Thursday, June 17, 2021

Court Kicks Obamacare Challenge for Lack of Standing

The Supreme Court ruled today that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Affordable Care Act's zeroed-out minimum coverage provision (or "individual mandate"), and the rest of the Act, too. The ruling deals a sharp blow to opponents of the ACA. It means that the ACA--all of it--stays on the books.

The case, Texas v. California, started when Congress zeroed-out the ACA's minimum coverage provision. Remember that Congress couldn't muster the votes to overturn the ACA, so instead it set the tax-penalty for the minimum coverage provision at $0. The move invited opponents of the Act to challenge the provision as unconstitutional--exceeding congressional authority under its taxing power, because, well, the provision couldn't raise any revenue, and therefore couldn't be a "tax." (Recall that the Court in NFIB upheld the minimum coverage provision under Congress's taxing power.) The move also invited opponents to claim that the entire ACA was unconstitutional, because the rest of the well-integrated, closely-knit Act couldn't be severed from the minimum coverage provision. (Recall that the government originally argued that the minimum coverage provision was a necessary part of the larger ACA in order to provide universal access to health insurance while at the same time keeping costs affordable. Opponents picked up on this and argued that the minimum coverage provision couldn't be severed from the community-rating provision, the non-discrimination provision, and the rest of the Act (including things like the requirement that insurers allow young adults to stay on their parents' insurance until age 26).

More than a dozen states, led by Texas, and two individuals accepted the invitation and sued. They won big in the district court (which held the minimum coverage provision unconstitutional and inseverable from the rest of the Act). The Fifth Circuit agreed that the minimum coverage provision was unconstitutional, but remanded for further consideration of severability.

The Court today didn't touch the merits issues and instead ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. The Court said that the two individual plaintiffs lacked standing, because the zeroed-out minimum coverage provision didn't, and couldn't, harm them, because the government had no way to enforce it. The Court wrote that "there is no possible Government action that is causally connected to the plaintiffs' injury--the costs of purchasing health insurance." Without connecting the minimum coverage provision to their harm, the plaintiffs lacked standing.

The Court said that the states lacked standing, too, but for different reasons. First, the Court held that the minimum coverage provision didn't cause the states to incur costs for increased enrollment in state-operated medical insurance programs (like CHIP). The Court said that the states "failed to show how this injury is directly traceable to any actual or possible unlawful Government conduct in enforcing [the minimum coverage provision]," and that in any event the states failed to show that individuals actually enrolled in state medical insurance programs because of the zeroed-out provision. Next, the Court held that the provision didn't cause them to incur costs directly, as insurers of their own employees, because other portions of the Act (not the minimum coverage provision) required them to provide insurance to their own employees.

Justice Alito wrote a sharp dissent, joined by Justice Gorsuch. Justice Alito argued that the states had standing, because "[t]he ACA saddles them with expensive and burdensome obligations, and those obligations are enforced by the Federal Government." He said that states incur costs for complying with ACA reporting requirements, for providing health insurance to their employees, and for complying with other portions of the ACA--all of which are connected to, and inseverable from, the challenged minimum coverage provision. Justice Alito went on to argue that the minimum coverage provision was unconstitutional, and other ACA obligations that harmed the states were inseverable from the minimum coverage provision, and therefore must go, too.

June 17, 2021 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, News, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 3, 2021

Cole, Jaffer, and Olson on FISA Court Transparency

Check out David Cole, Jameel Jaffer, and Ted Olson's piece in the NYT on transparency at the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The FISC "authorizes panoramic surveillance programs that can have profound implications for the rights of millions of Americans, but many of its significant decisions have been withheld from the public."

The three and others teamed up on a cert. petition, asking SCOTUS to rule on whether the First Amendment provides a qualified right of public access to the FISC's significant opinions. (The FISC and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review both ruled that they lacked jurisdiction to hear the question.) The Court hasn't yet decided whether to take up the case. Here's the docket, with amicus briefs supporting the cert. petition.

June 3, 2021 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, First Amendment, News | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, May 6, 2021

Circuit Judge Takes on Standing Doctrine

The Eleventh Circuit ruled that a plaintiff had standing to sue for monetary damages for a "stigmatic injury" after a municipality failed to add captions to its online videos in violation of the ADA.

One of the panel judges, Judge Newsom, used the routine standing case to write a very un-routine concurrence (starting on page 11), lodging a frontal assault on the injury-in-fact requirement for standing and arguing for an "Article II approach." Here's the gist:

First, in my view, a "Case" exists within the meaning of Article III, and a plaintiff thus has what we have come to call "standing," whenever he has a legally cognizable cause of action, regardless of whether he can show a separate, stand-alone factual injury. Second, however--and it's a considerable "however"--Article II's vesting of the "executive Power" in the President and his subordinates prevents Congress from empowering private plaintiffs to sue for wrongs done to society in general or to seek remedies that accrue to the public at large.

May 6, 2021 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 5, 2021

Judge Orders DOJ to Release Advice on AG Barr's Summary of Special Counsel Report

Judge Amy Berman Jackson (D.D.C.) ordered the Justice Department to release a memo that contains advice to former Attorney General Barr on his infamous four-page summary of the Mueller Report and his conclusion that evidence in the report didn't support an obstruction-of-justice case against former President Trump. Judge Jackson gave DOJ until May 17 to comply and release the memo, or to file a motion to stay pending appeal.

The case, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. DOJ, arose when CREW filed a FOIA request for any records related to consultations between former AG Barr and DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel related to his four-page summary of the Mueller Report and his conclusion that the report didn't contain sufficient evidence to charge Trump. Barr mentioned that he had consulted with OLC in relation to his four-page letter, and his conclusion that its evidence "is not sufficient to establish that the President committed an obstruction-of-justice offense," when he later testified before Congress. (Recall that Barr purported to summarize the Mueller Report in this widely panned letter before the Report's public release. The letter misleadingly said that the Special Counsel "did not draw a conclusion--one way or the other--as to whether" former President Trump committed obstruction of justice. Barr concluded that the Report didn't contain sufficient evidence to charge Trump with obstruction.)

DOJ argued that the OLC advice was protected under FOIA Exemption 5 and the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges. Judge Jackson rejected those claims.

In short, based on an in camera review of the documents, the court recognized that Department officials wrote Barr's four-page letter before and during the time when it wrote the OLC memo. In other words, the OLC memo couldn't have been part of deliberations leading to Barr's letter, and it couldn't have provided legal advice related to Barr's letter, because Department officials drafted the letter before and simultaneously with Barr's letter. To put the finest point on it: the AG and DOJ already decided not to prosecute former President Trump before the Department wrote the OLC memo.

