Constitutional Law Prof Blog

New York Sues Feds for Dropping Trusted Traveler

Steven D. Schwinn, UIC John Marshall Law School

New York yesterday sued Homeland Security officials for dropping the state from the Customs and Border Patrol's Trusted Traveler program in retribution for the state adopting its Green Light Law. That Law allows unauthorized aliens to get a drivers license in the state, and, in order to facilitate that, prohibits state officials from sharing an applicant's personal information from the DMV database with federal immigration authorities, except where disclosure is pursuant to a lawful court order or judicial warrant.

New York argues in that CBP's move violates the "equal state sovereignty" principle in the Tenth Amendment; that it's unduly coercive in violation of the Tenth Amendment; that it is wholly irrational in violation of due process; and that it violates the Administrative Procedure Act (for lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking, for being arbitrary and capricious, and for violating federal law).

On that last point--violating federal law--New York contends that the move violates the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and implementing regulations. That's because the IRTPA directs the Secretary to "ensure that the international trusted traveler program includes as many participants as practicable," yet CBP's move takes millions of New Yorkers out of the program. Moreover, nothing in the program requires applicants to submit state drivers license information, and CBP can get any information they need to run background checks from other state sources, which New York readily shares with the FBI. In other words: CBP doesn't need information from New York's DMV database.

The complaint asks the court to declare CBP's move unconstitutional and in violation of the APA, and to enjoin enforcement of it.

Ninth Circuit Rebuffs Government's Challenge to California's Sanctuary Laws

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

The Ninth Circuit ruled yesterday that the federal government was unlikely to succeed in its challenge to certain California "sanctuary" laws that protect undocumented immigrants from federal immigration enforcement. The ruling denies the government's motion for a preliminary injunction against these laws. At the same time, the court remanded one particular provision to the lower court for further consideration.

The ruling, while preliminary, is yet another blow to the federal government's efforts to clamp down on sanctuary jurisdictions.

The case, United States v. California, tested three of California's "sanctuary" provisions. The federal government argued that they violated the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity (which prohibits state governments from regulating the federal government) and that federal law preempted them. 

The first, AB 450, prohibits public and private employers in the state from providing consent to an immigration enforcement agent to enter any nonpublic area of their property and to review their employment records without a subpoena or warrant. It also requires employers to provide employees with a notice of inspection by an immigration agency within 72 hours of receiving the notice. The court rejected the government's intergovernmental immunity claim, because "AB 450 is directed at the conduct of employers, not the United States or its agents, and no federal activity is regulated." It rejected the obstacle-preemption argument, because the provision regulates the relationship between employers and their employees, not between federal immigration authorities and the employees they regulate, and therefore it "imposes no additional or contrary obligations that undermine or disrupt the activities of federal immigration authorities." 

The second, AB 103, requires the California attorney general to inspect "county, local, or private" detention facilities where immigrants are housed and to review the conditions of confinement, including the "standard of care and due process provided to" detainees, and "the circumstances around their apprehension and transfer to the facility." The court ruled that the government was unlikely to succeed on its intergovernmental immunity argument as to the provision's burdens that duplicated preexisting inspection requirements, including the due process provision. But it ruled that the government was likely to succeed as to the provision's excessive burdens that fell uniquely on the federal government (the requirement that the state ag examine the circumstances surrounding the apprehension and transfer of immigration detainees). The court ruled that the government was not likely to succeed on the merits of its preemption claim, because "California possesses the general authority to ensure the health and welfare of inmates and detainees in facilities within its borders," and the government failed to show that Congress intended to supersede this authority.

The final provision, SB 54, restricts law enforcement from cooperating with federal immigration authorities in immigration enforcement. The court held that the federal government's preemption claim runs headlong into the Tenth Amendment's anti-commandeering principle. That's because the federal government can't force the state or its officers into participating in federal immigration enforcement, even if "SB 54 may well frustrate the federal government's enforcement efforts." The court rejected the federal government's intergovernmental immunity argument, because accepting that claim "would imply that California cannot choose to discriminate against federal immigration authorities by refusing to assist their enforcement efforts--a result that would be inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and the anticommandeering rule." Finally, the court ruled that SB 54 does not directly conflict with 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1373, which prohibits state and local governments from prohibiting their officers from communicating with federal immigration officials about the immigration status of any person.

District Court Hands Sweeping Victory to Sanctuary Jurisdictions

Judge Edgardo Ramos (S.D.N.Y.) this week issued a sweeping ruling against the Trump Administration and its attempts to clamp down on sanctuary jurisdictions. The ruling is a significant victory for sanctuary jurisdictions, and a blow to the Trump Administration.

We last posted on sanctuary jurisdiction litigation here.

The case involves the states of New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Washington; the commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia; and the city of New York. These jurisdictions sued the Administration to halt its unilateral anti-sanctuary conditions on their DOJ JAG/Byrne grants. In particular, they sought to stop the Administration from enforcing its three conditions on grant-receiving jurisdictions, on threat of losing their grants: (1) the "notice condition," which requires jurisdictions to give advance notice to DHS of the scheduled release date and time of aliens housed in state or local correctional facilities; (2) the "access condition," which requires jurisdictions to give federal agents access to aliens in state or local correctional facilities in order to question them about their immigration status; and (3) the "1373 compliance" condition, which requires jurisdictions to comply with 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1373, which, in turn, prohibits state or local governments from prohibiting their officials from communicating with the federal government about the immigration status of detainees.

Importantly, former AG Sessions imposed these conditions himself, without specific congressional authority (or any congressional action).

The court ruled that DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose the conditions, and thus acted ultra vires and in violation of the separation of powers in imposing them unilaterally (that is, without specific congressional authority). It also ruled that the conditions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.

