Monday, October 7, 2019

Interesting Second Circuit Decision on Section 1782 Discovery Applications

Today the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a unanimous decision in In re del Valle Ruiz. The case involves discovery applications under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which provides: “The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”

Judge Hall’s opinion, joined by Judges Parker and Droney, begins:

Banco Santander S.A. (“Santander”) acquired Banco Popular Español, S.A. (“BPE”) after a government‐forced sale. Petitioners, a group of Mexican nationals and two investment and asset‐management firms, initiated or sought to intervene in various foreign proceedings contesting the legality of the acquisition.

Petitioners then filed in the Southern District of New York two applications under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 seeking discovery from Santander and its New York‐based affiliate, Santander Investment Securities Inc. (“SIS”), concerning the financial status of BPE. The district court (Ramos, J.) denied the applications for the most part, concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Santander. The court granted discovery against SIS and in doing so rejected Santander’s argument that § 1782 does not allow for extraterritorial discovery. These consolidated appeals follow.

We are first asked to delineate the contours of § 1782’s requirement that a person or entity “resides or is found” within the district in which discovery is sought. We hold that this language extends § 1782’s reach to the limits of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process. We nonetheless conclude that Santander’s contacts with the Southern District of New York were insufficient to subject it to the district court’s personal jurisdiction.

We are next tasked with deciding whether § 1782 may be used to reach documents located outside of the United States. We hold that there is no per se bar to the extraterritorial application of § 1782, and the district court may exercise its discretion as to whether to allow such discovery. We conclude that the district court acted well within its discretion here in allowing discovery from SIS.

(emphasis added)

Download In re del Valle Ruiz (2d Cir)

 

 

October 7, 2019 in Discovery, Federal Courts | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, October 4, 2019

The Friday Before First Monday: SCOTUS Cert Grant in Louisiana Abortion Case Presents Questions About Standing

Today the Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari arising from a challenge to Louisiana’s abortion regulations. The cases are June Medical Services LLC v. Gee (18-1323), and Gee v. June Medical Services, LLC (18-1460).

The first petition asks whether the Louisiana law is unconstitutional, especially in light of the Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). The second petition is about standing, presenting the following questions:

1. Can abortion providers be presumed to have third-party standing to challenge health and safety regulations on behalf of their patients absent a “close” relationship with their patients and a “hindrance” to their patients’ ability to sue on their own behalf?

2. Are objections to prudential standing waivable (per the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits) or non-waivable (per the D.C., Second, and Sixth Circuits)?

You can follow the case at SCOTUSblog [18-1323 &  18-1460] or on the Supreme Court’s website [18-1323 & 18-1460].

 

 

 

 

 

 

October 4, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Standing, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 27, 2019

Sohoni on Article III and Universal Injunctions

Mila Sohoni has posted on SSRN a draft of her article, The Lost History of the 'Universal' Injunction, which is forthcoming in the Harvard Law Review. Here’s the abstract:

The issuance of injunctions that reach beyond just the plaintiffs has recently become the subject of a mounting wave of censorious commentary, including by members of Congress, a Supreme Court justice, the Solicitor General, the Attorney General, and the President. Critics of these “universal” injunctions have claimed that such injunctions are a recent invention and that they exceed the power conferred by Article III to decide cases “in … equity.” This Article rebuts the proposition that the universal injunction is a recent invention and that it violates Article III or the traditional limits of equity as practiced by the federal courts. As far back as 1913, the Supreme Court itself enjoined federal officers from enforcing a federal statute not just against the plaintiff, but against anyone, until the Court had decided the case. If the Supreme Court can issue a universal injunction against enforcement of a federal law, then — as an Article III matter — so can a lower federal court. Moreover, lower federal courts have been issuing injunctions that reach beyond the plaintiffs as to state laws in cases that date back more than a century, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly approved of these injunctions. If Article III allows such injunctions as to state laws, it also allows such injunctions as to federal laws. Mapping these and other pieces of the lost history of the universal injunction, this Article demonstrates that the Article III objection to the universal injunction should be retired, and that the unfolding efforts to outright strip the federal courts of the tool of the universal injunction — whether by statutory fiat or by a judicial re-definition of Article III — should halt.

 

 

 

September 27, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, September 16, 2019

Podcast Series Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the Wright & Miller Treatise

As covered earlier, Thomson Reuters is releasing a series of podcasts during 2019 to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure treatise.