The court sharply criticized Barr and Department officials who provided affidavits, given that the plain evidence contradicted their claims. Here's just a flavor, on the court's analysis of the deliberative process privilege:

And of even greater importance to this decision, the affidavits are so inconsistent with evidence in the record, they are not worthy of credence. The review of the unredacted document in camera reveals that the suspicions voiced by the judge in EPIC and the plaintiffs here was well-founded, and that not only was the Attorney General being disingenuous then, but DOJ has been disingenuous to this Court with respect to the existence of a decision-making process that should be shielded by the deliberative process privilege. The agency's redactions and incomplete explanations obfuscate the true purpose of the memorandum, and the excised portions belie the notion that it fell to the Attorney General to make a prosecution decision or that any such decision was on the table at any time.

The ruling gives the DOJ until May 17 to comply and release the memo, or to appeal.

May 5, 2021 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 27, 2021

Second Circuit Recognizes Standing for Increased Risk of Identity Theft for Unauthorized Data Disclosure

The Second Circuit recognized that plaintiffs in an unauthorized-disclosure-of-data case may have standing based on an increased risk of identity theft. In so ruling, the Second Circuit joins several other circuits in recognizing standing based on an imminent risk of identity theft in data breach cases. (At least three circuits have suggested that there's a split on the issue, but the Second Circuit denied that, saying that "in actuality, no court of appeals has explicitly foreclosed plaintiffs from establishing standing based on a risk of future identity theft--even those courts that have declined to find standing on the facts of particular cases.")

At the same time, the court held that the particular plaintiffs in the case failed sufficiently to establish such an injury.

The case, McMorris v. Carlos Lopez & Associates, LLC, arose when an employee at CLA accidentally sent out an e-mail to all employees that included Social Security Numbers, dates of birth, and other personal information of current and former employees. Three individuals filed a class-action against CLA. As the parties moved toward settlement, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing.

The Second Circuit recognized that plaintiffs in a case like this could have standing. The court looked to three non-exhaustive factors in sorting this out: "(1) whether the plaintiffs' data has been exposed as the result of a targeted attempt to obtain that data; (2) whether any portion of the dataset has already been misused, even if the plaintiffs themselves have not yet experienced identity theft or fraud; and (3) whether the type of data that has been exposed is sensitive such that there is a high risk of identity theft or fraud."

The court ruled that the plaintiffs in this case, however, failed to establish imminent harm of identity theft.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs' theory that the data breach caused them to take action to protect themselves against identity theft. The court said that the plaintiffs had to allege a substantial risk of future identity theft in order to use their protective actions as a basis for standing. If it were otherwise, the court said, plaintiffs could harm themselves into standing based only on fears of hypothetical future injuries.

April 27, 2021 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, News, Opinion Analysis, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 26, 2021

Court Says SSA Applicants Need Not Raise Appointments Clause Challenges with Agency

The Supreme Court ruled last week that individuals whose applications for Social Security disability benefits were denied did not have to raise their Appointments Clause challenges with the agency; instead, they could raise those challenges for the first time in court. The ruling means that applicants who failed to raise constitutional challenges to the appointments of their administrative law judges could nevertheless raise those challenges in court.

The case, Carr v. Saul, arose when SSA ALJs rejected the appeals of certain applicants for SSA disability benefits. The applicants appealed to the agency's Appeals Council, but the Council denied review.

The Supreme Court then issued its ruling in Lucia v. SEC, holding that the appointment by SEC ALJs by lower-level staff violated the Appointments Clause. (The Court held that ALJs were "officers" under the Appointments Clause and thus couldn't be appointed by SEC staff.)

Based on Lucia, the applicants argued in federal court that the SSA ALJs who decided their cases were similarly invalidly appointed, and that the ALJs' decisions should be vacated. The SSA claimed that the applicants forfeited that argument, because they didn't raise it before the agency in the first place.

The Supreme Court agreed with the applicants. The Court held that ALJ proceedings weren't sufficiently adversarial to trigger an issue-exhaustion requirement. Moreover, it held that "agency adjudications are generally ill suited to address structural constitutional challenges," and that agency review would be futile, anyway.

The ruling's a victory for the applicants in this case, and for any other individuals who seek to challenge the appointment of an ALJ in the wake of Lucia.

April 26, 2021 in Appointment and Removal Powers, Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, April 17, 2021

Seventh Circuit Upholds Anti-Patronage Consent Decrees Against Cook County Clerk

The Seventh Circuit yesterday rebuffed the Cook County Clerk's challenge to a pair of consent decrees designed to monitor political patronage practices in that office and others. The ruling means that the decrees stay on the books (or, more precisely, on the district court's docket). But at the same time, the court warned that federalism concerns counsel in favor of resolving the case, and clearing the decrees from the court's docket, "swift[ly]."

The case, Shakman v. Clerk of Cook County, originated with two consent decrees, the "Shakman Decrees," from 1972 and 1991. The 1972 Decree enjoined Chicago and Cook County officials from "conditioning, basing or knowingly prejudicing or affecting any term or aspect of governmental employment, with respect to one who is at the time already a governmental employee, upon or because of any political reason or factor." The 1991 Decree expanded the 1972 Decree to cover hiring decisions: among other things, it required officials to post "prior public notice of the opportunity to apply for and be hired for" all positions, with just a few exceptions. (The City of Chicago and the Chicago Park District have since demonstrated substantial compliance and have been dismissed.)

While the Shakman Decrees remained on the district court's docket, there wasn't really any significant activity until 2019. That's when Shakman, the Voters Organization, and other plaintiffs moved for the appointment of a special master to monitor the Clerk's compliance with the Decrees. The plaintiffs claimed that the Clerk's hiring practices violated the 1991 Decree and that the Clerk took retaliatory actions against employees in violation of the 1972 Decree.

The Clerk opposed the motion and asked the magistrate judge to vacate both Decrees. After discovery and an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge found that the Clerk violated the Decrees, appointed a special master, and rejected the Clerk's request to vacate the Decrees. The Clerk appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that the case raised nonjusticiable political questions, and that the Clerk's actions didn't violate the Decrees.

The Seventh Circuit disagreed. The court ruled first that the plaintiffs had standing, because at least one member of the Voters Organization was a current employee in the Clerk's office who refused to engage in political patronage and suffered reprisal. The court said next that the case didn't raise a nonjusticiable political question, because "both the legal right and applicable standard here"--free association under Elrod v. Burns--"are evident and judicially manageable." Finally, the court held that the magistrate judge didn't clearly err in concluding that the Clerk's "ongoing violations reflect the precise political patronage the Consent Decrees seek to end."

The court noted, however, that federalism considerations counsel in favor of ending the Decrees now, or very soon:

Our federal structure, including the Article III Case or Controversy requirement, does not contemplate federal courts putting units of state or local government under what amounts to static and permanent consent decrees. Federal injunctions interfere with local control over local decision making, and, in turn, local democracy does not work as our federal constitutional design envisions.

