Wednesday, December 12, 2018

Court Tosses San Francisco's Challenge to Trump Walk-Back of Regulatory Guidance

Judge Jon S. Tigar (N.D. Cal.) ruled that San Francisco lacked standing to challenge the Trump Administration's rescission of administrative guidance documents related to various federal civil rights and immigration statutes. The ruling is a victory for the Trump Administration and its deregulatory agenda.

The case, San Francisco v. Whitaker, arose out of President Trump's executive order instructing agencies to identify regulatory actions that were "outdated, unnecessary, or ineffective" as candidates for repeal, modification, or replacement. Then-AG Sessions issued a memo stating that DOJ would no longer "issue guidance documents that purport to create rights or obligations binding on persons or entities outside the Executive Branch (including state, local, and tribal governments)." DOJ subsequently announced that it would rescind 25 guidance documents.

San Francisco sued to stop the DOJ from rescinding eight of those, arguing that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. (The eight relate to the ADA, the FHA, the INA, and various fee and fine practices.)

The court ruled that San Francisco lacked standing. While the court said that San Francisco could assert procedural standing or organizational standing, it still needed to show a harm--and it didn't. The city's theory of harm varied depending on the particular guidance document, but in general the court held that it failed to show that rescission would interfere with its interest in regulation, or increase the risk of enforcement action against it, or that it failed to show a sufficiently tight connection between the rescission and any harm to the city.

The ruling means that the rescission can move forward, ultimately curbing federal regulation of these provisions. Establishing standing to challenge a roll-back on regulations is always trickier than establishing standing to challenge regulations themselves, and it's not clear if or how another plaintiff might show a harm to challenge these or other rescission documents.

December 12, 2018 in Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 11, 2018

District Court Dismisses FACA Challenge to Trump's Infrastructure Council

Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle (D.D.C.) dismissed a suit challenging President Trump's Infrastructure Council under the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

The ruling in Food & Water Watch v. Trump arose out of the plaintiff's FACA challenge to the Council, which was (or would have been) designed to give the President advice on infrastructure policy. The plaintiff claimed that the Council was stacked with President Trump's friends, and thus violated FACA's membership and transparency requirements.

The problem: the Council never got off the ground. For that reason, the court said it wasn't a "committee" or even a "de facto committee" under FACA, and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction.

Judge Huvelle emphasized how narrowly courts interpret FACA in order to avoid a separation-of-powers problem. Citing In re Cheney, she wrote

Congress could not have meant that participation in committee meetings or activities, even influential participation, would be enough to make someone a member of the committee . . . . Separation-of-powers concerns strongly support this interpretation of FACA. In making decisions on personnel and policy, and in formulating legislative proposals, the President must be free to seek confidential information from many sources, both inside the government and outside.

The court also denied the plaintiff's request for further discovery.

December 11, 2018 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Organizations Have Standing to Challenge USDA Inaction on Birds (again), but Lose (again)

Judge Trevor N. McFadden (D.D.C.) ruled in American Anti-Vivisection Society v. USDA that plaintiff organizations had standing to sue the USDA for its 14-year failure to extend protections under the Animal Welfare Act to birds. But at the same time, the court ruled that the plaintiffs' Administrative Procedure Act claims failed.

The case is a reprise of PETA v. USDA, a D.C. Circuit ruling over 3 years ago.

The court recognized the D.C. Circuit's "permissive" rules on organizational standing, and said that while this case presented standing difficulties, it fell in line with PETA:

But the Plaintiffs' organizational standing allegations are similar enough to PETA II to dictate the outcome here. As there, the Plaintiffs have, "at the dismissal stage, adequately shown that the USDA's inaction injured [their] interests and, consequently, [they have] expended resources to counteract those injuries." They have alleged with enough supporting factual allegations that the challenged agency decisions "deny [them] access to information and avenues of redress they wish to use in their routine information-dispensing, counseling, and referral activities." In other words, they have plausibly "alleged inhibition of their daily operations, . . . an injury both concrete and specific to the work in which they are engaged."

This injury--an inability to gather information, publish reports, and help reduce the neglect and abuse of birds--is traceable to the Department's inaction and could be redressed by an order compelling the Department to issue regulations. And the Plaintiffs have pointed to webinars and other educational programs they must produce in the absence of applicable avian regulations. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have standing and that it has jurisdiction to consider the merits of their arguments.

Nevertheless, the court ruled that the plaintiffs' APA claims failed, because the USDA took the "legally required" action (even if not the bird rules), and because the USDA's inaction isn't a "final agency action."

December 11, 2018 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, December 5, 2018

Third Circuit Upholds New Jersey's Large Capacity Magazine Prohibition

In its opinion in Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs v. Attorney General of New Jersey, a divided panel of the Third Circuit rejected a challenge to New Jersey's prohibition of large capacity magazines (LCM), defined as magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds of ammunition, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:39-1(y), 2C:39-3(j).  The challengers sought a preliminary injunction based on violations of the Second Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause; after an evidentiary hearing the district judge denied the injunction.

On the Second Amendment claim, the Third Circuit majority agreed with the general analysis laid out by the Second Circuit in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo (2015). Judge Patty Shwartz, writing for the majority, first determined that a "magazine" is an arm regulated under the Second Amendment. Judge Shwartz then considered whether the regulation of a specific type of magazine, namely an LCM, “imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee," by inquiring whether the type of arm at issue is commonly owned, and “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes." The court noted that the record showed there were "millions" of such magazines and then assumed "without deciding that LCMs are typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and that they are entitled to Second Amendment protection." The court then turned to the level of scrutiny to be applied — a question left open by the Court in Heller v. D.C. — by inquiring how severely the challenged regulation "burdens the core Second Amendment right."

