Wednesday, October 21, 2020

Alien Tort Statute lawsuit filed based on killing of Jamal Khashoggi

Cengiz v. Bin Salman was filed yesterday in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The suit is based on the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. The plaintiffs invoke, among other things, the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act.

Spencer Hsu and Kareem Fahim have this story in the Washington Post.

Here’s the full complaint:

Download Cengiz Complaint (D.D.C.)

 

 

 

 

October 21, 2020 in Federal Courts, In the News, International/Comparative Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 19, 2020

Interesting Issues in Today's SCOTUS Cert Grants

Today’s Supreme Court order list contained some high-profile grants of certiorari that include some interesting federal courts issues.

Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab involves a challenge to the Trump administration’s “Remain in Mexico” policy, which had been enjoined by lower federal courts. One of the four questions presented is “[w]hether the district court’s universal preliminary injunction is impermissibly overbroad.”

Trump v. Sierra Club involves the Trump administration’s diversion of Department of Defense (DoD) funds to build portions of a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border. The first question presented is whether the plaintiffs “have a cognizable cause of action to obtain review of the Acting Secretary’s compliance with Section 8005’s proviso in transferring funds internally between DoD appropriations accounts.”

Here's where you can check out the cert-stage briefing and follow the merits briefs as they come in:

SCOTUSblog:

Supreme Court website:

 

 

 

October 19, 2020 in Current Affairs, Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, October 16, 2020

SCOTUS Will Hear Census Case This November

Today the Supreme Court set oral argument in Trump v. New York for Monday, November 30. Here are the questions presented, which include a question on the lower court's authority to grant relief under Article III:

Congress has provided that, for purposes of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives, the President shall prepare “a statement showing the whole number of persons in each State * * * as ascertained under the * * * decennial census of the population.” 2 U.S.C. 2a(a). It has further provided that the Secretary of Commerce shall take the decennial census “in such form and content as he may determine,” 13 U.S.C. 141(a), and shall tabulate the results in a report to the President, 13 U.S.C. 141(b). The President has issued a Memorandum instructing the Secretary to include within that report information enabling the President to implement a policy decision to exclude illegal aliens from the base population number for apportionment “to the maximum extent feasible and consistent with the discretion delegated to the executive branch.” 85 Fed. Reg. 44,679, 44,680 (July 23, 2020). At the behest of plaintiffs urging that the exclusion of illegal aliens would unconstitutionally alter the apportionment and chill some persons from participating in the census, a three-judge district court declared the Memorandum unlawful and enjoined the Secretary from including the information in his report. The questions presented are:

(1) Whether the relief entered satisfies the requirements of Article III of the Constitution.

(2) Whether the Memorandum is a permissible exercise of the President’s discretion under the provisions of law governing congressional apportionment.

Here is the lower court's opinion. You can follow the merits briefs as they come in at SCOTUSblog and at the Supreme Court website.

 

 

October 16, 2020 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 5, 2020

October Term 2020 SCOTUS Arguments Begin Today (Remotely)

The Supreme Court begins oral argument by telephone conference this morning. If you want to listen in, here’s some information from the Supreme Court’s press release:

The Court will hear oral arguments by telephone conference on October 5, 6, 7, 13, and 14. In keeping with public health guidance in response to COVID-19, the Justices and counsel will all participate remotely. The oral arguments are scheduled to begin at 10 a.m. On days when more than one case will be heard, there will be a three minute pause before the second case begins.

The Court will provide a live audio feed of the arguments to ABC News (the network pool chair), the Associated Press, and C-SPAN, and they will in turn provide a simultaneous feed for the oral arguments to livestream on various media platforms for public access. * * *

The oral argument audio and a transcript of the oral arguments will be posted on the Court's website following oral argument each day.

Today’s arguments include Carney v. Adams, which presents some interesting standing and severability issues.

 

October 5, 2020 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Standing, State Courts, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, October 2, 2020

SCOTUS Cert Grant on Appellate Jurisdiction in Baltimore Climate Change Lawsuit

Today the Supreme Court granted certiorari in BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. (We covered earlier the Fourth Circuit’s decision from last March.)