April 17, 2021 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Federalism, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Political Question Doctrine | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 14, 2021

Ninth Circuit Denies Qualified Immunity for Judicial Deception Resulting in Minors' Medical Exams

The Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity to two social workers who knowingly and falsely represented to a juvenile court that they had made reasonable efforts to notify parents about medical examinations of their children. The false representations led to court-ordered exams without the knowledge or consent of the parents. The ruling means that the parents' civil-rights suit against the social workers can move forward.

The case, Benavidez v. County of San Diego, arose when social workers falsely told a juvenile court, as part of child removal proceedings, that they had made reasonable efforts to notify the children's parents when they sought a court order for medical examinations of the children. Based on the social workers' false statements, the court ordered medical exams of the children. The parents only learned of the exams after they occurred.

The parents sued, arguing that the social workers violated their due process rights by deceiving the juvenile court in procuring the orders for medical exams. The social workers argued that they enjoyed qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit disagreed.

The court ruled that "Plaintiffs' claims sufficiently alleged a violation of their constitutional right to family association, which 'includes the right of parents to make important medical decisions for their children, and of children to have those decisions made by their parents rather than the state.'" More particularly, the court said that "[w]e have previously recognized a constitutional right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from judicial deception and fabrication of evidence in the context of civil child custody cases." The court ruled that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded facts to support a violation here.

The court went on to say that the right was well established at the time of the violation.

At the same time, the court rejected the plaintiffs' Monell claim for county liability. The court said that the plaintiffs failed to allege that county policy or the county's failure to train the social workers led to the violations. (County policy, in fact, required the social workers to obtain parental consent before the examination.)

April 14, 2021 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 13, 2021

D.C. Circuit Effectively Erases Judicial Review of FEC Nonenforcement

The D.C. Circuit ruled on Friday that a private party can't challenge an Federal Election Commission decision not to enforce election law if the decision was based in any measure on agency discretion. The ruling effectively gives commissioners who successfully oppose enforcement action a get-out-of-judicial-review card simply by invoking discretion as any part of their explanation for not enforcing the law. The ruling also adds to the structural features that have paralyzed the FEC. (The FEC is comprised of six commissions, no more than three of either major political party. But it requires four votes to initiate an enforcement action. Partisan deadlock and quorum issues have created an impotent agency. This ruling only adds to those features, because it allows commissioners who vote against enforcement to insulate their decision simply by mentioning "discretion.")

The case, CREW v. FEC, arose when CREW sued the FEC for deciding not to enforce election law against New Models, a now-defunct non-profit. CREW filed a complaint against New Models for failing to comply with FECA's registration and reporting requirements for "political committees." But the FEC, by a 2-2 vote, decided not to pursue an investigation. The two commissioners who voted against an investigation wrote a 31-page, single-spaced opinion explaining their legal reasons why New Models wasn't a "political committee" under FECA. They added a final sentence, "For these reasons, and in exercise of our prosecutorial discretion, we voted against finding reason to believe that New Models violated the Act . . . ." (The commissioners dropped a footnote to their reference to "prosecutorial discretion" with a brief explanation: "Given the age of the activity and the fact that the organization appears no longer active, proceeding further would not be an appropriate use of Commission resources.")

CREW sued under FECA's provision that authorizes a private suit to challenge an FEC nonenforcement decision if it is "contrary to law." The D.C. Circuit ruled that the court couldn't review the decision, though, because it was "based even in part on prosecutorial discretion."

The court said that the ruling was a simple application of its previous ruling in Commission on Hope. In that case, the court said that under Heckler v. Chaney it couldn't review an FEC nonenforcement decision based on agency discretion. (Discretion formed a much more significant portion of the justification for nonenforcement in Commission on Hope, however.) It also said that FECA doesn't contain any standards for a court to judge an FEC decision based on discretion.

Judge Millett wrote a lengthy dissent, arguing that "the majority opinion creates an easy and automatic 'get out of judicial review free' card for the Federal Election Commission."

April 13, 2021 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, March 27, 2021

Court Says Plaintiffs Can Sue Ford Where Torts Occurred

The Supreme Court ruled this week that Ford had sufficient contacts with states where plaintiffs suffered injuries in Ford vehicles to allow the plaintiffs to sue there. The ruling means that the plaintiffs can pursue their claims against Ford in states where "Ford had systematically served a market . . . for the very vehicles" that caused the injuries, even though the plaintiffs didn't purchase their vehicles in those states, and even though Ford did not manufacture or design them there.

The holding breaks no new ground. But the reasoning might.

The case, Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, arose when plaintiffs who were injured in Ford vehicles in Montana and Minnesota sued the carmaker in those states. Ford argued that the state courts lacked personal jurisdiction, however, because the plaintiffs didn't buy the cars in those states, Ford didn't manufacture the cars there, and Ford didn't design the cars there--even though it had many other contacts with those states.

In other words, Ford said that there was no causal link between its behavior in the states and the plaintiffs' injuries.

The Court rejected this approach. In an opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court wrote that "Ford's causation-only approach finds no support in this Court's requirement of a 'connection' between a plaintiff's suit and a defendant's activities." The Court said that this result squares with language from World-Wide Volkswagen that "has appeared and reappeared in many cases since." Justice Alito summarized that language in his concurrence: "If a car manufacturer makes substantial efforts to sell vehicles in States A and B (and other States), and a defect in a vehicle first sold in State A causes injuries in an accident in State B, the manufacturer can be sued in State B."

In getting there, the Court looked to language in past opinions that said that a plaintiff's claims "must arise from or relate to the defendant's contacts" with the forum state. The Court read this as a disjunctive phrase, and said that while the first part ("arise from") requires causation, the second part ("relate to") doesn't. Even if the plaintiffs' claims here might not have "arose from" Ford contacts (in the causal sense), they certainly "related to" those contacts--and that's enough for personal jurisdiction.

Justice Alito and Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Thomas) wrote separate concurrences taking issue with that parsing of the phrase. Justice Alito worried that "[r]ecognizing 'relate to' as an independent basis for specific jurisdiction risks needless complications." Instead, he'd "leave the law exactly where it stood before we took these cases." Justice Gorsuch said the Court's approach was "unnecessary" to resolve the case. He'd revisit the modern approach (starting with International Shoe) and look instead to "the Constitution's original meaning." He suggested that for a case like this (with a defendant "nationwide corporation" whose "business is everywhere"), the defendant could be sued anywhere.

