grown significantly: “Nearly 15 percent, or one in seven, of all new marriages in 2008 were between people of different races or ethnicities.”*

The effects of these marriages extend beyond those who are themselves married. “[M]ore than a third of all adults surveyed reported having a family member whose spouse is of a different race or ethnicity – up from less than a quarter in 2005.”* Since Loving, the proportion of the U.S. population with multiple racial heritages has grown dramatically. Moreover, the children born as a result of Loving also have disrupted the social construction of race itself, with more people self-identifying as of more than one race, biracial, multiracial, or mixed.

The Law Review seeks submissions exploring these issues – to range from reflections (up to 1000 words) and essays (approximately 2500-3000 words) to articles (no more than 7000 words, not including references and footnotes). Draft abstracts of up to one page and queries may be addressed to Research Editor Sean Nakamoto at [email protected] no later than January 15, 2017. Final submissions will be March 20, 2017. There will be an opportunity at the symposium for selected authors to discuss their submissions at the 50 Years of Loving symposium at Creighton University in March, 2017.**

Authors are also encouraged to join the moderated online discussion on the effects of the Loving decision on our society hosted by the 2040 Initiative and ADRHub at http://blogs.creighton.edu/creighton2040/50-years-of-loving-moderated-online-discussion. Selected excerpts from this discussion will also be featured in the June 2017 Creighton Law Review edition. Discussion entries should respond to the following question: From the perspective of your academic discipline or professional institution, what are the questions, issues, or tensions that have arisen out of 50 Years of Loving?

 

*john a. powell, Racing to Justice (2012)

** Contact Amanda Guidero at AmandaGuidero  AT  creighton.edu for more information on the symposium and opportunities to present your work.

November 16, 2016 in Conferences, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Family, Fourteenth Amendment, Race, Scholarship, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, September 17, 2016

Constitution Day 2016

It's Constitution Day - - - week - - - yet again.  And as we do every year, we commemorate it with a few notes.

First, there is the issue of the constitutionality of constitution day:

As we've said, it's quite possible that Constitution Day is itself unconstitutional. One of the classic discussions is from ConLawProf Kent Greenfield in 2005 where he argues:

The right to be free of government-compelled speech - even speech that is worthwhile and beneficial - has been a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation" for over sixty years. That quote comes from Justice Robert Jackson, writing for the Supreme Court striking down a law expelling students who refused to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Even though the country was in the middle of World War II at the time, the Court recognized that patriotism must be voluntary to be meaningful. Jackson did not mince words: "Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters."

The same is true now. Though we are at war, if we have to mandate patriotism or respect for the constitution, then we have already lost.

In part, this is because Constitution Day is a "mandate":

Federal law mandates that:

Each educational institution that receives Federal funds for a fiscal year shall hold an educational program on the United States Constitution on September 17 of such year for the students served by the educational institution.

Eleventh Amendment Department of Education regulations provide that the law:

requires that Constitution Day be held on September 17 of each year, commemorating the September 17, 1787 signing of the Constitution. However, when September 17 falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, Constitution Day shall be held during the preceding or following week.

 

And then there is the issue of whether we should be honoring the Constitution's inception or its reconstruction:

LawProf Colin Starger and others argue that the commemorative day should be February 3:

On that date in 1870, our nation ratified the last of the Civil War Amendments. That date symbolizes our commitment to reconstruct the Founders’ immoral compromise and place under national protection the inalienable rights of all the nation’s people.

 This year, President Obama's Presidential Proclamation stressed immigration - - - and included a mention of refugees - - - and also articulated a "living constitutionalism" theory:

 

America is more than a piece of land -- it is an idea, a place where we can contribute our talents, fulfill our ambitions, and be part of something bigger than ourselves. Each year on Citizenship Day, we celebrate our newest citizens who raise their hands and swear a sacred oath to join our American family. The journey they have taken reminds us that immigration is our origin story. For centuries, immigrants have brought diverse beliefs, cultures, languages, and traditions to our country, and they have pledged to uphold the ideals expressed in our founding documents. They come from all around the world, mustering faith that in America, they can build a better life and give their children something more. That is why I was proud to create the White House Task Force on New Americans, which is helping to build welcoming communities around our country and enhance civic, economic, and linguistic integration for immigrants and refugees. Through the Task Force, Federal agencies and local communities are working together to raise awareness about the rights, responsibilities, and opportunities of citizenship -- and to give immigrants and refugees the tools they need to succeed.

