Monday, November 4, 2019
Second Circuit Rejects President Trump's Effort to Protect Taxes, Establish Categorical Immunity from Criminal Investigation
The Second Circuit today flatly rejected President Trump's attempt to halt a grand jury subpoena for the President's financial records directed at his accounting firm, Mazars, based on a claim of absolute presidential immunity from all criminal processes (including investigations).
The ruling deals a sharp blow to the President and his extraordinary efforts to conceal his taxes. Still, the President is sure to appeal. (Just last month, the President lost in the D.C. Circuit on a similar case, dealing with a House subpoena directed at Mazars.)
Recall that the President filed this federal case to stop a state criminal process, in particular, a state grand jury's subpoena to Mazars for the President's financial records, including his taxes. The district court ruled that the President's suit was barred by Younger abstention and, in the alternative, that the President was not likely to succeed on the merits of his immunity claim.
The Second Circuit reversed on the abstention question, but affirmed on the immunity question. The court noted that the subpoena was directed at Mazars, not President Trump, and therefore did not require the President to do anything that might interfere with his ability to faithfully execute the law. It noted moreover that the subpoena seeks information that has nothing to do with the President's official responsibilities, and is therefore not subject to any claim of executive privilege.
As to the President's claim of absolute privilege against any criminal process (including even an investigation), the court wrote that the scant authority on this question goes only against the President. In particular, it noted that the Court in United States v. Nixon held that executive privilege and separation-of-powers concerns did not preclude the enforcement of a subpoena for presidential records. (As to the separation of powers, the court noted, "That the Court [in Nixon] felt it unnecessary to devote extended discussion to the latter argument strongly suggests that the President may not resist compliance with an otherwise valid subpoena for private and non-privileged materials simply because he is the President.") Moreover, the court noted that even the two OLC memos that the President cited--the 1973 Dixon memo, and the 2000 Moss memo, only go so far as immunity from indictment, not mere investigation.
Although the ruling doesn't mean that we'll see the President's taxes soon--again, the President is sure to appeal, and that'll take some time--it is a sharp blow against his claim of absolute privilege from all criminal process.
Friday, November 1, 2019
The Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction against the Department of Justice's effort to clamp down on sanctuary cities by imposing two conditions on recipients of the DOJ-administered Byrne JAG grant program. The ruling keeps in place the injunction against DOJ's "notice" and "access" conditions that are designed to encourage local governments to cooperate with federal immigration authorities to identify unauthorized aliens.
The Ninth Circuit ruling is just the latest in a line halting the implementation of these conditions. We posted most recently on sanctuary litigation here.
The case, City of Los Angeles v. Barr, tests the two conditions that DOJ put on Byrne-JAG grant recipients without specific congressional authorization. The first condition, the "notice" condition, requires a recipient to honor DHS's requests for advance notice of the scheduled release date and time of any detained alien held in a grant recipient's correctional facilities. The second condition, the "access" condition, requires a grant recipient to give federal agents access to correctional facilities to meet with detained aliens.
The court rejected DOJ's arguments that two statutory provisions authorized it to impose the conditions. The first, a provision in the Violence Against Women Act, says that the Assistant AG shall "exercise such other powers and functions as may be vested in the Assistant Attorney General pursuant to this title or by delegation of the Attorney General, including placing such special conditions on all grants, and determining priority purposes for formula grants." The court held that the notice and access conditions were not "special conditions" under the provision, "because they are not conditions triggered by specific characteristics not addressed by established conditions, as was the case for high-risk grantees under [Department regulations]." It held that they weren't "priority purposes," because "[t]he notice and access conditions are not included as purposes of the Byrne JAG award, nor are they purposes of either of its predecessor grant statutes." The court said that the first provision therefore didn't authorize the conditions.
The second provision, a section of the Byrne-JAG statute itself, authorizes the AG to obtain certain information and to require coordination with agencies. The court held that maintenance and reporting requirements applied to programs under the statute, and not to notice of a detained alien. And it held that the coordination requirement applied to "agencies affected by the program to be funded by the Byrne JAG award," not "DHS agents who are not part of a funded program." The court said that the second provision therefore didn't authorize the conditions, either.
Because no statute authorized DOJ to impose the conditions, DOJ lacked authority to impose them, and the court upheld a preliminary injunction halting them.
Thursday, October 31, 2019
In commentary on Slate, Dahlia Lithwick assesses how or whether we should "turn the page" on the disturbing confirmation hearings of the newest SCOTUS Justice, Brett Kavanaugh.
She writes that two women Justices have
hailed him as a mentor to his female clerks or as a collegial member of the Nine and urged us, in the case of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, to look to the future and turn the page. It is, of course, their actual job to get over it. They will spend the coming years doing whatever they can to pick off a vote of his, here and there, and the only way that can happen is through generosity and solicitude and the endless public performance of getting over it. I understand this.
As a Supreme Court reporter, I am also expected to afford the new justice that same generosity and solicitude. As a journalist, I am finding it hard to do. After all, he is a man who has already publicly condemned his critics to suffer his wrath for embarrassing him. He is a man who has promised that his doubters and detractors will “reap the whirlwind.”
Lithwick raises the question of what we "owe" to the newest Justice — and the Court and the judiciary — a year later.
Tuesday, October 29, 2019
That's the question raised in a lawsuit filed by the United States last week in the Eastern District of California. The U.S. seeks a declaration that the agreement is unconstitutional and a permanent injunction to halt its operation.