March 27, 2021 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, March 17, 2021

Seventh Circuit Strikes Indiana's Parental Notification Bypass for Minors' Abortion, Again

The Seventh Circuit ruled last week that Indiana's amended judicial bypass procedure violated the right to an abortion for minors. The court earlier ruled on the case (and struck the same amended bypass procedure), but the Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case in light of the Court's ruling last summer in June Medical. Last week, the Seventh Circuit came to the same result.

The case, Planned Parenthood v. Box, challenged Indiana's judicial bypass procedure. As amended, that procedure required a court to notify a minor's parents when the minor sought an abortion through judicial bypass of the state's parental-consent requirement, unless the judge finds that parental notification is not in the minor's best interest.

The district court originally ruled that the procedure created an undue burden on a minor's right to an abortion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appeals court applied the balancing test from Whole Women's Health, the 2016 Supreme Court case that struck Texas's admitting-privileges requirement. (Under the requirement, abortion doctors had to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of the place where they performed abortions.) The Court in Whole Women's Health assessed whether the admitting-privileges requirement created an undue burden by balancing the burdens of the requirement on a woman's right to an abortion against the putative benefits of the requirement. It held that the requirement created substantial burdens, but no benefits. The Seventh Circuit similarly ruled that Indiana's judicial bypass procedure created substantial burdens, but no benefits. (The plaintiffs demonstrated that the procedure would create burdens on access, while the state failed to produce any evidence of benefits of the law.)

Then, last summer, the Supreme Court ruled in June Medical that Louisiana's admitting-privilege requirement (the same as Texas's requirement, struck in Whole Women's Health) also created an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion. But the Court in June Medical split differently than in Whole Women's Health, because Justice Kavanaugh had replaced Justice Kennedy. (Justice Kennedy sided with the majority in Whole Women's Health, but Justice Kavanaugh sided with the dissent in June Medical.) In particular, Justice Breyer wrote for a four-justice plurality (including Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) that Louisiana's law was unconstitutional for two reasons: stare decisis (because Louisiana's law was the same as Texas's law, struck in Whole Women's Health); and because the burdens of Louisiana's law outweighed the benefits, thus creating an undue burden under the Whole Women's Health balancing approach. Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment based on stare decisis alone. But he also disagreed with the balancing approach. Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh wrote their own separate dissents.

The Court vacated the earlier Seventh Circuit ruling and remanded it for considering in light of June Medical. So the Seventh Circuit had to figure out whether June Medical changed the balancing test from Whole Women's Health that the Seventh Circuit had previously relied upon to strike Indiana's bypass procedure.

The Seventh Circuit last week ruled that June Medical did not change the balancing test. Under the Marks rule (which sorts out which opinion states the holding of the Court when, as in June Medical, there's no majority opinion), the court looked to Chief Justice Roberts's concurrence in June Medical as the "position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds." The Seventh Circuit held that Chief Justice Roberts's stare decisis rationale aligned with Justice Breyer's stare decisis rationale as the holding of the Court, and that the Court didn't otherwise alter or overrule the balancing approach in Whole Women's Health. (The court rejected the state's argument that Chief Justice Roberts's second rationale (that the balancing approach was wrong) aligned with the four dissenters' positions (also that the balancing approach was wrong) to create a majority that the balancing approach was wrong. The court explained that Chief Justice Roberts's second rationale (that the balancing approach was wrong) was dicta, and that under Marks the June Medical dissents (which also took issue with the balancing approach) don't count.)

The court said that because the balancing approach under Whole Women's Health was still the law, Indiana's bypass procedure still violated it.

Judge Kane dissented, arguing that under Marks Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in June Medical aligned with the plurality on a "substantial obstacle" test (without balancing, and not merely on stare decisis), and that Indiana's bypass procedure did not violate that "substantial obstacle" test.

March 17, 2021 in Abortion, Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 15, 2021

Court Says Request for Nominal Damages is Enough for Standing

The Supreme Court ruled last week that a plaintiff's request for nominal damages is sufficient to satisfy standing requirements and keep the case moving forward. The ruling is a significant win for the plaintiffs in the case, and for civil-rights plaintiffs generally; but it says nothing on the merits of the plaintiffs' claim. Instead, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The case, Uzuegbunam v. Presczewski, arose when a couple of students at Georgia Gwinnett College tried to engage fellow students and distribute religious literature in the school's free-speech zone. Campus officers stopped them, however, citing campus policy that prohibits speech that "disturbs the peace and/or comfort of person(s)." The plaintiffs sued College officials for injunctive relief and nominal damages. (Civil-rights plaintiffs often request nominal damages, $1.00, when their harm can't be quantified.) Rather than defending the policy on the merits, the College changed it, and moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the students' claim for injunctive relief was now moot, and that the students lacked standing based on their sole remaining claim for nominal damages.

The Court disagreed. Justice Thomas wrote for the 8-1 Court that a plaintiff continues to have standing to sue even when the plaintiff seeks only nominal damages. Justice Thomas said that courts at common law recognized suits for nominal damages, and that the common law did not require a plaintiff to seek compensatory damages in order to claim nominal damages.

Chief Justice Roberts was the lone dissenter. He argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because "an award of nominal damages does not alleviate the harms suffered by a plaintiff, and is not intended to." More, "If nominal damages can preserve a live controversy, then federal courts will be required to give advisory opinions whenever a plaintiff tacks on a request for a dollar."

The case now goes back to the district court for further consideration. The Court said that one plaintiff--the one who actually spoke--stated a cognizable injury that could be redressed with nominal damages. If that plaintiff meets other all other requirements, his case will go to the merits. But the Court instructed the district court to consider whether the other plaintiff--the one who didn't speak, and only alleged that he was deterred from speaking--suffered a constitutional violation.

March 15, 2021 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, News, Opinion Analysis, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, January 11, 2021

High Court Rebuffs Election Challenges

In orders this morning and last Thursday, the Supreme Court denied requests for expedited and interim relief in President Trump's challenges to state election processes and in Representative Louie Gohmert's lawsuit, respectively.

The rulings functionally close any chance that the Supreme Court will hear any additional challenges to the 2020 election.

January 11, 2021 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, News | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 8, 2021

A Primer on Constitutional Issues Related to the Insurgency

Here's a short Q&A on some of the more common constitutional questions related to Wednesday's insurgency:

The Twenty-Fifth Amendment

What is it?

Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides a four-step process for determining when a President "is unable to discharge the powers and duties of . . . office . . . ." Section 4 comes into play when a sitting President cannot or will not determine for him- or herself that he or she is so unable. (Section 3 provides the process for a President to make this determination for him- or herself, e.g., to temporarily designate him- or herself as unable to discharge the duties when he or she goes in for a medical procedure that may render the President temporarily unable to do the job.) If successful, a Section 4 process would make the Vice President the "Acting President." 

How does it work?