The first three episodes have now been posted:

 

 

 

September 16, 2019 in Books, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 13, 2019

Second Circuit Revives Emoluments Lawsuit Against Trump

Today, the Second Circuit issued its decision in Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, a lawsuit against President Trump alleging violations of the Emoluments Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Judge Leval’s majority opinion begins:

Plaintiffs—Eric Goode, a restaurateur and hotelier, and Restaurant Opportunities Center United (“ROC”), a non‐partisan, member‐based  organization of restaurants and restaurant workers—appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.) dismissing their complaint against Defendant Donald J. Trump, the President of the United States, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for the President’s alleged violations of the Domestic and Foreign Emoluments Clauses of the United States Constitution. The President moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that Plaintiffs did not have standing to sue. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, they fall outside the zone of interests of the Emoluments Clauses, their claims do not present a ripe case or controversy within the meaning of Article III, and their suit is barred by the political question doctrine. For the reasons below, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 

Judge Walker authored a dissenting opinion.

 

 

 

September 13, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 12, 2019

SCOTUS stays injunction against Trump administration’s asylum restrictions

Yesterday evening, the Supreme Court granted a stay in Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant. (The Ninth Circuit’s earlier ruling in the case was covered here.)

The Supreme Court’s order stays the district court’s preliminary injunction against the Trump administration’s recent restrictions on asylum eligibility. The order states:

The district court’s July 24, 2019 order granting a preliminary injunction and September 9, 2019 order restoring the nationwide scope of the injunction are stayed in full pending disposition of the Government’s appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought.

Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg. She concludes:

In sum, granting a stay pending appeal should be an “extraordinary” act. Williams, 442 U. S., at 1311. Unfortunately, it appears the Government has treated this exceptional mechanism as a new normal. Historically, the Government has made this kind of request rarely; now it does so reflexively. See, e.g., Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming Nov. 2019). Not long ago, the Court resisted the shortcut the Government now invites. See Trump v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 586 U. S. ___ (2018). I regret that my colleagues have not exercised the same restraint here. I respectfully dissent.

 

 

September 12, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 26, 2019

Nelson on Standing, Remedial Rights, and Administrative Law

Caleb Nelson has published "Standing" and Remedial Rights in Administrative Law, 105 Va. L. Rev. 703 (2019). Here’s the abstract:

Modern doctrine about judicial review of administrative action traces back to Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp (1970). There, the Supreme Court announced a new test for deciding whether a plaintiff has “standing” to challenge the legality of an action taken by a federal agency. Judges were simply supposed to ask (1) “whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact” and (2) “whether the interest sought to be protected by the [plaintiff] is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee” that the challenged action allegedly violated.

Partly because of intervening scholarship, modern courts and commentators have translated Data Processing’s discussion of “standing” into the language of remedial rights (or “rights of action”). At least since the 1980s, Data Processing has been understood to hold that when a federal agency oversteps its authority, the Administrative Procedure Act normally confers remedial rights upon everyone who satisfies Data Processing’s test for “standing.” That is an exceptionally important aspect of modern administrative law. But it is mistaken—not just about the Administrative Procedure Act, but also about what Data Processing itself held. This Article shows that Data Processing’s concept of “standing” was only a preliminary screen, not the last word about whether plaintiffs have a claim for relief. The Supreme Court has never made a considered decision that when an agency is behaving unlawfully, the Administrative Procedure Act confers the same remedial rights upon plaintiffs whose interests are only “arguably” within a protected zone as upon plaintiffs whose interests are actually protected.

 

 

August 26, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, August 23, 2019

Burbank & Farhang on the Effects of Judicial Partisanship and Identity on Class Certification Decisions

Steve Burbank & Sean Farhang have posted on SSRN a draft of their article, Politics, Identity, and Class Certification on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Here’s the abstract:

This article draws on novel data and presents the results of the first empirical analysis of how potentially salient characteristics of Court of Appeals judges influence precedential lawmaking on class certification under Rule 23. We find that the partisan composition of the panel (measured by the party of the appointing president) has a very strong association with certification outcomes, with all-Democratic panels having more than double the certification rate of all-Republican panels in precedential cases. We also find that the presence of one African American on a panel, and the presence of two females (but not one), is associated with pro-certification outcomes. Contrary to conventional wisdom in the scholarship on diversity on the bench, such diversity may be consequential to lawmaking beyond policy areas conventionally thought to be of particular concern to women and racial minorities.