The case, U.S. v. California, tests California's cap-and-trade agreement with the provincial government of Quebec, Canada. The federal government argues that the agreement violates the Treaty Clause (prohibiting states from "enter[ing] into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation"), the Compact Clause (prohibiting states, without congressional consent, from "enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power"), and the Foreign Commerce Clause. It also contends that the agreement impermissibly interferes with the federal government's powers over foreign affairs.
This intrusion complexifies and burdens the United States' task, as a collective of the states and territories, of negotiating competitive international agreements. Moreover, California's actions, as well as the actions of those acting in concert with it, have had the effect of enhancing the political power of that state vis-a-vis the United States. This is due not only to the effect of the Agreement itself but also stems from the fact that the Agreement could encourage other states to enter into similarly illegal arrangements.
The design of the Constitution requires that the federal government be able to speak with one voice on behalf of the United States in matters of foreign affairs. Allowing individual states in the Union to conduct their own foreign policy to advance their own narrow interests is thus anathema to our system of government and, if tolerated, would unlawfully enhance state power at the expense of the United States and undermine the United States' ability to negotiate competitive international agreements.
The D.C. Circuit today stayed last week's district court order that the Justice Department release material from the Mueller Report that was redacted because it was part of the grand jury proceeding. We posted on the district court order here.
This means that DOJ won't release the material to the Committee--at least not until the appeals court says so.
The ruling is not a surprise--it simply maintains the status quo--and says nothing about the merits. The court ordered the Committee to file a response to DOJ's emergency motion by Friday, and DOJ to file any reply by next Tuesday.
Saturday, October 26, 2019
Former National Security Official Sues for Declaration on Congressional Subpoena, Absolute Privilege
Former Deputy National Security Advisor and Acting National Security Advisor Charles Kupperman sued late Friday for a ruling on how he should navigate between a House committee subpoena to testify in the impeachment inquiry and White House instructions not to.
The case is unusual, in that the subject of a subpoena seeks a ruling before making a decision to testify. More commonly, a rebuffed House committee has filed suit to enforce its subpoena.
Kupperman's complaint sets out two questions for the court. First, the complaint asks whether the White House is right in flatly instructing him not to testify based on its now-familiar categorical assertion of absolute executive privilege. On the one hand, he says that the Office of Legal Counsel "has consistently opined that 'the President and his immediate advisers are absolutely immune from testimonial compulsion by a Congressional committee' on matters related to their official duties," and that "[t]he Executive Branch has, with few exceptions, refused to permit close White House advisors to the President to testify before Congress since the 1940s when the Executive Office of the President was created." On the other, he points out that the D.C. District rejected just such an absolute, categorical claim of executive privilege in Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers. But he notes that the court "further concluded that the Counsel to the President was not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity because the inquiry did not 'involve the sensitive topics of national security or foreign affairs.'" He also notes that the ruling was stayed pending appeal, and that it settled before the D.C. Circuit had a chance to rule.
Next, the complaint asks whether the committee had authority under House rules to issue the subpoena. He cites Rule XI, clause 2(m), which grants committees subpoena power "[f]or the purpose of carrying out any of its functions and duties under this rule and rule X . . . ." He notes that the rule doesn't specifically include impeachment as one of the "functions and duties," and that Rule X speaks in terms of legislative functions, not impeachment. But he also points out that the D.C. Circuit recently held in Mazars "that Rule XI, clause 2(m) authorized the House Oversight Committee to issue a subpoena in furtherance of an investigation into alleged misconduct by the President," but that Judge Rao dissented on this point.
Kupperman asked the court for a declaration on how to reconcile the competing demands and for expedited review.
Friday, October 25, 2019
Court Orders DOJ to Release Grand Jury Material from Mueller Report to House,Validates House Impeachment Inquiry
Judge Beryl A. Howell (D.D.C.) today granted the House Judiciary Committee's application for portions of the Mueller Report that were redacted because they were part of a grand jury proceeding. "Consequently, DOJ is ordered to provide promptly, by October 30, 2019, to HJC all portions of the Mueller Report that were redacted pursuant to Rule 6(e) and any underlying transcripts or exhibits referenced in the portions of the Mueller Report that were redacted pursuant to Rule 6(e). HJC is permitted to file further requests articulating its particularized need for additional grand jury information requested in the initial application."
The ruling deals a sharp blow to the Trump Administration and its attempts to protect grand jury material from the Mueller Report from Congress. It's also a clear validation of the legitimacy of the House's impeachment process. It doesn't plow any new legal ground, however. Indeed, the case is only notable because it rebuffs the administration's extraordinary claims.
Still, there's sure to be an appeal.
The case, In re Application of the Committee on the Judiciary, arose when DOJ refused the House Judiciary Committee's request for grand jury material from the Mueller Report. DOJ cited Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). That rule generally prohibits disclosure of "a matter occurring before the grand jury." But it has an exception for disclosure "preliminary to or in connection with a judiciary proceeding." The Committee filed its application with the district court under this exception and requested "the grand jury information referenced in or underlying the Mueller Report as well as grand jury information collected by the Special Counsel relating to four categories of information pursuant to Rule 6(e)'s exception . . . ."
The court ruled for the Committee. The court first concluded that a Senate impeachment trial is "a judicial proceeding." The court said that the phrase "judicial proceeding" has a broad meaning; that an impeachment trial is inherently judicial in nature; that historical practice supports this reading; and that D.C. Circuit law "forecloses any conclusion other than that an impeachment trial is a 'judicial proceeding.'"