Section 4 has four steps:

Step 1: The VP and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments (the cabinet) send a written declaration of inability to the President Pro Tem of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. (There are 15 executive departments, so a majority is 8. Section 4 alternatively allows "such other body as Congress may by law provide" to serve this role. But there's currently no "such other body.") When this happens, the VP automatically becomes Acting President and assumes the powers of the presidency.

Step 2: The President may then send a letter to these congressional leaders stating that he or she has no disability--in other words, contesting the judgment of the VP and the cabinet. Note that the President isn't required to do this. If the President doesn't do it, the VP continues as Acting President. There's no time limit for the President to submit this transmission.

Step 3: The VP and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments can send another transmission to the congressional leaders, but must do so within four days of the President's transmission. If so, then the VP remains Acting President. (There is some disagreement about who would have the powers of the presidency during the period between the President's transmission and the VP/cabinet's re-submission. There is good textual and historical evidence that the VP would remain Acting President during this period.)

Step 4: Congress shall assemble within 48 hours to decide the issue; it must make a decision within 21 days (of receipt of the last transmission (in Step 3), or, if not in session, after it's required to assemble). If Congress votes by 2/3 in each chamber that the President is unable to discharge the duties of office, then the VP remains Acting President. "[O]therwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." 

What does it mean for President Trump?

If the VP and cabinet activate Section 4, VP Pence is likely to become the Acting President for the rest of President Trump's term, no matter what President Trump does. That's because the VP would become Acting President after Step 1, and because the VP and the cabinet would almost certainly complete Step 3 (having already committed to Step 1). At that point, Congress has a full 21 days--days in which the VP would be Acting President--which would carry us beyond January 20, the date of President-Elect Biden's inauguration. (Congress could easily drag its feet and avoid a vote until after January 20.)

Here's a fantastic Congressional Research Service report on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.

Impeachment

What is it?

Impeachment is a two-step process by which Congress can remove a sitting President from office and ban the President from holding future office. According to the Congressional Research Service, "[i]t appears that federal officials who have resigned have still been thought to be susceptible to impeachment and a ban on holding future office." A pardon doesn't work on impeachment. An impeached individual could also be subject to criminal liability.

How does it work?

Impeachment is a two-step process:

Step 1: The House votes to impeach. This requires only a bare majority. 

Step 2: The Senate then holds a trial and votes to convict. Removal from office requires a 2/3 vote. But under Senate practice, a bare majority could vote to prevent the President from holding future office.

What does it mean for President Trump?

Congress could remove President Trump from office, or ban him from holding office in the future, or both. Congress could ban President Trump from holding future office, even if he resigns from office first. Congress could dispense with its ordinary impeachment procedures (which take a longer time) and move very quickly, even before January 20. That's because impeachment proceedings are non-justiciable (the courts won't hear challenges to them), and President Trump therefore couldn't challenge an impeachment process in court.

Here's an excellent Congressional Research Service Report on impeachment.

Presidential Resignation

President Trump is free to resign from office at any time. There are no restrictions on this. If he resigns, under Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, "the Vice President shall become President."

Pardon

What is it?

The President has the power to pardon individuals for federal (but not state) crimes. But the President can pardon for crimes arising from past behavior only; the President cannot pardon for future acts. (But by pardoning for past behavior, the President can insulate individuals from future indictments or convictions.) The pardon power is probably not reviewable in the courts, although an improper exercise of the pardon power could be an impeachable offense.

The Justice Department has long held that a President cannot pardon him- or herself. (The OLC memo is here.) But we've never faced that situation, and we have no court rulings. 

There's a question as to whether the President can issue a blanket pardon, or whether the President must identify the specific criminal behavior. This has never been tested.

What does it mean for President Trump?

President Trump cannot pardon himself. If he tries--and attempts to use his self-pardon as a defense in a future federal prosecution--he will likely fail. But President Trump could resign from office, or delegate authority to the VP, and VP Pence (as Acting President) could pardon him. (See the discussion on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, above.)

VP Pence could not pardon President Trump for state crimes. The pardon power only works for federal offenses.

Presidential Immunity

What is it?

The President enjoys certain immunities from the law by virtue of the President's unique position in our constitutional system. For example, the President is absolutely immune from civil liability for official actions. But the President is not immune from civil lawsuits for behavior prior to coming to office. 

The Justice Department has long held that a sitting President is immune from federal criminal prosecution while in office. This is not uncontroversial, however, and it's never been tested. At the same time, DOJ has also long held that a President is not immune from federal criminal prosecution after the President leaves office. (Here's the most recent DOJ/OLC memo on this.) 

The Supreme Court ruled just this past summer that a sitting President is not absolutely immune from all state criminal processes. President Trump is not immune from state criminal investigations and more, and he will enjoy no immunity from state criminal indictments or convictions when he leaves office.

What does it mean for President Trump?

President Trump is subject to federal and state criminal indictment and conviction for behavior while in office when he leaves office, and maybe sooner. Traditionally, the DOJ has not pursued criminal charges against a former President. But the Constitution does not forbid this. 

A pardon, of course, would insulate President Trump from future federal criminal prosecution.

January 8, 2021 in Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, News, Separation of Powers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 1, 2021

Court Kicks Gohmert's Election Case Against Pence

Judge Jeremy D. Kernodle (E.D. Tx.) dismissed the lawsuit headed by Representative Louie Gohmert against Vice President Mike Pence to throw the 2020 presidential election.

The ruling in the frivolous case was not unexpected. 

The case arose when Gohmert and self-appointed Trump electors from Arizona sued VP Pence, arguing that the Electoral Count Act violates the Electors Clause and the Twelfth Amendment, and that Pence has authority to determine which slate of electors to accept when he presides over the congressional count of electoral votes on January 6. The, er, novel argument turns on the plaintiffs', um, creative reading of the Electors Clause, the Twelfth Amendment, and the Electoral Count Act.

Start with the Electors Clause. It says that "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . ." 

Next, the Twelfth Amendment. It says that each state's electors meet in their respective states and vote for President and VP. The electors then transmit their votes to the President of the Senate, the VP. "The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted." The candidate winning the majority of electoral votes wins. But if no candidate gets a majority, the House selects the President, with each state delegation receiving one vote. 

Finally, the Electoral Count Act. It says that Congress must count the votes in a joint session on January 6, with the VP presiding. It says that the executive in each state shall certify the electors to the Archivist of the United States, who then transmits the certificates to Congress. It says that a state's determination of their electors is "conclusive" if the state resolved all disputes over the election pursuant to state law at least 6 days before the electors meet. (This is called the "safe harbor" date.) Under the Act, if at least one Member of the House of Representatives and one Senator objects to a state's elector votes, the House and Senate meet in separate sessions and vote on the objection--by members, not state delegations.