As to Section 1373, the court said that it violated the anti-commandeering principle, based on Murphy v. NCAA. (The anti-commandeering principle says that the federal government can't compel a state to act in its sovereign capacity. Recall that the Court held in Murphy extended this principle to when the government compels a state not to act--as in Section 1373.)

The court granted the plaintiffs' request for mandamus relief and ordered the government to reissue their Byrne grant award documents without the conditions. It also enjoined the government from imposing the conditions against any of the plaintiffs in the future.

District Judge Finds ICWA Unconstitutional

Professor Ruthann Robson, City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law

In his opinion in Brackeen v. Zinke, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, Reed O'Connor, entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs and found that portions of the Indian Child Welfare Act, ICWA  are unconstitutional, specifically violating equal protection, the non-delegation doctrine of Article I, and the commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment.  Passed in 1978, the general purpose of ICWA is to prevent Native children from being removed from their families and tribes based on a finding that "an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families [were being] broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies” as Judge O'Connor's opinion acknowledged, quoting Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (2013) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4)).

Judge Reed O'Connor, however, accepts an argument that was sidestepped by the United States Supreme Court in Baby Girl: that ICWA violates equal protection (applied to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment) by making a racial classification that does not survive strict scrutiny. Recall that in some briefs as well as in the oral argument, the specter of the racial classification was raised.  In United States District Judge O'Connor's opinion, that specter is fully embodied. Judge O'Connor found that ICWA does make a racial classification, rejecting the government's view that the classification at issue was a political category. Judge O'Connor reasoned that ICWA defines Indian child not only by membership in an Indian child, but extends its coverage to children "simply eligible for membership who have a biological Indian parent." Thus, Judge O'Connor reasoned, ICWA's definition "uses ancestry as a proxy for race" and therefore must be subject to strict scrutiny.  Interestingly, the United States government did not offer any compelling governmental interest or argued that the classification is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Judge O'Connor nevertheless credited the Tribal Defendants/Intervenors assertion of an interest in maintaining the Indian child's relationship with the tribe, but found that the means chosen was overinclusive, concluding that

The ICWA’s racial classification applies to potential Indian children, including those who will never be members of their ancestral tribe, those who will ultimately be placed with non-tribal family members, and those who will be adopted by members of other tribes.

On the non-delegation claim, Judge Reed O'Connor found it fatal that ICWA allows Tribes to change the child placement preferences selected by Congress and which then must be honored by the states in child custody proceedings.

On the Tenth Amendment claim, Judge Reed O'Connor relied on the Court's recent decision in Murphy v. NCAA holding unconstitutional a federal law prohibiting states from allowing sports gambling regarding anti-commandeering, concluding that

Congress violated all three principles [articulated in Murphy] when it enacted the ICWA. First, the ICWA offends the structure of the Constitution by overstepping the division of federal and state authority over Indian affairs by commanding States to impose federal standards in state created causes of action. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Second, because the ICWA only applies in custody proceedings arising under state law, it appears to the public as if state courts or legislatures are responsible for federally-mandated standards, meaning “responsibility is blurred.” Third, the ICWA shifts “the costs of regulations to the States” by giving the sole power to enforce a federal policy to the States.  Congress is similarly not forced to weigh costs the States incur enforcing the ICWA against the benefits of doing so. In sum, Congress shifts all responsibility to the States, yet “unequivocally dictates” what they must do.

[citations to Murphy omitted].

 

With more abbreviated analysis, Judge Reed O'Connor found that the applicable regulations pursuant to ICWA violated the Administrative Procedure Act and that Congress did not have power to pass ICWA under the Indian Commerce Clause because it was limited by the Tenth Amendment. However, Judge O'Connor rejected the individual prospective plaintiffs' argument that ICWA violated the Due Process Clause's protection of family rights.

 

This opinion finding a long-standing statute unconstitutional is sure to be appealed, especially by the Cherokee Nation and other Tribal Intervenors.

 

Supreme Court Strikes Federal Sports Betting Ban

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

The Supreme Court ruled today that federal law prohibiting states from authorizing sports gambling violates the anticommandeering principle. The ruling in Murphy v. NCAA strikes the prohibition the federal Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) and opens the door to state-authorized sports gambling across the country.

While the ruling is potentially quite significant with regard to sports gambling, it does not restrict Congress from regulating or prohibiting sports gambling directly. Congress could enact a new law doing just that.

As to the constitutional law: The ruling says that the anticommandeering principle applies both when Congress requires states to act (which we already knew), and when Congress prohibits states from acting (which we didn't yet know, at least not for sure). That could have implications in the sanctuary cities litigation, which involves, among other things, the federal prohibition against state and local governments from restricting their officers in cooperating with federal immigration agents.

The case arose when New Jersey challenged the prohibition on state-authorized sports gambling in the PASPA under the anticommandeering principle. New Jersey sought to revoke its law prohibiting sports gambling, but the NCAA sued, arguing that New Jersey's proposed revocation violated the PASPA's provision that forbids a state "to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme" based on a competitive sporting events and forbids "a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote" those gaming schemes if done "pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity." (New Jersey did this once before, but was stopped in the lower courts. The Supreme Court denied cert. in that earlier challenge.) (Importantly, PASPA does not make sports betting a federal crime. Instead, it authorizes the Attorney General and professional and amateur sports organizations to sue to halt violations.) New Jersey countered that PASPA violated the anticommandeering principle insofar as it prohibited the state from repealing its ban on sports betting. The lower courts ruled against the state, but the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Alito wrote for the Court.

The Court first held that New Jersey's repeal fell within PASPA's ban on "authorizing" sports betting: "When a State completely or partially repeals old laws banning sports gambling, it 'authorize[s]' that activity."

The Court then ruled that PASPA's prohibition violated the anticommandeering principle. The Court said that it didn't make a difference whether Congress directed a state to act, or prohibited a state from acting; either way, "state legislatures are put under the direct control of Congress."