440px-Double_drum_magazine_filled.svgHere, the court held that the New Jersey law did not severely burden the core Second Amendment right to self-defense in the home for five reasons and thus determined that intermediate scrutiny should apply. The court then held that the State of New Jersey has, undoubtedly, a significant, substantial and important interest in protecting its citizens’ safety," including reducing the lethality of active shooter and mass shooting incidents. The court rejected the challengers' argument that the rarity of such incidents should negate the state's interest, finding instead that the "evidence adduced before the District Court shows that this statement downplays the significant increase in the frequency and lethality of these incidents."  The court further found that the LCM ban was a sufficiently close fit to the state's interest in promoting safety.

It was on the Second Amendment issue that Judge Stephanos Bibas dissenting, arguing that strict scrutiny should apply and that even if it does not, the New Jersey statute fails intermediate scrutiny. For Judge Bibas, although the majority stands in good company: five other circuits have upheld limits on magazine sizes," the courts err "in subjecting the Second Amendment to different, watered-down rules and demanding little if any proof."

While the Second Amendment challenge was at the heart of the case, the majority also rejected the challengers' claims under the Takings Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. On the Takings Clause, the majority held that there is not actual taking, and no "regulatory taking because it does not deprive the gun owners of all economically beneficial or productive uses of their magazines." On the Equal Protection Clause, the challengers faulted the Act because it allows retired law enforcement officers to possess LCMs while prohibiting retired military members and ordinary citizens from doing so.The majority did not engage in a robust analysis, but held that "retired law enforcement officers are not similarly situated to retired military personnel and ordinary citizens, and therefore their exemption from the LCM ban does not violate the Equal Protection Clause."

In short, the Third Circuit's opinion is part of a trend of determining that intermediate scrutiny applies to various regulations of high capacity firearms or magazines and upholding state regulation. Most likely a petition for certiorari will follow this opinion and it will be interesting to see whether the United States Supreme Court continues its own trend of denying such petitions.

[image: double-drum magazine, which holds 100 rounds, via]

December 5, 2018 in Criminal Procedure, Equal Protection, Fundamental Rights, Opinion Analysis, Recent Cases, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 4, 2018

Ninth Circuit Strikes Law Criminalizing "encouraging or inducing" Aliens to Come or Stay in U.S.

The Ninth Circuit ruled in U.S. v. Sineneng-Smith that a federal statute that criminalizes "encourag[ing] or induc[ing]" an alien to come to, to enter, or to reside in the United States violates the First Amendment. The court ruled that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and struck it.

The statute, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), permits a felony prosecution of any person who "encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States" if the encourager knew, or recklessly disregarded "the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law."

The court held that the law bans substantially more speech than the First Amendment allows under the incitement doctrine, or as speech integral to criminal conduct. (The court reminds us that simply being in the United States isn't a crime.) Here's an example the court quotes from an amicus brief: "a loving grandmother who urges her grandson to overstay his visa," by saying "I encourage you to stay." The statement violates Subsection (iv), but:

Again, in Williams, the Supreme Court used almost identical language--"I encourage you to obtain child pornography"--to describe abstract advocacy immune from government prohibition. The government has not responded persuasively to this point; it simply argues that the grandmother would not be subject to criminal charges because her statement was "not accompanied by assistance or other inducements." However, as we have detailed above, Subsection (iv) does not contain an act or assistance requirement.

Another example: "marches, speeches, publications, and public debate expressing support for immigrants." And other: an attorney who tells a client that the client should remain in the country while contesting removal, because non-citizens in the U.S. have greater due process rights than non-citizens outside the U.S.

The court rejected the government's limiting interpretation--that the statute only prohibits a person from (1) knowingly undertaking (2) a non-de-minimis (3) act that (4) could assist (5) a specific alien (6) in violating (7) civil or criminal immigration laws--as wholesale rewriting the law.

December 4, 2018 in Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Fifth Circuit Says No Standing to Challenge Mississippi Flag

The Fifth Circuit ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge a Mississippi town's decision to fly the state flag over city hall as a violation of the Fair Housing Act. The ruling ends the case.

The plaintiffs in Mississippi Rising Coalition v. City of Ocean Springs, Mississippi, challenged a city council resolution requiring the state flag to be flown over city hall and other municipal buildings. They claimed that flying the flag, which includes the Confederate battle flag, amounted to "racial steering" in violation of the FHA.

But the Fifth Circuit ruled that they lacked both Article III and statutory standing. As to Article III, the court simply pointed to a 2017 ruling, Moore v. Bryant, also denying standing to plaintiffs challenging the state flag, but under equal protection: "That Plaintiff alleges that he personally and deeply feels the impact of Mississippi's state flag, however sincere those allegations are, is irrelevant to . . . standing analysis unless Plaintiff alleges discriminatory treatment." The court said that "[i]f exposure to a flag does not injure a plaintiff for equal protection purposes, exposure to the same flag does not injure a plaintiff for FHA purposes either."

As to statutory standing under the FHA, the court said that flying the flag is not a "discriminatory housing practice," and that the plaintiffs therefore weren't "aggrieved persons" under the Act.

