Thursday, December 3, 2020

Ninth Circuit Halts Public Charge Rule

The Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction yesterday that halted the administration's "public charge" rule--the ban on admission of aliens to the United States who are likely to receive certain public benefits for more than 12 months within any 36 month period. But the court vacated a lower court's nationwide injunction; instead, the ruling temporarily halted the rule within the Ninth Circuit and in other outside states that brought the case.

The ruling aligns with similar rulings in the Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit (where then-Judge Amy Coney Barrett dissented), but conflicts with a ruling out of the Fourth Circuit.

Ordinarily, this case would seem destined for the Supreme Court. But DHS may reverse course in the Biden Administration and render it moot.

The case arose when DHS adopted a rule in August 2019 that re-defined "public charge" under the Immigration and Naturalization Act provision that renders inadmissible any alien who is likely to become a "public charge." In particular, DHS defined "public charge" to mean "an alien who receives one or more [specified] public benefits . . . for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36-month period."

The change in definition broke with a long history, "from the Victorian Woodhouse to agency guidance in 1999," defining "public charge" to mean dependence on public assistance for survival--and not "short-term use of in-kind benefits that are neither intended nor sufficient to provide basic sustenance."

The court ruled that the 2019 rule was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious in violence of the Administrative Procedure Act. It held that the rule violated the long-running meaning of "public charge" under the INA and thus violated the Act. It also held that DHS failed to consider the financial impact of the rule and the health consequences of the rule for immigrants and the public as a whole, and failed to explain its reversal in position (from the 1999 guidance).

Judge VanDyke dissented, relying on the reasoning in the Fourth Circuit ruling, then-Judge Barrett's dissent in the Seventh Circuit case, the earlier Ninth Circuit ruling staying a district court injunction pending appeal, and "the Supreme Court's multiple stays this year of injunctions virtually identical to those the majority today affirms." 

December 3, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Executive Authority, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, November 26, 2020

Court Halts Application of New York's Occupancy Limits to Synagogues, Churches

The Supreme Court yesterday granted an application to temporarily halt the enforcement of New York's "red zone" and "orange zone" occupancy limits to the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and Agudath Israel of America, the plaintiffs challenging the restrictions. The ruling means that New York cannot apply its red- and orange-zone restrictions to the plaintiffs as their case works its way through the lower courts. (It's currently on appeal at the Second Circuit.) But it also telegraphs the way the Court will rule when the case eventually comes to it on the merits.

The 5-4 ruling reflected the conventional divide on the Court (with Chief Justice Roberts siding with the three progressives). It also revealed a rift between Justice Gorsuch and Chief Justice Roberts, as Justice Gorsuch took aim at the Chief for his earlier opinion in South Bay. The ruling illustrates the impact of Justice Amy Coney Barrett: it almost certainly would've come out the other way if Justice Ginsburg were still on the Court.

The Court held that New York's 10- and 25-person occupancy restrictions (the red- and orange-zone restrictions, respectively) likely violate the Free Exercise Clause. The per curiam opinion said that the zones "single out houses of worship for especially harsh treatment" in comparison to secular "essential" businesses like "acupuncture facilities, camp grounds, garages[, and] plants manufacturing chemicals and microelectronics and transportation facilities." The Court said that because the restrictions are not "neutral" and of "general applicability," they must satisfy strict scrutiny, and that they failed. The Court noted that New York's zones are far more restrictive than other COVID-related regulations that the Court has considered, that "there is no evidence that the applicants have contributed to the spread of COVID-19," and that the state could achieve its objective (to minimize the risk of transmission) with less restrictive means, for example, tying the occupancy limits to the size of the synagogue or church (rather than setting the limit at a particular number).

Chief Justice Roberts dissented, arguing that an injunction isn't necessary, because the state lifted the red- and orange-zone restrictions on the plaintiffs.

Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, arguing that the injunction isn't necessary and that the plaintiffs didn't meet the requirements for an "extraordinary remedy."

Justice Sotomayor dissented, too, joined by Justice Kagan, arguing that the state treats synagogues and churches more favorably than similar secular activities (like concerts), and that the state's "essential services" that enjoy more favorable treatment are distinguishable based on the science. 

November 26, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, News | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, November 10, 2020

Argument Preview: Court Again Considers Affordable Care Act, this time the entire thing

The Supreme Court hears arguments today in the latest challenge to the Affordable Care Act--a case that could take down the entire Act. Here's my preview, from the ABA Preview of United States Supreme Court cases, with permission:

INTRODUCTION

The universal coverage provision is once again at the Supreme Court. This time, challengers argue that the provision is not a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing authority, because the provision lacks a critical feature of a “tax”: it cannot raise revenue for the government. (After all, the penalty for noncompliance is zero.) Moreover, challengers argue that because the universal coverage provision is so integrated with the rest of the Act, the provision’s invalidity also means that the rest of the Act must fall, too. But before we even get to these issues, the Court will first consider whether the challengers even have standing to bring their claims.

ISSUES

  1. Do individual and state plaintiffs have standing to challenge the minimum-coverage provision in the Affordable Care Act?
  2. Did Congress render the minimal-coverage provision unconstitutional by setting the tax penalty for individuals who lack health insurance to zero?
  3. If the minimal-coverage provision is unconstitutional, is the rest of the Affordable Care Act unconstitutional, too?

FACTS

In 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The central goal of the Act was to extend quality and affordable health insurance to all Americans. In order to achieve this goal, the ACA included a host of new policies and regulations of the health-insurance market.

Three of those policies stand out. First, the “guaranteed-issue provision” prohibits health-insurance companies from denying coverage for pre-existing conditions. Second, the “community-rating provision” bars health-insurance companies from charging individuals higher premiums because of their health conditions. And third, the “universal coverage provision” (or “individual mandate”) requires all individuals to obtain health insurance, or to pay a tax penalty. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.

The three provisions complement each other in order to achieve the goals of the Act. The guaranteed-issue provision ensures that all individuals have access to health insurance. The community-rating provision ensures that no individuals pay an outsized rate based on their health conditions. And the universal-coverage provision helps to ensure that health-insurance rates are affordable, by expanding the pool of insured individuals who pay into the health-insurance system, including healthy, but previously uninsured, individuals. These provisions form a “three-legged stool” that sits at the center of the Act.

But the ACA contains a web of other reforms and regulations, too, all designed to help extend quality and affordable health insurance to all Americans. Most notably, the Act provides federal financial incentives to states to expand their Medicaid programs; it expands access to employer-based health insurance; it creates health-insurance marketplaces ( “exchanges”) where individuals can shop for insurance; it provides subsidies to insurance companies and individuals to help keep rates affordable; it requires health-insurance plans to provide certain minimal benefits; it allows young adults to stay on their parents’ health insurance plans until age 26; and more. The ACA also contains a number of provisions that are designed to expand access to quality and affordable healthcare and improve public health outcomes, even if they are not directly related to the health-insurance market.

Opponents of the ACA immediately sued to stop the Act. They argued, among other things, that Congress lacked authority to enact the universal-coverage provision, and that the provision was therefore unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court disagreed. A sharply divided five-to-four Court ruled that while Congress could not enact the provision under its Commerce Clause authority, Congress could enact the provision under its taxing authority. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). In other words, the Court held that Congress could not require individuals to purchase health insurance as a free-standing regulatory mandate. But it said that Congress could impose a tax penalty against individuals who failed to comply with the provision.

In explaining why Congress could enact the universal coverage provision under its taxing authority, Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the Court, noted that the tax penalty for noncompliance with the universal coverage had all the indicia of valid tax. He observed that the provision was located in the Internal Revenue Code, and that the amount of the penalty was “determined by such familiar factors as taxable income, number of dependents, and joint filing status.” Most importantly, he noted that the provision “yield[ed] the essential feature of any tax: It produce[d] at least some revenue for the Government.” As a tax, Chief Justice Roberts observed, the provision “is not a legal command to buy insurance,” but instead “a condition—not owning health insurance—that triggers a tax.”

Before and after the ruling, opponents of the ACA waged several attempts to revoke the Act through legislation. These efforts failed. But in 2017, in direct response to the ruling, opponents in Congress, through the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), succeeded in undermining the universal-coverage provision indirectly, by setting the tax penalty for noncompliance at zero dollars.

After Congress enacted the TCJA, two private individuals and a group of states sued the government, arguing that the TCJA rendered the universal-coverage provision unconstitutional. They claimed that by zeroing out the tax penalty for noncompliance, Congress transformed the universal-coverage provision from a valid tax (under NFIB) to an unconstitutional direct requirement to buy health insurance (also under NFIB). Moreover, they argued that because the universal-coverage provision worked in concert with the many other provisions of the ACA, the universal-coverage provision was not “severable” from the rest of the Act, and the rest of the Act must necessarily fall, too.