Class action doctrine is a form of trans-substantive procedural law that traverses many policy areas. The effects of gender and racial diversity on the bench, through making more precertification law, radiate widely across the legal landscape, influencing implementation of consumer, securities, labor and employment, antitrust, prisoner’s rights, public benefits, and many other areas of law. The results highlight how the consequences of diversity extend beyond conceptions of “women’s issues” or “minority issues.” The results also suggest the importance of exploring the effects of diversity on trans-substantive procedural law more generally.

Our findings on gender panel effects in particular are novel in the literature on panel effects and the literature on gender and judging. Past work focusing on substantive antidiscrimination law found that one woman can influence the votes of males in the majority (mirroring what we find with respect to African American judges in class certification decisions). These results allowed for optimism that the panel structure — which threatens to dilute the influence of underrepresented groups on the bench because they are infrequently in the panel majority — actually facilitates minority influence, whether through deliberation, cue taking, bargaining, or some other mechanism.

Our gender results are quite different and more normatively troubling. We observe that women have more pro-certification preferences based on outcomes when they are in the majority. However, panels with one female are not more likely to yield pro-certification outcomes. Female majority panels occur at sharply lower rates than women’s percentage of judgeships, and thus certification doctrine underrepresents their preferences relative to their share of judgeships.

Our suggestions regarding mechanisms that may help to explain these results are speculative and tentative. Recent scholarship on the gender gap in political discussions and decision-making illuminates some disquieting possibilities. If the dynamics identified by this research are at play, one possibility is that a female judge in the minority who vigorously advocates for a preferred outcome is less successful because, as a panel minority in a substantive domain that, unlike anti-discrimination law, does not elicit gender-based deference, she is regarded as less authoritative and influential. Another is that the reinforcement of a female majority increases her propensity to advocate preferences that differ systematically from those of her male colleagues in areas without obvious gender salience.

 

 

 

 

 

August 23, 2019 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, August 21, 2019

Parrillo on Negotiations over Federal Agency Compliance with Court Orders

Nicholas Parrillo has published Negotiating the Federal Government's Compliance with Court Orders: An Initial Exploration, 97 N.C. L. Rev. 899 (2019). Here’s the abstract:

Judicial review of federal agencies rests on the premise that if a court gives an order to an agency, the agency will obey. Yet the federal government’s compliance with court orders is far from automatic, especially with orders telling an agency to act affirmatively, which may strain limited agency resources, interfere with the agency’s other legally required tasks, or force the agency to act on deficient information. An agency may invoke these difficulties to convince a judge that it should be cut more slack—that is, given more latitude (especially more time) to comply. Judges often find the agency’s difficulties to be quite real and hold back from demanding strict and rapid compliance. Thus, whether an agency must actually do what a court has ordered, and on what terms, entails a delicate negotiation between agency, judge, and plaintiff. These compliance negotiations, despite their great practical importance, are little analyzed or understood in the academic literature, for it is difficult to learn about them through traditional sources like appellate case law. This Essay, drawing upon a large cache of dockets from district court cases in which compliance troubles arose, provides an initial exploration of this unexplored subject. This Essay finds that the central problem in these cases is the judge’s access (or lack of access) to information about why the agency is falling short and whether it could do more. On this theme, this Essay discusses (1) the kind of information that an agency can provide about its own internal management so as to convince the judge that it is trying hard enough to comply; (2) the imperfect and even crude methods that judges use to discern whether an agency is trying hard enough; and (3) the ways in which judges can employ information-gathering techniques, such as requiring testimony by high agency officials, as quasi sanctions to force the agency to pay more attention to what the court has ordered.

 

 

 

August 21, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, August 16, 2019

Ninth Circuit partially stays nationwide injunction against Trump administration's asylum restrictions

Today the Ninth Circuit issued a 2-1 decision in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr. The court partially grants and partially denies the government’s motion to stay a nationwide injunction issued by the district court against the Trump administration’s recent restrictions on asylum eligibility.

Because the government had not made a “strong showing” that it was “likely to succeed on the merits,” the court denies the motion for a stay “insofar as the injunction applies within the Ninth Circuit.”

