Tuesday, April 13, 2021

11th Circuit Decision on FRCP 6

Last week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision in Circuitronix, LLC v. Shenzen Kinwong Electronic Co., which addresses (among other things) FRCP 6(a)(3)’s provision for extending a filing deadline when “the clerk’s office is inaccessible . . . on the last day for filing.”

In that case, the district court’s chief judge “had designated July 5 as a holiday such that ‘the Court will be closed.’” The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that “the clerk’s office remained accessible on July 5 because Kinwong could have filed its motion electronically.” Noting that “Rule 6 refers to the clerk’s physical office,” it held that “[t]he clerk’s office is inaccessible when its building is officially closed or otherwise unavailable, even if the parties are still able to submit filings electronically.”

H/T: C.E. Petit

 

 

 

April 13, 2021 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, April 9, 2021

Some Thoughts on the Google v. Oracle Decision and the Standard of Review for Civil Jury Verdicts

This week’s Supreme Court decision in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. is mostly about copyright law. But there was a very interesting procedural question in the case regarding what standard of review the Court should use in connection with the jury’s verdict in favor of Google on its fair use defense. The answer is: it’s complicated. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion does say that “the ultimate ‘fair use’ question” is subject to de novo review. But he also states that “subsidiary factual questions” must be reviewed deferentially—and that deference ends up playing a very important role in the Court’s decision.

In this post I want to make two quick points about how the Court handles the standard of review issue. First, as I’ve argued in a recent article, I don’t think that Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a court may displace a jury’s verdict only when “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue,” allows a court to declare that a certain issue (like fair use) is categorically subject to de novo review. But second, Justice Breyer’s deference to the jury on implicitly-found “subsidiary” facts leads to an analysis of fair use that—at the end of the day—isn’t so different from the sort of deferential review Rule 50 would require.

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April 9, 2021 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 8, 2021

Thomas on Coleman on Federal Procedural Rulemaking Committees

Now on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Suja Thomas’s essay, Should the Rules Committees be Remade? Suja reviews Brooke Coleman’s recent article, #SoWhiteMale: Federal Procedural Rulemaking Committees, 68 UCLA L. Rev. Disc. 370 (2020).

 

 

 

 

April 8, 2021 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 23, 2021

Appellate Courts and Civil Juries

The final version of my article, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 2021 Wisconsin L. Rev. 1, is now posted. It tackles the question of what standard of review appellate courts should use for findings made by civil juries. There’s a fair amount of confusion on this issue, because some appellate courts have conflated it with the framework for choosing the standard of appellate review for rulings by lower court judges. (The confusion is not helped by the extent to which the often elusive distinction between “law” and “fact” plays a role.)

This is also an issue that the Supreme Court is considering right now in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., a $9 billion lawsuit about Google’s use of Java programming code to develop its Android operating system. SCOTUS issued a specific order asking the parties to brief the appropriate standard of review for the jury’s verdict in favor of Google on its fair use defense. The Google case was argued at the beginning of this Term but is still awaiting a decision—here are some of my thoughts on the case from back in October after the oral argument: SCOTUS, Google v. Oracle, and Appellate Review of Civil Jury Verdicts.

I enjoyed working on this piece, and I hope folks find it helpful. Special thanks to the great editors at the Wisconsin Law Review, who did a fantastic and timely job getting the article finalized—maybe even in time for SCOTUS to read it! Here’s the full abstract:

In federal civil litigation, decisionmaking power is shared by juries, trial courts, and appellate courts. This Article examines an unresolved tension in the different doctrines that allocate authority among these institutions, one that has led to confusion surrounding the relationship between appellate courts and civil juries. At base, the current uncertainty stems from a longstanding lack of clarity regarding the distinction between matters of law and matters of fact. The high-stakes Oracle-Google litigation--which is now before the Supreme Court--exemplifies this. In that case, the Federal Circuit reasoned that an appellate court may assert de novo review over a jury's verdict simply by characterizing a particular issue as legal rather than factual. But this approach misperceives the approach demanded by Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits judicial override of a jury's verdict only when "a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis" to reach such a verdict.