As a Nation of immigrants, our legacy is rooted in their success. Their contributions help us live up to our founding principles. With pride in our diverse heritage and in our common creed, we affirm our dedication to the values enshrined in our Constitution. We, the people, must forever breathe life into the words of this precious document, and together ensure that its principles endure for generations to come.

 

 

September 17, 2016 in Current Affairs, Executive Authority, Fourteenth Amendment, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 25, 2016

Sixth Circuit Holds Michigan's Sexual Offender Registration Act is Unconstitutional Ex Post Facto Law

In its opinion in Doe v. Snyder, the Sixth Circuit has concluded that the 2006 and 2011 amendments of Michigan's Sexual Offender Registration Act (SORA), as retroactively applied to plaintiffs violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, United States Constitution, Art. I §10, cl. 1.

The Ex Post Facto Clause only applies to retroactive punishment, and the opinion notes that under the United States Supreme Court's Smith v. Doe (2003), upholding Alaska's SORA, the test is "quite fixed": "an ostensibly civil and regulatory law, such as SORA, does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause unless the plaintiff can show 'by the clearest proof' that 'what has been denominated a civil remedy' is, in fact, 'a criminal penalty.'"

Judge Alice Batchelder, writing for the unanimous panel, applied the Smith v. Doe test for determining whether a statute that does not have a punitive intent nevertheless has actual punitive effects, including five factors:

  • Does the law inflict what has been regarded in our history and traditions as punishment?
  • Does it impose an affirmative disability or restraint?
  • Does it promote the traditional aims of punishment?
  • Does it have a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose?
  • Is it excessive with respect to this purpose?

Grand Rapids mapIn considering the history factor, the court relied on an amicus brief from law professors and discussed the relationship of SORA to ancient punishments of banishment.  To this end, the court reproduced a map for Grand Rapids Michigan, illustrating (in blue) where persons under SORA were now prohibited from living, working, or traveling.  

The map also figured into the court's conclusions regarding the other factors, including the rational relationship.  Indeed, the court found that SORA may actually increase recidivism rates and that "Tellingly, nothing the parties have pointed to in the record suggests that the residential restrictions have any beneficial effect on recidivism rates."

There were other constitutional challenges to SORA, but the court seemingly found the Ex Post Facto argument most determinative. The court's originalist theoretical perspective on the Ex Post Facto Clause is  striking:

Indeed, the fact that sex offenders are so widely feared and disdained by the general public implicates the core counter- majoritarian principle embodied in the Ex Post Facto clause. As the founders rightly perceived, as dangerous as it may be not to punish someone, it is far more dangerous to permit the government under guise of civil regulation to punish people without prior notice. Such lawmaking has “been, in all ages, [a] favorite and most formidable instrument[] of tyranny.” The Federalist No. 84, supra at 444 (Alexander Hamilton). It is, as Justice Chase argued, incompatible with both the words of the Constitution and the underlying first principles of “our free republican governments.” Calder, 3 U.S. at 388–89; accord The Federalist No. 44, supra at 232 (James Madison) (“[E]x post facto laws . . . are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.”).

 Thus, while the court acknowledged that the Smith v. Doe test was a difficult one to meet, "difficult is not the same as impossible" and Smith v. Doe should not "be understood to write a blank check to states to do whatever they please in this arena." Most likely, Michigan will disagree and seek United States Supreme Court review to ask the Court to clarify its understanding.