The question presented involves the permissible scope of an appellate court’s review of a district court’s order remanding a case to state court. From the cert. petition:

Section 1447(d) of Title 28 of the United States Code generally precludes appellate review of an order remanding a removed case to state court. But Section 1447(d) expressly provides that an “order remanding a case * * * removed pursuant to” the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, or the civil-rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443, “shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” Some courts of appeals have interpreted Section 1447(d) to permit appellate review of any issue encompassed in a district court’s remand order where the removing defendant premised removal in part on the federal-officer or civil-rights removal statutes; other courts of appeals, including the Fourth Circuit in this case, have held that appellate review is limited to the federal-officer or civil-rights ground for removal. The question presented is as follows:

Whether 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) permits a court of appeals to review any issue encompassed in a district court’s order remanding a removed case to state court where the removing defendant premised removal in part on the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, or the civil-rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443.

You can find all the cert-stage briefing—and follow the merits briefs as they come in—at SCOTUSblog and at the Supreme Court website.

 

 

October 2, 2020 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 29, 2020

Steinman on Appellate Courts and Civil Juries

I posted on SSRN a draft of my article, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries. Here’s the abstract:

In federal civil litigation, decisionmaking power is shared by juries, trial courts, and appellate courts. This article examines an unresolved tension in the different doctrines that allocate authority among these institutions, which has led to confusion regarding the relationship between appellate courts and civil juries. At base, the current uncertainty stems from a longstanding lack of clarity regarding the distinction between matters of law and matters of fact. The high-stakes Oracle-Google litigation—which is now before the Supreme Court—exemplifies this. In that case, the Federal Circuit reasoned that an appellate court may assert de novo review over a jury's verdict simply by characterizing a particular issue as legal rather than factual. But this approach misperceives the approach demanded by Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits judicial override of a jury's verdict only when "a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis" to reach such a verdict.

Rule 50's reasonable-jury standard does not permit de novo review of a jury's verdict on a particular issue. Rather, it requires deference to the jury's conclusion on that issue unless the reviewing court can explain why principles of substantive law or other aspects of the trial record render that verdict unreasonable. This deferential standard of review faithfully implements the text and structure of the Federal Rules and respects the jury's role in our federal system. Yet it also preserves appellate courts' ability to provide meaningful clarification that will guide future decisionmakers.

As the abstract indicates, the Supreme Court may be wrestling with this issue this coming Term in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., which is scheduled for oral argument (telephonically) next Wednesday.

Thanks to the Southeastern Association of Law Schools for letting me present an earlier draft of this paper back in July at the SEALS 2020 Annual Conference Federal Courts and Procedure Panel. I got a lot of great feedback.  

 

 

 

September 29, 2020 in Conferences/Symposia, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 18, 2020

Trump Files Cert Petition in Emoluments Case

Last week, Donald Trump filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in In re Trump. That case arises from a lawsuit filed in Maryland federal court alleging violations of the Emoluments Clauses. As covered earlier, the Fourth Circuit ultimately allowed the lawsuit to proceed, refusing to grant Trump a writ of mandamus directing the district court to dismiss the case.

The pending Supreme Court case is captioned Trump v. District of Columbia, and the questions are focused on appellate jurisdiction:

  1. Whether a writ of mandamus is appropriate because, contrary to the holding of the court of appeals, the district court’s denial of the President’s motion to dismiss was clear and indisputable legal error.
  1. Whether a writ of mandamus is appropriate, contrary to the holding of the court of appeals, where the district court’s refusal to grant the President’s motion to certify an interlocutory appeal was a clear abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b).

You can follow the Supreme Court filings at the Court’s website or at SCOTUSblog.

If folks are interested, I talk about some of these issues in a recent article Appellate Jurisdiction and the Emoluments Litigation, which was part of the Akron Law Review’s recent symposium on federal appellate procedure.

 

 

 

September 18, 2020 in Federal Courts, In the News, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 9, 2020

Interesting 11th Circuit Decision on Qualified Immunity

Last week the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision in Cantu v. City of Dothan, reversing the district court’s grant of qualified immunity. Judge Ed Carnes’ opinion for the panel begins with a quote from Rick Bragg’s The Prince of Frog Town:

When Rick Bragg wrote about “a gothic story” in which “you can see the bad luck tumbling, as if the devil himself had shaved the dice,” he was talking about his father’s tragic life, but those words could also describe Robert Earl Lawrence’s effort to help a stray dog he found in a Walmart parking lot.