Rule 50's reasonable-jury standard does not permit de novo review of a jury's verdict on a particular issue. Rather, it requires deference to the jury's conclusion on that issue unless the reviewing court can explain why principles of substantive law or other aspects of the trial record render that verdict unreasonable. This deferential standard of review faithfully implements the text and structure of the Federal Rules and respects the jury's role in our federal system. Yet, it also preserves appellate courts' ability to provide meaningful clarification that will guide future decisionmakers.

 

 

 

March 23, 2021 in Adam Steinman, Current Affairs, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, Supreme Court Cases, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, February 18, 2021

Parness on a Proposed Amendment to FRCP 27

Jeff Parness has posted Proposed Amendment to the Federal Civil Procedure Rule 27(c): Federal Presuit Information Preservation Orders on SSRN. Here’s the abstract:

Professor Jeffrey A. Parness submitted a proposed amendment to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 27(c) on November 13, 2020. It urged that federal civil procedure laws allowing presuit information preservation orders should be expanded in order to promote greater uniformity across the country and greater compliance with current substantive and procedural laws on the preservation duties involving civil litigation information. These new laws were said to be best placed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The proposal includes the rationales, some guidelines, and suggested language for a new FRCP 27(c). In particular, the proposal suggests the following language (additions underlined): "This rule does not limit a court's power to entertain an action to perpetuate testimony and an action involving presuit information preservation when necessary to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of a possible later federal civil action."

 

 

 

February 18, 2021 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 8, 2021

11th Circuit Decision on Class Certification

Last week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued an important decision on class actions, Cherry v. Dometic Corp. Judge William Pryor’s unanimous opinion for the panel rejects the view that “administrative feasibility” is a requirement for class certification under Rule 23.

The court does recognize that administrative feasibility is “relevant” for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions—because of the “manageability criterion of Rule 23(b)(3)(D).” But even so, “the district court must balance its manageability finding against other considerations.” Therefore, “administrative difficulties—whether in class-member identification or otherwise—do not alone doom a motion for certification.”

 

 

 

February 8, 2021 in Class Actions, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, January 27, 2021

Bartholomew on Lammon on FRCP 23(f) Class Certification Appeals

Today on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Christine Bartholomew’s essay, The Reality of Class-Action Appeals. Christine reviews Bryan Lammon’s recent article, An Empirical Study of Class-Action Appeals.

 

 

 

January 27, 2021 in Class Actions, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, December 16, 2020

SCOTUS Cert Grant on Class Actions

Today the Supreme Court granted certiorari in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which presents the question: “Whether either Article III or Rule 23 permits a damages class action where the vast majority of the class suffered no actual injury, let alone an injury anything like what the class representative suffered.”

(The cert petition presented a second question relating to punitive damages, but the grant is limited to Question 1.)

You can find all the cert-stage briefing—and follow the merits briefs as they come in—at SCOTUSblog and at the Supreme Court website.

 

 

 

 

December 16, 2020 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 26, 2020

SCOTUS, Google v. Oracle, and Appellate Review of Civil Jury Verdicts

The Supreme Court’s first batch of oral arguments this Term included Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., a high-profile and high-stakes ($9 billion) lawsuit about Google’s use of Java programming code to develop its Android operating system. Google prevailed after a jury trial, but the Federal Circuit reversed. Google’s Supreme Court cert petition initially presented two questions: (1) whether copyright protection extends to a software interface; and (2) whether, as the jury found at trial, Google’s use of Oracle’s software interface constituted fair use for purposes of copyright law. That second question, however, prompted the Court to ask its own question: what was “the appropriate standard of review” for the jury’s fair use verdict?