Arizona, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin all certified their electors to President-Elect Biden and VP-Elect Harris, pursuant to state law and the Electoral Count Act. The governors certified the electors to the Archivist. 

But then Trump electors in those states met and, without any legal authority, self-certified their votes to President Trump and VP Pence. 

The plaintiffs contend that the self-appointed Trump electors created a competing slate of electors in each of these states. (They did not. The "Trump electors" named themselves electors without any legal authority and contrary to state law in each state.) They argue that "provisions . . . of the Electoral Count Act are unconstitutional insofar as they establish procedures for determining which of two or more competing slates of Presidential Electors for a given State are to be counted in the Electoral College, or how objections to a proffered slate are adjudicated, that violate the Twelfth Amendment."

In particular, they argue that the states appointed Biden electors in violation of the Electors Clause, because the state governors and secretaries of state certified those electors, even though the Electors Clause specifies that this is a function for the legislature. (In fact, the legislatures in each of those states already determined the manner of appointing electors by enacting state law that awards electors to the majority winner of the popular vote in those states.) 

Moreover, they argue that the dispute-resolution procedure in the Electoral Count Act "limits or eliminates [the VP's] exclusive authority and sole discretion under the Twelfth Amendment to determine which slates of electors for a State, or neither, may be counted." (In fact, the Twelfth Amendment does not give this authority to the VP. The VP's role is ceremonial, simply to read and count the certified results from each state.)

Finally, they argue that the dispute-resolution procedure in the Electoral Count Act "replaces the Twelfth Amendment's dispute resolution procedure--under which the House of Representatives has sole authority to choose the President." (In fact, the Twelfth Amendment dispute resolution procedure only applies when no candidate won a majority of electoral votes. The Electoral Count Act procedure applies when a member of both Houses objects to a state's slate of electors. Those are different dispute resolution processes, to be sure, but for very different kinds of dispute.) 

The plaintiffs asked the court to hold that the VP has "exclusive authority and sole discretion in determining which electoral votes to count for a given State." 

But the court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing. It said that Gohmert lacked standing, because he asserted only an institutional harm (to the House), and not a personal harm. "Congressman Gohmert's alleged injury is 'a type of institutional injury (the diminution of legislative power), which necessarily damages all Members of Congress.'" It said that the Trump "electors" lacked standing, because any alleged injury that they suffered was not created by VP Pence, the defendant. Moreover, it said that both Gohmert and the Trump "electors" failed to show that their requested relief (an order that VP Pence has exclusive discretion to determine which electoral votes to count) would redress their injuries, because VP Pence might not determine the electoral votes in their favor. 

The plaintiffs vowed to appeal. But don't expect this case to go anywhere . . . on standing, or on the merits.

January 1, 2021 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Elections and Voting, Federalism, News, Opinion Analysis, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, December 30, 2020

D.C. Circuit Says House Committee Minority Can Sue to Get GSA Info

The D.C. Circuit ruled this week that members of a House committee have standing to sue to enforce their statutory right to obtain information from executive agencies, in this case the General Services Administration.

The ruling means that the plaintiff-House members can pursue their claim to get the information, but it does not say that they'll win. In any event, the case is likely to become moot under President Biden, when the administration seems much more likely to comply with the request. (The ruling is likely to embolden minority Republican House members to ask for information from the Biden Administration.)

The case, Maloney v. Murphy, arose when Democratic members of the House Oversight Committee, then in a minority, sought information from the GSA related to the Agency's lease with a Trump corporation for the Old Post Office. The members invoked 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2954, which authorizes seven members of the House Oversight Committee or five members of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee to request and obtain information from any executive agency. The statute functionally allows a minority group of lawmakers on those committees to obtain information from an executive agency, even if the full committee does not seek that same information. 

GSA balked, and the members sued. The district court granted the GSA's motion to dismiss for lack of standing, but the D.C. Circuit reversed.

The court said that the plaintiffs suffered a cognizable informational injury--that the GSA deprived them of information to which they were entitled, and that their lawsuit would redress that injury. 

The court went on to say that the injury was "personal," and not "institutional," and therefore the individual lawmakers had standing. (A personal injury is a direct harm to a person, or in this case a lawmaker; the harmed individual, even if a lawmaker, has standing to sue. An institutional injury, in contract, is a generalized harm to the institution, in this case the Committee; the Committee would have standing, but not an individual lawmaker.) The court explained:

The Requestors do not assert an injury to institutional powers of functions that "damages all Members of Congress and both Houses of Congress equally." The injury they claim--the denial of information to which they as individual legislators are statutorily entitled--befell them and only them. Section 2954 vested them specifically and particularly with the right to obtain information. The 34 other members of the Committee who never sought the information suffered no deprivation when it was withheld. Neither did the nearly 400 other Members of the House who were not on the Committee suffer any informational injury. Nor was the House (or Senate) itself harmed because the statutory right does not belong to those institutions.

Judge Ginsburg dissented:

The Plaintiff-Members here allege harm to the House rather than to themselves personally. Their theory of injury is that the General Services Administration (GSA), by refusing their request for certain documents, hindered their efforts to oversee the Executive and potentially to pass remedial legislation. The Complaint is clear and consistent on this point: The Plaintiff-Members were harmed through the "impedance of the oversight and legislative responsibilities that have been delegated to them by Congress . . . ."

December 30, 2020 in Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 8, 2020

Government Seeks Stay of Census Order at Supreme Court

The Trump Administration yesterday filed a motion at the Supreme Court to stay, pending appeal, a district court's order directing the government to continue census operations until October 31. The filing is just the latest in the ongoing efforts of the Trump Administration to rush census operations amid a pandemic. The Administration says that it needs to speed efforts in order to meet the December 31 statutory deadline for reporting census data to the President.

The case is important, because congressional apportionment, legislative districts, and federal funds are all tied to census data. The numbers that come from the 2020 census will lock these in for the next ten years. Moreover, the Trump Administration seems set on the December 31 deadline so that President Trump (and not a potential President Biden) would certify the census numbers to Congress--and possibly try not to include unauthorized noncitizens in the count.

The case arose when the Trump Administration reversed course on a revised census plan that would extend census data collection through October 31 in light of data-collection delays resulting from Covid-19.

The Census Bureau adopted the plan after it lost 47 days of data-collection efforts, and anticipated additional difficulties in collecting data, due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The plan set the end of collection efforts at October 31, 2020. But this would mean that the Bureau would likely not meet the December 31 statutory deadline for reporting data to the President. 

So on August 3, the Administration abruptly issued a "Replan," which set the end of data-collection efforts at September 30. The Replan condensed the total time to conduct the census to 49.5 weeks--4.5 weeks shy of the pre-Covid schedule of 54 weeks, and 22 weeks shy of the extended Covid schedule. 