The court next concluded that the Committee's investigation is "preliminary to" that judicial proceeding. It held that the Committee's "primary purpose is to determine whether to recommend articles of impeachment," and that requiring anything more would result in the court impermissibly intruding on Congress's Article I powers.
Notably, the court emphasized that the Committee's work investigating impeachment is legitimate and constitutionally permissible, and that nothing requires the House to adopt an "impeachment inquiry resolution" to legitimate its work.
Finally, the court surveyed the several reasons why the Committee "has a 'particularized need' for the requested materials,'" including why and how this material may relate to the Ukraine investigation and to any other possible grounds for impeachment.
Thursday, October 24, 2019
The Ninth Circuit this week affirmed a district court's preliminary injunction against agency rules that categorically exempt certain organizations from the Affordable Care Act's contraception requirement.
The ruling is a blow to the administration's efforts to side-step the ACA's contraception requirements for religious groups. We previously posted on the case here.
The case, California v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, tests HHS's final rules that exempt certain entities from the ACA's contraception-coverage requirement. The court upheld a district court ruling that the final rules likely violated the Administrative Procedure Act.
The ACA provides that group health plans and insurance issuers "shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for . . . with respect to women, such additional preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in the comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration . . . ." HHS previously exempted group health plans of certain religious employers, like churches. It also had previously provided for an accommodation for certain nonprofits that had a religious objection: those groups merely had to tell HHS that they objected (then HHS would inform the organization's insurer that it had to provide contraceptive care for the organization's employees without any further involvement of the organization). HHS later also exempted certainly closely-held for-profit corporations (after Hobby Lobby) and modified the exemption-trigger to require objecting organizations merely to notify HHS in writing of its objections (after Wheaton College).
But the Trump Administration went a step farther. It issued rules that categorically exempt entities "with sincerely held religious beliefs objecting to contraception or sterilization coverage" and "organizations with sincerely held moral convictions concerning contraceptive coverage." The rules meant that organizations that might previously have sought and received a waiver would be categorically exempt on their own say-so.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that these rules likely violated the APA. In short, the court said that HHS didn't have authority under the ACA to create categorical exemptions:
The statute grants HRSA the limited authority to determine which, among the different types of preventative care, are to be covered. But nothing in the statute permits the agencies to determine exemptions from the requirement. In other words, the statute delegates to HRSA the discretion to determine which types of preventative care are covered, but the statute does not delegate to HRSA or any other agency the discretion to exempt who must meet the obligation.
The court rejected the government's claim that it issued the rules to harmonize the ACA with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The court questioned whether the RFRA even gave the government the authority to determine a violation and then act against federal law to effect it. And it went on to say that the accommodation didn't violate the RFRA, anyway. (Recall that the Court dodged this issue in Zubick.)
The dissent argued that the court lacked jurisdiction in light of a nationwide injunction issued by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The court responded at length, but acknowledged that it's an open question whether a federal court's nationwide injunction strips other federal courts of jurisdiction in a more limited case.
The Illinois Supreme Court last week upheld the state's revenge-porn law against a First Amendment challenge. The ruling rebuffed an appeal by a criminal defendant charged with violating the law.
The case, People v. Austin, tested Illinois's effort to criminalize revenge porn. The law provides as follows:
(b) A person commits non-consensual dissemination of private sexual images when he or she:
(1) intentionally disseminates an image of another person:
(A) who is at least 18 years of age; and
(B) who is identifiable from the image itself or information displayed in connection with the image; and
(C) who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed, in whole or in part; and
(2) obtains the image under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private; and
(3) knows or should have known that the person in the image has not consented to the dissemination.
The court first ruled that the law doesn't cover material in any categorical exception to free speech (like incitement, true threats, obscenity, etc.), and it declined to establish a new exception.
It next ruled that the law is a content-neutral restriction on speech: "There is no criminal liability for the dissemination of the very same image obtained and distributed with consent. The manner of the image's acquisition and publication, and not its content, is thus crucial to the illegality of its dissemination." The court went on to hold that the act satisfies intermediate scrutiny, because it serves the state's interest in protecting privacy and "the substantial government interests of protecting Illinois residents from nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images would be achieved less effectively" without it.
The court rejected arguments that the act was overbroad or vague.
The dissent argued that the act was content-based, because "one must look at the content of the photo to determine whether it falls within the purview of the statute," and that it failed strict scrutiny because it lacked a specific intent element. "Instead, simply viewing an image sent in a text message and showing it to the person next to you could result in felony charges."
Tuesday, October 22, 2019
The Supreme Court on Friday agreed to hear a separation-of-powers challenge to the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The Court granted cert. to determine whether the for-cause removal provision for the head of the CFPB violates the separation of powers. It then ordered the parties to brief whether the for-cause removal provision was severable from the Dodd-Frank Act.
We previously posted on the case, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, here. Notably, the CFPB itself now joins Seila Law in arguing that the structure is unconstitutional.
The case tests the for-cause removal provision for the head of the CFPB--long a target of opponents of independent agencies within the executive branch. Opponents argue that the for-cause removal provision impermissibly encroaches on the President's authority to execute the law, because it prohibits the President from firing the head of the agency at will.
