Tuesday, January 14, 2020

SCOTUS Decision in Ritzen Group: Appealability and Motions for Relief from Automatic Stays in Bankruptcy

Today the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, covered earlier here. From the opening paragraphs of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion:

The precise issue the Court today decides: Does a creditor’s motion for relief from the automatic stay initiate a distinct proceeding terminating in a final, appealable order when the bankruptcy court rules dispositively on the motion? In agreement with the courts below, our answer is “yes.” We hold that the adjudication of a motion for relief from the automatic stay forms a discrete procedural unit within the embracive bankruptcy case. That unit yields a final, appealable order when the bankruptcy court unreservedly grants or denies relief.

The opinion concludes:

Because the appropriate “proceeding” in this case is the adjudication of the motion for relief from the automatic stay, the Bankruptcy Court’s order conclusively denying that motion is “final.” The court’s order ended the stay-relief adjudication and left nothing more for the Bankruptcy Court to do in that proceeding. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly ranked the order as final and immediately appealable, and correctly affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of Ritzen’s appeal as untimely.

In a footnote, Justice Ginsburg observes:

We do not decide whether finality would attach to an order denying stay relief if the bankruptcy court enters it “without prejudice” because further developments might change the stay calculus. Nothing in the record before us suggests that this is such an order.

 

 

 

 

January 14, 2020 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, December 19, 2019

Fourth Circuit revives challenge to 2020 Census, reverses district court finding that claims under the Enumeration Clause are unripe

Today the Fourth Circuit issued its decision in NAACP v. Bureau of the Census. The district court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Enumeration Clause. Judge Keenan’s opinion, joined by Chief Judge Gregory and Judge Richardson, reverses the district court’s dismissal of the Enumeration Clause claims.

From the introductory section:

This appeal addresses a challenge to the “methods and means” that the Census Bureau has adopted for the 2020 Census, and the contention that the 2020 Census will produce an even greater differential undercount. Plaintiffs-Appellants are the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); Prince George’s County, Maryland; Prince George’s County, Maryland, NAACP Branch; Robert E. Ross; and H. Elizabeth Johnson (collectively, the plaintiffs). They represent “hard-to-count” communities that historically have suffered the greatest harms from differential undercounts, and that directly will lose federal funding if, as the plaintiffs assert, the differential undercount increases in 2020. * * *

Upon our review, we hold that the plaintiffs’ APA claims, as pleaded, do not satisfy the jurisdictional limitations on judicial review set forth in the APA. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing those claims.

Nevertheless, mindful of the Supreme Court’s recent guidance affirming judicial review of “both constitutional and statutory challenges to census-related decision-making,” Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2568 (2019), we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ Enumeration Clause claims as unripe, and in precluding the plaintiffs from filing an amended complaint regarding those claims after the defendants’ plans for the 2020 Census became final. Additionally, we decline to address in the first instance the defendants’ alternative arguments for affirming the district court’s judgment. We therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of the Enumeration Clause claims, and remand that portion of the case to allow the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint setting forth their Enumeration Clause claims.

Chief Judge Gregory also authors a concurring opinion.

 

 

 

December 19, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 3, 2019

SCOTUS Oral Argument in Big Second Amendment Case: Is It Moot?

Mootness played a major role in yesterday’s Supreme Court oral argument in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York.

Here’s the oral argument transcript.

And here’s coverage from Robert Barnes (Washington Post) and Amy Howe (SCOTUSblog).

 

 

 

 

December 3, 2019 in Federal Courts, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, November 14, 2019

House Judiciary Committee Hearing on "Snap" Removal

Today at 2:00pm (eastern time), the House Judiciary Committee is holding a hearing entitled Examining the Use of “Snap” Removals to Circumvent the Forum Defendant Rule.

You can watch the hearing here.