The government sided with the plaintiffs on the universal-coverage provision, but adopted a somewhat more nuanced position on severability. In particular, the government maintained that the universal-coverage provision was inseverable only as to the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions, and so only those two additional components of the ACA must fall. Because the government sided with the plaintiffs, a group of states and the District of Columbia, and later the U.S. House of Representatives, intervened to defend the Act.

The district court ruled for the plaintiffs. The court held that the universal-coverage provision was no longer valid as a tax, and that it was inseverable from the rest of the Act. The court struck the entire ACA, but stayed the ruling pending appeal.

The Fifth Circuit agreed that the universal-coverage provision was no longer valid as a tax, and therefore exceeded Congress’s authority. But it remanded the case to the district court for further consideration of the severability question. The appeals court instructed the lower court to give more attention to the legislative intent behind the TCJA, and to more carefully consider how particular portions of the ACA were linked to the universal-coverage provision.

This appeal followed.

CASE ANALYSIS

The case includes three distinct issues. Let’s take a look, one at a time. (The individual and state plaintiffs briefed a fourth issue—that the Court should uphold the district court’s nationwide injunction against the ACA—but the Court did not certify that question for appeal. We’ll refer to the parties defending the ACA, the states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. House of Representative, together as the “petitioners.”)

Standing

In order to sue in federal court, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have “standing.” This requires a plaintiff to show (1) that the plaintiff suffered a direct and concrete harm (2) that was caused by the defendant’s actions and (3) that would be redressed by the plaintiff’s requested relief in court. Only one plaintiff needs to demonstrate standing for a case to move forward, so this case could proceed if any of the individual plaintiffs or the states have standing.

The petitioners argue that the plaintiffs (now the respondents) lack standing. As to the individual plaintiffs, the petitioners claim that the universal-coverage provision, as altered by the TCJA, does not harm the plaintiffs, because it doesn’t require them to do anything, and because it doesn’t penalize them if they don’t buy insurance. The petitioners say that the zeroed-out universal-coverage provision simply gives individuals a choice—buy insurance or don’t—but that it doesn’t impose any consequence. They say that any harm is therefore self-inflicted, and doesn’t count for standing purposes. As to the states, the petitioners point out that the universal-coverage provision doesn’t even apply to them. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that they simply have failed to introduce any evidence that the zeroed-out universal-coverage provision itself inflicts any injury on them at all (even if other provisions of the ACA may increase their costs).

The plaintiffs argue that they have standing. The individual plaintiffs contend that they have standing, because the universal-coverage provision, even without a penalty, still requires them to purchase insurance—an actual harm for standing purposes. The states claim that the universal-coverage provision, even without a penalty, imposes several costs on them: increased enrollment in their Medicaid programs (because some individuals will enroll in Medicaid to comply with the universal-coverage provision); increased reporting and regulatory requirements under other provisions in the ACA; and increased costs in providing state employees with health insurance in order to comply with the ACA’s employer mandate. The states say that all of these costs count toward standing, notwithstanding the petitioners’ unduly narrow focus on the lack of particular harms that derive from the universal-coverage provision.

The government argues that the individual plaintiffs have standing. (The government does not make an argument one way or another about the states’ standing.) The government claims that the individual plaintiffs are injured by the ACA’s provisions that regulate health-insurance plans (the government calls these “insurance reform provisions”), because these provisions limit the individual plaintiffs’ choices and increase their costs in the health-insurance market. The government says that the individual plaintiffs can leverage this harm to challenge the universal-coverage provision, because the insurance reform provisions are inseverable from the universal-coverage provision, and all other portions of the ACA, because they, too, are inseverable. But the government maintains that the Court can only grant relief with regard to those provisions that actually injure the individual plaintiffs—relief that would redress only the individual plaintiffs’ harms. The government urges the Court to rule the entire Act unconstitutional, but then to remand the case “for consideration of the scope of appropriate relief redressing the plaintiffs’ injuries.”

Constitutionality of the Universal-Coverage Provision

The petitioners argue that the universal-coverage provision is still constitutional, even after Congress reduced the tax penalty to zero. They say that while the provision may encourage individuals to buy insurance, it doesn’t require anyone to do anything. They contend that this kind of action is well within Congress’s authority, either as a precatory statement, or as a suspended exercise of its taxing power (a placeholder provision in the law that is currently dormant, but that Congress could reactivate in the future). And they note that Congress did not revoke the provision; it simply zeroed out the penalty. The petitioners claim that the Fifth Circuit’s ruling to the contrary—that Congress transformed the universal-coverage provision into an invalid exercise of its Commerce Clause authority—flies in the face of NFIB itself, which says that the courts must “construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible.”

The plaintiffs and the government respond that the universal-coverage provision is no longer constitutional under Congress’s taxing authority, because it no longer raises revenue. As the government says, “Under NFIB’s functional approach, a statute that imposes no tax liability on anyone cannot be sustained as a tax.” The plaintiffs and the government say that the provision now reads most naturally to directly require individuals to buy insurance. They contend that this is exactly what the Court in NFIB ruled that Congress could not do.

Severability

The petitioners argue that even if the universal-coverage provision is no longer constitutional, it is severable from the rest of the Act. They note that when Congress zeroed-out the tax penalty in the TCJA, it left the rest of the Act in place. According to the petitioners, this shows that Congress intended only to remove the enforcement mechanism for the universal-coverage provision, but not to undermine the rest of the ACA. (Importantly, the petitioners focus on congressional intent in 2017, when it enacted the TCJA, and not 2010, when it enacted the ACA.) The petitioners maintain that, as a practical matter, the rest of the ACA has continued to operate since 2017, even without the tax penalty.

The individual and state plaintiffs and the government counter that the universal-coverage provision is inseverable from the rest of the ACA, because Congress enacted the provision as an essential part of the larger Act. They say that the universal-coverage provision is an indispensable part of the “three-legged stool” (along with the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions), and that the many and myriad other provisions in the Act cannot operate without the Act’s core three-legged stool. (In contrast to the petitioners, the individual and state plaintiffs emphasize congressional intent in 2010 and before the TCJA. They note, however, that the TCJA retained statutory findings as to how these provisions work together to achieve the goals of the Act.)

SIGNIFICANCE

This case is easily one of the most important cases of the Term. That’s because it tests the entire ACA—a sweeping piece of legislation that comprehensively restructured the health insurance market in the United States and brought quality and affordable health insurance to millions of individuals. A ruling for the challengers could mean the end for many or all of the ACA’s reforms, and could result in millions of individuals losing health insurance and other protections and benefits under the Act. Given that Congress has not offered a viable alternative to the ACA, a ruling for the challengers would likely return the health-insurance market to its pre-ACA status.

This is all the more significant in the middle of a pandemic, with an illness, Covid-19, that has infected millions of Americans and killed over 200,000. Infected individuals require various levels of health care, often quite significant, paid at least in part by their health insurance. Many previously infected individuals continue to show signs of longer-lasting, even chronic, conditions that will require future health care and health insurance. A ruling for the plaintiffs could affect these individuals’ health-insurance policies, and their ability to obtain quality and affordable health care for treatment. At the same time, lingering Covid-19-related conditions could drive up insurance rates or even prevent some previously infected individuals from obtaining new health insurance without the community-rating and guaranteed-issue provisions in the ACA.

But that’s only if the Court rules for opponents on each of the three issues in the case. Such a ruling is not at all certain. For starters, the Court could dismiss the case for lack of standing, vacate the lower courts’ rulings, and leave the ACA in place, exactly as it is. Despite the plaintiffs’ and the government’s arguments, and despite the lower courts’ rulings, the plaintiffs’ standing is tenuous. The universal-coverage provision doesn’t require any of the individual or state plaintiffs to do anything, and the states’ theory of standing hinges on other provisions of the ACA. It’s not at all clear that the Court will rule for the plaintiffs on standing. That said, the Court’s rulings on standing often seem to turn on the underlying merits. That may be true here, too: if a majority wishes to address the merits, the Court will likely find standing.

As to the universal-coverage provision, the Court seems primed to rule this unconstitutional. Remember that Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a bare majority in NFIB that the universal-coverage provision fell within congressional authority to tax, because it could raise revenue. But with the provision now zeroed-out, it is not at all clear that Chief Justice Roberts would vote to uphold it. Even if the other current justices who joined this portion of the NFIB ruling (Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) voted to uphold the provision, there may now be a five-justice majority against the provision. Since Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s death, the Court has only eight justices. (More on this below.) A four-four tie would affirm the Fifth Circuit’s ruling striking the universal-coverage provision, but without setting a Supreme Court precedent.