 

 

 

August 25, 2016 in Criminal Procedure, Opinion Analysis, Sexuality, Supreme Court (US), Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 18, 2016

CFP: Feminist Legal Theory at Law and Society in Mexico City

The Feminist Legal Theory Collaborative Research Network of Law & Society is a great group and Law & Society is always terrific.  Here's the call:

 

Call for Papers – Friday September 16th Deadline

The Feminist Legal Theory Collaborative Research Network

Seeks submissions for the

Law and Society Association Annual Meeting

Mexico City, Mexico, at the Sheraton Maria Isabel, June 20 – 23, 2017

Dear friends and colleagues,

We invite you to participate in the panels sponsored by the Feminist Legal Theory Collaborative Research Network at the Law and Society Annual Meeting in 2017. The Feminist Legal Theory CRN seeks to bring together law and society scholars across a range of fields who are interested in feminist legal theory. Information about the Law and Society meeting is available at http://www.lawandsociety.org.

2017Mex_375This year’s meeting is unique in that it brings us to the Global South, and invites us to explore the theme Walls, Borders, and Bridges: Law and Society in an Inter-Connected World. We are especially interested in proposals that explore the application of feminist legal theory to this theme, broadly construed. This might include papers that explore feminist legal theory in comparative or transnational contexts, as well as in relation to the impacts of globalism and other intersections within particular locations, relationships, institutions, and identities. We are also interested in papers that will permit us to collaborate with other CRNs, such as the Critical Research on Race and the Law CRN, and welcome multidisciplinary proposals.

Our goal is to stimulate focused discussion of papers on which scholars are currently working. Thus, while you may submit papers that are closer to publication, we are particularly eager to receive proposals for works-in-progress that are at an earlier stage and will benefit from the discussion that the panels will provide.

The Planning Committee will assign individual papers to panels based on subject. Panels will use the LSA format, which requires four papers. We will also assign a chair, and one or two commentators/discussants for each panel, to provide feedback on the papers and promote discussion. For panels with two commentators/discussants, one may be asked to also chair.

As a condition of participating as a panelist, you must also agree to serve as a chair and/or commentator/discussant for another panel or participant. We will of course take into account expertise and topic preferences to the degree possible.

The duties of chairs are to organize the panel logistically; including registering it online with the LSA, and moderating the panel. Chairs will develop a 100-250 word description for the session and submit the session proposal to LSA before their anticipated deadline of October 19. This will ensure that each panelist can submit their proposal, using the panel number assigned.

The duties of commentator/discussants are to read the papers assigned to them and to prepare a short commentary about the papers that discusses them individually and (to the extent relevant) collectively, identifying ways that they relate to one another.

If you would like to present a paper as part of a CRN panel, please email:

  • An 1000 word abstract or summary,
  • Your name and a title, and
  • A list of your areas of interest and expertise within feminist legal theory

to the CRN Planning Committee at [email protected]. (Please do not send submissions to individual committee members.)

Note that LSA is imposing a requirement that your summary be at least 1,000 words long. Although a shorter summary will suffice for our purposes, you will be required to upload a 1,000 word summary in advance of LSA’s anticipated deadline of October 19. If you are already planning a LSA session with at least four panelists (and papers) that you would like to see included in the Feminist Legal Theory CRN, please let the Committee know.

In addition to these panels, we may try to use some of the other formats that the LSA provides: the “author meets readers” format, salon, or roundtable discussion. If you have an idea that you think would work well in one of these formats, please let us know. Please note that for roundtables, organizers are now required to provide a 500-word summary of the topic and the contributions they expect the proposed participants to make. Please also note that LSA rules limit you to participating only once as a paper panelist or roundtable participant.

Please submit all proposals by Friday, September 16 to the email provided above. This will permit us to organize panels and submit them prior to the LSA’s anticipated deadline of October 19. In the past, we have accommodated as many panelists as possible, but have been unable to accept all proposals. If we are unable to accept your proposal for the CRN, we will notify you by early October so that you can submit an independent proposal to LSA.

We hope you’ll join us in Mexico City to share and discuss the scholarship in which we are all engaged and connect with others doing work on feminist legal theory.