The introductory paragraphs describe the events that would lead to Lawrence’s death:

When the backup officer arrived at the shelter parking lot, still more words were exchanged. That officer told Lawrence that if he didn’t stop talking he was going to jail. Lawrence didn’t stop talking and the backup officer, with the assistance of the other two officers on the scene, attempted to arrest and handcuff him. Lawrence would not submit and resisted –– not aggressively, but vigorously. He refused to put his hands behind his back as ordered, he struggled, and twice he temporarily freed himself from an officer’s grip and ran around the car trying to get away, but officers caught up with him. In the last moments of the encounter, while trying to get free from three officers again, he put his hand either on an officer’s taser, or on the officer’s wrist or hand that was holding the taser. In response, an officer pulled her service weapon and without warning, and to the surprise of the other two officers, shot Lawrence while he was being held. He was taken to a hospital where he died from the gunshot wound.

The district court granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to the officer who shot Lawrence. But the panel unanimously reverses and remands for further proceedings:

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], a reasonable jury could find that Woodruff violated Lawrence’s clearly established constitutional rights by shooting him. As a result, Woodruff is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity or based on state agent immunity.

 

 

September 9, 2020 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 3, 2020

Freer on Diversity Jurisdiction

Rich Freer has posted on SSRN a draft of his article, The Political Reality of Diversity Jurisdiction, which is forthcoming in the Southern California Law Review. Here’s the abstract:

Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction has been a staple of federal civil dockets since 1789. In the mid- to late-twentieth century, academics and some high-profile federal judges led a significant effort to abolish diversity jurisdiction. They were confident that diversity had outlived its purpose, which, they said, was to provide a federal court for out-of-state litigants who feared bias in the local state courts.

But diversity survived. Today, it represents a burgeoning percentage of the federal civil docket and is supported by an efficiency rationale that did not exist at the founding. Academics and judges seem relatively ambivalent toward, and even accepting of, this form of federal jurisdiction. We are in the midst of a resurgence of academic interest in diversity – not to abolish it, but to rationalize the various threads of its doctrine.

These efforts should be informed by the lessons that should have been learned by those who sought to abolish diversity jurisdiction. First, diversity is not a free-standing phenomenon. It is part of a carefully constructed constitutional plan intended to promote the free flow of commerce and a national identity. Second, what is usually presented as the traditional justification for diversity is sclerotic and understates the value of diversity jurisdiction. Third, as a matter of political power, the bar embraces diversity jurisdiction and will fight to keep it. At one level, we retain diversity for raw political reason. But the bar’s embrace is important for another reason: it likely manifests rational choices made in the interests of litigation clients. At least, the embrace should spur meaningful study of the interests served by diversity jurisdiction (study that remains to be done). And that study must appreciate that, over two centuries, an elaborate legal culture has emerged concerning the relations of state and federal courts.

September 3, 2020 in Federal Courts, Recent Scholarship, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 31, 2020

En Banc DC Circuit Denies Mandamus in Flynn Case

We covered earlier the D.C. Circuit’s grant of a writ of mandamus in In re Flynn, which involves the federal government’s Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss the criminal charges against Michael Flynn. Today the en banc D.C. Circuit reversed course, denying Flynn’s request for a writ of mandamus by an 8-2 vote.

From the court’s per curiam opinion:

As to Petitioner’s first two requests—to compel the immediate grant of the Government’s motion, and to vacate the District Court’s appointment of amicus—Petitioner has not established that he has “no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)). We also decline to mandate that the case be reassigned to a different district judge, because Petitioner has not established a clear and indisputable right to reassignment. See id. at 381. We therefore deny the Petition.

 

 

August 31, 2020 in Federal Courts, In the News, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, August 28, 2020

Second Circuit En Banc Decision on Standing in the SDNY Trump Emoluments Suit

Last week the Second Circuit denied President Trump’s petition for en banc rehearing in CREW v. Trump. This left in place the panel decision (953 F.3d 178) reversing the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing.

Here’s a link to the en banc ruling, which features several separate opinions and statements:

José A. Cabranes, Circuit Judge, dissents by opinion from the denial of rehearing en banc.

Steven J. Menashi, Circuit Judge, joined by Debra Ann Livingston and Richard J. Sullivan, Circuit Judges, dissents by opinion from the denial of rehearing en banc.