December 4, 2018 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, News, Opinion Analysis, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, November 28, 2018

Ninth Circuit Upholds Alaska's Contribution Limits, Except its Nonresident Aggregate Contribution Limit

The Ninth Circuit ruled in Thompson v. Hebdon that Alaska's person-to-candidate, person-to-non-political-party-group, and political-party-to-candidate contribution limits were valid. But at the same time the court struck the state's nonresident aggregate contribution limit as a violation of free speech.

The case tested four separate provisions of Alaska's campaign finance law.

The first provision limits individual contribution to candidates to $500. Based on trial court evidence, the Ninth Circuit held that the limit was "narrowly focused" to address actual and potential quid pro quo corruption in the state. As to the amount, the court noted that $500 was low, but not unreasonably so, and still allowed candidates plenty of opportunities to fund their campaigns. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the cap should be measured in comparison to the prior limit, $1,000, and that the state should justify the drop.

The second provision limits individual contributions to non-party organizations to $500. The court upheld this limit as a measure designed to avoid circumvention of the individual contribution limit, above. "We conclude that Alaska has demonstrated the same interest here where the risk of circumvention of the individual-to-candidate limit is apparent: under Alaska law, any two individuals could form a 'group,' which could then funnel money to a candidate. Such groups could easily become pass-through entities for, say, a couple that wants to contribute more than the $500 individual-to-candidate limit."

The third provision limits political party contributions to candidates to $5,000. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that this amounts to discriminatory treatment (in comparison to labor-union PACs), but noted that its ruling doesn't foreclose a challenge to the dollar amount.

Finally, the fourth provision limits nonresident aggregate contributions to $3,000. Here's why:

Alaska fails to show why an out-of-state individual's early contribution is not corrupting, whereas a later individual's contribution--i.e., a contribution made after the candidate has already amassed $3,000 in out-of-state funds--is corrupting. Nor does Alaska show that an out-of-state contribution of $500 is inherently more corrupting than a like in-state contribution--only the former of which is curbed under Alaska's nonresident limit. Alaska fails to demonstrate that the risk of quid pro quo corruption turns on a particular donor's geography. Accordingly, while we do not foreclose the possibility that a state could limit out-of-state contributions in furtherance of an anti-corruption interest, Alaska's aggregate limit on what a candidate may receive is a poor fit.

Chief Judge Thomas concurred on the first three provisions, but dissented on this last one. Judge Thomas argued that the limit furthered the state's interests in actual quid pro quo corruption and its appearance and its interest in preserving "self-governance."

November 28, 2018 in Campaign Finance, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, November 23, 2018

New York State Judge Denies Trump Foundation Motion to Dismiss Complaint by State Attorney General

In her Decision and Order in People of State of New York v. Donald Trump (and three of the Trump children and the Trump Foundation), Justice Saliann Scarpulla denied Trumps' motion to dismiss the complaint by New York's Attorney General seeking dissolution of the Trump Foundation for violations of New York's Not-for-Profit Corporation Law and New York Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law.

 

The motion to dismiss argued in part that the state court lacked jurisdiction over "Mr. Trump" because pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, a "sitting president may not be sued.  As Justice Scarpulla stated, the New York Attorney General noted that Trump "failed to cite a single case in which any court has dismissed a civil action against a sitting president on Supremacy Clause grounds, where, as here, the action is based on the president's unofficial acts." Justice Scarpulla relied the United States Supreme Court's unanimous 1997 decision of Clinton v. Jones holding that then-President Clinton was subject to a civil action, and agreeing with another New York judge in Zervos v. Trump, held that this extended to state courts as well as federal. Justice Scarpulla rejected Trump's arguments that state courts are less fair to federal officials and less able to manage accommodations for a sitting president, pointing out that state courts were equally fair and competent. She also rejected the argument that state courts were less suited to address legal issues against federal officials:  "The dissenting opinion that Respondents cite for this proposition simply noted that federal courts have greater expertise than state courts in applying federal law" and here, "resolution of the petition is governed entirely by New York law, thus a federal court's alleged superior knowledge of federal law is inapposite."

Donald_J._Trump_Foundation_logoThe Trump respondents also argued the petition should be dismissed because of bias by the former Attorney General and the office as a whole.  Justice Scarpulla concluded that there was not a sufficient evidentiary basis for bias, conflict of interest, or abuse of confidence, and that "given the very serious allegations set forth in the petition," there is "no basis for finding that animus and bias were the sole motivating factors" for the petition.

The Trump respondents also raised grounds for dismissal of specific claims, including claims surrounding the misuse of foundation funds during the campaign; Justice Scarpulla rejected all of these.

Justice Scarpulla's order notes that the Foundation has been "attempting to voluntarily dissolve for the past two years" and urges the parties to reach an agreement leading to that dissolution. Justice Scarpulla did dismiss as moot one count of the petition which sought an injunction against continuing operation of the Foundation, stating that the Trumps were attempting to dissolve the foundation and that no injunction was necessary.

This decision by a trial judge — New York's Supreme Courts are trial courts — is not a final order, but if Trump's past litigation strategies are any indication, he will attempt to forestall answering the petition, which Justice Scarpulla ordered be done within 45 days.

 

November 23, 2018 in Campaign Finance, Current Affairs, Executive Authority, Federalism, Opinion Analysis, Supremacy Clause | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, November 21, 2018

District Court Rules Federal Criminal Ban on Female Genital Mutilation Unconstitutional

Judge Bernard A. Friedman (E.D. Mich.) ruled that the federal criminal statute banning female genital mutilation exceeded Congress's authority and was therefore invalid. The ruling dismisses those counts in an indictment against Michigan doctors accused of performing the procedure.