As to severability, we just don’t know. To be sure, there is language in NFIB that suggests that the universal-coverage provision is inextricably linked to other provisions of the Act, particularly the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions. But that language does not necessarily foretell the Court’s ruling on severability. (The inextricability of the universal-coverage provision as a matter of policy may be different than the inseverablity of the provision as a matter of constitutional law.) If the Court were to strike the universal-coverage provision, it could (1) rule all of the Act severable (and strike only the universal-coverage provision), (2) rule only the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions inseverable (and strike only the three provisions), (3) rule certain other provisions of the ACA also inseverable (and strike only those provisions), or (4) rule the entire ACA inseverable (and strike the whole Act). Because the Fifth Circuit did not rule on the severability of specific ACA provisions—remember that the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for further consideration of severability—the Court may similarly kick the question back to the lower courts. (As described above, in standing, the government urges the Court to rule the entire Act unconstitutional, but to remand the case for a determination of which provisions harm the individual plaintiffs.)

The timing of the case, just a week after the 2020 presidential election, is critical. As this piece goes to print, President Trump has nominated Judge Amy Coney Barrett to replace Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the Court. Justice Ginsburg voted to uphold the universal-coverage provision in NFIB, and has consistently voted against other challenges to the Act. Judge Barrett, in stark contrast, is on the record opposing the Court’s holding in NFIB that Congress validly enacted the universal-coverage provision under its taxing authority. A Justice Barrett would almost certainly tilt the Court—with possibly a six-justice majority—further against the universal-coverage provision. We probably don’t have enough information to predict the way a Justice Barrett might rule on severability.

At publication, the Senate just began confirmation hearings. If the Senate confirms Judge Barrett before November 10, as now seems likely, she will sit for oral arguments and participate in the case. If the Senate does not confirm Judge Barrett before November 10, under ordinary practice, she won’t—unless the Court orders a reargument in order to include her. With the current eight-justice Court, a tie would simply leave the Fifth Circuit ruling in place.

One final point. Even if the Court were to rule for the plaintiffs on all the issues, Congress could probably restore much or all of the ACA, if it had the votes. Remember that the Court in NFIB held that Congress could enact the universal-coverage provision with a tax penalty under its taxing authority. That ruling still stands, for now, at least. Again, a Justice Amy Coney Barrett could move the Court against it.

November 10, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, News, Taxing Clause | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, November 4, 2020

Supreme Court Tests LBGTQ Rights Against Free Exercise Claim

The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments today in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, the case testing whether the city's enforcement of a clause in its foster-care contracts that prohibits discrimination by sexual orientation violates Catholic Social Service's Free Exercise rights. Here's my preview, from the ABA Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases, with permission:

FACTS

The City of Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services (DHS) operates the City’s foster-care program. DHS takes legal custody of children whom courts have removed from their homes, and places the children in a foster home or facility that is appropriate to each child’s interests and needs.

In order to help operate the program, DHS contracts with private-sector social-service providers. Some of these providers serve as “Community Umbrella Agencies” (CUAs), which provide social services to foster children. Some operate congregate-care facilities, which provide group housing for children. And some operate as “Foster Family Care Agencies” (FFCAs), which conduct home studies of potential foster parents, issue certifications for families that meet state criteria, and, upon referral from DHS, place children with foster parents that the FFCAs have certified. State law delegates authority to FFCAs, so that FFCAs exercise state power when they evaluate and certify foster parents. Private agencies have no authority to place children with foster parents without an FFCA contract. Still, DHS’s standard contract says that a contracting agency “is an independent contractor,” and not “an employee or agent of the City.”

DHS contracts include a standard nondiscrimination clause. The clause says that FFCAs must comply with the City’s Fair Practices Ordinance, which prohibits discrimination based on any protected characteristic, including sexual orientation. The contracts also say that contractors “shall not discriminate” in any “public accommodations practices” on the basis of sexual orientation.

Catholic Social Services (CSS) is a faith-based social-service organization that has long contracted with DHS to provide services in the City’s foster-care program. On March 13, 2018, the Philadelphia Inquirer ran a piece titled “Two foster agencies in Philly won’t place kids with LGBTQ people.” The story reported that CSS and another social-service organization would not certify same-sex couples for foster-care placements. In the article, the Archdiocese’s spokesperson confirmed CSS’s longstanding religion-based policy against providing foster-care certification for unmarried couples and for same-sex married couples, but emphasized that CSS had received no inquiries from same-sex couples. (CSS maintains that if it received such an inquiry, it would refer the couple to another agency.) 

Two days after the story ran, the City Council passed a resolution condemning “discrimination that occurs under the guise of religious freedom.” Around the same time, the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations (PCHR), at the request of the Mayor, sent a letter to the Auxiliary Bishop who oversees CSS. The letter asked the Bishop to answer questions about CSS’s policies, including whether “you have authority as a local affiliate/branch of a larger organiz[ation] to create or follow your own policies.” (CSS maintains that the Mayor previously said that he “could care less about the people of the Archdiocese,” called the Archbishop’s actions “not Christian,” and called on Pope Francis “to kick some ass here!”)

The Mayor also contacted DHS Commissioner Cynthia Figueroa. Figueroa met with CSS representatives “to find a mutually agreeable solution.” During the meeting, she urged CSS representatives to follow “the teachings of Pope Francis,” and told them that “times have changed,” “attitudes have changed,” and that CSS should change its policy because it was “not 100 years ago.” CSS maintained its position, however, and DHS then halted its referrals to CSS for the rest of its contractual term, through the City’s Fiscal Year 2018.

CSS’s FY 2018 FFCA contract expired on June 30, 2018. DHS repeatedly expressed its “strong desire to keep CSS as a foster care agency,” and offered CSS FFCA contracts on the same terms as other agencies. In FYs 2019 and 2020, DHS offered CSS a choice between the same contract it offered to other FFCA agencies and a “maintenance contract” to provide foster-care services for families that CSS was already supporting. CSS chose the maintenance contract. (Although CSS declined to enter into an FFCA contract, the agency nevertheless continued to contract with DHS to provide CUA and a congregate-care services.)

In May 2018, while its FY 2018 FFCA contract was still in force, CSS sued DHS. CSS argued that DHS’s move to halt referrals violated the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act. The district court denied CSS’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court denied CSS’s motion for an injunction pending appeal. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 139 S. Ct. 49 (2018). (Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch noted their dissent.) The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. This appeal followed.

CASE ANALYSIS

The case includes three distinct issues. We’ll review them one by one.

Free Exercise Clause

Under the Free Exercise Clause, a government action that targets religion or a religious practice must be narrowly tailored, or necessary, to meet a compelling government interest. This test, “strict scrutiny,” is the most rigorous test known to constitutional law; under strict scrutiny, the challenged government action almost always fails. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).

On the other hand, a government action that is generally applicable and neutral with regard to religion, but that nevertheless has an “incidental” effect on religion, must only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. This test, “rational basis review,” is one of the more lenient tests known to constitutional law, and the challenged government action almost always passes. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

In this case, CSS argues that DHS’s nondiscrimination policy targets the agency’s religious exercise, that it is not generally applicable, and that it fails strict scrutiny. CSS claims that “[t]he City has repeatedly shifted policies,” developed post hoc rationalizations for its nondiscrimination policy, and “changed the rules in response to CSS”—all proving that the City targeted CSS’s religious exercise. Moreover, CSS contends that the actions and statements of the City Council, the Mayor, the PCHR, and DHS all reflect hostility toward CSS’s religious beliefs. CSS asserts that the City’s nondiscrimination policy is not generally applicable, because it allows for exemptions by a “Waiver/Exemption Committee” for “constitutional issues” and by “the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee, in his/her sole discretion.” CSS contends that the City’s exemptions undermine its own interests, and that the City does not even apply nondiscrimination to its own actions.

CSS argues that the City’s nondiscrimination policy cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. CSS says that the City’s “hostility towards CSS’s religious exercise” and the policy’s many exemptions both show that the City’s interest cannot be compelling. And it claims that the City’s categorical freeze on CSS referrals was not narrowly tailored to meet any City interest, because the move meant that CSS could not place children in already-certified homes, and because the City could instead simply require CSS to refer same-sex couples to another FFCA. (CSS maintains that it already has a policy to do this.)

(The government weighs in to support CSS on this point, and this point only. It argues that the City’s policy targets CSS’s exercise of religion and fails strict scrutiny for many of the same reasons. Notably, the government does not argue that the Court should overrule Smith. It also does not argue that the City violated CSS’s free speech.)

The City responds that its nondiscrimination policy is a neutral law of general applicability, and that it easily satisfies Smith’s rational basis review. The City starts by claiming that it has “significantly greater leeway” in directing its own employees and contractors than when it regulates private individuals. It says that this “extra power” applies with full force to this case, and that the Court should “be especially hesitant to infer anti-religious animus from stray remarks of government officials.”