A group of organizations, cities, counties, and tribal groups sued to stop the Replan, arguing that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Enumeration Clause. The district court ordered the Replan halted, order data-collection efforts to extend to October 31, and enjoined the Administration from implementing the September 30 and December 31 deadlines. 

The Ninth Circuit denied an administrative stay, and, yesterday, partially stayed the district court's order pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit stayed the district court's order enjoining the Administration from complying with the statutory December 31 deadline--the Ninth Circuit said that a court shouldn't order the government to ignore a statutory deadline--but denied a stay of the order enjoining the September 30 stop date. This meant that the Administration would have to continue census data-collection through October 31.

Soon after the Ninth Circuit ruled, the Administration filed for a stay with the Supreme Court. The Administration argued that the APA didn't apply, that in any event the plaintiffs didn't prove a violation of the APA, and that the Administration couldn't meet the December 31 statutory deadline if data collection extended through October 31.

In other words, the Administration says that it couldn't have been arbitrary and capricious (and therefore in violation of the APA) for the Administration to halt data-collection efforts at an earlier date in order to meet the statutory deadline of December 31.

October 8, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, News | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, October 4, 2020

Supreme Court to Hear First Amendment Challenge to Political Balancing Requirements for State Courts

The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments tomorrow, the opening day of October Term 2020, in Carney v. Adams. The case tests whether Delaware's "political balancing" requirements for its courts violate the First Amendment. A ruling on the merits could have implications for a variety of state and federal commissions that have similar balancing requirements. But first the Court'll need to address the plaintiff's standing . . . .

Here's my Preview of the case, from the ABA Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases, with permission:

Case at a Glance

Delaware attorney James Adams, a registered Independent, considered applying for a judicial position on the state courts. Despite his interest, however, Adams did not apply, because he believed that, as an Independent, he would not qualify. Adams pointed to a state constitutional provision that capped the number of judges from a political party to no more than a bare majority on the courts (the “bare-majority” requirement) and that, for some courts, required that the other judges come from the other major political party (the “major-party” requirement). Instead of applying for judicial vacancies on these courts, Adams sued, arguing that the provision violated the First Amendment.

INTRODUCTION

According to the Supreme Court, the First Amendment permits the government to use a person’s political affiliation as a qualification for “policymaking” positions, but generally not for lower-level government jobs. This case tests how that principle applies to Delaware’s political balancing provision for judges. But before we get to the merits, the case raises a significant question whether Adams even has standing to sue.

ISSUES

  1. Does Adams have standing to sue, given that he declined to apply for judicial vacancies, and given that he would have qualified for vacancies on two of Delaware’s courts?
  2. Does the First Amendment prohibit a state from specifying and defining the composition of its courts by reference to the judges’ political parties?
  3. Is the provision of Delaware’s constitution that caps the judges from one political party on three of the state’s courts severable from the provision that requires that all judges on those courts are members of a major political party?

FACTS

Delaware’s “Bare Majority” and “Major Party” Political Balancing Requirements

In 1897, delegates to the Delaware constitutional convention sought to reduce the influence of politics on the state’s judiciary. In order to achieve this goal, delegates recommended a political balancing requirement for the state’s principal courts. Under the requirement, these courts could not have more than a single-judge majority from any one political party. The state adopted the bare-majority proposal, and Delaware has had some form of a bare-majority requirement for its principal courts ever since.

In 1951, the state modified the political balancing requirements to exclude third party and unaffiliated voters from applying to serve as judges on the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, and the Chancery Court, the so-called “business courts.” The change retained the existing bare-majority requirement, but it added a major-party requirement that limited service on these courts only to members of a major political party, Republican or Democrat. The major-party requirement helped to ensure that a governor could not side-step the bare-majority requirement by appointing a nominal third-party or independent judge to a seat reserved for the other side. The change stuck through several amendment processes, including in 2005.

Today, Article IV, Section 3, of the Delaware Constitution specifies that these three courts shall include no more than a single-judge majority from one major political party, and that all other judges shall be from the other major political party. (If one of these courts has an even number of judges, the provision specifies that the judges on that court shall be equally divided, Republican and Democrat.)

The same section also specifies that the Family Court and the Court of Common Pleas shall include no more than a single-judge majority of the same political party. (If one of these courts has an even number of judges, the provision specifies that no more than one-half of the judges shall be of the same political party.) But in contrast to the provision for the business courts, the provision for these two courts does not include a major-party requirement. As a result, members of non-major political parties, including independents, may serve on these two courts, so long as these courts satisfy their bare-majority requirement.

Delaware’s Judicial Nominations

Since 1978, Delaware governors have relied on recommendations from a judicial nominating commission to identify candidates to appoint to judicial vacancies. Under this practice, the commission, which is politically balanced and comprised of both lawyers and non-lawyers, recommends three candidates for each judicial vacancy. The governor then selects one of the three nominees for appointment. If the governor is not satisfied with the commission’s recommendations, the commission may generate another list of recommendations.

When a judicial position becomes available, the commission provides public notice of the position, the salary, and the job requirements, including the party membership, in order to comply with the bare-majority and major-party requirements, discussed above.

James Adams’s Non-Application for a Judicial Position

In December 2015, Delaware attorney James Adams retired and went on “emeritus” status with the Delaware state bar. Sometime in late 2016 or early 2017, Adams decided to explore judicial vacancies. He reactivated his full state bar membership and changed his party affiliation from Democrat to Independent. Adams said that he would have considered and applied for any available positions on any of the state’s courts. (Adams said he changed his party affiliation because he grew disenchanted with the Delaware Democratic Party and considered himself “more of a Bernie [Sanders] independent.” The state, in contrast, suggests that he changed his party only to bring this suit. Adams also claims that he declined to apply for judicial vacancies in the past, because he would not have qualified as a Democrat. The state disputes this and says that he would have qualified for at least ten judgeships.)

Rather than applying for any vacancies, however, Adams brought this suit. He claimed that the political balancing requirements rendered him ineligible for available vacancies based on his Independent political status, and argued that the requirements violated the First Amendment. The district court agreed and struck both the bare-majority requirement and the major-party requirement as they applied to all five courts.

The Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court ruled that Adams lacked standing to challenge the bare-majority requirements for the Family Court and the Court of Common Pleas, because the bare-majority requirements did not bar his appointment as an Independent to those courts. The court also accepted that Adams lacked standing to challenge the bare-majority requirement for the business courts for the same reason. On the merits, the court held that the major-party requirement for the business courts violated the First Amendment. It ruled that the bare-majority requirement failed, too, because (notwithstanding Adams’s lack of standing to challenge it) the bare-majority requirement was not severable from the major-party requirement. This appeal followed.

CASE ANALYSIS

There are three issues in this case. Let’s take them one at a time.