The federal criminal ban reads,

Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of another person who has not attained the age of 18 years shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

The government defended the statute under Congress's authority to enforce a treaty and its power to regulate interstate commerce. The court rejected both.

As to the treaty power, the court concluded that the statute wasn't rationally related to applicable provisions in the supporting treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. More, the court ruled that even if it were rationally related to the ICCPR, federalism principles restricted Congress from acting. That's because the U.S. entered the ICCPR with a reservation (valid under international law) that "this Convention shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by state and local governments . . . ." And because intrastate criminal law is a traditional area for the states (and not the federal government), the reservation itself restricts Congress from acting. (Judge Friedman suggested that under Bond Congress might have lacked authority even without the reservation--just because the federal statute intrudes on states' exclusive authority over "local criminal activity.")

As to the Commerce Clause, the court ruled that the statute failed: FGM is not commerce (the government produced no evidence that it's done for money); there's no jurisdictional element in the statute; congressional fact-finding on the commercial connection was sparse; and FGM is a local activity that, without more, has no actual connection to the interstate economy.

Congress could certainly go back and fix any of this (if Judge Friedman is upheld on appeal). For example, it could clarify that the ICCPR bans FGM, and remove its reservation. Or it could incentivize states to criminalize FGM. As to the Commerce Clause, it could add a jurisdictional element and fact-finding--exactly what it did after the Court struck the Gun Free School Zone Act in Lopez. (It's not clear why the jurisdictional element wasn't in the act--enacted after Lopez--in the first place.)

November 21, 2018 in Commerce Clause, Congressional Authority, Federalism, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, November 20, 2018

Court Halts Trump's Restrictions on Asylum

Judge Jon S. Tigar (N.D. Cal.) issued a temporary restraining order today against President Trump's move to prevent aliens along the Mexico border from applying for asylum except at ports of entry. The court ruled that government action violated the plain terms of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, and, alternatively, that there were "serious questions" about whether the government could bypass notice-and-comment procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (as it did).

The order applies nationwide.

The ruling strikes a substantial blow against President Trump's effort to restrict aliens' ability to apply for asylum. The next step is a show-cause hearing on December 19, during which Judge Tigar will hear arguments whether the government "should not be enjoined from taking any action continuing to implement the Rule and ordered to return to the pre-Rule practices for processing asylum applications, pending the final disposition of this action."

DOJ and DHS published a joint interim rule, bypassing notice-and-comment procedures under the APA's "military or foreign affairs function" and "good cause" exemptions, that renders an alien categorically ineligible for asylum "if the alien is subject to a presidential proclamation or other presidential order suspending or limiting the entry of aliens along the southern border with Mexico . . . ." President Trump then issued a presidential proclamation (claiming authority under 8 U.S.C. Secs. 1182(f) and 1185(a)) suspending "[t]he entry of any alien into the United States across the international boundary between the United States and Mexico" for ninety days, but exempts "any alien who enters the United States at a port of entry and properly presents for inspection."

The problem is that this runs headlong into the INA. 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1158(a)(1) (emphasis added) provides:

Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum . . . .

In short: the government's rule violates the statute. "Basic separation of powers principles dictate that an agency may not promulgate a rule or regulation that renders Congress's words a nullity."

The court rejected the government's argument that its rule is consistent with the statute, because the statute says that an alien can apply for asylum, while the rule uses the port-of-entry requirement to render an alien ineligible for asylum. "The argument strains credulity. To say that one may apply for something that one has no right to receive is to render the right to apply a dead letter. There is simply no way to harmonize the two."

The court went on to say that there were "serious questions" about the government's invocation of the "foreign affairs" and "good cause" exceptions to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements. Although the court didn't have to rule on the exceptions (because it held that the rule violates the plain terms of the INA), it did, for completeness.

November 20, 2018 in Cases and Case Materials, Executive Authority, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, November 15, 2018

Florida District Judge Issues Injunction on Mismatched Signature Ballot Claim

In his opinion in Democratic Executive Committee of Florida v. Detzner, United States District Judge Mark Walker, Chief Judge for the Northern District of Florida, has granted the motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered Florida to "allow voters who have been belatedly notified they have submitted a mismatched-signature ballot to cure their ballots by November 17, 2018, at 5:00 p.m."

After finding that the plaintiffs had standing and were not barred by laches, Judge Walker reached the question of whether the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their constitutional claims on the infringement of the right to vote. Judge Walker decided that the standard derived from Anderson-Burdick should be applied:

Under Anderson-Burdick, a court considering a challenge to a state election law “must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’ ” Burdick. When an election law imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the constitutional rights of voters, the states’ important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions. Id. But, “[h]owever slight the burden may appear . . . it must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests sufficiently weighty to justify the limitations.” Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009). This is not a litmus test, rather the court must balance these factors and make hard judgments. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008). Finally, “Anderson/Burdick balancing . . . should not be divorced from reality, and [] both the burden and legitimate regulatory interest should be evaluated in context.”

[some citations omitted]

Judge Walker found that the "injury is the deprivation of the right to vote based on a standardless determination made by laypeople that the signature on a voters’ vote-by-mail or provisional ballot does not match the signature on file with the supervisor of elections." The judge noted that there are  "dozens of reasons a signature mismatch may occur, even when the individual signing is in fact the voter," and concluded that disenfranchisement of "approximately 5,000 voters based on signature mismatch is a substantial burden." While Judge Walker found that Florida's interests "to prevent fraud, to efficiently and quickly report election results, and to promote faith and certainty in election results" were compelling, the "use of signature matching is not reasonable and may lead to unconstitutional disenfranchisement."