However, the court grants the motion for a stay “insofar as the injunction applies outside the Ninth Circuit, because the nationwide scope of the injunction is not supported by the record as it stands.” On that point, the court states: “While this appeal proceeds, the district court retains jurisdiction to further develop the record in support of a preliminary injunction extending beyond the Ninth Circuit.”

The judges on the motions panel are Judge Wallace Tashima, Judge Milan Smith, and Judge Mark Bennett. Judge Tashima dissents in part—he would have denied the motion to stay in its entirety.

Download East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v Barr (8-16-2019)

 

 

August 16, 2019 in Current Affairs, Federal Courts, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Durling on Article III and the D.C. Court System

James Durling has published The District of Columbia and Article III, 107 Geo. L.J. 1205 (2019). Here’s the abstract:

Today, it is black-letter law that Congress may create non-Article III courts in the District of Columbia and staff them with judges who lack salary protection and life tenure. Forty-five years ago, the Supreme Court upheld the District’s non-Article III court system. And since that decision, judges and scholars alike have accepted that the District is an exception to Article III.

This Article challenges that consensus. It shows that, as a historical matter, Article III’s judicial protections were long believed to apply to the District. And it demonstrates that the various functional justifications for non-Article III adjudication do not apply to courts in the capital. In short, this Article demonstrates that the current D.C. court system likely violates Article III.

This conclusion should be significant in its own right, since the right to an Article III judge has long been viewed as an essential constitutional safeguard. Indeed, the modern history of the D.C. court system reveals the troubling influence of crime and race on Congress’s decision to create a non-Article III court system in the capital. But the historical research presented in this Article also has broader implications outside the seat of government. Most directly, it suggests a new limit on Congress’s power to create non-Article III tribunals on public lands.

 

 

 

August 16, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, August 14, 2019

Fallon on Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts

Richard Fallon has published Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 Calif. L. Rev. 933 (2019). Here’s the abstract:

The Supreme Court displays increasing hostility to constitutional tort claims. Although the Justices sometimes cast their stance as deferential to Congress, recent cases exhibit aggressive judicial lawmaking with respect to official immunity. Among the causes of turbulence in constitutional tort doctrine and the surrounding literature is a failure—not only among the Justices, but also among leading scholarly critics—to see interconnected problems in a sufficiently broad frame.

This Article refocuses analysis along four interconnected dimensions. First, it examines relevant constitutional history, centrally including that of the maxim “for every right, a remedy.” That maxim has exerted significant generative force, but it has also been widely misunderstood. Second, the Article reviews and critiques recent Supreme Court decisions involving constitutional tort claims, many of which reflect fallacious assumptions. Third, the Article addresses the question, What role would damages and injunctive remedies for constitutional violations play in a justly and prudently designed legal system unfettered by historical accidents and path dependence? Commentators almost invariably assume that any gap between constitutional rights and individually effective, make-whole remedies is inherently regrettable. This Article refutes that premise. Although an ideal regime would substitute entity liability for officer liability and afford broad opportunities for victims of constitutional violations to vindicate their rights, it would not always authorize recovery of money damages.

Finally, the Article considers reforms that the Supreme Court could effectuate in the absence of action by Congress. Among other proposals, it calls for expansion of municipal liability in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for reinvigoration of Bivens actions, but it defends the main outlines of qualified immunity doctrine against a spate of recent critics.

 

 

August 14, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, August 13, 2019

Alabama Attorney General Concedes that 2019 Abortion Law Should Be Partially Enjoined

This May, a lawsuit was filed challenging Alabama’s 2019 abortion law (House Bill 314). The case, Robinson v. Marshall, is pending before Judge Myron Thompson in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. (No. 2:19-cv-00365).

Last week, the Alabama Attorney General filed a response to the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. He concedes that the law must be—at least partially—enjoined. The Attorney General recognizes that the Alabama statute is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s case law, but he states that he will ask the Supreme Court to overrule those decisions. He writes: "For now, though, this Court is bound by Roe and Casey, and these cases require that Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction be granted with respect to the Act’s ban on pre-viability abortions."

This would seem to pave the way for the entry of a preliminary injunction against the Alabama statute, from which the Alabama Attorney General would appeal to the Eleventh Circuit and ultimately the Supreme Court.