Standing

In order to sue in federal court,  plaintiffs must establish that they have suffered, or imminently will suffer, a concrete and particularized injury that was caused by the challenged law. Here, the state argues that Adams failed to establish a sufficient injury to challenge the political balancing requirements. The state says that the bare-majority requirement could not possibly injure Adams, because he does not belong to either political party. Moreover, the state contends that Adams failed to establish that he suffered past injuries based on the bare-majority requirement, because he would have qualified “for at least ten judgeships.” The state asserts that Adams failed to establish that he will suffer future harms based on the major-party requirement, because he cannot say with certainty that the major-party requirement will disqualify him from future consideration. Finally, the state notes that Adam declined to apply for any positions as an Independent, and that any harm he suffered is therefore “self-inflicted” and non-cognizable.

Adams counters that he only has to allege that the political balancing requirements chilled his exercise of his First Amendment right to affiliate (or not) with a political party (and not that the state actually denied his application). He says he easily meets this standard, because he alleged that he would have applied for judicial vacancies but for the balancing requirements’ political discrimination. He claims that the requirements force him “to choose between the right to seek a judgeship and violating his political conscience by re-registering as a Democrat or a Republican in order to be considered.” And he contends that a decision striking the political balancing requirements would allow him to submit an application as an Independent and have it “accepted and considered on its own merit.”

The Political Balancing Requirements

The state argues that it may consider party affiliation of state judges consistent with the First Amendment. It contends that under Supreme Court precedent, the First Amendment only limits a state from considering political affiliation for “low-level public employees,” not for “policymaking” jobs. The state asserts that the “ultimate inquiry” is “whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.” Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 508 (1980).

The state says that its use of party affiliation for judges easily meets these tests. It contends that judges occupy “policymaking” positions, because, among other things, they “develop the common law.” And it claims that party affiliation is “an appropriate requirement” for the job, “[b]ecause party affiliation is a proxy for how would-be judges might understand their role,” and because it helps to ensure bipartisan decisionmaking on the bench. The state asserts that the Third Circuit adopted an unduly narrow definition of “policymaking”—one that does not square with Supreme Court precedent.

Finally, the state argues that even if its political balancing requirements are subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny (because judgeships are not “policymaking” positions), they pass muster. The state says that they are narrowly tailored to ensure a politically balanced judiciary, and that this, in turn, serves its compelling interest of preserving “public confidence in judicial integrity.”

Adams counters that the balancing requirements violate the First Amendment, because “[p]olitical affiliation is not only not necessary for the work of a judge, it also is inconsistent with the role of a judge.” Adams claims that judges only make “policy” insofar as they rule on the immediate cases before them, and so are not policymakers under Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, he says that judges are supposed to render their decisions without consideration of politics, and so their political affiliation is not “an appropriate requirement” for their office. In short, he contends that the state’s balancing requirements run exactly against the state’s own interests in a politically neutral judiciary.

Severability

The state argues that the bare-majority requirement is severable from the major-party requirement, and that the Court can therefore strike the major-party requirement (if it must) without also striking the bare-majority requirement. As an initial matter, the state asserts again that Adams lacks standing to challenge the bare-majority provision, and argues that he cannot use its non-severability from the major-party requirement to create standing to challenge it. Such a rule, the state contends, “would allow parties to obtain sweeping relief against whole statutory schemes even if injured by only part of them.” Moreover, the state claims that the bare-majority requirement can stand alone, independent of the major-party requirement, as it stood for 54 years before the state adopted the major-party requirement, and as it currently stands for the state’s Family Court and Court of Common Pleas. According to the state, “[t]here is simply no evidence that the Delaware Constitution’s framers would have preferred no political balance provisions at all to a system with just the bare majority provision.”

Adams counters that the state failed to raise the severability argument before the lower courts, and so waived it. But if the Court rules on severability, Adams argues that the major-party requirement is not severable from the bare-majority requirement, because the two provisions “are textually intertwined” and necessarily work together. He says that the history of the bare-majority requirement reveals that “the Legislature had only Democrats and Republicans in mind.” Moreover, he claims that the major-party requirement is necessary for the bare-majority requirement to achieve its goals. He contends that the major-party requirement “has no independent justification for its existence,” and so the two are not severable. According to Adams, this means that when the Court strikes the major-party requirement, it must also strike the bare-majority requirement.

SIGNIFICANCE

First and foremost, there is a circuit split on an issue central to the merits question in this case, whether judges are “policymakers.” The Third Circuit said no, but the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits (and, according to the state, “every other court to address the issue”) has said yes. Under Court precedent, if judges are “policymakers,” then the state can use their political affiliation as a qualification without violating the First Amendment. If they are not, then the state must show that its use of political affiliation is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. This is a high standard, but one that the state argues, in the alternative, that it can satisfy. If the Court reaches the central merits question in this case, it may resolve the circuit split and determine whether judges are “policymakers” that fall under this exception to the First Amendment.

I say “may,” because it’s not entirely obvious that the Court’s precedents establishing the “policymakers” standard apply here. Those precedents deal more directly with the problem of political patronage, that is, when the government doles out jobs to politically friendly allies. But Delaware’s stated interest is very different here, to reduce the influence of politics in the judiciary by mandating a non-partisan, or, in this case, a bi-partisan, process. According to the State and Local Government Associations, as amicus in support of the state, merely applying the Court’s patronage precedents could threaten similar state and local government balancing requirements far beyond the judiciary. According to amicus, this could affect state and local governments’ efforts to reduce the influence of politics in a variety of policy areas.

But all that’s only if the Court reaches the central merits question, whether Delaware’s balancing provision violates the First Amendment. Before the Court can address this issue, it must determine that Adams has standing to sue. Given that Adams declined to apply for several positions for which he apparently qualified (either as a Democrat, in the past, or as an Independent, in the present and future), it seems likely that the Court may simply dismiss the case for lack of standing, vacate the Third Circuit’s ruling, and wait for a more appropriate case to address the hard question of whether Delaware’s political balancing provision violates the First Amendment.

October 4, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, First Amendment, News | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 30, 2020

How Could a Justice Amy Coney Barrett Affect the Affordable Care Act?

Looking for a plain-English explainer on how a Justice Amy Coney Barrett could affect the Affordable Care Act, or Obamacare, in a case scheduled for oral argument on November 10? Here you go:

 



 

September 30, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, News, Taxing Clause | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, September 26, 2020

President Trump Announces Nomination of Judge Amy Coney Barrett

Here's SCOTUSblog's resource page:

    https://www.scotusblog.com/category/special-features/nomination-of-amy-coney-barrett-to-the-supreme-court/

Here's the Seventh Circuit opinions website, which allows you to search opinions by author:

    http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/opinion.html

September 26, 2020 in Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, News | Permalink | Comments (0)