The City argues that its nondiscrimination requirement is generally applicable and neutral with regard to religion. It says that every FFCA contract contains an identical nondiscrimination requirement, and (contrary to CSS’s understanding) that DHS has no authority to make exceptions and, indeed, has never done so. The City contends that the policy contains “no trace of religious hostility,” and that CSS wrongly infers hostility “from the statements of persons who played no role in the decisionmaking process and from events far removed from the relevant decisions.”

Finally, the City argues that its nondiscrimination requirement does not require CSS to do anything contrary to its religious beliefs. In particular, the City says that neither the policy nor state law requires CSS “to endorse a couple’s relationship when certifying them as qualified foster parents.”

Free Speech

CSS argues that the City compels it to support nondiscrimination in violation of its right to free speech. CSS says that the City requires CSS, as a condition of participation in the foster care system, to issue written certifications of potential foster parents that “evaluat[e] and endors[e] same-sex and unmarried cohabitating relationships.” CSS maintains that this is “private speech,” based on Commissioner Figueroa’s testimony that the City has “nothing to do with” home studies, and does not control their content. CSS claims that the City violated its free speech by revoking its contract and attempting to “leverage a program it pays for to compel speech it does not pay for.” CSS claims that the City cannot justify these violations under strict scrutiny, for the same reasons that it cannot justify its violation of the Free Exercise Clause under strict scrutiny, above.

The City counters that its nondiscrimination policy simply does not compel CSS to say anything about the validity of same-sex relationships. Instead, the City claims that the policy simply regulates CSS’s conduct—not to discriminate against foster parents based on their sexual orientation.

Overruling Smith

CSS argues that the Court should overrule Smith and its rational basis review test. CSS claims that the Court designed the Smith test to apply when “legislatures make general laws and courts apply them.” But it says that government officials “often infringe religious exercise with non-neutral, non-general laws, and courts mistakenly apply Smith anyway.” (CSS contends that this is exactly what the City and the Third Circuit, respectively, did in this case.) CSS claims that the Smith test is therefore not an administrable standard, and that none of its predictions about its administrability came true. Moreover, CSS asserts that the Smith test lacks support in the text, history, and tradition of the Free Exercise Clause. It says that courts have done much better applying a higher level of scrutiny under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and similar state laws, and it argues that the Court should replace the Smith test with strict scrutiny, or at least a more rigorous test based on the “purpose and history” of the Free Exercise Clause. CSS maintains that under a proper heightened standard, the City’s move to freeze its contract would fail.

The City counters that the Court should not overrule Smith. The City says that this case is “an extremely poor vehicle to reconsider Smith,” because it involves government contracting (not direct government regulation) and because the City’s nondiscrimination policy satisfies strict scrutiny, anyway. (The City and intervenor Support Center for Child Advocates and Philadelphia Family Pride say that banning discrimination in its FFCA contracts is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling government interests of eliminating discrimination based on sexual orientation and ensuring that children in foster care have access to all qualified families.) Moreover, it claims that the Smith test “has firm support” in the original meaning of the Constitution, and that it “has served as the predicate for three decades of precedents and legislative enactments.”

 

 

SIGNIFICANCE

This case pits a plaintiff’s right to free exercise of religion against the government’s power to ban discrimination by sexual orientation—a tension that is increasingly familiar in today’s politics and constitutional law. Under existing free-exercise law, in Smith, a plaintiff’s religious rights would almost certainly give way to a government’s categorical ban on discrimination. But if a plaintiff can demonstrate that a government’s ban is not generally applicable or neutral with regard to religion, or that a government official targeted or exhibited hostility toward the plaintiff’s religion, then a plaintiff’s free-exercise claim would almost surely prevail.

The Court last addressed this tension just three Terms ago, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). In that case, a baker claimed that Colorado’s ban on discrimination would require him to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple in violation of his right to free exercise. The Court, in a seven-to-two ruling, held that members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission exhibited hostility toward the baker’s religion in considering his case, and that the Commission therefore violated his free-exercise rights. The Court, however, did not say whether Colorado’s anti-discrimination law would violate the baker’s religious rights without that kind of hostility, under the Smith test. (We expected to see other similar challenges like this, especially in the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015), where the Court struck state laws that banned same-sex marriage. But the Court has not (yet) taken these cases. In fact, the Court earlier this month declined to take up the appeal of Kim Davis, the Kentucky clerk who refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples because of her religious beliefs. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito issued a strong statement on the Court’s denial of certiorari that took aim at Obergefell and elevated Davis’s religious claim. Davis v. Ermold, 2020 WL 5881537 (Oct. 5, 2020).)

Masterpiece Cakeshop and Fulton well illustrate the increasingly familiar tension between nondiscrimination by sexual orientation and free exercise. Fulton now gives the Court another shot to reckon with it.

The parties in Fulton frame at least some of their free-exercise arguments around Masterpiece Cakeshop. CSS says that the City exhibited exactly the same kind of hostility toward religion that members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission exhibited against the baker in that case. The City, for its part, contends that its officers did not exhibit this kind of hostility, and that, in any event, those officers weren’t in the decisionmaking loop. The City also says that the Court should grant greater leeway to the City in regulating its contractors than the Court granted the Colorado Civil Rights Commission in regulating a private person (the baker).

If the Court sees Fulton through the lens of Masterpiece Cakeshop, these similarities and differences will matter. A ruling for CSS could continue the Court’s trend toward increasing free-exercise rights, while a ruling for the City could provide an important backstop to Masterpiece Cakeshop. Either way, though, if the Court sees Fulton through the lens of Masterpiece Cakeshop, it could retain the Smith test.

But if the Court also tackles the Smith issue, the case could be even more important. Smith was a hotly controversial ruling from the start, provoking legislative responses from the federal government (in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act) and states (in “mini-RFRAs”). The case remains controversial today. Moreover, the issue comes to the Court as it has moved steadily in recent years to privilege the right to free exercise of religion. For these reasons, the issue seems well teed-up for the Court. If so, Fulton could accelerate the Court’s trend toward greater and greater religious rights, and even provide a capstone to the Court’s cases in this area by overruling Smith. At the same time, Fulton could restrict, at least to some degree, governments at all levels from enacting and enforcing generally applicable laws, like the nondiscrimination policy at issue in this case. But on the other hand, as the City points out, this may not be the right case for the Court to take such a significant step.

As to CSS’s free speech claim: don’t look for the Court to hang its hat here. The claim itself is weak; it’s overshadowed by the free-exercise issues; and the parties did not heavily brief it. Free speech may have been an obligatory adjunct to CSS’s claims (as it was in the baker’s case in Masterpiece Cakeshop), but this case is much more likely to be significant for what it’ll say about free exercise.

November 4, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, News | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 8, 2020

Government Seeks Stay of Census Order at Supreme Court

The Trump Administration yesterday filed a motion at the Supreme Court to stay, pending appeal, a district court's order directing the government to continue census operations until October 31. The filing is just the latest in the ongoing efforts of the Trump Administration to rush census operations amid a pandemic. The Administration says that it needs to speed efforts in order to meet the December 31 statutory deadline for reporting census data to the President.

The case is important, because congressional apportionment, legislative districts, and federal funds are all tied to census data. The numbers that come from the 2020 census will lock these in for the next ten years. Moreover, the Trump Administration seems set on the December 31 deadline so that President Trump (and not a potential President Biden) would certify the census numbers to Congress--and possibly try not to include unauthorized noncitizens in the count.

The case arose when the Trump Administration reversed course on a revised census plan that would extend census data collection through October 31 in light of data-collection delays resulting from Covid-19.

The Census Bureau adopted the plan after it lost 47 days of data-collection efforts, and anticipated additional difficulties in collecting data, due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The plan set the end of collection efforts at October 31, 2020. But this would mean that the Bureau would likely not meet the December 31 statutory deadline for reporting data to the President. 

So on August 3, the Administration abruptly issued a "Replan," which set the end of data-collection efforts at September 30. The Replan condensed the total time to conduct the census to 49.5 weeks--4.5 weeks shy of the pre-Covid schedule of 54 weeks, and 22 weeks shy of the extended Covid schedule. 

A group of organizations, cities, counties, and tribal groups sued to stop the Replan, arguing that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Enumeration Clause. The district court ordered the Replan halted, order data-collection efforts to extend to October 31, and enjoined the Administration from implementing the September 30 and December 31 deadlines. 

The Ninth Circuit denied an administrative stay, and, yesterday, partially stayed the district court's order pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit stayed the district court's order enjoining the Administration from complying with the statutory December 31 deadline--the Ninth Circuit said that a court shouldn't order the government to ignore a statutory deadline--but denied a stay of the order enjoining the September 30 stop date. This meant that the Administration would have to continue census data-collection through October 31.

Soon after the Ninth Circuit ruled, the Administration filed for a stay with the Supreme Court. The Administration argued that the APA didn't apply, that in any event the plaintiffs didn't prove a violation of the APA, and that the Administration couldn't meet the December 31 statutory deadline if data collection extended through October 31.