Here is the Alabama Attorney General’s filing:

Here is the plaintiffs’ complaint and memorandum in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction:

Here is coverage from Abbey Crain at AL.com. and Kim Chandler at the AP.  

 

 

 

 

August 13, 2019 in Federal Courts, In the News | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 8, 2019

Interesting Ninth Circuit Decision on Article III Standing and Class Certification

Today the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a unanimous decision in Patel v. Facebook. The panel opinion by Judge Ikuta begins:

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Facebook subjected them to facial-recognition technology without complying with an Illinois statute intended to safeguard their privacy. Because a violation of the Illinois statute injures an individual’s concrete right to privacy, we reject Facebook’s claim that the plaintiffs have failed to allege a concrete injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III standing. Additionally, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class.

Download Patel v Facebook (9th Cir)

 

August 8, 2019 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Lammon on Qualified Immunity Appeals

Bryan Lammon has posted on SSRN a draft of his article, Blatant Contradictions in Qualified-Immunity Appeals. Here’s the abstract:

Courts hearing an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal normally have jurisdiction to address only whether the facts assumed by the district court make out a clear constitutional violation. They lack jurisdiction to look behind the district court’s assumed facts to see whether the evidence supports them. The Supreme Court created this limit on the scope of interlocutory review to reduce the burdens of qualified-immunity appeals. But the blatant-contradiction exception to this limit on the scope of review (which stems from the infamous Scott v. Harris) allows appellate courts to review the genuineness of a fact dispute when something in the record blatantly contradicts the district court’s assumed facts.

To assess the blatant-contradiction exception, I created an original dataset of cases invoking the exception in the 12 years after Scott. The data show that the exception is both profoundly unpragmatic and unnecessary. It is an unwieldy and inefficient method for determining appellate jurisdiction. And all of the time spent addressing supposedly blatant contradictions produces few (if any) benefits. Defendants frequently raise the exception and courts regularly reject it — courts unanimously found a blatant contradiction in only 15% of the cases that squarely addressed the matter. The blatant-contradiction exception nevertheless invites attempted appeals, fights over appellate jurisdiction, wasted merits briefing, and delayed district court proceedings.

Scott’s blatant-contradiction exception needs to go. A better practice is one modeled on a supervisory rule that the Third Circuit created (in an opinion written by then-Judge Alito): require district courts to state the facts they assume when denying qualified immunity at the summary-judgment stage, and limit qualified-immunity appeals to addressing only whether those facts make out a clear violation of federal law. The Supreme Court could adopt this rule in an appropriate case. Or the Rules Committee could get involved; the Committee can craft rules on interlocutory appeals. And if the Committee does decide to address qualified-immunity appeals, there are several other aspects of those appeals that are ripe for reform. This article is the first in a series tackling these issues, all written with an eye towards ultimately reforming the law of qualified-immunity appeals.

 

 

August 8, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, August 2, 2019

Arizona Invokes SCOTUS Original Jurisdiction in Suit Against Sackler Family Over Opioids

This week Arizona filed a bill of complaint (and a motion for leave to file that bill of complaint) in the Supreme Court.

Download Arizona-Motion-for-Leave-to-File-Bill-of-Complaint

The bill begins:

1.  Defendants Richard Sackler, Theresa Sackler, Kathe Sackler, Jonathan Sackler, Mortimer D.A. Sackler, Beverly Sackler, David Sackler, and Ilene Sackler Lefcourt (“the Sacklers”) for decades owned and controlled The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc., Purdue Pharma Inc. and Purdue Pharma, L.P. (collectively, “Purdue”). The Sacklers and Purdue have made billions of dollars off the promotion and sale of opioids, fueling a crisis with devastating effects in Arizona and the nation. The Sacklers and Purdue reaped profits through misleading marketing tactics that were barred by a 2007 consent judgment that Purdue entered into with the State of Arizona. The State is seeking civil penalties and other relief for violation of that consent judgment in a pending case before Pima County Superior Court. See Arizona ex rel. Brnovich v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., et al., No. C20072471 (Ariz. Super. Ct.).

2.  The State brings this action because it has evidence that the Sacklers, Purdue, and the other Defendants were parties in recent years to massive cash transfers—totaling billions of dollars— at a time when Purdue faced enormous exposure for its role in fueling the opioids crisis. These transfers threaten the ability of Purdue to satisfy any relief the State may obtain in its pending proceeding against Purdue. The State therefore brings this action to hold the Defendants accountable for their attempts to loot Purdue, and to ensure that the people of Arizona can obtain adequate relief for the devastation that the Sacklers and Purdue have wrought in this state.