The PASPA provision at issue here--prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling--violates the anticommandeering rule. That provision unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do. And this is true under either our interpretation or that advocated by the respondents and the United States. In either event, state legislatures are put under the direct control of Congress. It is as if federal officers were installed in state legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators from voting on any offending proposals. A more direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to imagine.

***

It was a matter of happenstance that the laws challenged in New York and Printz commanded "affirmative" action as opposed to imposing a prohibition. The basic principle--that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures--applies in either event.

The Court said that PASPA's prohibition on state "licensing" of sports betting similarly violates the anticommandeering principle.

Finally, the Court said that PASPA's prohibition on states from "operat[ing]," "sponsor[ing]," or "promot[ing]" sports gambling schemes, its provisions that prohibit a private actor from "sponsor[ing], operat[ing], advertis[ing], or promot[ing]" sports gambling schemes "pursuant to" state law, and its provisions prohibiting the "advertis[ing]" of sports gambling all cannot be severed and therefore go down, as well.

Justice Thomas concurred in full, but wrote separately "to express [his] growing discomfort with . . . modern severability precedents." In particular, Justice Thomas argued that the Court's severability "precedents appear to be in tension with traditional limits on judicial authority."

Justice Breyer concurred, except to the severability holding on the provision regulating private actors.

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor and in part by Justice Breyer, dissented. Justice Ginsburg argued that (assuming arguendo that the state-authorization provision amounted to commandeering) the Court improperly failed to sever the prohibition on state and private-party operations, because they can stand alone.

Daily Read: Janet Calvo on DACA and State Professional Licensing

Who needs a professional license? In California, anyone wishing to be an accountant, acupuncturist, cosmetologist, court reporter, bedding salesperson, landscape architect, pharmacist, teacher, real estate agent, pest control operator, or teacher, among many others. Yet the type of immigration status that should be a prerequisite for obtaining a state professional license has not been consistent, at least until California did implement a remedy. And in New York, with a different array of immigration regulations for professional licensing, a different type of remedy was eventually decided upon.

In her article Professional Licensing and Teacher Certification for Non-Citizens: Federalism, Equal Protection and a State’s Socio-Economic Interests, in Columbia Journal of Race and Law, Professor Janet Calvo analyzes the intersection of Equal Protection doctrine and the Tenth Amendment to argue that states have the constitutional responsibility as well as the constitutional power to remove immigration barriers to state licensing requirements. Distinguishing among categories of immigration status raises equal protection concerns and, as the Second Circuit has held, constitutional violations. Additionally, licensing is a traditional state function which Congress can regulate to some extent but not totally commandeer.

As Calvo argues, California and New York each took a unique path to solving the licensing issue, yet taken together, they offer a map to other states, organizations, and communities seeking to address similar problems.

 

Fifth Circuit Rules on Texas Anti-Sanctuary Law

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

The Fifth Circuit earlier this week upheld most of Texas's SB4, the state law banning local jurisdictions from adopting sanctuary-city policies. The ruling means that most of SB4 stays in place and applies to Texas jurisdictions.

The ruling is a victory for Texas, which adopted the measure in order to crack-down on sanctuary cities in the state. It's only preliminary--so goes to the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, and not (necessarily) the merits themselves--but, given the nature of the (facial challenge) case, is certainly the same as a ruling on the merits.

SB4 has three provisions at issue in the case: (1) the "materially limit" provision, which bans local jurisdictions from "prohibit[ing] or materially limit[ing]" an officer from asking a lawfully detained individual's immigration status, from sharing that status with federal agencies, and from assisting federal agencies in enforcement; (2) the "detainer" provision, which requires local officers to comply with federal immigration detainers; and the "endorsement" provision, which prohibits local officers from endorsing sanctuary policies.

Here's what the court said:

The "Materially Limit" Provision

The court rejected the plaintiffs' claims that federal law preempted these prohibitions and that "materially limit" is unconstitutionally vague. As to preemption, the court said that federal law didn't field-preempt, because "SB4 and the federal statutes involve different fields": "Federal law regulates how local entities may cooperate in immigration enforcement; SB4 specifies whether they cooperate." The court said that it "could perhaps define the field broadly enough to include both SB4 and federal legislation, but the relevant field should be defined narrowly." It also said that Congress didn't state a clear purpose to field-preempt. Finally, the court said that the Tenth Amendment points against field preemption:

The plaintiffs acknowledge that the Tenth Amendment prevents Congress from compelling Texas municipalities to cooperate in immigration enforcement. Congress could not pass a federal SB4. But if that is so, it seems impossible that Congress has occupied the field that SB4 regulates.

The court also held that the requirements weren't conflict preempted, because, under the requirements, local officers could comply with both federal law and SB4. In particular, the court said that any authority (or requirement) that SB4 imposed upon local officers did not conflict with the allowable cooperation between local and federal officers under federal immigration law, and the authority of federal immigration officials.

Finally, the court held that "materially limit" isn't unconstitutionally vague, especially in the context of this facial challenge.

The "Detainer" Provision

The court held that this provision, which requires local officers to notify federal officials when they release an alien and to maintain custody of the alien up to 48 hours after the preexisting release date so that DHS can assume custody, did not violate the Fourth Amendment on its face (although the court didn't, and couldn't, say whether it might violate the Fourth Amendment in any particular case).

The "Endorse" Prohibition

The court held that SB4's provision that a "local entity or campus police department" may not "endorse a policy under which the entity or department prohibits or materially limits the enforcement of immigration laws" violated the First Amendment. The court rejected a narrowing construction of "endorse" offered by the state. The court noted, however, that "[t]his conclusion does not . . . insulate non-elected officials and employees, who may well be obliged to follow the dictates of SB4 as 'government speech.'" But this issue wasn't before the court (because the plaintiffs "do not represent the public employees putatively covered by Garcetti and the government speech doctrine.")