Judge Walker extended the period for voters to address a potential signature mismatch by noting that the previous opportunity to cure has "proved illusory."

Provisional ballot voters are provided no opportunity to cure under the law. Without this Court’s intervention, these potential voters have no remedy. Rather, they are simply out of luck and deprived of the right to vote. What is shocking about Florida law is that even though a voter cannot challenge a vote rejected as illegal, any voter or candidate could challenge a vote accepted as legal. The burden on the right to vote, in this case, outweighs the state’s reasons for the practice. Thus, under Anderson-Burdick, this scheme unconstitutionally burdens the fundamental right of Florida citizens to vote and have their votes counted.

Additionally, Judge Walker noted that although the plaintiffs' claims rested on the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he was also troubled by the lack of procedural due process, citing the Georgia mismatch decision in Martin v. Kemp.

Judge Walker's 34 page opinion did not cite Bush v. Gore (2000).

The Florida recount, like the Georgia recount continues, more than a week after election day.

Florida_population_map

 

November 15, 2018 in Current Affairs, Elections and Voting, Equal Protection, First Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, November 2, 2018

United States District Judge Issues Injunction in Georgia Vote Challenge

In an Order in Georgia Coalition for the People's Agenda v. Kemp, United States District Judge Eleanor Ross has found that the challengers would be likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claim regarding Georgia's flagging of potential voters as noncitizens ineligible to vote.  Recall that a different district judge recently issued an injunction against Secretary of State Kemp — who is also a candidate for Governor — in a challenge to the "mismatch" of  voter names.

Here, Judge Ross articulated the appropriate framework as:

When deciding whether a state election law violates First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights, we weigh the character and magnitude of the burden the State’s rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State’s concerns make the burden necessary.

Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997).

Judge Ross first found that the burden was "severe for those individuals who have been flagged and placed in pending status due to citizenship." Discussing one particular person, Judge Ross stated that

it was not a nominal effort for him to vote; it was a burdensome process requiring two trips to the polls, his own research, and his hunting down a name and telephone number to give to election officials so that his citizenship status could be verified, all after he had already submitted proof of citizenship with his voter registration application. This is beyond the merely inconvenient.

Relying on Timmons, Judge Ross continued with a strict scrutiny analysis, finding that while the State's interest in ensuring only citizens vote was compelling, the specific means chosen were not narrowly tailored. Here, the focus was on the fact that 4 of the 5 ways in which the State proposed that persons could verify their citizenship required a "deputy registrar," which were derived from a previous settlement. However, Judge Ross declared that the court's hands were not tied as to this matter, and ultimately all 5 of the options "for allowing individuals with flags for citizenship to vote in the upcoming election, sweep broader than necessary to advance the State's interest, creating confusion as Election Day looms."

Judge Ross directed Brian Kemp in his official capacity as Secretary of State to:

  1. Allow county election officials to permit eligible voters who registered to vote, but who are inaccurately flagged as non-citizens to vote a regular ballot by furnishing proof of citizenship to poll managers or deputy registrars.

  2. Update the “Information for Pending Voters” on the Secretary of State’s website so that it provides (a) clear instructions and guidance to voters in pending status due to citizenship and (b) a contact name and telephone number that individuals may call with questions about the pending status due to citizenship.

  3. Direct all county registrars, deputy registrars, and poll managers on how to verify proof of citizenship to ensure that they can properly confirm citizenship status consistent with this order. Issue a press release (a) accurately describing how an individual flagged and placed in pending status due to citizenship may vote in the upcoming election, as set forth herein; and (b) providing a contact name and telephone number that individuals may call with questions about the pending status due to citizenship.

  4. Issue a press release (a) accurately describing how an individual flagged and placed in pending status due to citizenship may vote in the upcoming election, as set forth herein; and (b) providing a contact name and telephone number that individuals may call with questions about the pending status due to citizenship.

  5. Direct the county boards of elections to post a list of acceptable documentation to prove citizenship, which includes a naturalization certificate, birth certificate issued by a state or territory within the United States, U.S. passport, and other documents or affidavits explicitly identified by Georgia law and listed on the Georgia Secretary of State’s website, at polling places on Election Day.

1200px-Flag_of_Georgia_(U.S._state).svg

November 2, 2018 in Elections and Voting, Equal Protection, Federalism, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Race | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 24, 2018

Federal Judge Grants Injunction in Challenge to Georgia "Mismatch" Ballots

In her Order & Opinion in Martin v. Kemp, United States District Judge Leigh Martin May stated she would enjoin county election officials from simply rejecting absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots due to an "alleged signature mismatch" but shall instead follow additional procedures. There has reportedly been some controversy regarding the Defendant Secretary of State, Brian Kemp, who is also a candidate for Governor, and the voter restrictions he oversees.

Judge May found that the plaintiffs and plaintiff organizations had standing, there was no laches, and that a facial challenge was appropriate. She also concluded that there was a substantial likelihood of success on the procedural due process challenge (and thus did not reach the other constitutional challenges).

Judge May quickly concluded that the plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right to vote by absentee ballot:

While Defendants correctly assert that the right to apply for and vote via absentee ballot is not constitutionally on par with the fundamental right to vote, once the state creates an absentee voting regime, they “must administer it in accordance with the Constitution.”  Indeed, the Supreme Court has long held that state- created statutory entitlements can trigger due process.  Having created an absentee voter regime through which qualified voters can exercise their fundamental right to vote, the State must now provide absentee voters with constitutionally adequate due process protection.