In other words, the Administration says that it couldn't have been arbitrary and capricious (and therefore in violation of the APA) for the Administration to halt data-collection efforts at an earlier date in order to meet the statutory deadline of December 31.

October 8, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, News | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 7, 2020

Second Circuit Rebuffs Trump's Case Against NY Grand Jury Subpoena

The Second Circuit today flatly rejected President Trump's case challenging the NY grand jury subpoena for his financial records. The ruling follows a summer Supreme Court decision saying that the grand jury was not categorically (and constitutionally) barred from seeking the President's financial records.

The ruling in Trump v. Vance deals a serious blow to President Trump and his efforts to keep his financial records under wraps. (The subpoena goes to far more than President Trump's taxes.) But the President will surely seek to appeal.

The ruling says that President Trump failed even to plausibly plead (under the Iqbal and Twombly pleading standard) that the grand jury subpoena was overbroad or issued in bad faith. At the same time, it noted that going forward the President might need some accommodations in state criminal proceedings in order to avoid intruding on the President's Article II responsibilities. (The President didn't raise categorical constitutional claims in this round--the Supreme Court already rejected those claims in its ruling this summer--and did not specifically claim that complying with this subpoena would interfere with his Article II responsibilities.)

The court's decision was issued per curiam (without naming the judges involved), suggesting that the case was easy and that the ruling was perfunctory. 

October 7, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Executive Authority, Executive Privilege, Federalism, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 5, 2020

Obergefell as Precedent: First Monday in October

On the first Monday in October, the United States Supreme Court begins its Term, this time with only eight of the usual nine Justices given Justice Ginsburg's death in September.

In today's Order List of the Term, the Court denied certiorari in Davis v. Ermold to the Sixth Circuit's decision that court clerk Kim Davis did not have immunity from a damages suit. (Recall that in 2017 the Sixth Circuit allowed the damages suit to proceed). Kim Davis achieved notoriety as a clerk who refused to issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple despite the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges.

Two Justices on the Court who dissented in Obergefell — Thomas joined by Alito — used today's denial of certiorari to issue a "statement" (it is not a dissent as the issue is not "cleanly presented" in this case) to cast doubt on the continued validity of Obergefell:

this petition provides a stark reminder of the consequences of Obergefell. By choosing to privilege a novel constitutional right over the religious liberty interests explicitly protected in the First Amendment, and by doing so undemocratically, the Court has created a problem that only it can fix. Until then, Obergefell will continue to have “ruinous consequences for religious liberty.”

Two Justices who joined the slim 5-4 majority in Obergefell  — Ginsburg and Kennedy — are no longer on the Court.  This statement sends a strong message to courts and advocates that the the Court would contemplate overruling or severely limiting Obergefell should the issue be more "cleanly presented."

October 5, 2020 in Current Affairs, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Religion | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, October 4, 2020

Supreme Court to Hear First Amendment Challenge to Political Balancing Requirements for State Courts

The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments tomorrow, the opening day of October Term 2020, in Carney v. Adams. The case tests whether Delaware's "political balancing" requirements for its courts violate the First Amendment. A ruling on the merits could have implications for a variety of state and federal commissions that have similar balancing requirements. But first the Court'll need to address the plaintiff's standing . . . .

Here's my Preview of the case, from the ABA Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases, with permission:

Case at a Glance

Delaware attorney James Adams, a registered Independent, considered applying for a judicial position on the state courts. Despite his interest, however, Adams did not apply, because he believed that, as an Independent, he would not qualify. Adams pointed to a state constitutional provision that capped the number of judges from a political party to no more than a bare majority on the courts (the “bare-majority” requirement) and that, for some courts, required that the other judges come from the other major political party (the “major-party” requirement). Instead of applying for judicial vacancies on these courts, Adams sued, arguing that the provision violated the First Amendment.

INTRODUCTION

According to the Supreme Court, the First Amendment permits the government to use a person’s political affiliation as a qualification for “policymaking” positions, but generally not for lower-level government jobs. This case tests how that principle applies to Delaware’s political balancing provision for judges. But before we get to the merits, the case raises a significant question whether Adams even has standing to sue.

ISSUES

  1. Does Adams have standing to sue, given that he declined to apply for judicial vacancies, and given that he would have qualified for vacancies on two of Delaware’s courts?
  2. Does the First Amendment prohibit a state from specifying and defining the composition of its courts by reference to the judges’ political parties?
  3. Is the provision of Delaware’s constitution that caps the judges from one political party on three of the state’s courts severable from the provision that requires that all judges on those courts are members of a major political party?

FACTS

Delaware’s “Bare Majority” and “Major Party” Political Balancing Requirements

In 1897, delegates to the Delaware constitutional convention sought to reduce the influence of politics on the state’s judiciary. In order to achieve this goal, delegates recommended a political balancing requirement for the state’s principal courts. Under the requirement, these courts could not have more than a single-judge majority from any one political party. The state adopted the bare-majority proposal, and Delaware has had some form of a bare-majority requirement for its principal courts ever since.

In 1951, the state modified the political balancing requirements to exclude third party and unaffiliated voters from applying to serve as judges on the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, and the Chancery Court, the so-called “business courts.” The change retained the existing bare-majority requirement, but it added a major-party requirement that limited service on these courts only to members of a major political party, Republican or Democrat. The major-party requirement helped to ensure that a governor could not side-step the bare-majority requirement by appointing a nominal third-party or independent judge to a seat reserved for the other side. The change stuck through several amendment processes, including in 2005.

Today, Article IV, Section 3, of the Delaware Constitution specifies that these three courts shall include no more than a single-judge majority from one major political party, and that all other judges shall be from the other major political party. (If one of these courts has an even number of judges, the provision specifies that the judges on that court shall be equally divided, Republican and Democrat.)

The same section also specifies that the Family Court and the Court of Common Pleas shall include no more than a single-judge majority of the same political party. (If one of these courts has an even number of judges, the provision specifies that no more than one-half of the judges shall be of the same political party.) But in contrast to the provision for the business courts, the provision for these two courts does not include a major-party requirement. As a result, members of non-major political parties, including independents, may serve on these two courts, so long as these courts satisfy their bare-majority requirement.

Delaware’s Judicial Nominations

Since 1978, Delaware governors have relied on recommendations from a judicial nominating commission to identify candidates to appoint to judicial vacancies. Under this practice, the commission, which is politically balanced and comprised of both lawyers and non-lawyers, recommends three candidates for each judicial vacancy. The governor then selects one of the three nominees for appointment. If the governor is not satisfied with the commission’s recommendations, the commission may generate another list of recommendations.

When a judicial position becomes available, the commission provides public notice of the position, the salary, and the job requirements, including the party membership, in order to comply with the bare-majority and major-party requirements, discussed above.

James Adams’s Non-Application for a Judicial Position

In December 2015, Delaware attorney James Adams retired and went on “emeritus” status with the Delaware state bar. Sometime in late 2016 or early 2017, Adams decided to explore judicial vacancies. He reactivated his full state bar membership and changed his party affiliation from Democrat to Independent. Adams said that he would have considered and applied for any available positions on any of the state’s courts. (Adams said he changed his party affiliation because he grew disenchanted with the Delaware Democratic Party and considered himself “more of a Bernie [Sanders] independent.” The state, in contrast, suggests that he changed his party only to bring this suit. Adams also claims that he declined to apply for judicial vacancies in the past, because he would not have qualified as a Democrat. The state disputes this and says that he would have qualified for at least ten judgeships.)

Rather than applying for any vacancies, however, Adams brought this suit. He claimed that the political balancing requirements rendered him ineligible for available vacancies based on his Independent political status, and argued that the requirements violated the First Amendment. The district court agreed and struck both the bare-majority requirement and the major-party requirement as they applied to all five courts.

The Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court ruled that Adams lacked standing to challenge the bare-majority requirements for the Family Court and the Court of Common Pleas, because the bare-majority requirements did not bar his appointment as an Independent to those courts. The court also accepted that Adams lacked standing to challenge the bare-majority requirement for the business courts for the same reason. On the merits, the court held that the major-party requirement for the business courts violated the First Amendment. It ruled that the bare-majority requirement failed, too, because (notwithstanding Adams’s lack of standing to challenge it) the bare-majority requirement was not severable from the major-party requirement. This appeal followed.

CASE ANALYSIS

There are three issues in this case. Let’s take them one at a time.