Justice Tightens the Screws on Sanctuary Cities

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

The Justice Department today sent letters to 23 sanctuary jurisdictions, requesting certain additional documents to show that they are not preventing their officers from sharing immigration information with the feds, in violation of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1373.

The letters say that Justice will subpoena the documents if a jurisdiction declines to share. The letter outlines other consequences, too:

Should the Department determine your jurisdiction is out of compliance with section 1373, the Department may, as detailed in your award documents, seek return of your FY 2016 grant funds, require additional conditions for receipt of any FY 2017 Byrne JAG funding for which you have applied, and/or deem you ineligible for FY 2017 Byrne JAG funds.

Justice's moves to clamp down on sanctuary jurisdictions have drawn lawsuits by many of those jurisdictions. They argue, among other things, that Section 1373 amounts to unconstitutional commandeering of local officers, that Justice's conditions on their grants fail the conditioned-spending test under South Dakota v. Dole, and that Justice has no authority to impose conditions on federal grants without Congress's say so. We last posted on the suits here.

District Judge Permanently Enjoins Trump's Sanctuary Cities EO

Judge William H. Orrick (N.D.Cal.) granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and issued a nationwide permanent injunction against the defunding and enforcement provisions of President Trump's sanctuary cities executive order.

The ruling deals a serious blow to the President and his efforts to rein in sanctuary cities. This ruling goes to the EO itself, not AG Sessions's interpretation and enforcement of the EO, as the more recent temporary injunctions did. We posted most recently on the case in Philadelphia here.

Judge Orrick noted that nothing had changed from his earlier temporary injunction. He summarized his ruling this way:

The Constitution vests the spending powers in Congress, not the President, so the Executive Order cannot constitutionally place new conditions on federal funds. Further, the Tenth Amendment requires that conditions on federal funds be unambiguous and timely made; that they bear some relation to the funds at issue; and that they not be unduly coercive. Federal funding that bears no meaningful relationship to immigration enforcement cannot be threatened merely because a jurisdiction chooses an immigration enforcement strategy of which the President disapproves. Because the Executive Order violates the separation of powers doctrine and deprives the Counties of their Tenth and Fifth Amendment rights, I GRANT the Counties' motions for summary judgment and permanently enjoin the defunding and enforcement provisions of Section 9(a).

Recall that Section 9(a) says that "[i]n furtherance of [the policy to ensure that states and their subdivisions comply with 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1373], the [AG] and the Secretary [of Homeland Security] . . . shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes . . . ." Importantly, the EO didn't specify which federal grants were at risk; it apparently applied to all federal grants.

AG Sessions tried to restrict the EO to JAG/Byrne grants from the Justice Department, but Judge Orrick had nothing of it: "The AG Memorandum not only provides an implausible interpretation of Section 9(a) but is functionally an 'illusory promise' because it does not amend Section 9(a) and does not bind the Executive Branch. It does not change the plain meaning of the Executive Order."

Judge Orrick said that a nationwide injunction was appropriate "[b]ecause Section 9(a) is unconstitutional on its face, and not simply in its application to the plaintiffs here . . . ."

District Court Halts Government's Sanctuary Cities Enforcement Against Philadelphia

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

Judge Michael Baylson (E.D. Pa.) granted a preliminary injunction yesterday against the government's enforcement of it's anti-sanctuary cities moves against Philadelphia, and enjoyed AG Sessions from denying the city's Byrne JAG grant for FY 2017.

The ruling is a major victory for the city, and a significant strike against the federal crack-down on sanctuary cities. It follows a similar, but less sweeping, ruling in the Chicago case.

Judge Baylson ruled that AG Sessions's order to condition DOJ Byrne JAG grants on Philadelphia's agreement to give federal authorities notice when city officials detain an unauthorized alien (the "notice condition"), to give federal authorities access to city jails (the "access condition"), and to certify that it complies with 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1373 likely violate federal law and the Constitution.

In particular, Judge Baylson ruled that the conditions violate the Administrative Procedure Act, because they're arbitrary and capricious. He also ruled that they "are improper under settled principles of the Spending Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and principles of federalism." On the constitutional issues, he said that the conditions are not sufficiently related to the purposes of the Byrne JAG grant program (in violation of the conditioned-spending test under South Dakota v. Dole), because "[i]mmigration law [the purpose of the conditions] has nothing to do with the enforcement of local criminal laws [the purpose of Philadelphia's Byrne JAG grant]." He also said that the conditions were ambiguous (also in violation of South Dakota v. Dole), because "the Access and 48-hours Notice Conditions cannot have been unambiguously authorized by Congress if they were never statutorily authorized," and the "malleable language [of Section 1373] does not provide the 'clear notice that would be needed to attach such a condition to a State's receipt of . . . funds.'" (The court also said, but "[w]ithout specifically so holding," that "Philadelphia is likely to succeed on the merits of its Tenth Amendment challenge" to the conditions, because the notice and access conditions "impose affirmative obligations on Philadelphia, with associated costs of complying with such conditions," and because the compliance condition (on 1373) "would inherently prevent Philadelphia from, among other things, disciplining an employee for choosing to spend her free time or work time assisting in the enforcement of federal immigration laws" (and thus commandeers the city).

Finally, Judge Baylson noted that Philadelphia isn't a sanctuary city, anyway--at least not in the way defined by federal law. In particular, he wrote that the city "substantially complies with Section 1373."

District Judge Enjoins Sanctuary Cities Conditions in Part

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

Judge Harry D. Leinenweber (N.D. Ill.) yesterday enjoined two conditions nationwide, but declined to enjoin a third, that AG Sessions placed on a federal grant program to clamp down on sanctuary cities. The order came in the lawsuit that Chicago filed against Session.

