Monday, December 9, 2019
We covered earlier the State of Arizona’s Bill of Complaint against the Sackler family and related entities arising from the opioid crisis. Arizona filed the bill in the U.S. Supreme Court this summer, invoking the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3).
Today’s Supreme Court order list contains a one-line denial of Arizona’s motion for leave to file the bill of complaint.
Friday, August 16, 2019
Ninth Circuit partially stays nationwide injunction against Trump administration's asylum restrictions
Today the Ninth Circuit issued a 2-1 decision in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr. The court partially grants and partially denies the government’s motion to stay a nationwide injunction issued by the district court against the Trump administration’s recent restrictions on asylum eligibility.
Because the government had not made a “strong showing” that it was “likely to succeed on the merits,” the court denies the motion for a stay “insofar as the injunction applies within the Ninth Circuit.”
However, the court grants the motion for a stay “insofar as the injunction applies outside the Ninth Circuit, because the nationwide scope of the injunction is not supported by the record as it stands.” On that point, the court states: “While this appeal proceeds, the district court retains jurisdiction to further develop the record in support of a preliminary injunction extending beyond the Ninth Circuit.”
The judges on the motions panel are Judge Wallace Tashima, Judge Milan Smith, and Judge Mark Bennett. Judge Tashima dissents in part—he would have denied the motion to stay in its entirety.
Tuesday, April 23, 2019
Coleman on Law Clerks for Workplace Accountability’s Public Comment on Proposed Changes to the Judicial Conduct Code & Rules
Today on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Brooke Coleman’s essay, Accountability Requires Tenacity. Brooke reviews Law Clerks for Workplace Accountability, Public Comment on The Judicial Conference of the United States’ Proposed Changes to the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges and Judicial Conduct & Disability Rules.
Saturday, December 1, 2018
Friday, September 14, 2018
Here is a quick summary:
- H.R. 3487. This bill’s purpose is to “amend section 1332 of title 28, United States Code, to provide that the requirement for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is met if any one party to the case is diverse in citizenship from any one adverse party in the case.”
Here is the text of the bill.
H.R. 3487 was not reported, apparently because no reporting quorum was present. (See 3:54:25 here.)
- H.R. 6730, the “Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2018.” This bill’s purpose is to “amend title 28, United States Code, to prohibit the issuance of national injunctions, and for other purposes.”
Here is the text of the bill.
H.R. 6730 was ordered to be reported during the hearing.
- H.R. 6754, the “CIRCUIT Act of 2018” or the “Court Imbalance Restructure Concerning Updates to Impacted Tribunals Act of 2018.” This bill’s purpose is to “amend title 28, United States Code, to modify the structure of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and for other purposes.”
Here is the text of the bill.
H.R. 6754 was ordered to be reported during the hearing.
- H.R. 6755, the “Judiciary Reforms, Organization and Operational Modernization Act of 2018” or the “Judiciary ROOM Act of 2018.” This bill’s purpose is to “provide for additional Article III judges, to modernize the administration of justice, and for other purposes.”
Here is the text of the bill.
H.R. 6755 was ordered to be reported during the hearing.
Tuesday, August 7, 2018
Here's an announcement for a program that will be co-sponsored by the AALS Section on Civil Procedure at the 2019 AALS Annual Meeting:
AALS 2019 Program Summary: “Court Debt”: Fines, Fees, and Bail, Circa 2020
This symposium, co-sponsored by the Sections on Civil Procedure, Tax, Bankruptcy, and Criminal Justice, examines how courts are financed and the growing reliance on user fees, whether for filing or defending civil cases; charges imposed on criminal defendants such as “registration fees” for “free” lawyers; the imposition of both civil and criminal “fines”; and the use of money bail. We explore whether and how constitutional democracies can meet their obligations to make justice accessible, both to participants and to the public, in light of the numbers seeking help from courts, high arrest and detention rates, declining government budgets, and shifting ideologies about the utility and desirability of accessible courts. These topics have prompted the creation of national and state task forces; litigation (including challenges to detention of individuals eligible for release but lacking funds to secure bail bonds, and the automatic losses of drivers’ licenses for nonpayment of fines); and a mix of economic, political, and legal analyses probing the effects of “court debt.”