The Court has long upheld similar protections that create agency independence. But the government argues that those rulings involved multi-member bodies (as in Humphrey's Executor v. U.S.) or "inferior offices" that lack the independent power of the CFPB (as in Morrison v. Olson), so that they don't unduly encroach on the President's authority.
The attack on the structure of the CFPB is just the latest in a long line of challenges that draw on a strong version of the "unitary executive theory," set out most prominently in Justice Scalia's lone dissent in Morrison v. Olson. Justice Scalia's position has gained traction since Morrison, and this case may now make it law.
In a different case dealing with the same question, then-Judge Kavanaugh wrote for a panel of the D.C. Circuit that the CFPB's structure violated the separation of powers. The ruling is a robust endorsement of the unitary executive theory and a roadmap for opponents of the agency's independence.
The severability question means that if the Court strikes the director's for-cause removal provision, it could also overturn the provisions in Dodd-Frank that created the agency in the first place. That could have sweeping effects, even potentially nullifying the agency's prior actions.
The Court hasn't yet scheduled the case for argument.
Friday, October 18, 2019
In an opinion in Jones v. DeSantis, United States District Judge Robert Hinkle of the Northern District of Florida held that the Florida statute requiring payment of fines, fees, and costs in order for a person convicted of a felony to have their voting rights restored is unconstitutional and should be enjoined.
Recall that Florida law disenfranchising persons convicted of felonies, held unconstitutional in 2018, was changed by a voter referendum to amend the Florida Constitution. Amendment 4. Amendment 4 changed the Florida Constitution to provide:
any disqualification from voting arising from a felony conviction shall terminate and voting rights shall be restored upon completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation.
Fla. Const. Art. VI §4. After the amendment was passed, the Florida legislature passed SB7066, codified as Fla. Stat. §98.071 (5) which defined "completion of all terms of sentence" to include "full payment of any restitution ordered by the court, as well as "Full payment of fines or fees ordered by the court as a part of the sentence or that are ordered by the court as a condition of any form of supervision, including, but not limited to, probation, community control, or parole."
Judge Hinkle first addressed Florida's motion to dismiss based on lack of standing and motion to abstain, finding them without merit. Judge Hinkle then discussed whether or not Amendment 4 authorized the statute extending the conditions to all restitution, fines, and fees, acknowledging that "the last word will belong to the Florida Supreme Court," on the matter of that interpretation. However, for purposes of the issue of constitutionality at this stage, the judge assumed that " “all terms of sentence” includes fines and restitution, fees even when unrelated to culpability, and amounts even when converted to civil liens, so long as the amounts are included in the sentencing document."
While the court acknowledged that a state can deny persons convicted of a felony the right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment as construed by the Court in Richardson v. Ramirez (1974), here the state had amended its constitution not to do so, but with an exception for those persons convicted of felonies who could not meet their financial obligations. Thus, the Equal Protection Clause is implicated. On this point, Judge Hinkle found Eleventh Circuit precedent was clear, citing Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). The court quotes the en banc court in Johnson stating:
Access to the franchise cannot be made to depend on an individual’s financial resources. Under Florida’s Rules of Executive Clemency, however, the right to vote can still be granted to felons who cannot afford to pay restitution. . . . Because Florida does not deny access to the restoration of the franchise based on ability to pay, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on these claims.
[emphasis in original]. For Judge Hinkle, this is both the "starting point of the analysis of this issue, and pretty much the ending point."
As support for Johnson and further explication of the standard of review under equal protection doctrine, Judge Hinkle reasoned:
Johnson does not lack Supreme Court support; it is consistent with a series of Supreme Court decisions.
In one, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996), the Court noted the “general rule” that equal-protection claims based on indigency are subject to only rational-basis review. This is the same general rule on which the Secretary [of State of Florida] places heavy reliance here. But in M.L.B. the Court said there are two exceptions to the general rule.
The first exception, squarely applicable here, is for claims related to voting. The Court said, “The basic right to participate in political processes as voters and candidates cannot be limited to those who can pay for a license.” The Court cited a long line of cases supporting this principle. In asserting that the Amendment 4 and SB7066 requirement for payment of financial obligations is subject only to highly deferential rational-basis scrutiny, the Secretary ignores this exception.
The second exception is for claims related to criminal or quasi-criminal processes. Cases applying this exception hold that punishment cannot be increased because of a defendant’s inability to pay. See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (holding that probation cannot be revoked based on failure to pay an amount the defendant is financially unable to pay). Disenfranchisement of felons has a regulatory component, see, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958), and when so viewed, disenfranchisement is subject only to the first M.L.B. exception, not this second one. But when the purpose of disenfranchisement is to punish, this second exception applies. If, after adoption of Amendment 4, the purported justification for requiring payment of financial obligations is only to ensure that felons pay their “debt to society”—that is, that they are fully punished—this second M.L.B. exception is fully applicable.
Another case applying these principles is Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), which was cited in both M.L.B. and the Johnson footnote. In Harper the Supreme Court said “[v]oter qualification has no relation to wealth.” The Court continued, “[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.” And the Court added, “[t]o introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter’s qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.” The Secretary says none of this is true when the voter is a felon, but the Secretary does not explain how a felon’s wealth is more relevant than any other voter’s. And Johnson plainly rejected the Secretary’s proposed distinction.