The ruling is a partial victory for the City and partial victory for the government. It partially halts two key conditions that AG Sessions placed on Byrne Grant recipients, but upholds a third, requiring certification of compliance with Section 1373.

Recall that AG Sessions placed three conditions on a municipality's receipt of federal funds under the Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program: (1) that a state law or practice is in place to honor a request by DHS to provide advance notice of any scheduled release date and time for a particular alien (the "notice" condition); (2) that a state law or practice permits federal agents to have access to any correctional facility to meet with aliens and interrogate them (the "access" condition); and (3) that a local government submit a certification of compliance with 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1373, the federal law prohibiting state and local laws and practices that restrict state and local officials from sending to, or receiving from, federal officials information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any individual, and prohibiting officials from maintaining such information or exchanging it with federal officials. (the "certification" condition).

The conditions ran up against Chicago's "Welcoming Ordinance." That Ordinance prohibits any "agent or agency" from "request[ing] information about or otherwise investigat[ing] or assist[ing] in the investigation of the citizenship or immigration status of any person unless such inquiry or investigation is required by [state law], federal regulation, or court decision." It goes on to forbid any agent or agency from "disclos[ing] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any person."

So Chicago sued Sessions, arguing that all three conditions were unconstitutional and unlawful.

Judge Leinenweber agreed in part and disagreed in part. As to the notice and access conditions, the court said that Sessions lacked statutory authority and exceeded his power to implement these conditions. In particular, the court held that only Congress could impose these conditions, or authorize the AG to do so, and that the statutory scheme in place didn't do that. Because the court ruled on statutory grounds, it declined to rule on the constitutionality of those two provisions.

But in contrast to its ruling on the notice and access conditions, the court held that Chicago did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of its challenge to the certification condition. The court held that this condition was authorized by Congress under the Byrne Grant statute, which says that a recipient must certify that it's in compliance "with all provisions of this part and all other applicable Federal laws" (emphasis added). The court said that Section 1373 fell into that latter category, "all other applicable Federal laws."

Moreover, it held that the certification condition didn't violate the Spending Clause and the anti-commandeering principle. In particular, the court said that Section 1373 doesn't compel Chicago to do anything; instead, it merely forbids it from doing something. The court said that the anti-commandeering principle only prohibits the federal government from requiring states or state officials to act, not from prohibiting them from acting, so Section 1373 doesn't violate it. 

Without a doubt, Section 1373 restricts the ability of localities to prohibit state or local officials from assisting a federal program, but it does not require officials to assist in the enforcement of a federal program. . . . Because no case has gone so far as to prohibit the federal government from restricting actions that directly frustrate federal law, the Court finds that Congress acts constitutionally when it determines that localities may not prevent local officers from voluntarily cooperating with a federal program or discipline them for doing so.

But the court went on to recognize that Section 1373 raises an unanswered constitutional question: Does the provision commandeer insofar as it prevents local governments from disciplining an employee for spending time assisting in the enforcement of federal immigration law? The court punted, leaving that novel question for appeal:

[B]y leaving it up to local officials whether to assist in enforcement of federal immigration priorities, the statute may effectively thwart policymakers' ability to extricate their state or municipality from involvement in a federal program. . . . Here, we follow binding Supreme Court precedent and the persuasive authority of the Second Circuit, neither of which elevates federalism to the degree urged by the City here. A decision to the contrary would require an expansion of the law that only a higher court could establish.

DOJ Tightens Sanctuary Cities EO and Moves to Reconsider Court's Injunction

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

AG Jeff Sessions issued a memo yesterday tightening President Trumps "sanctuary cities" executive order. The government then asked Judge Orrick to reconsider his earlier preliminary injunction halting the EO.

We posted on Judge Orrick's order here, with links to earlier posts.

Sessions's memo specifies that the government can only withhold certain DOJ and DHS grants (and not all federal grants) from sanctuary cities. Moreover, he wrote that DOJ will apply a certification requirement (putting the grant recipients on notice that they could lose funds if they "willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373" (see below)) "to any existing grant administered by the Office of Justice Programs and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services that expressly contains this certification condition and to future grants for which the Department is statutorily authorized to impose such a condition."

This portion of the memo is designed to satisfy the clear-notice requirement, the relatedness requirement, and no-pressure-into-compulsion requirement for conditioned federal spending.

Sessions's memo also defined "sanctuary jurisdiction" (for the first time) as "jurisdictions that 'willfully refuse to comply with section 1373.'" This portion of the memo is designed to exempt jurisdictions that do not "willfully refuse to comply with section 1373," including some that have sued the government.

At the same time, the government asked Judge Orrick to revise or lift his earlier preliminary injunction. The government's argument is that Sessions's memo takes care of all the likely legal problems that Judge Orrick identified (the conditions for federal spending, mentioned above) and leaves the plaintiffs with no standing.

Seattle Sues Over Sanctuary Cities EO

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

Seattle sued the Trump Administration this week over President Trump's "sanctuary cities" executive order. Seattle's move follows San Francisco's earlier suit and AG Sessions's speech this week on how he intends to enforce the EO.

We posted earlier on the EO here, on San Francisco's suit here, and on Section 1373's constitutionality here.

Like San Francisco, Seattle alleges that it's already complying with Section 1373 (because that section doesn't "impose an affirmative obligation to collect the citizenship and immigration data of its residents, or to provide such data to federal officials"), and that Section 1373 is unconstitutional if it requires anything more.

As to the constitutionality of Section 1373, Seattle contends that it violates the anti-commandeering principle in violation of Printz, that it turns pressure into compulsion in violation of NFIB, and that it contains only vague conditions on federal spending, unrelated to the underlying federal program.