Standing

In order to sue in federal court,  plaintiffs must establish that they have suffered, or imminently will suffer, a concrete and particularized injury that was caused by the challenged law. Here, the state argues that Adams failed to establish a sufficient injury to challenge the political balancing requirements. The state says that the bare-majority requirement could not possibly injure Adams, because he does not belong to either political party. Moreover, the state contends that Adams failed to establish that he suffered past injuries based on the bare-majority requirement, because he would have qualified “for at least ten judgeships.” The state asserts that Adams failed to establish that he will suffer future harms based on the major-party requirement, because he cannot say with certainty that the major-party requirement will disqualify him from future consideration. Finally, the state notes that Adam declined to apply for any positions as an Independent, and that any harm he suffered is therefore “self-inflicted” and non-cognizable.

Adams counters that he only has to allege that the political balancing requirements chilled his exercise of his First Amendment right to affiliate (or not) with a political party (and not that the state actually denied his application). He says he easily meets this standard, because he alleged that he would have applied for judicial vacancies but for the balancing requirements’ political discrimination. He claims that the requirements force him “to choose between the right to seek a judgeship and violating his political conscience by re-registering as a Democrat or a Republican in order to be considered.” And he contends that a decision striking the political balancing requirements would allow him to submit an application as an Independent and have it “accepted and considered on its own merit.”

The Political Balancing Requirements

The state argues that it may consider party affiliation of state judges consistent with the First Amendment. It contends that under Supreme Court precedent, the First Amendment only limits a state from considering political affiliation for “low-level public employees,” not for “policymaking” jobs. The state asserts that the “ultimate inquiry” is “whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.” Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 508 (1980).

The state says that its use of party affiliation for judges easily meets these tests. It contends that judges occupy “policymaking” positions, because, among other things, they “develop the common law.” And it claims that party affiliation is “an appropriate requirement” for the job, “[b]ecause party affiliation is a proxy for how would-be judges might understand their role,” and because it helps to ensure bipartisan decisionmaking on the bench. The state asserts that the Third Circuit adopted an unduly narrow definition of “policymaking”—one that does not square with Supreme Court precedent.

Finally, the state argues that even if its political balancing requirements are subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny (because judgeships are not “policymaking” positions), they pass muster. The state says that they are narrowly tailored to ensure a politically balanced judiciary, and that this, in turn, serves its compelling interest of preserving “public confidence in judicial integrity.”

Adams counters that the balancing requirements violate the First Amendment, because “[p]olitical affiliation is not only not necessary for the work of a judge, it also is inconsistent with the role of a judge.” Adams claims that judges only make “policy” insofar as they rule on the immediate cases before them, and so are not policymakers under Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, he says that judges are supposed to render their decisions without consideration of politics, and so their political affiliation is not “an appropriate requirement” for their office. In short, he contends that the state’s balancing requirements run exactly against the state’s own interests in a politically neutral judiciary.

Severability

The state argues that the bare-majority requirement is severable from the major-party requirement, and that the Court can therefore strike the major-party requirement (if it must) without also striking the bare-majority requirement. As an initial matter, the state asserts again that Adams lacks standing to challenge the bare-majority provision, and argues that he cannot use its non-severability from the major-party requirement to create standing to challenge it. Such a rule, the state contends, “would allow parties to obtain sweeping relief against whole statutory schemes even if injured by only part of them.” Moreover, the state claims that the bare-majority requirement can stand alone, independent of the major-party requirement, as it stood for 54 years before the state adopted the major-party requirement, and as it currently stands for the state’s Family Court and Court of Common Pleas. According to the state, “[t]here is simply no evidence that the Delaware Constitution’s framers would have preferred no political balance provisions at all to a system with just the bare majority provision.”

Adams counters that the state failed to raise the severability argument before the lower courts, and so waived it. But if the Court rules on severability, Adams argues that the major-party requirement is not severable from the bare-majority requirement, because the two provisions “are textually intertwined” and necessarily work together. He says that the history of the bare-majority requirement reveals that “the Legislature had only Democrats and Republicans in mind.” Moreover, he claims that the major-party requirement is necessary for the bare-majority requirement to achieve its goals. He contends that the major-party requirement “has no independent justification for its existence,” and so the two are not severable. According to Adams, this means that when the Court strikes the major-party requirement, it must also strike the bare-majority requirement.

SIGNIFICANCE

First and foremost, there is a circuit split on an issue central to the merits question in this case, whether judges are “policymakers.” The Third Circuit said no, but the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits (and, according to the state, “every other court to address the issue”) has said yes. Under Court precedent, if judges are “policymakers,” then the state can use their political affiliation as a qualification without violating the First Amendment. If they are not, then the state must show that its use of political affiliation is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. This is a high standard, but one that the state argues, in the alternative, that it can satisfy. If the Court reaches the central merits question in this case, it may resolve the circuit split and determine whether judges are “policymakers” that fall under this exception to the First Amendment.

I say “may,” because it’s not entirely obvious that the Court’s precedents establishing the “policymakers” standard apply here. Those precedents deal more directly with the problem of political patronage, that is, when the government doles out jobs to politically friendly allies. But Delaware’s stated interest is very different here, to reduce the influence of politics in the judiciary by mandating a non-partisan, or, in this case, a bi-partisan, process. According to the State and Local Government Associations, as amicus in support of the state, merely applying the Court’s patronage precedents could threaten similar state and local government balancing requirements far beyond the judiciary. According to amicus, this could affect state and local governments’ efforts to reduce the influence of politics in a variety of policy areas.

But all that’s only if the Court reaches the central merits question, whether Delaware’s balancing provision violates the First Amendment. Before the Court can address this issue, it must determine that Adams has standing to sue. Given that Adams declined to apply for several positions for which he apparently qualified (either as a Democrat, in the past, or as an Independent, in the present and future), it seems likely that the Court may simply dismiss the case for lack of standing, vacate the Third Circuit’s ruling, and wait for a more appropriate case to address the hard question of whether Delaware’s political balancing provision violates the First Amendment.

October 4, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, First Amendment, News | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 1, 2020

Check it Out: The Voter-Fraud Myth and How it Impacts the Right to Vote

Wednesday, September 30, 2020

Seventh Circuit Rebuffs Appeal by Republicans, State Legislation in Wisconsin Voting Case

The Seventh Circuit flatly rejected an appeal by the Wisconsin legislature and the state and national Republican Party of a lower court's order that the state extend voting deadlines in light of Covid-19. The ruling leaves the extended deadlines in place and ends the case, unless the intervenors can persuade the full Seventh Circuit or the Supreme Court to step in.

The case arose when the Democratic National Committee and others sued the state, arguing that its statutory voting deadlines violated the right to vote. The district court agreed, and ordered extended deadlines.

State executive officials declined to appeal. But the RNC, state Republicans, and the state legislature moved to intervene to defend the state's statutory deadlines (and to oppose the district court's order extending them), and brought this appeal.

The Seventh Circuit's ruling says that these parties don't have standing to appeal. The court said that the state and national Republican parties don't have standing, because neither group contended that the district court's ruling would affect their members, and because neither group suffered an injury itself.

Legislative standing was a little different. The court acknowledged that a legislature can litigate in federal court when it seeks to vindicate a legislative interest. But here the court said there was none. "All the legislators' votes were counted; all of the statutes they passed appear in the state's code."

The legislature argued that state law authorized it to defend against challenges to state statutes. But the court observed that the state supreme court previously ruled that this provision violated the state constitution, which "commits to the executive branch of government [and not the legislative branch] the protection of the state's interest in litigation."

The court gave the putative appellants a week to show cause why the court shouldn't dismiss the case.

September 30, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Elections and Voting, News, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)

How Could a Justice Amy Coney Barrett Affect the Affordable Care Act?

Looking for a plain-English explainer on how a Justice Amy Coney Barrett could affect the Affordable Care Act, or Obamacare, in a case scheduled for oral argument on November 10? Here you go:

 



 

September 30, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, News, Taxing Clause | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, September 26, 2020

President Trump Announces Nomination of Judge Amy Coney Barrett

Here's SCOTUSblog's resource page:

    https://www.scotusblog.com/category/special-features/nomination-of-amy-coney-barrett-to-the-supreme-court/

Here's the Seventh Circuit opinions website, which allows you to search opinions by author:

    http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/opinion.html

September 26, 2020 in Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, News | Permalink | Comments (0)

District Court Halts Administration's Plan to Rush Census

Judge Lucy H. Koh (N.D. Cal.) ruled this week that the Trump Administration's late summer plan to rush census data collection likely violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The ruling halts the implementation of the plan.

The ruling is a blow to the Trump Administration and its latest effort to alter or manipulate census data.

The case arose when the Census Bureau first suspended census operations and then pushed back internal deadlines for census data collection and analysis because of collection problems related to COVID-19. (For one, the Bureau couldn't keep census data doorknockers on the payroll: they kept quitting out of fear of contracting COVID.) The Bureau also announced that it wouldn't be able to meet statutory deadlines for reporting census data. The Bureau said that under its regular deadlines the census would be incomplete and inaccurate.