[some citations omitted]
Judge Hinkle's remedy was not to entirely enjoin the enforcement of the statute. Instead, Florida must follow its procedures and amend them if need be to allow indigent persons to demonstrate their inability to pay any restitution, fines, or fees. Nevertheless, this is a victory for those who have argued that the Florida statute undermined Amendment 4.
October 18, 2019 in Courts and Judging, Elections and Voting, Equal Protection, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Opinion Analysis, Standing, State Constitutional Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, October 17, 2019
The Ninth Circuit ruled today in Walden v. Nevada that a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity over any federal claims when it removes a case from state to federal court. The court previously ruled that a state waives immunity over only those federal claims that Congress failed to apply to the states by abrogation when a state removes; today's ruling extends that waiver-by-removal rule to all federal claims.
The case arose when Nevada state employees sued the state for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act in state court. The state removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss based on state sovereign immunity.
The Ninth Circuit rejected that claim. The court noted that the Supreme Court ruled in Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia that a state waives Eleventh Amendment immunity when it removes state law claims for which it waived immunity in state court. It further noted that it (the Ninth Circuit) extended Lapides so that a state waives Eleventh Amendment immunity when it removes federal law claims for which Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity. Then it said the same reasoning justifies extending waiver-by-removal to any federal claims (congressional abrogation or not). In so ruling, the Court quoted Lapides:
It would seem anomalous or inconsistent for a State both (1) to invoke federal jurisdiction, thereby contending that the "Judicial power of the United States" extends to the case at hand, and (2) to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity, thereby denying that the "Judicial Power of the United States" extends to the case at hand.
The ruling means that the plaintiffs' FLSA case, now in federal court, can move forward.
Saturday, October 12, 2019
Judge David Briones (W.D. Texas) ruled on Friday that President Trump's effort to reprogram federal funds in the name of a "national emergency" to build a border wall exceeded his authority under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019. The ruling further invites the plaintiffs to file for a preliminary injunction to halt the reprogramming.
The ruling deals a substantial blow to President Trump in his effort to shift around money to pay for his border wall. Still, this isn't the end of this case: it'll surely be appealed.
The case arose when El Paso County and Border Network for Human Rights sued President Trump to halt reprogramming under his national emergency declaration. Upon declaring the emergency, President Trump ordered the relevant secretaries to reprogram $2.5 billion of Defense Department funds appropriated for Support for Counterdrug Activities under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 284, and $3.6 billion of DOD funds appropriated for "military construction projects" under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2808. The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the order violated the 2019 CAA. The court agreed.
The court first ruled that the plaintiffs had standing. It wrote that El Paso was the target location for the new wall, that it suffered a reputational injury (in President Trump's statements about how dangerous it is), and that it suffered economic harm--all because of President Trump's order, and which would be redressed by a favorable ruling. It held that BNHR had standing, too, because it spent significant resources to respond to President Trump's actions that would have gone to support its regular activities. The court ruled that the plaintiffs had standing to sue under Section 2808, because the government took steps to fund the construction of a wall.
As to the CAA, the court held that the reprogramming violates the plain terms of the CAA:
the CAA specifically appropriates $1.375 billion for border-wall expenditures and requires those expenditures to be made on "construction . . . in the Rio Grande Valley Sector" alone. Defendants' funding plan, by contrast, will transfer $6.1 billion of funds appropriated for other more general purposes--military construction, under Section 2808, and counterdrug activities, under Section 284. Their plan therefore flouts the cardinal principle that a specific statute controls a general one and violates the CAA.
In addition, the court said that the proclamation violates Section 739 of the CAA, which provides
None of the funds made available in this or any other appropriations Act may be used to increase . . . funding for a program, project, or activity as proposed in the President's budget request for a fiscal year until such proposed change is subsequently enacted in an appropriation Act, or unless such change is made pursuant to the reprogramming or transfer provisions of this or any other appropriations Act.
The court explained: "Section 739 prohibits Defendants' plan to fund the border wall because the plan is barred by that provision's general rule and the plan does not fall within its exception," because neither Section 2808 nor Section 284 is an appropriations act.
Although the ruling grants summary judgment to the plaintiffs on these issues, it does not grant a preliminary injunction. "Defendants have countered that Plaintiffs cannot obtain equitable relief against the President. The Court has requested additional briefing on this issue and will reserve judgment in this regard for a later date."
In light of the Supreme Court's ruling this summer staying a permanent injunction because the government showed that the plaintiffs had no cause of action to challenge a Section 8005 transfer, the ruling says nothing about the government's Section 8005 authority to reprogram funds for Section 284 counterdrug activities. It also says nothing about reprogramming Treasury Forfeiture Funds.
Friday, October 11, 2019
The D.C. Circuit ruled today that the House Committee on Oversight and Reform acted within its powers, and not in violation of the Constitution, when it issued a subpoena to Mazars USA, LLP, for records related to work performed by President Trump and his business entities both before and after he took office.
The ruling deals a sharp blow to President Trump and his efforts to shield his financial records. But the D.C. Circuit probably won't have the last say: this seems destined for the Supreme Court.
The case arose when the Committee subpoenaed Mazars for the records. President Trump sued to stop Mazars from releasing them, and the Justice Department filed an amicus brief on the side of the President.
The court flatly rejected the President's novel claims that the subpoena exceeded the Committee's authority and violated the Constitution. In particular, the court held that the subpoena was not an invalid exercise of law-enforcement (as opposed to legislative) power, because the Committee's explanation for the subpoena on its face stated a valid legislative purpose--to inform "multiple laws and legislative proposals under [the Committee's] jurisdiction." Moreover, the court noted that the House actually has pending legislation related to the subpoena, thus underscoring the legislative character of the subpoena, even though this isn't required.