 

 

 

November 14, 2019 in Federal Courts, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 13, 2019

Second Circuit Revives Emoluments Lawsuit Against Trump

Today, the Second Circuit issued its decision in Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, a lawsuit against President Trump alleging violations of the Emoluments Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Judge Leval’s majority opinion begins:

Plaintiffs—Eric Goode, a restaurateur and hotelier, and Restaurant Opportunities Center United (“ROC”), a non‐partisan, member‐based  organization of restaurants and restaurant workers—appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.) dismissing their complaint against Defendant Donald J. Trump, the President of the United States, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for the President’s alleged violations of the Domestic and Foreign Emoluments Clauses of the United States Constitution. The President moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that Plaintiffs did not have standing to sue. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, they fall outside the zone of interests of the Emoluments Clauses, their claims do not present a ripe case or controversy within the meaning of Article III, and their suit is barred by the political question doctrine. For the reasons below, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 

Judge Walker authored a dissenting opinion.

 

 

 

September 13, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 23, 2019

Davis on State Standing

Seth Davis has published The New Public Standing, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1229 (2019). Here’s the abstract:

Today’s public litigants are not citizens or individual taxpayers who, suffering no injury of their own, seek instead to stand for the public. Instead, they are states that have suffered financial injuries. In recent years, states have brought many high-profile public law cases against the federal government based upon financial injuries. State standing to sue the federal government for financial injuries is the new public standing.

This Article’s goal is to offer a comprehensive account of the new public standing. It argues that we should not hope—or expect—that the federal courts will treat the new public standing with the disfavor they have shown to citizen and taxpayer standing. Nor, however, should we hope or expect that the federal courts will treat the new public standing as indistinguishable from private standing based upon financial injuries.

One aspect of this thesis is doctrinal and normative. Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s Article III jurisprudence, financial injuries are the paradigmatic example of an injury in fact that supports standing to sue, as contrasted with an ideological injury that does not suffice for standing. What makes the new public standing doctrinally difficult is that while some financial injuries to states mirror those to private parties, others do not. And what makes these cases normatively difficult is that the state attorneys general who sue based upon financial injuries to their states are ideological litigants. The new public standing thus requires us to rethink the terms of the debate about state standing to sue the federal government.

Another aspect of this thesis is descriptive and positive. To ground its normative analysis, this Article attempts to identify the ideological, institutional, and political factors that have contributed to the new public standing and that will shape its future prospects. Analysis of these factors leads to the conclusion that the Court will preserve the new public standing while tinkering with its remedial scope. The new public standing will prove more durable than citizen and taxpayer standing for the public, but will not substitute for the promise of an individual standing upon her conscience in federal court.

 

 

 

July 23, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Scholarship, Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 17, 2019

SCOTUS Decision in Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill: Virginia House Lacks Standing to Appeal Ruling Striking Down 2011 Legislative Districts

Today the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision in Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill. Justice Ginsburg authors the majority opinion, joined by Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. The Court rules that the Virginia House of Delegates lacks standing to appeal a three-judge district court’s decision that Virginia’s 2011 legislative districts had been racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

The majority first rejects the argument that the State of Virginia had designated its House of Delegates to litigate on its behalf. It then finds that the House of Delegates lacks “standing in its own right,” because it had suffered no “legally and judicially cognizable” injury. Justice Ginsburg writes: “This Court has never held that a judicial decision invalidating a state law as unconstitutional inflicts a discrete, cognizable injury on each organ of government that participated in the law’s passage.”

Justice Alito authors a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Kavanaugh.

 

 

June 17, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 3, 2019

SCOTUS Decision in Fort Bend County v. Davis: Title VII’s Charge-Filing Requirement Is Not Jurisdictional

Today the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Fort Bend County v. Davis, covered earlier here. Justice Ginsburg writes the opinion. From the first paragraph: 

As a precondition to the commencement of a Title VII action in court, a complainant must first file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission). §2000e–5(e)(1), (f)(1). The question this case presents: Is Title VII’s charge-filing precondition to suit a “jurisdictional” requirement that can be raised at any stage of a proceeding; or is it a procedural prescription mandatory if timely raised, but subject to forfeiture if tardily asserted? We hold that Title VII’s charge-filing instruction is not jurisdictional, a term generally reserved to describe the classes of cases a court may entertain (subject-matter jurisdiction) or the persons over whom a court may exercise adjudicatory authority (personal jurisdiction). Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 455 (2004). Prerequisites to suit like Title VII’s charge-filing instruction are not of that character; they are properly ranked among the array of claim-processing rules that must be timely raised to come into play.