But then in early August, the Bureau abruptly reversed course and issued the "Replan." The Replan "accelerate[d] the completion of data collection and apportionment counts by our statutory deadline of December 31, 2020 . . . ."

The problem was that the Bureau itself--and the Bureau's unanimous Scientific Advisory Committee, and the GAO, and the Commerce Department's Inspector General--concluded that the Replan increased the risks of an incomplete and inaccurate 2020 census.

Plaintiff organizations and local jurisdictions sued, arguing that the Replan violated the APA and the Enumeration Clause and sought to halt its implementation. The court ruled that the case was justiciable, that the plaintiffs had standing, and that the Replan likely violated the APA. (It did not rule on the Enumeration Clause, because it didn't have to. The APA ruling was enough to say that it likely violated the law.) As to the APA claim, the court wrote:

[T]he Court agreed that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their APA arbitrary and capricious claim for five reasons: (1) Defendants failed to consider important aspects of the problem, including their constitutional and statutory obligations to produce an accurate census; (2) Defendants offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence before them; (3) Defendants failed to consider alternatives; (4) Defendants failed to articulate a satisfactory explanation for the Replan; and (5) Defendants failed to consider reliance interests.

 

September 26, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Executive Authority, News, Separation of Powers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 25, 2020

Justice Ginsburg Lies in State at Capitol

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg today became the first woman to lie in state at the Capitol. Here's the NYT report, with live updates.

 

September 25, 2020 in Courts and Judging, News | Permalink | Comments (0)

D.C. Circuit Says House Has Standing to Challenge Trump's Reprogramming Funds for Wall

The D.C. Circuit ruled today that the House of Representatives has standing to challenge President Trump's reprogramming of federal funds to build a border wall.

The ruling is a setback for the Trump Administration and its efforts to build the wall (or at least more of it than Congress authorized through federal funding). But the ruling only says that the House has standing--not that it wins. The case now goes back to the district court for further proceedings, unless the administration seeks en banc or Supreme Court review.

The court said that the House has standing to challenge the reprogramming under the Appropriations Clause, but not under the Administrative Procedure Act. That shouldn't matter much to the future of the case, though: the lower court will still rule whether the Trump administration violated the law (the Constitution) in reprogramming funds.

Aside from allowing this case to move forward, the ruling is also significant because it says that a single house of Congress has standing to challenge executive action in violation of the Appropriations Clause. Appropriations, of course, require both houses of Congress. But the court said that a single house nevertheless suffered sufficient injury to satisfy Article III standing requirements when the executive branch reprograms federal funds in alleged violation of the Appropriations Clause. Here's what the court wrote on that point:

More specifically, by spending funds that the House refused to allow, the Executive Branch has defied an express constitutional prohibition that protects each congressional chamber's unilateral authority to prevent expenditures. It is therefore "an institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury" that is both concrete and particularized, belonging to the House and the House alone.

To put it simply, the Appropriations Clause requires two keys to unlock the Treasury, and the House holds one of those keys. The Executive Branch has, in a word, snatched the House's key out of its hands. That is the injury over which the House is suing.

. . . 

[U]nder the defendants' standing paradigm [requiring Congress to sue, not just a single house], the Executive Branch can freely spend Treasury funds as it wishes unless and until a veto-proof majority of both houses of Congress forbids it. Even that might not be enough: Under defendants' standing theory, if the Executive Branch ignored that congressional override, the House would remain just as disabled to sue to protect its own institutional interests. That turns the constitutional order upside down.

 

September 25, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 24, 2020

Federal Judge Enjoins Federal Agents Acting Against Journalists and Legal Observers in Portland, Oregon

In a Temporary Restraining  Order and Opinion in Index Newspapers v. City of Portland, Judge Michael Simon enjoined the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"); and the U.S. Marshals Service ("USMS") — the "Federal Defendants" — from arresting and otherwise interfering with journalists and legal observers who are documenting the troublesome and now widely reported events in Portland, Oregon, which have attracted Congressional attention.

Judge Simon's relatively brief TRO opinion, first finds that the plaintiffs have standing, and then applying the TRO criteria importantly finds that there is a likelihood the plaintiffs would prevail on the First Amendment claim. Judge Simon found both that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent against First Amendment rights and that plaintiffs had a right of access under Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1986).  Judge Simon found fault with many of the specific arguments of the federal defendants, including the unworkability of the remedy:

The Federal Defendants also argue that closure is essential because allowing some people to remain after a dispersal order is not practicable and is unworkable. This argument is belied by the fact that this precise remedy has been working for 21 days with the Portland Police Bureau. Indeed, after issuing the first TRO directed against the City, the Court specifically invited the City to move for amendment or modification if the original TRO was not working, or address any problems at the preliminary injunction phase. Instead, the City stipulated to a preliminary injunction that was nearly identical to the original TRO, with the addition of a clause relating to seized property. The fact that the City never asked for any modification and then stipulated to a preliminary injunction is compelling evidence that exempting journalists and legal observers is workable. When asked at oral argument why it could be workable for City police but not federal officers, counsel for the Federal Defendants responded that the current protests are chaotic. But as the Federal Defendants have emphatically argued, Portland has been subject to the protests nonstop for every night for more than 50 nights, and purportedly that is why the federal officers were sent to Portland. There is no evidence that the previous 21 nights were any less chaotic. Indeed, the Federal Defendants' describe chaotic events over the Fourth of July weekend through July 7th, including involving Portland police, and the previous TRO was issued on July 2nd and was in effect at that time. The workability of the previous TRO also shows that there is a less restrictive means than exclusion or force that is available.

The TRO is quite specific as to journalists as well as to legal observers, providing in paragraph 5, to "facilitate the Federal Defendants' identification of Legal Observers protected under this Order, the following shall be considered indicia of being a Legal Observer: wearing a green National Lawyers' Guild-issued or authorized Legal Observer hat (typically a green NLG hat) or wearing a blue ACLU-issued or authorized Legal Observer vest."

The TRO lasts for 14 days; the litigation will undoubtedly last much longer.

 

 

July 24, 2020 in Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Criminal Procedure, Federalism, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Speech, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, July 9, 2020

Court Says Congress Can Subpoena Trump Financial Records, but Must Account for Separation of Powers Concerns

The Supreme Court ruled today that while Congress has authority to issue subpoenas for the President's personal financial records, courts that judge those subpoenas must take more careful account of the separation-of-powers considerations at play.

The ruling in Trump v. Mazars vacates the lower courts' rulings and remands the case for reconsideration in light of the balancing test that the Court sets out.

The ruling means that the congressional committees won't get President Trump's financial records yet, and maybe never. It all depends on whether Congress can meet the test set out in the Court's opinion. Either way, it almost certainly won't happen before the 2020 election.

The ruling, like Vance, is a short-term victory for President Trump, in that his records probably won't come out soon. But on the other hand, it's a decisive long-term defeat for the presidency (and victory for Congress), as the Court affirmed Congress's power to subpoena the President's personal records, even with a somewhat higher-than-normal requirement.

Our argument preview is here; the review is here.

Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas dissented, and Justice Alito dissented. (If you're keeping count, that's the same line-up as in Vance.)

The Court first rejected the President's sweeping claim that tried to shoe-horn executive privilege into the case: "We decline to transplant that protection root and branch to cases involving nonprivileged, private information, which by definition does not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations."

The Court then acknowledged that Congress has very broad, but still defined, powers of investigation and subpoena, even against the President, and even for the President's personal papers. But the Court said that because these subpoenas sought personal information of the President (as the single head of the Executive Branch), they raised especial separation-of-powers concerns that the lower courts failed sufficiently to account for:

The House's approach fails to take adequate account of the significant separation of powers issues raised by congressional subpoenas for the President's information. . . .

Without limits on its subpoena powers, Congress could "exert an imperious controul" over the Executive Branch and aggrandize itself at the President's expense, just as the Framers feared.

The Court set out a non-exhaustive list of things that courts should look for in judging congressional subpoenas for a President's personal information:

First, courts should carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President and his papers. Congress may not rely on the President's information if other sources could reasonably provide Congress the information it needs in light of its particular legislative objective. . . .

Second, to narrow the scope of possible conflict between the branches, courts should insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Congress's legislative objective. . . .

Third, courts should be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered by Congress to establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative purpose. The more detailed and substantial the evidence of Congress's legislative purpose, the better. . . .

Fourth, courts should be careful to assess the burdens imposed on the President by a subpoena. . . .

Other considerations may be pertinent as well; one case every two centuries does not afford enough experience for an exhaustive list.

The Court vacated the lower courts' opinions and remanded for reconsideration under these factors.

Justice Thomas argued that "Congress has no power to issue a legislative subpoena for private, nonofficial documents--whether they belong to the President or not," unless Congress is investigating an impeachment.