The court held next that the subpoena has a valid legislative purpose. The court wrote that the subpoena could serve ethics and financial disclosure laws that apply to the President.
The court wrote that the subpoena's reach--seeking information before the President was elected and before he even announced his candidacy--fell within Congress's legislative power, because it could consider legislation requiring a President to disclose financial information going back before a President takes office.
Judge Rao dissented. She argued that the subpoena serves only the Committee's interest in determining "whether the President broke the law"; that the Committee can only take up this kind of law-enforcement function in the context of an impeachment; and that because the subpoena was issued outside of an impeachment proceeding, it is therefore invalid:
The majority breaks new ground when it determines Congress is investigating allegations of illegal conduct against the President, yet nonetheless upholds the subpoena as part of the legislative power. The Committee on Oversight and Reform has consistently maintained that it seeks to determine whether the President broke the law, but it has not invoked Congress's impeachment power to support this subpoena. When Congress seeks information about the President's wrongdoing, it does not matter whether the investigation also has a legislative purpose. Investigations of impeachable offenses simply are not, and never have been, within Congress's legislative power. Throughout history, Congress, the President, and the courts have insisted upon maintaining the separation between the legislative and impeachment powers of the House and recognized the gravity and accountability that follow impeachment. Allowing the Committee to issue this subpoena for legislative purposes would turn Congress into a roving inquisition over a co-equal branch of government.
Wednesday, October 9, 2019
The practice and the announcement of the White House that it will not cooperate with the House of Representatives Impeachment Inquiry as we discussed here, raises the question of the resources available to Congress to enforce its subpoenas. And as in so many cases about Congressional matters, there is a Congressional Research Service Report for that: Congressional Subpoenas: Enforcing Executive Branch Compliance, updated March 27, 2019.
The Report includes this overview:
Congress currently employs an ad hoc combination of methods to combat non-compliance with subpoenas. The two predominant methods rely on the authority and participation of another branch of government. First, the criminal contempt statute permits a single house of Congress to certify a contempt citation to the executive branch for the criminal prosecution of an individual who has willfully refused to comply with a committee subpoena. Once the contempt citation is received, any later prosecution lies within the control of the executive branch. Second, Congress may try to enforce a subpoena by seeking a civil judgment declaring that the recipient is legally obligated to comply. This process of civil enforcement relies on the help of the courts to enforce congressional demands.
Congress has only rarely resorted to either criminal contempt or civil enforcement to combat non- compliance with subpoenas . . . .
Of special note later in the Report is a discussion of "detention" of executive branch officials:
Although rare, the inherent contempt power has been used to detain executive branch officials, including for non-compliance with a congressional subpoena. During an 1879 investigation into allegations of maladministration by George F. Seward while a consul general in Shanghai, a House committee issued a subpoena to Seward for relevant documents and testimony.254 When Seward—then an ambassador to China—refused to comply, the House passed a resolution holding him in contempt and directing the Sergeant-at-Arms to take him into custody and bring him before the House. Seward was taken into custody and brought before the House, where he was ultimately released while the House considered impeachment articles.
In another example which gave rise to Marshall v. Gordon , the House adopted a contempt resolution directing the Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest U.S. Attorney Snowden Marshall for an insulting letter sent to a committee chair. The arrest was then made and quickly challenged in federal court, where ultimately the Supreme Court ordered Marshall released. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the contempt power generally, but concluded that in Marshall’s case the contempt was invalid as “not intrinsic to the right of the House to preserve the means of discharging its legislative duties.” Notably, the Court was silent on whether Marshall’s status as an executive branch official had any impact on the House’s exercise of the power.
Given these examples, and the Supreme Court’s general statements on the reach of the inherent contempt power, it would appear to be within Congress’s power to use inherent contempt to compel executive branch compliance with congressional subpoenas, at least in certain circumstances. But neither the Seward nor Marshall example involved an assertion of executive privilege, meaning that the Court did not need to consider what, if any, constraints that privilege may impose upon Congress’s exercise of its inherent contempt authority.
Moreover, an attempt by Congress to arrest or detain an executive official may carry other risks. There would appear to be a possibility that, if the Sergeant-at-Arms attempted to arrest an executive official, a standoff might occur with executive branch law enforcement tasked with protecting that official. This concern is also applicable in the event that a judicial marshal enforces a judicial order of contempt against an executive official, and perhaps will always be “attendant in high-stakes separation-of-powers controversies.”
There's a great deal more worth reading in this 45 page Report as what some are calling a "constitutional crisis" unfolds.
Tuesday, October 8, 2019
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone sent a scathing letter today to House leadership blasting the impeachment inquiry and stating that the White House won't cooperate. Given White House intransigence so far, it's not clear that the letter will really change anything on the ground.
Cipollone cited two flaws: the process lacks due process protections, and the House has no "legitimate basis" for the inquiry.
As to due process, Cipollone claims that an impeachment inquiry requires due process, and that the House process falls short:
To comply with the Constitution's demands, appropriate procedures would include--at a minimum--the right to see all evidence, to present evidence, to call witnesses, to have counsel present at all hearings, to cross-examine all witnesses, to make objections relating to the examination of witnesses or the admissibility of testimony and evidence, and to respond to evidence and testimony. Likewise, the Committees must provide for the disclosure of all evidence favorable to the President and all evidence bearing on the credibility of witnesses called to testify in the inquiry. The Committees' current procedures provide none of these basic constitutional rights.