I’ve written a piece that examines this standard of review issue, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 2021 Wisconsin L. Rev. 1 (forthcoming). There’s a lot more detail in the full article, but I wanted to highlight a few points in the wake of the recent oral argument—during which there were several questions about the standard of review.

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October 26, 2020 in Adam Steinman, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Recent Scholarship, Supreme Court Cases, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 15, 2020

Discovery Sanctions Issued Against Defendants in Opioid MDL

Yesterday, Judge Polster partially granted the plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions against the Allergan and Teva defendants in the In re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation MDL. The issue was “whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to some relief, given that they only recently received a critical document (‘the Cegidim Report’), even though the Court ordered the Report must be produced and even though Plaintiffs asked Allergan and Teva for it numerous times during discovery in the last 18 months.”

Judge Polster explained:

[I]f the Cegidim Report supported, rather than contradicted, assertions Teva and Allergan made in their summary judgment briefing, it seems awfully likely the defendants would have worked more diligently to find it. And that is the level of diligence that was required, regardless.

Here is the full order:

Download Discovery Sanctions Order 2020-10-14

 

 

October 15, 2020 in Discovery, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mass Torts, MDLs, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 29, 2020

Steinman on Appellate Courts and Civil Juries

I posted on SSRN a draft of my article, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries. Here’s the abstract:

In federal civil litigation, decisionmaking power is shared by juries, trial courts, and appellate courts. This article examines an unresolved tension in the different doctrines that allocate authority among these institutions, which has led to confusion regarding the relationship between appellate courts and civil juries. At base, the current uncertainty stems from a longstanding lack of clarity regarding the distinction between matters of law and matters of fact. The high-stakes Oracle-Google litigation—which is now before the Supreme Court—exemplifies this. In that case, the Federal Circuit reasoned that an appellate court may assert de novo review over a jury's verdict simply by characterizing a particular issue as legal rather than factual. But this approach misperceives the approach demanded by Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits judicial override of a jury's verdict only when "a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis" to reach such a verdict.

Rule 50's reasonable-jury standard does not permit de novo review of a jury's verdict on a particular issue. Rather, it requires deference to the jury's conclusion on that issue unless the reviewing court can explain why principles of substantive law or other aspects of the trial record render that verdict unreasonable. This deferential standard of review faithfully implements the text and structure of the Federal Rules and respects the jury's role in our federal system. Yet it also preserves appellate courts' ability to provide meaningful clarification that will guide future decisionmakers.

As the abstract indicates, the Supreme Court may be wrestling with this issue this coming Term in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., which is scheduled for oral argument (telephonically) next Wednesday.

Thanks to the Southeastern Association of Law Schools for letting me present an earlier draft of this paper back in July at the SEALS 2020 Annual Conference Federal Courts and Procedure Panel. I got a lot of great feedback.  

 

 

 

September 29, 2020 in Conferences/Symposia, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 25, 2020

Sixth Circuit Panel Reverses Certification of a Negotiation Class in the Opioid MDL

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit issued a 2-1 decision in In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, a much-anticipated case about the certification of a negotiation class in the Opioid MDL.

The majority reversed the district court’s certification of a negotiation class. Judge Clay’s majority opinion called it a “novel form of class action.” He observes that Rule 23 “does not mention certification for purposes of ‘negotiation’ or anything along those lines” and writes that “a new form of class action, wholly untethered from Rule 23, may not be employed by a court.” He also found that the district court’s certification of the negotiation class had “papered over the predominance inquiry” required by Rule 23(b)(3).

Judge Moore disagrees, with a 40+ page dissent that begins:

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not written and have never been interpreted to manacle district courts that innovate within the Rules’ textual borders. The district court has breathed life into a novel concept—a class certified for negotiation purposes—to aid in its Promethean duty to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of this byzantine multidistrict litigation. We should be in the business of encouraging, not exterminating, such resourcefulness. Certifying a negotiation class honors the Rules’ equitable heritage, complements the settlement class’s history, hews to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s textual requisites, and stirs no constitutional or policy qualms. So, with respect, I dissent.