Justice Alito dissented, too, arguing that the bar for Congress should be set higher than the Court's setting, and that "the considerations outlined by the Court can[not] be properly satisfied [on remand] unless the House is required to show more than it has put forward to date."

July 9, 2020 in Congressional Authority, Executive Authority, Executive Privilege, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Court Say State Grand Jury Can Subpoena President's Taxes, Financial Records

The Supreme Court ruled today that a state grand jury is not categorically prohibited from issuing a subpoena for the President's taxes and financial records. But the ruling leaves open the possibility that the President could argue that the subpoena violates state law, or that a particular subpoena, including this one, violates the separation of powers.

Because of that last bit, the ruling means that the grand jury probably won't get its hands on President Trump's taxes anytime soon. That's because the President is almost sure to pitch these arguments in state or federal court, and the litigation will likely take some time. That means that the ruling is likely a short-term win for the President.

But at the same time, the ruling is a dramatic loss for the presidency. That's because the Court unconditionally rejected the President's sweeping and categorical claim of absolute immunity against state criminal processes. President Trump overargued this, as did the DOJ, and the Court reined him in.

Here's our oral argument preview; here's the review.

Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Kavanaugh wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Gorsuch. Justice Thomas dissented, and Justice Alito dissented.

The Court held that Presidents long lacked immunity from federal criminal subpoenas, going all the way back to the Burr trial. It ruled that there's nothing different about a state criminal subpoena that would categorically immunize the President (as the president argued), or even raise the bar for a presidential subpoena (as DOJ argued). In particular, the Court rejected the President's claims that a state grand jury subpoena could divert the President's attention, stigmatize the President (and undermine his leadership), and harass the President in violation of federalism principles. It similarly rejected DOJ's similar reasons for a higher bar for presidential subpoenas.

The Court nevertheless left open the possibility that the President (like anybody else) could challenge a state grand jury subpoena under state law, like law that bans bad faith subpoenas or those that create an undue burden. It also left open the possibility that the President could challenge a specific subpoena on the basis that a particular subpoena unduly interfered with his duties as President. (The problem in this case was that the President claimed a categorical immunity from state subpoenas.) The President will probably take up these claims now, leading to yet another round of litigation, and probably preventing the grand jury from getting the documents and records anytime soon.

Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to underscore that there may be state law or constitutional problems with this particular subpoena, depending on how the courts balance out the competing interests of the state courts and the President.

Justice Thomas dissented, agreeing with the majority that the President isn't categorically immune from the grand jury's issuance of the subpoena, but that he might be immune from the enforcement of it.

Justice Alito dissented, too, agreeing that the President isn't categorically immune, but arguing for a heightened standard, given the nature of the Presidency and the federalism system.

 

July 9, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Executive Authority, Federalism, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 8, 2020

Court Upholds Administration's Religious, Moral Exemptions to ACA's Contraception Guarantee

The Supreme Court today upheld the Trump Administration's rules substantially broadening the religious exemption and expanding it to those with a "moral" objection to the Affordable Care Act's contraception guarantee.

Our argument preview of the case is here.

The ruling in Little Sisters v. Pennsylvania means that a dramatically expanded group of employers--those with a religious objection or moral objection to contraception--get an automatic free pass on the requirement that employers provide their female employees with health-insurance coverage that includes contraceptives. Covered employers need not file for an self-certified exemption or accommodation; they just have to, well, not provide coverage.

This could mean that between 70,500 and 126,400 women would lose access to contraceptive services under their employer-provided health insurance plans. (This is the Administration's estimate.)

The Court's ruling leaves open another challenge to the rules, however, and the plaintiffs could raise the argument on remand, that is, that the rules are arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Justice Thomas wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. The Court ruled that the Departments had statutory authority to adopt the rules under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300gg-13(a)(4), which provides that "with respect to women," group health plans must "at a minimum, provide . . . such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by [HRSA]." The Court said that the "as provided for" clause "grants sweeping authority to HRSA to craft a set of standards defining the preventive care that applicable health plans must cover," leaving the HRSA with "virtually unbridled discretion to decide what counts as preventive care and screenings." The Court held that this authority included the power "to identify and create exemptions" like the ones in the challenged rules.

The Court also held that the Departments complied with the procedural requirements in the Administrative Procedure Act in adopting the rules.

The Court expressly declined to say whether RFRA compelled the exemptions in the rules, as the Administration argued. Still, the Court did say that the Departments were within their powers to consider RFRA in writing the rules, and even that "[i]t is clear from the face of the statute that the contraceptive mandate is capable of violating RFRA."

Justice Alito concurred in full, joined by Justice Gorsuch. Justice Alito argued that the Court should have resolved the RFRA question in favor of the Administration--that is, that RFRA compelled the rules. According to Justice Alito, this would have meant that the rules were not impermissibly arbitrary and capricious under the APA, and thus foreclosed that argument on remand.

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the judgment. Justice Kagan argued that HRSA had statutory authority to exempt certain employers from the contraceptive guarantee, but (different than the Court) because the HRSA was entitled to Chevron deference in its interpretation of the ambiguous statutory language. She also argued that the rules could be arbitrary and capricious--an issue for the lower court on remand.

Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justice Sotomayor. Justice Ginsburg pointed to an earlier provision in the Act that specifies that group health plans and health insurance issuers "shall" cover specified services. She argued that this provision mandates who is required to provide specified services--and that it doesn't include any exemptions. (She argued that the section that the Court relied on only went to what services must be provided, not who must provide them. And yet the rules provide exemptions for who must provide services.) She also argued that the rules weren't compelled by the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA.

 

July 8, 2020 in Cases and Case Materials, Executive Authority, News, Opinion Analysis, Religion, Separation of Powers | Permalink | Comments (0)

SCOTUS Broadens Ministerial Exemption from Anti-Discrimination Laws

In its opinion in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, consolidated with St. James School v. Biel, the Court extended the application of the First Amendment's "ministerial exception" first accepted by the Court in 2012 in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, to the teachers at schools run by religious organizations in the cases, and seemingly to all teachers employed by religiously-affiliated schools. 

Writing for the Court, Alito's opinion — joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh — held that although the teachers in these cases were not actually "ministers" by title and did not have as much as religious training as the teacher in Hosanna-Tabor, they are encompassed in the same exception from enforcement of anti-discrimination laws.  The Court stated that the First Amendment protects a religious institution's independence on matters of "faith and doctrine" without interference from secular authorities, including selection of its "ministers." But who should qualify as a "minister" subject to this exemption? Recall that the factors of Hosanna-Tabor figured in the oral argument (and recall also that they figured in the Ninth Circuit's opinions). But here, the Court stated that while there may be factors,  "What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does," rather than what the employee is titled. Moreover, the "religious institution's explanation of the role of such employees in the life of the religion" is important. Indeed, the religious institution's "explanation" seems determinative. The Court rejected a "rigid formula" for determining whether an employee is within the ministerial exception, concluding instead that:

When a school with a religious mission entrusts a teacher with the responsibility of educating and forming students in the faith, judicial intervention into disputes between the school and the teacher threatens the school’s independence in a way that the First Amendment does not allow.

The brief concurring opinion by Thomas, joined by Gorsuch, argues that the Court should go further and essentially make the implicit more explicit: the Court should decline to ever weigh in "on the theological question of which positions qualify as 'ministerial.' "

Sotomayor dissenting opinion, joined by Ginsburg, begins:

Two employers fired their employees allegedly because one had breast cancer and the other was elderly. Purporting to rely on this Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC (2012), the majority shields those employers from disability and age-discrimination claims. In the Court’s view, because the employees taught short religion modules at Catholic elementary schools, they were “ministers” of the Catholic faith and thus could be fired for any reason, whether religious or nonreligious, benign or bigoted, without legal recourse. The Court reaches this result even though the teachers taught primarily secular subjects, lacked substantial religious titles and training, and were not even required to be Catholic. In foreclosing the teachers’ claims, the Court skews the facts, ignores the applicable standard of review, and collapses Hosanna-Tabor’s careful analysis into a single consideration: whether a church thinks its employees play an important religious role. Because that simplistic approach has no basis in law and strips thousands of school- teachers of their legal protections, I respectfully dissent.

For the dissent, the Court's conclusion has "grave consequences," noting that it is estimated that over 100,000 secular teachers employed by religiously-affiliated schools are now without employment protections. Further, it contrasts Esponiza v. Montana Dept of Revenue, decided this Term, in which the Court "lamented a perceived 'discrimination against religion,'" but here "it swings the pendulum in the extreme opposite direction, permitting religious entities to discriminate widely and with impunity for reasons wholly divorced from religious beliefs." The dissent concludes with a hope that the Court will be "deft" enough to "cabin the consequences" of this ministerial exception, but given the current composition of the Court, that hope seems a narrow one.

July 8, 2020 in Disability, Establishment Clause, Federalism, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Opinion Analysis, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (1)