Although the charge-filing precondition is not jurisdictional, Justice Ginsburg writes that it is “‘mandatory’ in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if a party properly raises it.” [Op. at 7 (citing Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (per curiam))]. She notes, however, that “[t]he Court has reserved whether mandatory claim-processing rules may ever be subject to equitable exceptions.” [n.5 (citing Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U.S. ___, ___, n. 3 (2017))].

Justice Ginsburg concludes: “Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is a processing rule, albeit a mandatory one, not a jurisdictional prescription delineating the adjudicatory authority of courts.”

 

 

 

June 3, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 21, 2019

SCOTUS Discusses Mootness in Yesterday’s Mission Product Holdings Decision

The main issue in yesterday’s Supreme Court decision in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC involved the provision of the bankruptcy code regarding a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract. But there was an interesting exchange regarding mootness.

From Justice Kagan’s majority opinion:

Mission has presented a claim for money damages—essentially lost profits—arising from its inability to use the Coolcore trademarks between the time Tempnology rejected the licensing agreement and its scheduled expiration date. See Reply Brief 22, and n. 8. Such claims, if at all plausible, ensure a live controversy. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8–9 (1978). For better or worse, nothing so shows a continuing stake in a dispute’s outcome as a demand for dollars and cents. See 13C C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3533.3, p. 2 (3d ed. 2008) (Wright & Miller) (“[A] case is not moot so long as a claim for monetary relief survives”). Ultimate recovery on that demand may be uncertain or even unlikely for any number of reasons, in this case as in others. But that is of no moment. If there is any chance of money changing hands, Mission’s suit remains live. See Chafin, 568 U. S., at 172.

Tempnology makes a flurry of arguments about why Mission is not entitled to damages, but none so clearly precludes recovery as to make this case moot.

Continue reading

May 21, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 20, 2019

SCOTUS Cert Grant in Ritzen Group

Today the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, which involves the federal district courts’ appellate jurisdiction over certain bankruptcy court orders The question presented is: “Whether an order denying a motion for relief from the automatic stay is a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).”

You can find all the cert-stage briefing—and follow the merits briefs as they come in—at SCOTUSblog and at the Supreme Court website.

 

May 20, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 30, 2019

Jurisdictional or Nonjurisdictional: SCOTUS Cert Petition in Graviss

Calendared for the Supreme Court’s May 16th conference is an interesting cert petition in Graviss v. Department of Defense, which was recently featured as one of SCOTUSblog’s petitions of the week. Graviss involves 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A)’s 60-day deadline for federal employees to petition the Federal Circuit for review of a Merit Systems Protection Board decision. The Federal Circuit found that the 60-day deadline was a jurisdictional requirement.

The petition for certiorari presents the following questions:

1. Whether the 60-day period for seeking Federal Circuit review under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) sets a jurisdictional bar, as the panel majority held, or prescribes a claim-processing rule subject to exceptions such as forfeiture, as the dissenting judges below maintained.

2. Whether the Government forfeited its timeliness defense.

As readers well know, the Supreme Court has decided numerous cases over the last decade or so addressing the distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional requirements. 14 law professors signed onto this amicus brief, which argues that that the Federal Circuit misapplied the Court’s recent case law in concluding that the 60-day deadline was jurisdictional. Other amici supporting the petitioner include the American Federation of Government Employees, the Federal Circuit Bar Association, the National Veterans Legal Services Program, and the National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates.

As for the law professors’ brief, my personal thanks to the distinguished group of signatories who joined the brief, and to Stanley Blackmon and Scott Burnett Smith at Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP for their great work.

Stay tuned, everyone!