[citations omitted].

Turning to the issue of the process that is due, Judge May applied the well-known Mathews v. Edlridge (1976) factors. On the first factor weighing the private interest at issue, Judge May stated that the interest implicated the fundamental right to vote and as such was "entitled to substantial weight." On the second factor regarding the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probative value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards, Judge May found that while "the risk of an erroneous deprivation is by no means enormous, permitting an absentee voter to resolve an alleged signature discrepancy nevertheless has the very tangible benefit of avoiding disenfranchisement."  On the third and final factor requiring the court to examine the government’s interest, including “the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail,” Judge May concluded that "Defendants cannot cry foul with regard to the burden of additional procedures given that Defendants conceded at oral argument that counties already permit voters to verify their signatures through extrinsic evidence on an ad hoc basis." Further, the remedy of the voter simply showing up did not apply to voters who vote by mail because they cannot show up in person. Thus, Judge May found there was likely a procedural due process problem.

The judge's Order included a proposed injunction, giving the parties until noon on October 25 to object to the form of the injunction, stressing that this was not an "opportunity to readdress the propriety" of the injunction, only whether the language of the injunction would be confusing or unworkable for election officials.

 

 

October 24, 2018 in Elections and Voting, Fourteenth Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Procedural Due Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 15, 2018

District Judge Dismisses Stormy Daniels' Claim of Defamation Against Trump

In his 14 page opinion as a minute order in Cliffords v. Trump, the federal judge dismissed the claim of Stormy Daniels (a/k/a Stephanie Clifford) against President Trump for defamation.  Recall the claim was based on Trump's tweet  "A sketch years later about a nonexistent man. A total con job, playing the Fake News Media for Fools (but they know it)!" Daniels' complaint claimed that Trump was not only attacking the truthfulness of  Daniels, but also accusing her of a crime: fabricating a crime and an assailant, both of which are crimes under New York law. The complaint alleges that Trump "made his statement either knowing it was false, had serious doubts about the truth of his statement, or made the statement with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity."

The judge, however, found:

Mr. Trump's statement constituted "rhetorical hyperbole" that is protected by the First Amendment.

Additionally, the judge denied a motion to amend the complaint:

ShoppingThe Court holds that Mr. Trump's tweet is "rhetorical hyperbole" and is protected by the First Amendment. Plaintiff cannot amend the Complaint in a way that challenges this holding. During argument on this matter, Plaintiff suggested that she could amend her Complaint to "shore up the malice allegations" and to "provide context for the statement to show that, in fact, it was not political nature at the time it was made." (Transcript * * * ) The former amendments are futile because this Court rules that Mr. Trump's tweet is protected by the First Amendment. The issue of malice is irrelevant to this holding. The latter amendments are futile because there is no way for Plaintiff to amend the Complaint to transform the tweet from "rhetorical hyperbole" into an actionable statement. * * * * Plaintiff cannot change Mr. Trump's tweet or the basic context of the tweet. Nor can Plaintiff withdraw factual allegations that she has made in pleadings before this Court. In the other litigation before this Court, Ms. Clifford argues that Mr. Trump sought to silence her as a strategy to win the Presidential election, a clear argument against the legitimacy of Mr. Trump's Presidency. Mr. Trump issued the tweet as a rejoinder against an individual challenging him in the public arena. This is the definition of protected rhetorical hyperbole. The Court denies Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint.

The result is not surprising given reports that after a hearing several weeks ago,  Judge James Otero indicated he would be dismissing the action.

The judge also awards Trump attorneys fees.

 

October 15, 2018 in Books, Current Affairs, First Amendment, Gender, Opinion Analysis, Sexuality | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 10, 2018

District Judge Finds ICWA Unconstitutional

In his opinion in Brackeen v. Zinke, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, Reed O'Connor, entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs and found that portions of the Indian Child Welfare Act, ICWA  are unconstitutional, specifically violating equal protection, the non-delegation doctrine of Article I, and the commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment.  Passed in 1978, the general purpose of ICWA is to prevent Native children from being removed from their families and tribes based on a finding that "an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families [were being] broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies” as Judge O'Connor's opinion acknowledged, quoting Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (2013) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4)).

Judge Reed O'Connor, however, accepts an argument that was sidestepped by the United States Supreme Court in Baby Girl: that ICWA violates equal protection (applied to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment) by making a racial classification that does not survive strict scrutiny. Recall that in some briefs as well as in the oral argument, the specter of the racial classification was raised.  In United States District Judge O'Connor's opinion, that specter is fully embodied. Judge O'Connor found that ICWA does make a racial classification, rejecting the government's view that the classification at issue was a political category. Judge O'Connor reasoned that ICWA defines Indian child not only by membership in an Indian child, but extends its coverage to children "simply eligible for membership who have a biological Indian parent." Thus, Judge O'Connor reasoned, ICWA's definition "uses ancestry as a proxy for race" and therefore must be subject to strict scrutiny.  Interestingly, the United States government did not offer any compelling governmental interest or argued that the classification is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Judge O'Connor nevertheless credited the Tribal Defendants/Intervenors assertion of an interest in maintaining the Indian child's relationship with the tribe, but found that the means chosen was overinclusive, concluding that

The ICWA’s racial classification applies to potential Indian children, including those who will never be members of their ancestral tribe, those who will ultimately be placed with non-tribal family members, and those who will be adopted by members of other tribes.