The entire dissent is worth a read. Before proceeding to analyze whether the district court properly certified the proposed negotiation class, Part I of Judge Moore’s opinion addresses the proper approach to interpreting and applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Part II provides an engaging history of Rule 23.

 

 

 

September 25, 2020 in Class Actions, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, MDLs, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, August 26, 2020

Higginbotham, Rosenthal & Gensler on the 12-person civil jury

Judge Patrick Higginbotham, Judge Lee Rosenthal, and Professor Steve Gensler have published Better by the Dozen: Bringing Back the Twelve-Person Civil Jury in the latest issue of Judicature. Their article begins:

A jury of 12 resonates through the centuries. Twelve-person juries were a fixture from at least the 14th century until the 1970s. Over 600 years of history is a powerful endorsement. So too are the many social-science studies consistently showing that a 12-person jury makes for a better deliberative process, with more predictable (and fewer outlier) results, by a more diverse group that is a more representative cross-section of the community. To that, add the benefit of engaging more citizens in the best civics lesson the judiciary offers. To all of that, add our common sense telling us that 12 heads are better than six, or eight, or even ten.

History. Social science. Civics. Common sense. That’s a powerful quartet. And yet, most federal judges today routinely seat civil juries without the full complement of 12 members. Why? Because in 1973 the United States Supreme Court said it was okay. Since then, the smaller-than-12-person jury has become a habit. For many courts, it has become the default.

 

 

August 26, 2020 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 10, 2020

Of Pleading Standards and Erie Guesses: Ninth Circuit Decision in Judd v. Weinstein

The Ninth Circuit recently issued its decision in Judd v. Weinstein. Judge Murguia’s opinion reverses the district court’s dismissal of Ashley Judd’s state-law sexual harassment claim against producer Harvey Weinstein.

In doing so, the court confronts an issue of “first impression under California law” and proceeds to “predict[] how the California Supreme Court would resolve it.” The court also finds that Judd’s complaint passes muster under Iqbal, despite Weinstein’s argument that she failed to adequately allege a professional relationship at the time of the alleged harassment:

Judd sufficiently alleged a “business, service, or professional relationship” at the time of the alleged harassment: Judd alleged that she established a professional relationship with Weinstein after working on the 1995 Miramax film Smoke, and went to the Peninsula Hotel in hopes of building upon that existing relationship to discuss future professional endeavors. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Moreover, Judd alleged that “at the time of the harassment, [she] was discussing potential roles in films produced or distributed by Weinstein or Miramax.” This is more than enough to allege a professional relationship at the time of the alleged harassment.

(H/T: Aaron Caplan)

 

 

 

August 10, 2020 in Current Affairs, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Twombly/Iqbal | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, August 4, 2020

Cabraser & Steinman on Class Action Objectors and the 2018 Amendments to Rule 23

Elizabeth Cabraser and I have posted on SSRN our recent article, What Is a Fair Price for Objector Blackmail? Class Actions, Objectors, and the 2018 Amendments to Rule 23, 24 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 549 (2020). Here’s the abstract:

As part of a symposium addressing what the next 50 years might hold for class actions, mass torts, and MDLs, this Article examines a recent amendment to Rule 23 that offers a new solution to the persistent problem of strategic objections. Most significantly, Rule 23 now requires the district judge to approve any payments made to class members in exchange for withdrawing or forgoing challenges to a class action settlement. Although the new provision is still in its infancy, it has already been deployed to thwart improper objector behavior and to bring for-pay objection practice out of the shadows. The 2018 changes — along with other on-the-ground developments — are important steps toward improving the class action settlement process.

Thanks once again to the Pound Civil Justice Institute, Lewis & Clark Law School, and Bob Klonoff for organizing a great symposium last fall.