Seattle's suit assumes that the EO threatens all federal funding for failure to comply with Section 1373--an assumption that seems supported by the plain language of the EO. AG Sessions's speech this week did very little (if anything) to qualify that assumption and to clarify the EO's reach.

Is Section 1373 Unconstitutional?

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

President Trump's EO on sanctuary cities says that "the Attorney General and the Secretary . . . shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdiction) are not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary."

The provision is almost certainly over-broad, in that it conditions apparently all "Federal grants" on compliance with Section 1373, running afoul of both the relatedness prong and the pressure-into-compulsion test for conditioned federal spending.

But is 1373 itself unconstitutional? In particular, does 1373 violate the non-commandeering principle?

Section 1373 reads:

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State, or local government entity from doing any of the following with respect to information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, or any individual:

(1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such information from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(2) Maintaining such information.

(3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local government entity.

(c) The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status information.

The provision--which prohibits action (it prohibits prohibitions) by state and local governments, but doesn't require action--is a pretty transparent attempt to try to work around the anti-commandeering principle. (Doing the same thing directly--by requiring state and local officers to report--would obviously violate the anti-commandeering principle.) Does that save it from commandeering?

Jane Chong, in a thoughtful post over at Lawfare, says maybe--or at least "the answer is not as open-and-shut as the experts insist it is."

If she's right--and she makes a good argument--maybe the problem isn't with transparent work-arounds like 1373. Maybe, instead, the problem is with the anti-commandeering principle itself. In light of 1373 (and a similar provision in the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, which Chong discusses), maybe "anti-commandeering" suffers from the same problem that another Tenth Amendment principle--"areas of traditional government functions"--suffered from between National League of Cities v. Usery and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: It's unworkable. And maybe the solution is the same as in Garcia: Abandon it, and leave the issue to the political process. (After all, there's nothing in the Tenth Amendment that says anything about commandeering.)

Florida State Judge Grants Writ of Habeas Corpus to Immigration Detainee on Tenth Amendment Grounds

Professor Ruthann Robson, City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law

In his opinion in LaCroix v. Junior, Florida state judge Milton Hirsch confronted the constitutionality of the Executive Order threatening to revoke federal funding for sanctuary cities which as we previously predicted "overreaches."

The judge granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus by a man "incarcerated in the Miami-Dade County correctional system." Although there were no state charges against him, LaCroix had "no prospect of imminent release," because as "often happens" Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), the federal agency "responsible for the deportation of those whose presence in this country is unlawful, had filed a detainer or lodged a request with the corrections department, seeking to have the department retain an inmate whom would otherwise be released, because ICE has a basis to inquire further as to the status of the person sought. 

Judge Hirsch identified "two inequities" of this practice.  First, until ICE takes custody of the person, the county must "house, oversee, and control" people in which it has no ongoing interest and to do so at county expense.  Second, "it results in the continued incarceration in county jails of persons neither charged with, nor sentenced for violating, any state or county law, and whose ongoing incarceration by the county is therefore difficult to justify."

Judge Hirsch's opinion outlines the controversies surrounding the county's changing practices, noting that while there had been county detention on behalf of ICE, in 2013 the Dade County Commission changed its policy to effectively ban county jails from honoring ICE requests.  However, after the President "threatened to cut federal grants for any counties or cities that don’t cooperate fully with Immigration and Customs Enforcement," Miami-Dade Mayor Carlos Gimenez immediately reversed county policy and ordered county jails to comply with ICE requests.

Judge Hirsch finds that the federal government cannot constrict or commandeer state officials largely relying on Printz v. United States (1997), which held the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act's requirement of background checks by state officials unconstitutional pursuant to the Tenth Amendment.  Quoting from Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Printz, Judge Hirsch concluded that the present situation was "actually easier" to decide: Printz involved something that local law enforcement is often called to do as a matter of local law, but here

however, we deal with an area of the law – the regulation of immigration and deportation – reserved exclusively to the federal government. See U.S. Const. Art. I § 8, clause 4. The Department does not, and as a matter of constitutional law cannot, act in this federal bailiwick. According to its “mission statement,” see http://www.miamidade.gov/corrections/about-corrections.asp, the Department, “serves our community by providing safe, secure and humane detention of individuals in our custody while preparing them for a successful return to the community.” (Emphasis added.) This is wholly unrelated, arguably antithetical, to the mission of ICE, see https://www.ice.gov/overview, which is “to protect America from the cross-border crime and illegal immigration that threaten national security and public safety.” Yet by operation of the recent change in county policy, and the presidential order upon which it is based, county correctional officers and county correctional facilities are made appendages of ICE, obliged to imprison and maintain Petitioner for ICE –
Petitioner and others, perhaps many others, similarly circumstanced. If the use made of local governmental resources in Printz was constitutionally proscribed, the use made of local governmental resources here is surely constitutionally proscribed.

Moreover, although LaCroix is not a government official, the Tenth Amendment's reservation of rights to "the people" is one that can be raised by an individual, as the Court unanimously held in Bond v. United States (2011). (Recall that Carol Anne Bond was similarly successful in her second trip to the United States Supreme Court when it held that the federal government had essentially overreached in prosecuting her for violation using "chemical weapons.")

Judge Hirsch's analysis of Tenth Amendment precedent is on solid ground.  The opinion is carefully crafted and closely reasoned.  But Judge Hirsch does evoke the larger political contexts in at least two respects. 

First, Judge Hirsch raises and discounts the term "sanctuary city."  He writes that although the term has a "Biblical sound to it" (explaining in a footnote the more precise Biblical meaning), and thus has some rhetorical force,

Miami is not and never was a “sanctuary city,” and the issue raised by the petition at bar has nothing to do with affording “sanctuary” to those unlawfully in this country. It has everything to do with the separation of powers between the state and federal governments as reflected in the Tenth Amendment to, and in the very structure of, the United States Constitution.