 

 

 

April 30, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, March 20, 2019

SCOTUS Decision in Frank v. Gaos

Today the Supreme Court issued its decision in Frank v. Gaos (covered earlier here). The Court had initially granted certiorari to decide “[w]hether, or in what circumstances, a cy pres award of class action proceeds that provides no direct relief to class members supports class certification and comports with the requirement that a settlement binding class members must be ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’” Following oral argument, however, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on whether any plaintiff had Article III standing under the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Spokeo v. Robins.

Today’s per curiam opinion remands the case for the lower courts to consider the standing question:

After reviewing the supplemental briefs, we conclude that the case should be remanded for the courts below to address the plaintiffs’ standing in light of Spokeo. The supplemental briefs filed in response to our order raise a wide variety of legal and factual issues not addressed in the merits briefing before us or at oral argument. We “are a court of review, not of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). Resolution of the standing question should take place in the District Court or the Ninth Circuit in the first instance. We therefore vacate and remand for further proceedings. Nothing in our opinion should be interpreted as expressing a view on any particular resolution of the standing question.

Justice Thomas dissented. He would have found that the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to establish standing but that “the class action should not have been certified, and the settlement should not have been approved.”

 

 

 

March 20, 2019 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 11, 2019

SCOTUS cert grant on whether Title VII’s administrative exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional

Today the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis. Here is the question presented:

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., requires plaintiffs to exhaust claims of employment discrimination with the EEOC before filing suit in federal court. Id. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1).

The question presented is: Whether Title VII’s administrative exhaustion requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, as three Circuits have held, or a waivable claim-processing rule, as eight Circuits have held.

You can find all the cert-stage briefing—and follow the merits briefs as they come in—at SCOTUSblog and at the Supreme Court website.

 

January 11, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 28, 2018

SCOTUS Cert Grant on the Class Action Fairness Act & Removal by Counterclaim Defendants

Yesterday the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson. The cert. petition presents the following question:

This action was commenced when Citibank, N.A. filed a routine state-court collection action against respondent George W. Jackson. Petitioner Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. was not a party to that action and never became a party to that collection dispute. Jackson then filed a counterclaim against Citibank asserting class-action consumer-protection claims. In addition to naming Citibank, Jackson named Home Depot and another company as original defendant to that counterclaim class action. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, permits "any defendant in a state-court class action to remove the action to federal court if it satisfies certain jurisdictional requirements. Petitioner Home Depot is an original defendant in the class action at issue here and was never a plaintiff in any claim associated with this case.

The question presented is: Whether an original defendant to a class-action claim can remove the class action if it otherwise satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act when the class action was originally asserted as a counterclaim against a co-defendant.

The Court also directed the parties to address the following question:

Should this court’s holding in Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941)—that an original plaintiff may not remove a counterclaim against it—extend to third-party counterclaim defendants?

You can find all the cert-stage briefing—and follow the merits briefs as they come in—at SCOTUSblog and at the Supreme Court website.

 

 

September 28, 2018 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 14, 2018

I’m just a bill: a busy day in the House Judiciary Committee

The House Judiciary Committee met yesterday to consider several bills that may be of interest. You can watch a video of the hearing here and here.

Here is a quick summary:  

  • H.R. 3487. This bill’s purpose is to “amend section 1332 of title 28, United States Code, to provide that the requirement for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is met if any one party to the case is diverse in citizenship from any one adverse party in the case.”

Here is the text of the bill.

H.R. 3487 was not reported, apparently because no reporting quorum was present. (See 3:54:25 here.)

  • H.R. 6730, the “Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2018.” This bill’s purpose is to “amend title 28, United States Code, to prohibit the issuance of national injunctions, and for other purposes.”

Here is the text of the bill.

H.R. 6730 was ordered to be reported during the hearing.

  • H.R. 6754, the “CIRCUIT Act of 2018” or the “Court Imbalance Restructure Concerning Updates to Impacted Tribunals Act of 2018.” This bill’s purpose is to “amend title 28, United States Code, to modify the structure of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and for other purposes.”