 

 

 

August 4, 2020 in Class Actions, Conferences/Symposia, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 24, 2020

Second Circuit Decision on the Rules Enabling Act and State Anti-SLAPP Statutes

Last week, the Second Circuit issued its decision in La Liberte v. Reid. Judge Jacobs’ opinion addresses a thorny question that has divided the circuits—whether state anti-SLAPP statutes apply in federal court under the Erie doctrine/Rules Enabling Act framework. The specific state provision in this case is California’s “special motion to strike” procedure. Here are some highlights:

The test is whether “a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ‘answer[s] the same question’ as the [special motion to strike].” Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333 (alteration in original) (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398–99 (2010)). If so, the Federal Rule governs, unless it violates the Rules Enabling Act. Id. Applying that test, we first conclude that the special motion to strike in California’s anti-SLAPP statute answers the same question as Federal Rules 12 and 56.

* * *

Since Rules 12 and 56 answer the same question as California’s special motion to strike, they “govern in diversity cases in federal court, unless Rules 12 and 56 violate the Rules Enabling Act.” Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1336. “So far, the Supreme Court has rejected every challenge to the Federal Rules that it has considered under the Rules Enabling Act.” Id. Neither Reid nor amici curiae invite us to deviate. Still, we briefly address the question for the sake of completeness. The test is “whether a rule really regulates procedure,--the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). Like the Eleventh Circuit, “[w]e have little difficulty concluding” that Rules 12 and 56 “comply with the Rules Enabling Act,” particularly because they “‘affect[] only the process of enforcing litigants’ rights and not the rights themselves.’” Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1357 (second alteration in original) (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8, (1987)). Accordingly, federal courts must apply Rules 12 and 56 instead of California’s special motion to strike.

H/T: Howard Wasserman

 

 

July 24, 2020 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 1, 2020

Endo on Engstrom & Gelbach on Legal Tech and Civil Procedure

Today on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Seth Endo’s essay, Charting the Interactions of Legal Tech and Civil Procedure. Seth reviews David Engstrom and Jonah Gelbach’s article, Legal Tech, Civil Procedure, and the Future of Adversarialism, 169 U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020).

 

July 1, 2020 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, Web/Tech, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 29, 2020

SCOTUS Decision in June Medical Services: Standing, Standards of Review, and Stare Decisis

Today the Supreme Court issued its decision in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo. By a 5-4 vote, the Court strikes down Louisiana’s admitting-privileges law (Act 620) as imposing an undue burden on women seeking an abortion. The five-Justice majority comes from Justice Breyer’s opinion, which is joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, and Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion. Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh dissent—each of them authoring dissenting opinions.

In addition to the substantive constitutional issues regarding access to abortion, the case implicates some interesting civil procedure and federal courts issues: standing, standards of review, and stare decisis.

1. Standing

The standing issue is whether the plaintiffs, who were abortion providers and clinics, could challenge the Louisiana law as infringing their patients’ rights. Justice Breyer’s opinion concludes that Louisiana waived its standing argument:

The State’s argument rests on the rule that a party cannot ordinarily “‘rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U. S. 125, 129 (2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975)). This rule is “prudential.” 543 U. S., at 128–129. It does not involve the Constitution’s “case-or-controversy requirement.” Id., at 129; see Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 193 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 (1976). And so, we have explained, it can be forfeited or waived. See Craig, 429 U. S., at 193–194.

Louisiana had argued in the lower courts that “there was ‘no question that the physicians had standing to contest’ Act 620.” This was an “unmistakable concession,” according to Justice Breyer. He adds that “even if the State had merely forfeited its objection by failing to raise it at any point over the last five years, we would not now undo all that has come before on that basis.” He explains:

What we said some 45 years ago in Craig applies equally today: “[A] decision by us to forgo consideration of the constitutional merits”—after “the parties have sought or at least have never resisted an authoritative constitutional determination” in the courts below—“in order to await the initiation of a new challenge to the statute by injured third parties would be impermissibly to foster repetitive and time-consuming litigation under the guise of caution and prudence.” 429 U. S., at 193–194 (quotation altered).