Nevertheless, near the end of the opinion, Judge Hirsch repeats his conclusion that "Miami is not, and has never been, a sanctuary city," and then adds:"But America is, and has always been, a sanctuary country." He quotes one of his own previous opinions and includes a footnote quoting Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus and discussing the dedication of the Statue of Liberty.

Second, Judge Hirsch raises the specter of unbridled Executive power.  He notes that although the "presidential edict at issue here seeks to bring about the conscription of the corrections department, and employs powerful financial pressure to do so," the Spending Power is vested in Congress under Art. I §8 cl. 1 rather than the Executive.  Additionally:

No doubt the limitations imposed by the Tenth Amendment, like so many limitations imposed by the Constitution, are a source of frustration to those who dream of wielding power in unprecedented ways or to unprecedented degrees. But America was not made for those who dream of power. America was made for those with the power to dream.

 It does not seem too far of a stretch to read this as a critique of the current President.

The case is sure to be appealed.  But whatever happens on appeal in this case, there is similar litigation throughout the nation, including the lawsuit by San Franscisco.

[images: Cape Florida Lighthouse, Miami-Dade County via & in 1830, via]

San Francisco Sues Trump Over Sanctuary Cities Order

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

San Francisco filed suit today against President Trump over his executive order stripping sanctuary cities of federal grants.

We posted on the EO and some of the federalism issues here.

San Francisco argues that the EO violates the anti-commandeering rule, that its funding provision turns persuasion into compulsion, and that the funding threat includes federal money that has nothing to do with immigration enforcement--all in violation of federalism principles in the Tenth Amendment.

Recall the EO's federal-funding-for-compliance provision:

the Attorney General and the Secretary, in their discretion and to the extent consistent with law, shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1371 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary.

8 U.S.C. Sec. 1373(a), in turn, prohibits local governments from "sending to, or receiving from, [federal immigration officials] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status . . . of any individual."

As an initial matter, San Francisco argues that it actually complies with 1373, because it doesn't prohibit officials from communicating with the feds regarding "citizenship or immigration status," even though it restricts communications on other matters.

The City goes on to argue that 1373, taken together with the EO, commandeers state and local governments in violation of the anti-commandeering rule, because it regulates "States in their sovereign capacity," "limit[s] state authority to regulate internal affairs and determine the duties and responsibilities of state employees," and "ultimately forc[es] States to allow their employees to use state time and state resources to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals." Moreover, the EO "commandeers state and local governments, violating the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by, inter alia, compelling them to enforce a federal program by imprisoning individuals subject to removal at the request of the Federal government when those individuals would otherwise be released from custody."

As to preenforcement review, San Francisco argues that it "faces the imminent loss of federal funds and impending enforcement action if it does not capitulate to the President's demand that it help enforce federal immigration law. At least one jurisdiction has already succumbed to this presidential fiat." (The complaint also outlines the many other harms the city says it suffers, and will suffer, under the EO.)

President Trump Way Overreaches on Sanctuary Cities

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

President Trump's EO today threatening to revoke federal funding for sanctuary cities runs right up against NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court's Obamacare decision, penned by Chief Justice John Roberts. In other words: It is unconstitutional.

Recall that the Court in NFIB ruled that Obamacare's Medicaid expansion violated federalism principles, because Obamacare threatened a state that declined to expand Medicaid with a potential loss of all federal Medicaid funding. Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the provision was "a gun to the head" of states, and that the threatened loss of Medicaid funding "is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion." The Court "saved" the provision, however, by ruling that the federal government could withhold the additional Obamacare funding for Medicaid expansion from any state that declined to expand Medicaid under Obamacare. It just couldn't withhold all Medicaid funding.

Enter Trump's policy on sanctuary cities. President Trump's EO says that it's the policy of Executive Branch to "[e]nsure that jurisdictions that fail to comply with applicable Federal law do not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law." So far, so good, if NFIB is part of law, as it is.

But the EO goes on to say that "the Attorney General and the Secretary . . . shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary."

This goes much farther than Obamacare's Medicaid expansion: The EO threatens to revoke all federal funding to a jurisdiction, with just a small caveat, and with no overriding "except as mandated by law" clause.

If Obamacare was a "gun to the head," this is much more. (Maybe a nuclear bomb to the head?) Moreover, most of the federal funding at stake has nothing to do with immigration, pretty clearly violating the "germaneness" or "relatedness" requirement from South Dakota v. Dole.

Whatever one thinks about NFIB, or even the animating federalism principles that the Court applied, President Trump's EO goes much, much farther. And whatever one thinks about sanctuary cities, President Trump's approach is quite clearly out of constitutional bounds.

Court Rebuffs State Challenge to Treasury Regs on Abandoned Bonds

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

Judge Christopher R. Cooper (D.D.C.) today rebuffed state arguments that a new Treasury rule governing state escheat claims of title and for payment of U.S. Treasury bonds did not violate the Constitution. The ruling ends this case (unless and until appealed) and means that the Treasury rule, designed to ensure that state judgments on the abandonment and ownership of Treasury bonds are accurate, stays in place.

The ruling is a blow to states like Kansas that sought to make it easier to show that a Treasury bond was abandoned, and that the state owned it, and therefore could redeem it.

The case came on the heels of some regulatory and judicial back-and-forth on the issues of whether and how states could take title to Treasury bonds under state escheat laws, redeem the bonds, and keep the proceeds. At one point in the back-and-forth, Kansas adopted a title-escheatment statute, which conveyed title of abandoned bonds to the state. Treasury agreed to redeem bonds in the state's possession, but, under its regs, not those escheated bonds not in its possession. So Kansas sued.