Session one: Understanding the dimensions and the Legal Critiques
Moderator/introduction: Judith Resnik, Yale Law School
Brandon Buskey, Staff Attorney, ACLU Criminal Law Reform Project, NYC
Abbye Atkinson, Berkeley
Beth Colgan, UCLA
Crystal Yang, Harvard Law School
Cortney Lollar, Kentucky
Lisa Foster and Johanna Weiss, co-directors of the Fines and Fees Justice Center
Session two: Remedies: from Bankruptcy to Abolition and from Courts to Legislatures
Introduction/moderator David Marcus, UCLA
Pamela Foohey, Indiana University Maurer School of Law
Alex Karakatsanis, Founder and Executive Director, Civil Justice Corps
Jeff Selbin, Berkeley
Gloria Gong, Director of Research and Innovation, Government Performance Lab, Harvard Kennedy School
Maureen O’Connor, Supreme Court Ohio and Chair of the National Center for State Courts on Task Force on Fines and Fees
For those interested in reading cases and commentary in advance, a 2018 volume, Who Pays? Fines, Fees, Bail, and The Costs of Courts, is available at https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/liman/document/liman_colloquium_book_04.20.18.pdf. Many other articles are available and, in advance of the symposium, we plan to provide a bibliography with additional readings. An edited set of essays will be published after the symposium in the North Carolina Law Review.
Thursday, June 7, 2018
Rorie Spill Solberg (Oregon State Univ., Department of Political Science, School of Public Policy) and Jennifer Segal Diascro (University of California Washington Program (UCDC)) have published an article entitled "A Retrospective on Obama's Judges: Diversity, Intersectionality, and Symbolic Representation" in the Journal of Politics, Groups, and Identities. Here's the abstract:
"Despite abundant attention to the judicial selection of U.S. Supreme Court justices, most federal legal disputes are resolved in the lower federal courts. Who the judges are and how they make their decisions matters enormously in a democracy that values the fair and equitable treatment of its citizens under the rule of law. Our focus in this study is on the demographic diversity of President Obama’s appointments to the lower federal bench. It is clear from the various methods of examining the numbers that Obama valued diversity – perhaps more so than any previous president. When we examine all lower courts in the aggregate, and then district and circuit courts separately, the total number of successful nominees, the replacement patterns for departing judges, and comparisons between active and senior status judges, we see a concerted and largely successful effort to increase symbolic representation on the federal judiciary. Under different political circumstances, the data would lead us to consider novel complexities in diversifying the federal bench in the next several years. But a Trump presidency and its expected focus on ideology over diversity is likely to lead the study of judicial selection in a different direction, at least for the time being."
Friday, June 1, 2018
Margaret Hagan (Stanford Design Lab) has posted an article entitled "A Human-Centered Design Approach to Access to Justice: Generating New Prototypes and Hypotheses for Innovation to Make Courts User-Friendly." Here's the abstract:
"How can the court system be made more navigable and comprehensible to unrepresented laypeople trying to use it to solve their family, housing, debt, employment, or other life problems? This Article chronicles human-centered design work to generate solutions to this fundamental challenge of access to justice. It presents a new methodology: human-centered design research that can identify key opportunity areas for interventions, user requirements for interventions, and a shortlist of vetted ideas for interventions. This research presents both the methodology and these “design deliverables” based on work with California state courts’ Self Help Centers. It identifies seven key areas for courts to improve their usability, and, in each area, proposes a range of new interventions that emerged from the class’s design work. This research lays the groundwork for pilots and randomized control trials, with its proposed hypotheses and prototypes for new interventions, that can be piloted, evaluated, and—ideally—have a practical effect on how comprehensible, navigable, and efficient the civil court system is."
Monday, April 23, 2018
Today a panel of the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Naruto v. Slater (the Monkey Selfie case), covered earlier here. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) brought suit as the next friend of Naruto, who “was a seven-year-old crested macaque that lived—and may still live—in a reserve on the island of Sulawesi, Indonesia.” The majority opinion by Judge Carlos Bea begins:
We must determine whether a monkey may sue humans, corporations, and companies for damages and injunctive relief arising from claims of copyright infringement. Our court’s precedent requires us to conclude that the monkey’s claim has standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Nonetheless, we conclude that this monkey—and all animals, since they are not human—lacks statutory standing under the Copyright Act.