Justice Breyer also questions whether Louisiana’s standing argument would be persuasive in any event, noting that “[w]e have long permitted abortion providers to invoke the rights of their actual or potential patients in challenges to abortion-related regulations.”

Chief Justice Roberts concurs in Justice Breyer’s standing analysis: “For the reasons the plurality explains, ante, at 11–16, I agree that the abortion providers in this case have standing to assert the constitutional rights of their patients.”

2. Standard of Appellate Review

Another procedural issue is the standard of appellate review regarding the district court’s findings. Justice Breyer’s opinion notes:

We start from the premise that a district court’s findings of fact, “whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a)(6). In “‘applying [this] standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo.’” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U. S. 100, 123 (1969)).

And the opinion concludes:

We conclude, in light of the record, that the District Court’s significant factual findings—both as to burdens and as to benefits—have ample evidentiary support. None is “clearly erroneous.” Given the facts found, we must also uphold the District Court’s related factual and legal determinations. These include its determination that Louisiana’s law poses a “substantial obstacle” to women seeking an abortion; its determination that the law offers no significant health-related benefits; and its determination that the law consequently imposes an “undue burden” on a woman’s constitutional right to choose to have an abortion. We also agree with its ultimate legal conclusion that, in light of these findings and our precedents, Act 620 violates the Constitution.

Chief Justice Roberts also emphasizes the deferential standard of review:

The question is not whether we would reach the same findings from the same record. These District Court findings “entail[ed] primarily . . . factual work” and therefore are “review[ed] only for clear error.” U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U. S. ___, ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 6, 9). Clear error review follows from a candid appraisal of the comparative advantages of trial courts and appellate courts.

3. Stare Decisis

And of course, the case presents important questions of stare decisis, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, which struck down Texas’s admitting privileges requirement. Stare decisis is key to Chief Justice Roberts’ tie-breaking fifth vote in favor of the plaintiffs: “I joined the dissent in Whole Woman’s Health and continue to believe that the case was wrongly decided. The question today however is not whether Whole Woman’s Health was right or wrong, but whether to adhere to it in deciding the present case.” Roberts concludes:

Stare decisis instructs us to treat like cases alike. The result in this case is controlled by our decision four years ago invalidating a nearly identical Texas law. The Louisiana law burdens women seeking previability abortions to the same extent as the Texas law, according to factual findings that are not clearly erroneous. For that reason, I concur in the judgment of the Court that the Louisiana law is unconstitutional.

 

 

June 29, 2020 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Standing, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 19, 2020

SCOTUS Decision on DACA

Yesterday the Supreme Court issued its decision in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of University of California. As folks are surely aware by now, the Court voted 5-4 to vacate the Trump administration’s rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program as “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

The case raised some interesting issues relating to civil procedure and federal courts that are worth flagging. The first is pleading. On the APA issue, Chief Justice Roberts authors the majority opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. But the plaintiffs had also argued that the rescission of DACA violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment because the rescission was motivated by discriminatory animus. In Part IV—which Justice Sotomayor did not join—Chief Justice Roberts finds that the plaintiffs’ allegations of animus were “insufficient.” He writes:

To plead animus, a plaintiff must raise a plausible inference that an “invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor” in the relevant decision. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977). Possible evidence includes disparate impact on a particular group, “[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence,” and “contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body.” Id., at 266–268. Tracking these factors, respondents allege that animus is evidenced by (1) the disparate impact of the rescission on Latinos from Mexico, who represent 78% of DACA recipients; (2) the unusual history behind the rescission; and (3) pre- and post-election statements by President Trump. Brief for New York 54–55.