John M. Walker, Jr., Circuit Judge, filed a statement with respect to the denial of rehearing en banc.

Pierre N. Leval, Circuit Judge, filed a statement with respect to the denial of rehearing en banc.

 

 

August 28, 2020 in Federal Courts, Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, August 26, 2020

Higginbotham, Rosenthal & Gensler on the 12-person civil jury

Judge Patrick Higginbotham, Judge Lee Rosenthal, and Professor Steve Gensler have published Better by the Dozen: Bringing Back the Twelve-Person Civil Jury in the latest issue of Judicature. Their article begins:

A jury of 12 resonates through the centuries. Twelve-person juries were a fixture from at least the 14th century until the 1970s. Over 600 years of history is a powerful endorsement. So too are the many social-science studies consistently showing that a 12-person jury makes for a better deliberative process, with more predictable (and fewer outlier) results, by a more diverse group that is a more representative cross-section of the community. To that, add the benefit of engaging more citizens in the best civics lesson the judiciary offers. To all of that, add our common sense telling us that 12 heads are better than six, or eight, or even ten.

History. Social science. Civics. Common sense. That’s a powerful quartet. And yet, most federal judges today routinely seat civil juries without the full complement of 12 members. Why? Because in 1973 the United States Supreme Court said it was okay. Since then, the smaller-than-12-person jury has become a habit. For many courts, it has become the default.

 

 

August 26, 2020 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 17, 2020

Federal Circuit Ruling on PACER Fees

Earlier this month, the Federal Circuit issued its decision in National Veterans Legal Services Program v. United States. Judge Hughes’ opinion begins in the style of Goldilocks:

These interlocutory cross-appeals challenge the district court’s interpretation of a statutory note to 28 U.S.C. § 1913 permitting the federal judiciary to charge “reasonable fees” for “access to information available through automatic data processing equipment.” Plaintiffs contend that under this provision unlawfully excessive fees have been charged for accessing federal court records through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system and that the district court identifies too little unlawful excess. The government argues that the district court identifies too much (and also that the district court lacked jurisdiction). We conclude that the district court got it just right. We therefore affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Here’s coverage from Debra Cassens Weiss (ABA Journal).

(H/T Roger Baron)

 

 

August 17, 2020 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 10, 2020

Of Pleading Standards and Erie Guesses: Ninth Circuit Decision in Judd v. Weinstein

The Ninth Circuit recently issued its decision in Judd v. Weinstein. Judge Murguia’s opinion reverses the district court’s dismissal of Ashley Judd’s state-law sexual harassment claim against producer Harvey Weinstein.

In doing so, the court confronts an issue of “first impression under California law” and proceeds to “predict[] how the California Supreme Court would resolve it.” The court also finds that Judd’s complaint passes muster under Iqbal, despite Weinstein’s argument that she failed to adequately allege a professional relationship at the time of the alleged harassment:

Judd sufficiently alleged a “business, service, or professional relationship” at the time of the alleged harassment: Judd alleged that she established a professional relationship with Weinstein after working on the 1995 Miramax film Smoke, and went to the Peninsula Hotel in hopes of building upon that existing relationship to discuss future professional endeavors. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Moreover, Judd alleged that “at the time of the harassment, [she] was discussing potential roles in films produced or distributed by Weinstein or Miramax.” This is more than enough to allege a professional relationship at the time of the alleged harassment.

(H/T: Aaron Caplan)

 

 

 

August 10, 2020 in Current Affairs, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Twombly/Iqbal | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 24, 2020

Second Circuit Decision on the Rules Enabling Act and State Anti-SLAPP Statutes

Last week, the Second Circuit issued its decision in La Liberte v. Reid. Judge Jacobs’ opinion addresses a thorny question that has divided the circuits—whether state anti-SLAPP statutes apply in federal court under the Erie doctrine/Rules Enabling Act framework. The specific state provision in this case is California’s “special motion to strike” procedure. Here are some highlights:

The test is whether “a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ‘answer[s] the same question’ as the [special motion to strike].” Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333 (alteration in original) (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398–99 (2010)). If so, the Federal Rule governs, unless it violates the Rules Enabling Act. Id. Applying that test, we first conclude that the special motion to strike in California’s anti-SLAPP statute answers the same question as Federal Rules 12 and 56.