As that case was pending, Treasury enacted new regs. The new regs gave Treasure the "discretion to recognize an escheat judgment that purports to vest a state with title to a [matured by unredeemed] savings bond . . . in the state's possession" when there is sufficient evidence that the bond has been abandoned. But the rule does not recognize "[e]scheat judgments that purport to vest a state with title to bonds that the state does not possess." In short, in order for a state to claim payment, the rule provides that (1) states must have possession of the bonds, (2) they must have "made reasonable efforts to provide actual and constructive notice of the state escheatment proceeding" and an opportunity to respond to all interested parties, and (3) there must be sufficient evidence of abandonment.

Kansas and others sued again, this time arguing that the new rule was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA, that it violates the Appointments Clause and the Tenth Amendment, and that it illegal confers the power to review state court judgments to a federal agency.

As to Appointments, the plaintiffs argued that the Treasury official who signed and promulgated the rule, Fiscal Assistant Secretary David A. Lebryk, appointed as an inferior officer, exercised authority as a principal officer in violation of the Appointments Clause. The court disagreed, pointing to the Fiscal Assistant Secretary's work, including the work on the new rule, which "is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate."

As to review of state judgments, the plaintiffs argued that the new rule permits Treasury to judge the due process and sufficiency-of-evidence in state court proceedings under the three prongs listed above. But the court said that "[t]wo bodies of law are at issue: a state law of escheat and a federal law of bond ownership," and that "[s]tate court judgments are final regarding the former, but Treasury--by operation of the Supremacy Clause and pursuant to its statutorily-delegated authority--may promulgate rules to define the latter." The court also said that Treasury's due process review is not aimed at implementing constitutional protections (as an appellate court might), "but at facilitating reliable determinations of abandonment."

Finally, as to the Tenth Amendment, the court said that Treasury promulgated the rule pursuant to statutory authority from Congress, enacted within Congress's constitutional authority, and so the rule raised no Tenth Amendment problem.

(The court also rejected the plaintiffs' APA claim.)

 

Tenther States Claim Sovereign Right Not to Pay Employees Overtime

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

Twenty-one states, led by Texas, sued the federal government this week over the Labor Department's new overtime rule. The complaint, which argues that the rule violates the Tenth Amendment and principles of state sovereignty, puts Garcia, long a thorn in the side of states'-righters, on the chopping block.

The suit challenges DOL regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act that raise the threshold exemption for overtime pay. This means that employers now have to pay overtime to employees who earn up to $47,476, up from $23,660. (The FLSA only exempts "managerial" positions from the overtime requirement. DOL has long used a salary test as a proxy for "managerial" in its regulations, however.) The rule applies to both private-sector employers and states.

The states argue that the new rule will cost them money and require them to reshuffle spending priorities, interfering with their state sovereignty and violating the Tenth Amendment.

The Supreme Court at one time would have agreed. The Court ruled in National League of Cities v. Usery in 1976 that the FLSA minimum-wage requirement violated the Tenth Amendment for exactly these reasons. But less than a decade later, when it became clear that this approach couldn't work across the myriad federal regulations that applied to states in their non-sovereign capacity, the Court walked back. It ruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) that the FLSA did not violate the Tenth Amendment, and that states had plenty of protection against federal overreach through the ordinary political process.

Now the plaintiffs in this latest lawsuit explicitly argue that Garcia should be overruled. They say that subsequent developments in the law have undermined the case, and that it's time to go back to National League of Cities.

The complaint speaks in terms of the additional burden to the states of the new DOL regulation, but its logic extends to any federal standard (like minimum wage, maximum hours, worker safety, etc.) imposed on the states. As a result, the case, if ultimately successful, would work a sea change in federal-state relations as they've existed since 1985, potentially across policy areas. That seems unlikely given the current composition of the Court. But who knows what might happen after the election.

The states also argue that the new regulation exceeds DOL authority under the FLSA, because the FLSA sets the overtime requirement based on job type ("managerial"), but the DOL regs set the requirement based on salary. This claim may have more traction (in the Fifth Circuit, at least, and possibly before the Supreme Court). It's similar to the core claim in the last state effort, also led by Texas, to challenge administrative action as a violation of the Constitution and the Administrative Procedures Act--in that case, the DAPA program. An evenly divided Supreme Court left in place the Fifth Circuit's ruling that DAPA violated the APA.

Ninth Circuit Upholds Federal Ban on Federal Inmate Sexual Assault

Steven D. Schwinn, John Marshall Law School

The Ninth Circuit yesterday upheld federal laws criminalizing sexual assaults in facilities where federal inmates are held by agreement with state and local governments. The ruling is a baby-step extension of United States v. Comstock, the Court's 2010 case holding that Congress had authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to authorize civil detention of "sexually dangerous" federal prisoners beyond their term of imprisonment. It's a baby-step beyond Comstock, because these laws have the added feature that they operate within state and local detention facilities--where the federal government contracts to hold federal inmates.

Sabil Mujahid brought the facial claim against the federal statutes, arguing that they exceeded Congress's authority and ran afoul of the Tenth Amendment. The provisions criminalized sexual assault "in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the Attorney General." By its plain terms, the provision outlaws sexual assault by non-federal inmates in these facilities, too, but Mujahid is a federal inmate, and the court limited its ruling to federal inmates.

The court, applying Comstock, flatly rejected Mujahid's claims. In short:

Like the civil commitment statute in Comstock, [these statutes] are not facially unconstitutional; they are "a 'necessary and proper' means of exercising the federal authority that permits Congress to create federal criminal laws, to punish their violation, to imprison violators, to provide appropriately for those imprisoned, and to maintain the security of those who are not imprisoned but who may be affected by the federal imprisonment of others. See Comstock.

As I said, the court specifically did not rule on the statutes as applied to state inmates in these same facilities. That question may raise more complicated issues (but just slightly).