None of these points, either singly or in concert, establishes a plausible equal protection claim.

Justice Sotomayor does not join this part of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion, and she writes a partial dissent on the equal protection issues. From her opinion:

Respondents’ equal protection challenges come to us in a preliminary posture. All that respondents needed to do at this stage of the litigation was state sufficient facts that would “allo[w a] court to draw the reasonable inference that [a] defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678 (2009). The three courts to evaluate respondents’ pleadings below held that they cleared this modest threshold. 908 F. 3d 476, 518–520 (CA9 2018) (affirming the District Court’s denial of the Government’s motion to dismiss); see also Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 274 (EDNY 2018).

I too would permit respondents’ claims to proceed on remand. The complaints each set forth particularized facts that plausibly allege discriminatory animus.

The Supreme Court’s handling of the equal protection claims raises another recurring chestnut for federal courts enthusiasts: the Marks rule and nonmajority opinions. The dissenting justices on the APA issue—Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh—write that they “concur in the judgment insofar as the Court rejects [the] equal protection claim.” It’s not clear, however, whether and how those votes can be added to the four-justice plurality on the plaintiffs’ pleading of their equal protection claims to generate a binding “majority” opinion on that issue. 

Finally, it’s worth noting that the Court avoided the recurring-yet-still-unaddressed question of nationwide injunctions (see, e.g., here). Footnote 7 of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion explains that, because the Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. federal court’s order vacating the Trump administration’s rescission of DACA, it was “unnecessary to examine the propriety of the nationwide scope of the injunctions” that had been issued by other federal courts.

 

 

June 19, 2020 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases, Twombly/Iqbal | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 12, 2020

Provenzano on Speech Act Theory and Pleading

Susan Provenzano has posted on SSRN a draft of her article, Can Speech Act Theory Save Notice Pleading?, which is forthcoming in the Indiana Law Journal. Here’s the abstract:

Countless scholars have debated—and lower courts have attempted to apply—the plausibility pleading regime that the Supreme Court introduced in Twombly and Iqbal. Iqbal took Twombly’s requirement that a complaint plead plausibly and turned it into a two-step test. Under that test, the life or death of a lawsuit rests on the distinction between “well-pleaded” and “conclusory” allegations. Only the former are assumed true on a motion to dismiss. Seven decades of pleading precedent had taken a sensible, if unstable, approach to the truth assumption, making a single cut between factual contentions (assumed true) and legal conclusions (ignored). But Iqbal redrew those lines. It treats as legal conclusions an entire subset of factual allegations and does so whenever, in the court’s view, those facts are presented too generally or too rhetorically. To date, the contours of “conclusory” have not been pinned down by legal-theoretic approaches, while lower court reactions range from conflicting to confused to avoidant. It is clearer than ever that Iqbal left an analytical void in the wake of its novel pleading inquiry—a void that must be filled in a stable way while recognizing the FRCP’s normative commitments.

That way is through speech act theory. Speech act theory is a philosophy of language that employs a descriptive methodology for understanding what speakers mean with their words. A speech act- theoretic approach targets Iqbal’s central flaws—failing to treat pleading as an act of communication, and ignoring how the pleader intends her allegations to function in the pleading conversation. Indeed, Iqbal makes the judge’s omniscient view of meaning the decisive factor. Furthermore, Iqbal conflates two types of speech acts whose difference was vital pre-Iqbal: allegations meant to report, which merit the truth assumption, and allegations meant to accuse, which do not. Speech act theory shores up pre-Iqbal instability and offers a consistent analytical approach for granting allegations the assumption of truth based on communicative meaning. Using speech act theory to set the parameters of “conclusory” also opens the doors of discovery to complaints that do their job as the FRCP intended: providing functional fair notice of the nature of the plaintiff’s claims and the grounds on which they rest.

 

June 12, 2020 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, Twombly/Iqbal | Permalink | Comments (0)