On the non-delegation claim, Judge Reed O'Connor found it fatal that ICWA allows Tribes to change the child placement preferences selected by Congress and which then must be honored by the states in child custody proceedings.

1170px-Flag_of_the_Cherokee_Nation.svg

On the Tenth Amendment claim, Judge Reed O'Connor relied on the Court's recent decision in Murphy v. NCAA holding unconstitutional a federal law prohibiting states from allowing sports gambling regarding anti-commandeering, concluding that

Congress violated all three principles [articulated in Murphy] when it enacted the ICWA. First, the ICWA offends the structure of the Constitution by overstepping the division of federal and state authority over Indian affairs by commanding States to impose federal standards in state created causes of action. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Second, because the ICWA only applies in custody proceedings arising under state law, it appears to the public as if state courts or legislatures are responsible for federally-mandated standards, meaning “responsibility is blurred.” Third, the ICWA shifts “the costs of regulations to the States” by giving the sole power to enforce a federal policy to the States.  Congress is similarly not forced to weigh costs the States incur enforcing the ICWA against the benefits of doing so. In sum, Congress shifts all responsibility to the States, yet “unequivocally dictates” what they must do.

[citations to Murphy omitted].

 
With more abbreviated analysis, Judge Reed O'Connor found that the applicable regulations pursuant to ICWA violated the Administrative Procedure Act and that Congress did not have power to pass ICWA under the Indian Commerce Clause because it was limited by the Tenth Amendment. However, Judge O'Connor rejected the individual prospective plaintiffs' argument that ICWA violated the Due Process Clause's protection of family rights.
 
This opinion finding a long-standing statute unconstitutional is sure to be appealed, especially by the Cherokee Nation and other Tribal Intervenors.
 

October 10, 2018 in Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Family, Federalism, Fifth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Nondelegation Doctrine, Opinion Analysis, Race, Tenth Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, October 9, 2018

Seventh Circuit Upholds Wisconsin's Butter-Grading System

The Seventh Circuit last week upheld Wisconsin's butter-grading system against Dormant Commerce Clause, due process, and equal protection challenges. The ruling means that Wisconsin's butter-grading system stays on the books.

The case, Minerva Dairy v. Harsdorf, took on Wisconsin's law for grading butter, which makes it unlawful "to sell . . . any butter at retail unless it has been graded." To satisfy this requirement, butter may be graded either by a Wisconsin-licensed grader, or by the USDA voluntary butter-grading program. The plaintiff, an Ohio butter producer, argued that the law violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, due process, and equal protection.

The Seventh Circuit disagreed. The court ruled that the law didn't discriminate against interstate commerce, and so didn't violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. (The court didn't even apply Pike v. Bruce Church balancing, because the law didn't discriminate on its face or in effect.) The court also said that Wisconsin's butter-grading-licensing standards, which require a person to come to Wisconsin to test to be a Wisconsin-certified butter-grader, didn't discriminate, either (even though a would-be butter-grader who lives in or close to Wisconsin can get there easier than a would-be grader who lives farther away).

The court rejected the due process and equal protection challenges, too, because the law satisfied rational basis review.

October 9, 2018 in Cases and Case Materials, Commerce Clause, Dormant Commerce Clause, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 4, 2018

District Judge Enjoins Termination of TPS Designations

In his opinion in Ramos v. Nielsen, United States District Judge Edward Chen of the Northern District of California enjoined the federal government's termination of TPS  — Temporary Protected Status — designations for Haiti, Sudan, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.

As we previously discussed related to the NAACP complaint filed in January in Maryland and related only to Haiti, one argument is that the termination is a violation of equal protection, springing from an intent to discriminate on the basis of race and/or ethnicity.

Judge Chen's opinion finds that the preliminary injunction is warranted based on a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of an Administrative Procedure Act claim, but also on the merits of the equal protection claim.  Judge Chen applied the factors from Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and concluded that there was sufficient evidence to

raise serious questions as to whether a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the decisions to terminate the TPS designations. In particular, Plaintiffs have provided evidence indicating that (1) the DHS Acting Secretary or Secretary was influenced by President Trump and/or the White House in her TPS decision-making and (2) President Trump has expressed animus against non-white, non-European immigrants.

440px-Kirstjen_Nielsen_official_photoAfter reciting specific incidences of animus for several pages, Judge Chen additionally stated that there were departures from the usual procedures which dovetailed with this animus:

there were departures from the normal procedural sequence during the TPS decision-making process; that is, instead of considering all current country conditions as had been done in previous administrations, the DHS political appointees in the current administration made TPS decisions turn on whether the originating condition or conditions directly related thereto continued to exist, disregarding all other current conditions no matter how bad. Moreover, at the apparent behest of then-DHS Secretary Kelly, there was an effort to gather negative information about Haitian TPS beneficiaries prior to the decision on Haiti’s TP designation – in particular, whether Haitian TPS beneficiaries had been convicted of crimes or were on public or private relief. See Degen Decl., Ex. 84 (email). There is no indication that these factors had previously been considered by DHS in making TPS decisions; indeed, the email indicated that the request for the information should be kept quiet. See Degen Decl., Ex. 84 (email) (“Please keep the prep for this briefing limited to those on this email. If you need a specific data set and need to ask someone to pull it, please do not indicate what it is for. I don’t want this to turn into a big thing were people start prodding and things start leaking out.”). The information sought by the Secretary coincides with racial stereotypes – i.e., that non-whites commit crimes and are on the public dole.