Cipollone also complained that the committees' ranking members lack subpoena power, and that "the Committees have also resorted to threats and intimidation against potential Executive Branch witnesses."
The impeachment process, of course, is a nonjusticiable political question under Nixon v. United States. So we don't have the Supreme Court's say-so as to what, if any, measures of due process are required. In the case that Cipollone cites as support for his claim that impeachment requires due process, Judge Hasting's impeachment, Hastings raised similar due process complaints about his trial in the Senate. But in a ruling not cited by Cipollone, the district court ultimately dismissed Hasting's complaint as raising a nonjusticiable political question under Nixon, and therefore did not touch on any process that might be due in an impeachment.
Cipollone's claims don't come in the context of a court case, though, so the political question doctrine doesn't foreclose them. Instead, they may cleverly put House Democrats in an awkward spot. The only practical way that House Democrats can get White House cooperation is to go to court; but if they seek to enforce a subpoena issued in an impeachment inquiry in court, the White House will surely claim that the case is a nonjusticiable political question under Nixon. Regardless of merits of that claim, unless the House can get the courts to enforce their subpoenas, the House will have to base its articles of impeachment only on evidence that it can obtain independent of White House cooperation, and, of course, obstruction. This may make it even more likely (if that's possible) that the House will impeach, but it also may make it even less likely (if that's possible) that the Senate will convict.
As to the lack of a "legitimate basis" for the inquiry, Cipollone argues that President Trump's call to President Zelenskyy "was completely appropriate," that "the President did nothing wrong," and therefore that "there is no basis for an impeachment inquiry." This echoes the familiar (and tenuous) constitutional claim that we've heard from the White House in nearly every congressional investigation--that the House lacks a "legitimate legislative purpose." It also begs the question: the whole purpose of an impeachment inquiry, it seems, is to get more evidence to discover whether there's a basis for going forward with impeachment. The House needs information from the executive branch to help it make that determination.
Cipollone's letter is a stunning rebuke. But in the end, it's not clear that it's much of a game-changer, only because the White House hasn't much cooperated so far, anyway.
Monday, October 7, 2019
Recall that the issue of which rights in the Bill of Rights are incorporated to the states has received recent attention: in McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), a 5-4 Court held that the Second Amendment is incorporated as against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment (with four Justices finding this occurred through the Due Process Clause and Justice Thomas stating the proper vehicle was the Privileges or Immunities Clause). And just last Term, in Timbs v. Indiana, the United States Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
But embedded in Timbs was a dispute about whether the "right" and the "substance of the right" must be similar, a question that the Court did not address. That dispute is at the heart of the incorporation doctrine surrounding the right to have a unanimous jury verdict. Justice Alito explained the problem in footnote 14 of McDonald, after stating in the text that the general rule is that rights "are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.”
There is one exception to this general rule. The Court has held that although the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury requires a unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials, it does not require a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972).
The precedential value of Apodaca, a case in which the Justices split 4-1-4, was at the center of the oral argument, although at times not as central as might be predicted. The reliance of Louisiana on Apodaca in stare decisis considerations was certainly discussed at length,including the issue of how many inmates would be effected by the Court's ruling. It was unclear how many persons were currently serving sentences under less than unanimous jury verdicts, although petitioner's counsel stated there were currently 36 cases on direct appeal.
However the Solicitor General of Louisiana largely advanced a different argument. She vigorously argued that the Sixth Amendment should not be read to require unanimous jury verdicts at all — whether or not in the context of incorporation. She stated that "nothing in the text, structure, or history of the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts." There seemed to be little support for this construction, although the Justices and opposing counsel did discuss the differences between unanimity and the "12" requirement which the Court has held is not constitutionally required.
There was little indication the Court was likely to revise its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. And more indication that the Court would continue its trend of incorporating rights in the Bill of Rights as against the states, which would mean overruling Apodaca.
October 7, 2019 in Criminal Procedure, Due Process (Substantive), Federalism, Fourteenth Amendment, Interpretation, Oral Argument Analysis, Seventh Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (1)
Judge Victor Marrero (S.D.N.Y.) today dismissed President Trump's lawsuit that sought to halt a state grand jury subpoena issued to Mazars USA for Trump organization financial documents, including the President's tax returns. We posted most recently here.
The ruling deals a blow to President Trump's efforts to protect his tax returns from disclosure, and to halt any state criminal process against him. But it may be temporary: the Second Circuit immediately stayed the ruling pending expedited review; and whatever the Second Circuit says, this case seems destined for the Supreme Court.
The district court ruled that President Trump's suit was barred by Younger abstention, and that his constitutional claim likely failed on the merits.
As to Younger abstention, which requires federal courts to abstain from intervening in pending state court proceedings under certain circumstances, the court said that the grand jury subpoena was part of a pending state criminal proceeding (despite a circuit split on the question), that the state proceeding implicates important state interests, and that the state proceeding affords President Trump plenty of opportunities to raise his constitutional claims. The court rejected the President's claims that the state process was in bad faith or merely designed to harass him, and that the case raised extraordinary circumstances.