* * *

Since Rules 12 and 56 answer the same question as California’s special motion to strike, they “govern in diversity cases in federal court, unless Rules 12 and 56 violate the Rules Enabling Act.” Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1336. “So far, the Supreme Court has rejected every challenge to the Federal Rules that it has considered under the Rules Enabling Act.” Id. Neither Reid nor amici curiae invite us to deviate. Still, we briefly address the question for the sake of completeness. The test is “whether a rule really regulates procedure,--the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). Like the Eleventh Circuit, “[w]e have little difficulty concluding” that Rules 12 and 56 “comply with the Rules Enabling Act,” particularly because they “‘affect[] only the process of enforcing litigants’ rights and not the rights themselves.’” Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1357 (second alteration in original) (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8, (1987)). Accordingly, federal courts must apply Rules 12 and 56 instead of California’s special motion to strike.

H/T: Howard Wasserman

 

 

July 24, 2020 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 21, 2020

First Circuit Finds Amazon's Arbitration Provision Unenforceable in Class Action by Last-Mile Drivers

On Friday, the First Circuit issued its decision in Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc. Judge Lipez’s decision begins:

This putative class action requires us to decide whether employment contracts of certain delivery workers -- those locally transporting goods on the last legs of interstate journeys -- are covered by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA" or the "Act"), given its exemption for "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. * * * After close examination of the text and purpose of the statute and the relevant precedent, we now hold that the exemption encompasses the contracts of transportation workers who transport goods or people within the flow of interstate commerce, not simply those who physically cross state lines in the course of their work.

Plaintiff-appellee Bernard Waithaka, a so-called "last mile" delivery driver for [Amazon] falls within this category of transportation workers whose contracts are exempt from the FAA. Hence, we conclude that the FAA does not govern the enforceability of the mandatory arbitration provision of his employment agreement with appellants. Because that provision prohibits proceeding on a class basis, either in the arbitral or judicial forum, we also agree with the district court that the arbitration provision is unenforceable under state law.

 

 

July 21, 2020 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 10, 2020

AALS Federal Courts Section: Calls for Nominations

Below are two announcements from the AALS Section on Federal Courts:

AALS Federal Courts Section - Daniel J. Meltzer Award: Call for Nominations

The AALS Section on Federal Courts is pleased to announce that it is seeking nominations for the Daniel J. Meltzer Award, which is designed to honor the life and work of the late Professor Meltzer.  The Award recognizes a professor of Federal Courts who has exemplified over the course of their career Professor Meltzer’s excellence in teaching, careful and ground-breaking scholarship, engagement in issues of public importance, generosity as a colleague, and overall contribution to the field of Federal Courts. 

Eligible nominees are those who are full-time faculty members at AALS member or affiliate schools, have not previously won the award, and have not served as an officer of the Federal Courts Section in the two previous years.  It is not required that the award be given out in any particular year, and it may not be given out more frequently than every three years. 

Nominations (and questions about the award) should be directed to Prof. Seth Davis at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law (sethdavis@berkeley.edu). Without exception, all nominations must be received by 11:59 p.m. (EDT) on September 15, 2020.  Nominations will be reviewed by a prize committee consisting of Professors Seth Davis (Berkeley), Gillian Metzger (Columbia), James Pfander (Northwestern), and Carlos Vázquez (Georgetown).  If the committee decides to make the award, it will be announced at the Federal Courts section program at the 2021 AALS Annual Meeting.

AALS Federal Courts Section - Best Untenured Article on Federal Jurisdiction: Call for Nominations

The AALS Section on Federal Courts is pleased to announce the annual award for the best article on the law of federal jurisdiction by a full-time, untenured faculty member at an AALS member or affiliate school—and to solicit nominations (including self-nominations) for the prize to be awarded at the 2021 AALS Annual Meeting.

The purpose of the award program is to recognize outstanding scholarship in the field of federal courts by untenured faculty members. To that end, eligible articles are those specifically in the field of Federal Courts that were published by a recognized journal during the twelve-month period ending on September 1, 2020 (date of actual publication determines eligibility). Eligible authors are those who, at the close of nominations (i.e., as of September 15, 2020), are untenured, full-time faculty members at AALS member or affiliate schools, and have not previously won the award.