Best,

2017 LSA Feminist Legal Theory CRN Planning Committee

Aziza Ahmed & Elizabeth MacDowell (co-chairs)

 

August 18, 2016 in Comparative Constitutionalism, Conferences, Gender, Scholarship, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, July 14, 2016

Agency Power, Executive Power, and Gender Equality in School Bathrooms

While the constitutional issues are not front and center in the controversies and litigation over gender identity and school bathroom access, the disputes certainly implicate constitutional issues of equal protection, federalism, unconstitutional conditions, and executive/agency as well as judicial powers.

A Virginia school board has filed a stay application in the United States Supreme Court pending a petition for writ of certiorari to the Fourth Circuit's opinion in G.G. v. Glouster County School Board.  In G.G., a divided panel, reversing the senior district judge, concluded that Title IX's ban on sex discrimination,  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), requires schools to provide transgender students access to restrooms congruent with their gender identity. (The senior district judge had not reached the Equal Protection claim, so it was not before the Fourth Circuit.)  In construing Title IX, the Fourth Circuit relied upon a January 7, 2015 opinion letter from the United States Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, with a similar conclusion.  The Fourth Circuit accorded deference to the agency interpretation of Title IX under Auer v. Robbins (1997), because the relevant regulation was ambiguous - - - perhaps not in the plain meaning, but in its application:

Although the regulation may refer unambiguously to males and females, it is silent as to how a school should determine whether a transgender individual is a male or female for the purpose of access to sex-segregated restrooms. We conclude that the regulation is susceptible to more than one plausible reading because it permits both the Board’s reading— determining maleness or femaleness with reference exclusively to genitalia—and the Department’s interpretation—determining maleness or femaleness with reference to gender identity. [citation omitted].  It is not clear to us how the regulation would apply in a number of situations—even under the Board’s own “biological gender” formulation. For example, which restroom would a transgender individual who had undergone sex-reassignment surgery use? What about an intersex individual? What about an individual born with X-X-Y sex chromosomes? What about an individual who lost external genitalia in an accident? The Department’s interpretation resolves ambiguity by providing that in the case of a transgender individual using a sex-segregated facility, the individual’s sex as male or female is to be generally determined by reference to the student’s gender identity.

The Fourth Circuit panel rejected G.G.'s request to have the case reassigned to another district judge, but did reverse, vacate, and remand the district court's order dismissing the complaint.  The Fourth Circuit panel, in an unpublished opinion on July 12, denied the school board's motion for a stay pending appeal, again with one dissent. 

The stay application in the United States Supreme Court pending a petition for writ of certiorari argues that the Fourth Circuit's opinion in an "extreme example" of judicial deference to an administrative agency and is the "perfect vehicle" for the Court's reconsideration of Auer v. Robbins (1997).  The motion notes that several Justices have signaled such a reconsideration might be warranted, notably the late Justice Scalia, as well as Alito and Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts.  The application also argues that the DOE and DOJ have "seized momentum" and issued further instructions (citing a May 13 DOE  "Dear Colleagues" Letter) which would further solidify Auer deference, making action by the Court necessary.

Meanwhile, thirteen states have filed a complaint and application for preliminary injunction in Texas, based on the same letter:

On May 13, 2016, following years of incremental preambles (“guidances,” “interpretations,” and the like), Defendants informed the nation’s schools that they must immediately allow students to use the bathrooms, locker rooms and showers of the student’s choosing, or risk losing Title IX-linked funding. And employers that refuse to permit employees to utilize the intimate areas of their choice face legal liability under Title VII. These new mandates, putting the federal government in the unprecedented position of policing public school property and facilities, inter alia, run roughshod over clear lines of authority, local policies, and unambiguous federal law.

The central challenge is failure to conform with the Administrative Procedure Act, including notice and comment for rule-making.  However, the complaint also alleges that the federal government defendants "violated the Spending Clause" by engaging in "unconstitutional coercion" by "economic dragooning."  The complaint relies on that portion of the "Obamacare" case, NFIB v. Sebelius, in which a plurality found constitutional issues with the medicaid expansion program.
This portion of the complaint is less than 2 pages (in a 39 page document) and is cursory at best, although perhaps these arguments have the potential to be developed.
 