The bill asserts jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3), which provides: “The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of . . . [a]ll actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State or against aliens.”

Here’s a NYT story from Adam Liptak: Arizona Files Novel Lawsuit in Supreme Court Over Opioid Crisis.

 

 

 

August 2, 2019 in Federal Courts, In the News, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 1, 2019

Blocking the Courthouse Door: Federal Civil Procedure Obstacles to Justice

The University of the Pacific Law Review has published a symposium issue entitled “Blocking the Courthouse Door: Federal Civil Procedure Obstacles to Justice,” which includes the following contributions:

Michael Vitiello, Due Process and the Myth of Sovereignty 

Donald Doernberg, The Supreme Court’s Cloaking Device: "[C]ongressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts" 

Richard Freer, Justice Black Was Right About International Shoe, But for the Wrong Reason 

Thomas Main, Over Passive-Aggressive Model of Civil Adjudication 

Linda Mullenix, Is the Arc of Procedure Bending Towards Injustice?  

 

 

August 1, 2019 in Conferences/Symposia, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 31, 2019

Smith on Litman on the collapse of constitutional remedies

Today on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Fred Smith’s essay, How Remedies Disappear. Fred reviews Leah Litman’s recent article, Remedial Convergence and Collapse, 106 Cal. L. Rev. 1477 (2018).

 

 

 

 

July 31, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Scholarship, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 30, 2019

Woolley on Personal Jurisdiction & the FRCPs

Patrick Woolley has published Rediscovering the Limited Role of the Federal Rules in Regulating Personal Jurisdiction, 56 Hous. L. Rev. 565 (2019). Here’s the abstract:

It is widely taken for granted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) may validly regulate whether a defendant is amenable to personal jurisdiction in federal court. But whether a person is subject to the authority of a court is a substantive matter outside the scope of rulemaking authorized by the Rules Enabling Act (REA). This fundamental principle was well understood when the Federal Rules were originally drafted. It has since been obscured by the failure of courts and commentators alike to place in historical context the 1938 version of Rule 4 and the Supreme Court’s 1946 decision validating that Rule.

The 1938 Rule reflected a paradigm shift in jurisdictional thinking that began to take hold just before the REA became law in 1934: the recognition when a defendant is otherwise amenable to jurisdiction in a federal district, requiring that notice through service of summons be given in the district itself is a formality that serves no substantive purpose. The 1938 Rule simply put aside that formality.

Almost forty years later, the Court intimated in dicta that a Federal Rule may regulate whether a person is amenable to jurisdiction. But casual dicta in a decision that did not even discuss the REA cannot override basic statutory limits on rulemaking. And in the absence of a federal statute that requires otherwise, the Rules of Decision Act generally demands that state law govern amenability to jurisdiction.

Recognizing that the REA does not authorize rules regulating amenability will have a real (albeit limited) effect on jurisdiction in federal court. To the extent that effect is undesirable, the remedy lies with Congress.

 

 

July 30, 2019 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, July 27, 2019

SCOTUS Stays District Court Injunction Against Trump’s Border Wall Funding Declaration

Last night the Supreme Court issued an order in Trump v. Sierra Club, staying an injunction issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California that blocked the Trump Administration from funding the construction of a border wall by declaring a national emergency under Section 8005 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act. The full text is here:

The application for stay presented to JUSTICE KAGAN and by her referred to the Court is granted. Among the reasons is that the Government has made a sufficient showing at this stage that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to obtain review of the Acting Secretary’s compliance with Section 8005. The District Court’s June 28, 2019 order granting a permanent injunction is stayed pending disposition of the Government’s appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate when the Court enters its judgment.

Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan would have denied the stay.

Justice Breyer dissented in part from the majority’s order, authoring an opinion that concludes:

I can therefore find no justification for granting the stay in full, as the majority does. I would grant the Government’s application to stay the injunction only to the extent that the injunction prevents the Government from finalizing the contracts or taking other preparatory administrative action, but leave it in place insofar as it precludes the Government from disbursing those funds or beginning construction. I accordingly would grant the stay in part and deny it in part.

 

 

 

 

 

July 27, 2019 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)