[footnote omitted].

This is yet another judicial finding that the administration has acted with racial animus and the administration is sure to appeal it.

[image: Kirstjen Nielsen, current Secretary of Department of Homeland Security]

October 4, 2018 in Equal Protection, Fifth Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Race, Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 28, 2018

District Court Says Members of Congress Have Standing to Sue President for Emoluments Violations

Judge Emmet G. Sullivan (D.D.C.) ruled today in Blumenthal v. Trump that members of Congress have standing to sue President Trump for violations of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. At the same time, Judge Sullivan declined to rule on the President's other three arguments for dismissal--that the plaintiffs lack a cause of action, that they've failed to state a claim (because the President's business interests aren't "emoluments" under the Clause), and that injunctive relief sought is unconstitutional. Thus, the ruling is a set-back for the President, but Judge Sullivan may yet end up dismissing the case on other grounds.

We posted here on the earlier district court ruling that another Emoluments case, brought by Maryland and D.C., can move forward.

The Congressmembers' case alleges that President Trump's overseas business holdings and properties generate income and benefits for the President, without the consent of Congress, in violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. That Clause says:

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

The 201 plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that they were harmed (for standing purposes) because the President, by failing to seek congressional consent, denied each of them a "vote on the record about whether to approve his acceptance of a prohibited foreign emolument."

The court agreed:

[E]ach time the President allegedly accepts a foreign emolument without seeking congressional consent, plaintiffs suffer a concrete and particularized injury--the deprivation of the right to vote on whether to consent to the President's acceptance of the prohibited foreign emolument--before he accepts it. And although the injury is an institutional one, the injury is personal to legislators entitled to cast the vote that was nullified.

The court went on to say that standing didn't violate the separation of powers. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked an alternative legislative remedy, and that the case was appropriate for judicial review.

September 28, 2018 in Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 20, 2018

Ninth Circuit Rules No-Fly Challenger's Case Not Moot

The Ninth Circuit ruled in Fikre v. FBI that the plaintiff's due process challenges to his inclusion on the government's no-fly list were not moot, even though the government took him off the list during the litigation. The ruling means that the plaintiff's case challenging his inclusion on the no-fly list can move forward.

The case arose from Yonas Fikre's inclusion on the no-fly list and his several and significant resulting harms. Fikre alleged that his inclusion violated substantive and procedural due process, and he sought declaratory and injunctive relief. During the litigation, the government removed Fikre from the list, however, and moved to dismiss the case as moot. The district court granted the motion.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court ruled that Fikre's case came under the voluntary cessation exception to mootness--that signs pointed to the government opportunistically removing him, and that the government could reinstate him at any time. The court explained:

To begin, the FBI's decision to restore Fikre's flying privileges is an individualized determination untethered to any explanation or change in policy, much less an abiding change in policy. . . .

Moreover, the government has no assured Fikre that he will not be banned from flying for the same reasons that prompted the government to add him to the list in the first place, nor has it verified the implementation of procedural safeguards conditioning its ability to revise Fikre's status on the receipt of new information. . . .

Finally . . . we note that Fikre's removal from the No Fly List does not "completely and irrevocably eradicate[] the effects of the alleged violation[s]."

The ruling sends the case back to the district court for further proceedings.

September 20, 2018 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, Mootness, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 11, 2018

Sixth Circuit Finds Candidate Trump's Speech Was Not Incitement

In its opinion  in Nwanguma v. Trump, a panel of the Sixth Circuit ruled that the complaint against Donald Trump and his campaign for damages based on "inciting to riot" during a Kentucky event should be dismissed. Recall that the district judge denied Trump's motion to dismiss the complaint's count of incitement to riot based on events during a campaign event in Louisville, Kentucky on March 1, 2016. The complaint alleged that the candidate told the crowd “Get ’em out of here,” when the plaintiffs were "peacefully protesting" at a campaign rally, and as  a result of the candidate's encouragement, three individual defendants pushed, shoved, and struck the three plaintiffs.  

The Sixth Circuit's opinion, authored by Judge David McKeague, agreed with the district judge that the relevant precedents were Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969),  Hess v. Indiana (1973), and the Sixth Circuit's  en banc decision in Bible Believers v. Wayne County (2015).  However, the Sixth Circuit criticized the district judge's analysis on some of the elements of the Kentucky incitement to riot statute as "decidedly thin."  For Judge McKeague, seemingly the most important fact of the Trump speech was that Trump's repeated statement “Get ’em out of here" was followed by "don't hurt 'em." Thus, "any implication of incitement to riotous violence is explicitly negated": "If words have meaning, the admonition 'don't hurt 'em' cannot reasonably be construed as an urging to "hurt 'em.'"

340px-Donald_Trump_August_19 _2015_(cropped)After considering the elements of the Kentucky incitement to riot statute, Judge McKeague then considers the First Amendment protection that inheres in the definition of incitement to riot. Yet on both issues, Trump's "don't hurt 'em" statement figures prominently.  Again, while in "the ears of some supporters, Trump's words may have had a tendency to elicit a physical response" they are undercut by the words "don't hurt 'em."

 Judge Helene White's short concurring opinion argues that the "majority opinion elides salient details of Trump's speech that make this a closer case" for her than for the majority opinion which "overemphasizes the legal significance of the 'don't hurt 'em' statement." However, Judge White concurs because she concludes that the allegations do not meet the Kentucky statute's definition, and therefore the court should not have reached the First Amendment issue.

 

September 11, 2018 in First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0)