In short, it seems issues of gender-identity will be the subject of much litigation, perhaps even at the United States Supreme Court, in the next few years.
 
Unisex_pictogram

[image via]

July 14, 2016 in Cases and Case Materials, Current Affairs, Equal Protection, Executive Authority, Federalism, Fourteenth Amendment, Gender, Interpretation, Sexuality, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, February 7, 2016

Feminist Judgments and Feminist Tax Judgments

The volume U.S. Feminist Judgments is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press, including 24 rewritten opinions and commentary, most of which will be of great interest to ConLawProfs.  The editors have posted the Table of Contents and Introduction on ssrn here.

Stay Tuned for an announcement of a forthcoming conference!

And if you are interested in ConLaw and Tax from a feminist perspective, consider the Call for Contributions for a new volume.

Cropped-USFJPBannerWeb111

[More on artist Soraida Martinez here]

February 7, 2016 in Gender, Scholarship, Supreme Court (US), Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 29, 2015

Daily Video: Chemerinsky & Volokh Discuss the First Amendment and the Roberts Court

Worth a watch:

A dialogue between ConLawProfs Erwin Chemerinsky & Eugene Volokh on the topic of  "THE FIRST AMENDMENT & THE ROBERTS COURT," moderated by Kelli Sager, and sponsored by The First Amendment Salon, spearheaded by ConLawProf Ron Collins and in association with the Floyd Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression at Yale Law School.

Chemerinsky and Volokh agree with each other more than might be anticipated.

 

The First Amendment and the Roberts Court

 

September 29, 2015 in First Amendment, Supreme Court (US), Teaching Tips, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 1, 2015

Anti-Masking Laws, the Ku Klux Klan, and the First Amendment

 

Reports that Ku Klux Klan (KKK) members are considering a rally in Columbia, South Carolina to support the controversial display of the confederate battle flag evokes images of hooded persons in traditional KKK garb.

However, South Carolina, like many states, has an anti-masking statute,  S.C. 16-7-110, which provides:

No person over sixteen years of age shall appear or enter upon any lane, walk, alley, street, road, public way or highway of this State or upon the public property of the State or of any municipality or county in this State while wearing a mask or other device which conceals his identity. Nor shall any such person demand entrance or admission to or enter upon the premises or into the enclosure or house of any other person while wearing a mask or device which conceals his identity. Nor shall any such person, while wearing a mask or device which conceals his identity, participate in any meeting or demonstration upon the private property of another unless he shall have first obtained the written permission of the owner and the occupant of such property.

As I've discussed in Dressing Constitutionally, such statutes, sometimes known as anti-KKK statutes, have been upheld against First Amendment challenges.

Children_with_Dr._Samuel_Green,_Ku_Klux_Klan_Grand_Dragon,_July_24,_1948
"Children with Dr. Samuel Green, Ku Klux Klan Grand Dragon" 1948 via

For example, the similar Georgia statute, passed in 1951 and still in force, makes it a misdemeanor for any person who “wears a mask, hood, or device by which any portion of the face is so hidden, concealed, or covered as to conceal the identity of the wearer” and is either on public property or private property without permission.  In 1990, the Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 674, 398 S.E.2d 547, 552 (1990) upheld the statute against a First Amendment challenge by Shade Miller, who was arrested for appearing in KKK regalia alone near the courthouse in Gwinnet County, purportedly to protest the anti-mask statute itself.  In addressing Miller’s argument that the statute was overbroad, the court interpreted the statute narrowly, but not so narrowly as to exclude the KKK.  Instead, the court required the mask-wearer to have intent to conceal his identity and further that the statute would  “apply only to mask-wearing conduct when the mask-wearer knows or reasonably should know that the conduct provokes a reasonable apprehension of intimidation, threats or violence.”