Although the majority opinion stated that “[w]e gravely doubt that PETA can validly assert ‘next friend’ status to represent claims made for the monkey,” it wrote:
Even so, we must proceed to the merits because Naruto’s lack of a next friend does not destroy his standing to sue, as having a ‘case or controversy’ under Article III of the Constitution. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, which authorizes “next friend” lawsuits, obligates the court “to consider whether [incompetent parties] are adequately protected,” even where they have no “next friend” or “guardian.” U.S. v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 1986). Within this obligation, the court has “broad discretion and need not appoint a guardian ad litem [or next friend] if it determines the person is or can be otherwise adequately protected.” Id. (citing Roberts v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 2556 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958) (“Rule 17(c) does not make the appointment of a guardian ad litem mandatory.”)). See also Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1139 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting circumstances in which “appointing a guardian ad litem . . . could hinder the purpose of Rule 17(c),” and thus was not required). For example, “the court may find that the incompetent person’s interests would be adequately protected by the appointment of a lawyer.” Krain v. Smallwood, 880 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Westcott v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 158 F.2d 20, 22 (4th Cir. 1946). Indeed, courts have done just this, and the fact that those courts did not then dismiss the case proves that the lack of a next friend does not destroy an incompetent party’s standing. See, e.g., Westcott, 158 F.2d at 22 (affirming judgment against minor who was represented by an attorney but not a guardian ad litem).
Proceeding to Naruto’s constitutional standing, the majority concluded that Naruto’s claim satisfied Article III:
Here, the complaint alleges that Naruto is the author and owner of the Monkey Selfies. The complaint further alleges that Naruto has suffered concrete and particularized economic harms as a result of the infringing conduct by the Appellees, harms that can be redressed by a judgment declaring Naruto as the author and owner of the Monkey Selfies.
In reaching these conclusions, the majority found that it was bound by an earlier Ninth Circuit decision—Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004). In a footnote, however, the majority argued that Cetacean was “incorrectly decided” and “needs reexamination.”
Ultimately, the panel found that the district court correctly dismissed the case because “Naruto—and, more broadly, animals other than humans—lack statutory standing to sue under the Copyright Act.”
Judge N.R. Smith wrote a concurring opinion that disagreed with the majority’s handling of PETA’s lack of next-friend standing.
Wednesday, April 18, 2018
Last week the Ninth Circuit issued an order denying a joint motion to dismiss the appeal in NARUTO, a Crested Macaque, by and through his Next Friends, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., v. DAVID JOHN SLATER (a.k.a. the Monkey Selfie case). Here is the full order:
Having reached a settlement, the parties moved—two months after oral argument—to dismiss the appeal and to vacate the lower court’s judgment. In denying the motion, the court noted that voluntary dismissals are permissive, not mandatory, under FRAP 42, and that “denying the motion to dismiss and declining to vacate the lower court judgment prevents the parties from manipulating precedent in a way that suits their institutional preferences.”
The court also observed that Naruto himself was not a party to the settlement between PETA and the appellees.
Tuesday, April 17, 2018
Agnieszka McPeak (Toledo Law) has published an article entitled Disappearing Data at 2018 Wis. L.R. 17, which considers the discovery implications of ephemeral social media platforms like Snapchat. Here's the abstract:
“Ephemeral” applications like Snapchat facilitate social interaction in a format that mimics the impermanence of face-to-face conversations. In the age of “big data” and the growing privacy concerns it raises, platforms offering ephemeral social media tools are meeting a market demand for smaller digital footprints. Additionally, these platforms are responding to regulatory pressure to embrace “privacy by design,” the idea that new technology should be built with privacy as a goal from the ground up. Indeed, ephemeral platforms, though imperfect in their impermanence, mark a positive shift in the direction of data minimization.
But the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for broad discovery of electronically stored information. And they mandate, along with other rules, preservation of potentially relevant data in anticipation of litigation. Preservation duties for this new brand of ephemeral data, however, have not been clearly defined.
This article urges for a fair and balanced approach to defining preservation duties for disappearing data. While ephemeral content may be discoverable, onerous preservation duties are unwarranted and will negatively impact both corporate and individual litigants alike. For corporate interests, overly broad preservation duties lead to risk-averse companies stockpiling all things digital, often at great cost. For individuals, the law should recognize that mobile technology has become ubiquitous and social media is a key tool for personal expression, free speech, and social interaction. But individuals also have become the unwitting stewards of vast amounts of data, some of which is dynamic and ever-changing. Deletion or revision of personal information is a normal occurrence on social media platforms — indeed, some are a product of privacy by design. Overly broad preservation duties for individual litigants thus impose unwarranted burdens and are out of step with technological change.