As to the underlying merits, which the court addressed "so as to obviate a remand" on President Trump's motion for a preliminary injunction if the Second Circuit overrules the abstention holding, the court flatly rejected the President's claim of absolute presidential immunity from all state criminal processes. The court said that it "cannot square a vision of presidential immunity that would place the President above the law with the text of the Constitution, the historical record, the relevant case law, or even the DOJ Memos on which the President relies most heavily for support." The court, citing Clinton v. Jones, said that the Supreme Court would likely reject the President's absolute, categorical approach to immunity in favor of a functional approach that "take[s] account of various circumstances concerning the appropriateness of a claim of presidential immunity from judicial process relating to a criminal proceeding" and to balance the competing interests in working out the immunity question.
The case now goes to the Second Circuit on an expedited basis. Again: the Second Circuit stayed the district court's ruling, which means that President Trump's federal case challenging the state subpoena is still alive. Whatever happens at the Second Circuit, this case will almost surely go to the Supreme Court.
Sunday, October 6, 2019
The United States Supreme Courts 2019 Term begins with oral arguments in three cases that will impact LGBTQ equality. To be clear, the Court is not considering constitutional law issues. Instead all three cases involve statutory interpretation of the prohibition of discrimination "because of sex" in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et. seq.
The two consolidated cases both involve sexual orientation discrimination. In Altitude Express v. Zarda, the Second Circuit en banc held that sexual orientation discrimination constituted a form of discrimination "because of sex" under Title VII, overruling previous Second Circuit decisions, and provoking the dissent of four judges. Reaching the opposite conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit in Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners, clung to its previous precedent, first in an unpublished opinion affirming the dismissal of the complaint, and then in a denial of rehearing en banc requested by a member of the court, with two judges issuing a dissenting opinion.
In deciding whether or not sexual orientation discrimination is included in Title VII's "because of sex" language, the primary precedent for the Court is its unanimous opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services (1998), authored by the late Justice Scalia. The claim involved same-sex sexual harassment and the Court held:
We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII. As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex” in the “terms” or “conditions” of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.
The third case LGBTQ Title VII case to be considered by the Court in the Term's opening days is R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC. The Sixth Circuit, in its unanimous panel opinion reversing the district judge, found that discrimination "against employees, either because of their failure to conform to sex stereotypes or their transgender and transitioning status, is illegal under Title VII" under the "because of sex" discrimination prohibition. The court found that the "Funeral Home fired Stephens because she refused to abide by her employer’s stereotypical conception of her sex" and that the religious claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1, raised by the funeral home's owner failed because "Title VII here is the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling interest in combating and eradicating sex discrimination."
While the Court has not previously decided a case of transgender discrimination under Title VII, the Court's opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) held that sex-stereotyping is included within the prohibition of discrimination "because of sex" under Title VII. Hopkins is a fractured opinion, and none of the Justices who decided the case remain on the Court.
These statutory interpretation cases will provide an indication of the Court's views on LGBTQ equality, a subject last at the Court in the closely-divided same-sex case Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), decided under the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, these three Title VII cases may illuminate how the Court is considering precedent.
Finally, no matter how the Court decides these Title VII issues, Congress retains ultimately authority. In 2019, the House of Representatives passed "The Equality Act" which would amend the 1964 Civil Rights Act to include prohibitions of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. The Senate has yet to take up this legislation.
October 6, 2019 in Courts and Judging, Current Affairs, Fourteenth Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Fundamental Rights, Gender, Religion, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, October 2, 2019
District Court Halts Enforcement of California Law Requiring Presidential Candidates to Release Taxes
Judge Morrison C. England, Jr., (E.D. Cal.) granted President Trump's motion for a preliminary injunction yesterday and halted enforcement of California's new requirement that presidential primary candidates file their income tax returns with the state before gaining a place on the primary ballot.
The ruling puts a temporary stop to California's effort to press President Trump to reveal his tax returns.
The case tests California's requirement that candidates in the California primary election for president file their tax returns with the state before the state will list them on the ballot. Here's the measure:
Notwithstanding any other law, the Secretary of State shall not print the name of a candidate for President of the United States on a primary election ballot, unless the candidate, at least 98 days before the presidential primary election, files with the Secretary of State copies of every income tax return the candidate filed with the Internal Revenue Service in the five most recent taxable years.
California said that it adopted the measure in order to help its voters make an informed choice among candidates in the primary election. But it was pretty clearly a blunt effort to force President Trump to file his tax returns, which the state could then make public.
The court ruled that the requirement likely violated the Article II Qualifications Clause, the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause.
As to Qualifications, the court drew on U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, where the Court struck Arkansas's effort to impose term limits on its members of Congress. The Court in Thornton ruled that the state's term limits impermissibly added a qualification to its members of Congress over and above the minimum qualifications set in the Article I Qualifications Clause. Judge England ruled that the same principle applies to a state's additional qualifications over and above the minimums set in the Article II Qualifications Clause, and that California's requirement amounts to just such an additional qualification.
As to the First Amendment, Judge England held that California's requirement amounts to a "severe restriction" on the right to access the ballot, the right to political association, the right to vote, and the right to express political preferences. The court applied strict scrutiny and held that the requirement failed.
Finally, as to equal protection, Judge England held that the requirement impermissibly treated partisan primary candidates differently than independent candidates (who are not subject to the requirement). "The State lacks any valid interest in providing voters with more information about party-backed candidates than independent candidates, especially when such requirements can lead to the exclusion of only major party candidates on the ballot."