Check it Out: Smith's Originalism, Common Good Constitutionalism, and Transparency

Michael L. Smith (Idaho), Originalism, Common Good Constitutionalism, and Transparency, Harvard J. L. and Public Policy (forthcoming):

A theory of interpretation that is more transparent tends to be preferable to less transparent alternatives. Increased transparency tends to promote the values of constraint, democratic legitimacy, and an understanding of what the law is. Under a transparency rubric, originalism, as a standard of interpretation, performs better than common good constitutionalism. Originalism provides a better defined (though still imperfect) basis for determining the correctness of claims about the Constitution means. Common good constitutionalism’s reliance on morally and politically loaded terminology makes it elusive as a standard of interpretation that tends to match the desires of the interpreter. At the implementation stage, however, those who implement common good constitutionalism do so in a transparent manner—reading the Constitution in line with their readily expressed moral and political inclinations. Originalism, on the other hand, is vulnerable to disingenuous interpreters who use originalism as a smokescreen to achieve political ends in the guise of neutrality. This casts doubts on originalist attempts to use common good constitutionalism as an opportunity to sell their theory to nonoriginalists.