New York's anti-masking statute, which was not originally prompted by KKK activities but by land revolts before the Civil War, was also upheld against a challenge by the KKK.  In 2004, the Second Circuit panel - - - including now United States Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor - - -decided Church of American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2004).  The KKK group had sought an injunction against the statute to allow a demonstration while wearing masks. Rejecting the First Amendment claim, the court agreed that the KKK regalia - - - the robe, hood, and mask - - - met the threshold requirement for expressive speech, but nevertheless separated the mask in its analysis.  In the court’s view, the mask was “redundant” and did “not convey a message independently of the robe and hood.” Moreover, the court opined that mask-wearing was not integral to the expression, but optional even amongst KKK members.  Thus, while the KKK members had a First Amendment right to march, they did not have a First Amendment right to do so wearing their masks.

Should KKK members attempt to demonstrate while wearing their "regalia" that includes hoods that obscures their faces,  the South Carolina masking statute - - - and its constitutionality - - - are sure to be in play. 

 

July 1, 2015 in Association, Criminal Procedure, Current Affairs, Federalism, First Amendment, Fundamental Rights, History, Interpretation, Race, Reconstruction Era Amendments, Speech, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 15, 2015

Does Immigration Marriage Case Foreshadow Same-Sex Marriage Case?

In United States Supreme Court's fragmented and closely divided decision in Kerry v. Din, the majority rejected the procedural due process argument of a naturalized American citizen to an explanation of the reasons supporting a denial of a visa to her noncitizen husband.  Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality and joined by Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts, concluded that she had no cognizable liberty interest attributable to her marriage.  Justice Kennedy, joined by Alito, would not reach the liberty interest issue because the process here was all that was due.  Justice Breyer, dissenting, and joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, would affirm the Ninth Circuit and find that she had a cognizable liberty interest and that more process was due in the form of a more precise and factual explanation.

So what might this mean for Obergefell?  Most obviously, the dissenting opinion by Breyer, and joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, articulates an expansive liberty interest in marriage under the Due Process Clause that could be easily imported into Obergefell.  On Justice Kennedy's concurrence, joined by Alito, the clear signal is that Justice Scalia's refusal to recognize a liberty interest in marriage is not one to which they are subscribing - - - in this case.  Given that Justice Kennedy, as author of the Court's opinions Windsor, Lawrence, and Romer v. Evans, is being closely watched as potential author of an opinion in favor of Obergefell, there is nothing in Din that would mitigate that judgment. As for the plurality, Justice Scalia's derogation of substantive due process has a familiar ring that might be echoed in his opinion in Obergefell, with an emphasis on history.  While Justice Thomas is widely expected to agree with Scalia's position, does the Chief Justice's joining of Scalia's opinion in Kerry v. Din signal a disapproval of recognizing any liberty interest in marriage?  Perhaps.  But perhaps not.  Consider this:

Unlike the States in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967), Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374 (1978), and Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987), the Federal Govern­ment here has not attempted to forbid a marriage. Although Din and the dissent borrow language from those cases invoking a fundamental right to marriage, they both implicitly concede that no such right has been infringed in this case. Din relies on the “associational interests in marriage that necessarily are protected by the right to marry,” and that are “presuppose[d]” by later cases estab­lishing a right to marital privacy.

Indeed, under this view, as the Court made clear in Zablocki, there must be a "direct and substantial" interference with marriage in order for there to be a liberty interest.  The Court in Zablocki distinguished Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) - - - which the Court in Din does not cite - - - which found no constitutional infirmity with altering social security benefits upon marriage.  In short, the marriage was not "forbidden," it was simply subject to certain regulations in another the complex social security scheme, not unlike the complex immigration scheme.

So for those who might attempt to predict the various positions of the Justices in Obergefell based on Kerry v. Din, there is certainly much "play."

418px-Henri_Rousseau,_dit_le_Douanier_-_The_Wedding_Party_-_Google_Art_Project
Henri Rousseau, "The Wedding Party," circa 1905, via

June 15, 2015 in Courts and Judging, Current Affairs, Due Process (Substantive), Family, Gender, Recent Cases, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality, Supreme Court (US), Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)