Here is the text of the bill.

H.R. 6754 was ordered to be reported during the hearing.

  • H.R. 6755, the “Judiciary Reforms, Organization and Operational Modernization Act of 2018” or the “Judiciary ROOM Act of 2018.” This bill’s purpose is to “provide for additional Article III judges, to modernize the administration of justice, and for other purposes.”

Here is the text of the bill.

H.R. 6755 was ordered to be reported during the hearing.

 

 

 

September 14, 2018 in Current Affairs, Federal Courts, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 6, 2018

Hessick on Consenting to Federal Adjudication Beyond Article III

Andy Hessick has published Consenting to Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 715 (2018). Here’s the abstract:

Article III confers the judicial power on the federal courts, and it provides the judges of those courts with life tenure and salary guarantees to ensure that they decide disputes according to law instead of popular pressure. Despite this careful arrangement, the Supreme Court has not restricted the judicial power to the Article III courts. Instead, it has held that Article I tribunals—whose judges do not enjoy the salary and tenure guarantees provided by Article III—may adjudicate disputes if the parties consent to the tribunals’ jurisdiction. This consent exception provides the basis for thousands of adjudications by Article I judges each year. This Article challenges the consent exception. It argues that the consent of the parties should not be a basis for adjudication before an Article I tribunal. As it explains, permitting Article I tribunals to adjudicate based on the parties’ consent is inconsistent with the text of the Constitution and historical practice, and it undermines both the separation of powers and federalism.

 

 

 

August 6, 2018 in Federal Courts, Recent Scholarship, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, July 26, 2018

SDNY rules on motions to dismiss cases challenging addition of a citizenship status question to 2020 census

Today U.S. District Judge Jesse Furman (S.D.N.Y.) issued an opinion and order granting in part and denying in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss two related cases, New York v. United States Department of Commerce and New York Immigration Coalition v. United States Department of Commerce. The plaintiffs in these cases are challenging—on a number of grounds—Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross’s decision to reinstate a question on citizenship status for the 2020 census. The upshot, as the court summarizes is this:

Plaintiffs’ claims under the Enumeration Clause — which turn on Secretary Ross’s power rather than his purposes — must be and are dismissed. By contrast, their claims under the APA (which Defendants seek to dismiss solely on jurisdictional and justiciability grounds) and the Due Process Clause — which turn at least in part on Secretary Ross’s purposes and not merely on his power — may proceed.

In reaching this conclusion, the opinion covers a number of interesting issues, including Article III standing, the political question doctrine, and whether the plaintiffs plausibly alleged discriminatory animus for purposes of their equal protection claim under the Due Process Clause.

Download SDNY Opinion and Order 07-26-2018

 

 

 

July 26, 2018 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Twombly/Iqbal | Permalink | Comments (0)

Yesterday’s Eleventh Circuit Decision in Lewis v. Governor of Alabama

In Lewis v. Governor of Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of an equal protection challenge to a 2016 Alabama statute that nullified a Birmingham city ordinance raising the minimum wage to $10.10. Here’s the introductory paragraph:

For a single day in February 2016, Marnika Lewis and Antoin Adams secured a pay raise. The Mayor of Birmingham, Alabama, William Bell, had just affixed his signature to Birmingham Ordinance No. 16-28, which guaranteed Lewis, Adams, and all other wage earners in the city $10.10 per hour. But the following afternoon, Alabama Governor Robert Bentley signed the Minimum Wage and Right-to-Work Act (The Minimum Wage Act or the Act) into law. The Minimum Wage Act nullified Birmingham Ordinance No. 16-28, preempted all local labor and employment regulation, and mandated a uniform minimum wage throughout Alabama—which, then and now, sits at $7.25 per hour. At the heart of this appeal is whether Lewis and Adams have stated a plausible claim that the Minimum Wage Act had the purpose and effect of discriminating against Birmingham’s black citizens, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because they have, we reverse the dismissal of that claim. We affirm the dismissal of all other claims.