Nominations (and questions about the award) should be directed to Prof. Seth Davis at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law (sethdavis@berkeley.edu). Without exception, all nominations must be received by 11:59 p.m. (EDT) on September 15, 2020. Nominations will be reviewed by a prize committee comprised of Professors Samuel Bray (Notre Dame), Seth Davis (Berkeley), Allison Orr Larsen (William & Mary), Marin Levy (Duke), and Leah Litman (Michigan), with the result announced at the Federal Courts section program at the 2021 AALS Annual Meeting.

 

 

July 10, 2020 in Conferences/Symposia, Federal Courts | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, July 9, 2020

Interesting End of Term Cert Grants

This morning featured some important decisions from the Supreme Court, but everyone knows the real action is at the after party. Here are some interesting grants of certiorari from this afternoon’s order list:

AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC and FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC involve the extent to which § 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act’s authorization for district courts to issue an “injunction” permits monetary relief such as restitution or the return of unlawfully obtained funds.

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski presents the question “whether a government’s post-filing change of an unconstitutional policy moots nominal-damages claims that vindicate the government’s past, completed violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional right.”

Here’s where to go if you want to find the cert-stage briefing and follow the merits briefs as they come in:

AMG Capital Management: Supreme Court website; SCOTUSblog
Credit Bureau Center: Supreme Court website; SCOTUSblog
Uzuegbunam: Supreme Court website; SCOTUSblog

 

 

July 9, 2020 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 6, 2020

SCOTUS Decision on Severability: Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants

Today the Supreme Court issued its decision in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., holding that the government-debt exception to the TCPA’s prohibition on robocalls to cell phones violated the First Amendment. The Court was sharply divided, as the breakdown indicates:

KAVANAUGH, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, J., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Parts I and II. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG and KAGAN, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Part II.

The lack of a majority opinion will surely be of interest to Marks-rule enthusiasts. Readers may also be interested in the Justices’ severability analysis. Seven Justices (Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan & Kavanaugh) conclude that the unconstitutional government-debt exception is severable from the rest of the TCPA. Gorsuch’s opinion, joined by Thomas, disagrees: “Respectfully, if this is what modern ‘severability doctrine’ has become, it seems to me all the more reason to reconsider our course.”

 

 

July 6, 2020 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Erbsen on Erie

Allan Erbsen has posted on SSRN a draft of his article, A Unified Approach to Erie Analysis for Federal Statutes, Rules, and Common Law, 10 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020). Here’s the abstract:

This Article proposes overhauling the Supreme Court’s approach to choice of law under Erie and Hanna. It develops three primary points.

First, Hanna’s “unguided” “twin aims” of Erie test for resolving conflicts between federal common law and state law is irredeemably flawed. The test is a canon of interpretation masquerading as a choice-of-law rule and fails at both tasks. The Hanna approach:

(1) relies on an arbitrary distinction between federal common law and statutory law that elides the indeterminate boundary between lawmaking and interpretation;

(2) fails to directly confront questions about federal common law’s validity and scope;

(3) cannot rely on the oft-cited but inapposite Rules of Decision Act; and

(4) ignores the judiciary’s authority to fill gaps in procedural codes with federal common law.

This Article is also the first to extensively explore how FRCP 83’s authorization of gap-filling undermines Hanna’s approach to choice of law.

Second, preemption doctrine implementing the Supremacy Clause should fill the choice-of-law role that courts mistakenly assign to Hanna. Under the Supremacy Clause, valid federal law — including federal common law — preempts state law on matters within the federal law’s scope. The “unguided” Hanna inquiry is misguided because it invents a distracting alternative to preemption analysis.

Third, reframing choice of law in terms of preemption spotlights policy questions that courts applying Hanna overlook. Preemption can occur only when a particular federal law is a valid exercise of federal lawmaking power and encompasses a disputed issue. Courts considering whether to apply federal law — including federal common law — must therefore assess the federal law’s validity and breadth. Relevant questions include:

(1) whether the federal government has authority to create law covering the issue;

(2) if so, which federal institutions — Congress or the judiciary — can create law; and

(3) whether federal courts should interpret the ensuing federal law broadly or narrowly to embrace or avoid conflict with state law.

These sensitive policy questions would benefit from direct attention and should not be blurred with Hanna’s tangents.

This approach would make choice of law analysis more coherent, enhance understanding of federal common law, and require courts to directly engage the federalism and separation of powers concerns at Erie’s core.

July 6, 2020 in Federal Courts, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)