The opinion addresses standing, sovereign immunity, and pleading standards. As to pleading, the court concludes:

Here, a sensitive but thorough examination of the plaintiffs’ detailed allegations leads us to conclude that they have plausibly alleged a discriminatory motivation behind the Minimum Wage Act, despite the law’s neutrality and rationale. This is all that is required for their claim to survive a motion to dismiss.

 

 

 

July 26, 2018 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Twombly/Iqbal | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 26, 2018

Some Interesting SCOTUS Cert Grants

Yesterday’s Supreme Court order list included grants of certiorari in several cases, including these three:

Sudan v. Harrison presents the question:

Whether the Second Circuit erred by holding — in direct conflict with the D.C., Fifth, and Seventh Circuits and in the face of an amicus brief from the United States — that plaintiffs suing a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act may serve the foreign state under 28 U.S.C § 1608(a)(3) by mail addressed and dispatched to the head of the foreign state’s ministry of foreign affairs “via” or in “care of” the foreign state’s diplomatic mission in the United States, despite U.S. obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to preserve mission inviolability.

[You can follow the Sudan merits briefs as they come in at SCOTUSblog and at the Supreme Court website.]

Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert presents the question:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) establishes a fourteen-day deadline to file a petition for permission to appeal an order granting or denying class-action certification. On numerous occasions, this Court left undecided whether mandatory claim-processing rules, like Rule 23(f), are subject to equitable exceptions, because the issue was not raised below. See, e.g., Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Serv. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 18 n.3, 22 (2017). That obstacle is not present here. The question presented is: did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that equitable exceptions apply to mandatory claim-processing rules and excusing a party’s failure to timely file a petition for permission to appeal, or a motion for reconsideration, within the Rule 23(f) deadline? As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged below, its decision conflicts with other United States Circuit Courts of Appeals that have considered this issue (the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).

The question presented is: did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that equitable exceptions apply to mandatory claim-processing rules and excusing a party’s failure to timely file a petition for permission to appeal, or a motion for reconsideration, within the Rule 23(f) deadline?

[You can follow the Neutraceutical merits briefs as they come in at SCOTUSblog and at the Supreme Court website.]

And Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc. presents the question:

Whether the Federal Arbitration Act permits a court to decline to enforce an agreement delegating questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator if the court concludes the claim of arbitrability is “wholly groundless.”

[You can follow the Henry Schein merits briefs as they come in at SCOTUSblog and at the Supreme Court website.]

 

 

 

 

 

June 26, 2018 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, International/Comparative Law, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 5, 2018

Shannon on Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Brad Shannon has published Reconciling Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 46 Hofstra L. Rev. 913 (2018). From the conclusion:

Current subject-matter jurisdiction practice, though well-entrenched, seems upon closer examination to be somewhat indefensible. Changes should be made. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 should be amended to eliminate the pleading of subject-matter jurisdiction. This should help obviate the need to respond to allegations of this nature. Moreover, Rules 12 and 60 should be amended to prevent the assertion of this defense beyond the pleading stage (except in the default judgment context). Such a move would significantly (and appropriately) limit the ability to raise this defense on direct or collateral review. It would, in short, help “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Perhaps more importantly, the practice relating to federal subject-matter jurisdiction would be reconciled with that relating to other “jurisdictional” concepts such as personal jurisdiction and venue, as well as state subject-matter jurisdiction practice, which has avoided many of these problems without incident.

Alas, sound reasoning might not be enough to get the Rules Committee to proceed on some of these matters. Tradition is a powerful thing. Moreover, the fact that the amendments proposed here would, in actuality, have little effect on post-pleading practice, though seemingly a virtue, might actually be a deterrent. Hopefully it will be enough that these amendments would promote simplicity, uniformity, predictability, and avoid unnecessary waste. Exceptions might be unavoidable regardless of which way one goes on these issues, and cases probably will continue to be decided suboptimally. The questions for now relate to baseline presumptions and how best to minimize errors and increase the efficiency of the federal courts.

 

June 5, 2018 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)