Thursday, March 22, 2018
Abbe Gluck, Ashley Hall, and Gregory Curfman have posted on SSRN a draft of their article, Civil Litigation and the Opioid Epidemic: The Role of Courts in a National Health Crisis, which will be published in the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics. Here’s the abstract:
The devastating impact of the national opioid epidemic has given rise to hundreds of lawsuits. The plaintiffs -- who range from states, to counties, to Indian tribes, and individuals -- have cast an exceedingly broad net for defendants. They have sued not only the opioid manufacturers and the doctors who prescribed the drugs, but also the companies that distribute them, the pharmacies that sell them, and even the hospital accreditation organization that encouraged doctors to stop undertreating pain -- which they were -- two decades ago.
This is not the first major national public health litigation effort -- tobacco, fast food, and guns offer earlier blueprints -- but it has some unique features. First, unlike the litigation it most resembles -- tobacco -- the opioid narrative has a far more complicated chain of causation. Opioids, unlike tobacco, have an important therapeutic purpose; they are FDA approved as safe and effective; they are often prescribed by doctors for sound medical reasons; and then they wind their way from manufacturer, to distributor, to pharmacy, to patient. This complicates litigation because defendants can argue that intervening factors (including other defendants) make any single defendant's culpability hard to isolate.
Second, more than 400 of the opioid cases have now been consolidated before a single federal judge in a so-called "multidistrict litigation." That judge has chided the federal and state governments for punting the problem to the courts; he has made clear he thinks everyone is to blame; and has vowed to get a settlement, with systemic change as part of it, by the end of 2018 -- a breathtaking pace for resolution that makes his courtroom the game changer.
None of this is to say that litigation is the ideal way to solve a public health problem. Concerns abound about attorneys fees', conflicts of interests, inadequate settlement and the possible overreach of the presiding judge. But litigation has already spurred change in both the industry and the practice of medicine. It has played a central role in the public response to the epidemic. This article details that story.
Saturday, March 17, 2018
There has been a lot of coverage of Donald Trump’s relationship with Stephanie Clifford (known by her stage name Stormy Daniels), and the $130,000 payment she received in connection with a nondisclosure agreement during the heat of the 2016 presidential campaign.
Earlier this month, Clifford filed a lawsuit against Trump and Essential Consultants, LLC, in California state court (Los Angeles County). Essential Consultants, which was a party to the nondisclosure agreement, is apparently a Delaware LLC, and Trump attorney Michael Cohen is its sole member. Clifford’s complaint seeks a declaration that the “Hush Agreement” is unenforceable.
Yesterday, Essential Consultants removed the case to federal court. The notice alleges that, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Clifford is a Texas citizen and Trump and Essential Consultants are New York citizens. It also alleges that “the value of the object of the litigation” exceeds $75,000. The federal case has been docketed as Clifford v. Trump, No. 2:18-cv-02217 (C.D. Cal.)
Donald Trump filed a separate document joining in Essential Consultants’ notice of removal. This appears to be his effort to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A), which provides: “When a civil action is removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action.”
You can find more coverage of the removal to federal court here:
Wednesday, September 27, 2017
Representative Steve King (R-IA) introduced H.R. 3487, a bill to expand diversity jurisdiction by defining diversity as minimal diversity:
Section 1332 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
“(f) For the purposes of this section, diversity of citizenship exists if at least one party adverse to any other party to the civil action does not share the same citizenship with that adverse party.”.
The bill has been referred to the House Judiciary Committee. We reported last year on a hearing held before the House Judiciary Committee that explored the adoption of minimal diversity.
Hat tip: Valerie Nannery
Thursday, August 17, 2017
This week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Block v. Tanenhaus, reinstating a Loyola University professor’s claims for defamation and false light against the New York Times and two of its authors. The per curiam opinion acknowledges, but does not resolve, the interesting question of whether state “anti-SLAPP” statutes—such as Louisiana’s Article 971—apply in federal court under Erie:
Block argues that Article 971 is not applicable in federal court because it is procedural and because, even if it is substantive, it is in direct collision with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The applicability of state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court is an important and unresolved issue in this circuit.2 Unfortunately for Block, his arguments against application of Article 971 have been forfeited.
Footnote 2 describes the state of play in the Fifth Circuit:
We have noted on several occasions that this is an open question. See, e.g., Block, 815 F.3d at 221; Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 706 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2016); Lozovyy, 813 F.3d at 582–83; Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 631 (5th Cir. 2015); Mitchell v. Hood, 614 F. App’x 137, 139 n.1 (5th Cir. 2015); NCDR, L.L.C. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., 745 F.3d 742, 752–53 (5th Cir. 2014). These opinions post-date our decision in Henry v. Lake Charles American Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2009), which stated without explanation that “Louisiana law, including the nominally-procedural Article 971, governs this diversity case.” Id. 168–69. In Lozovyy, we noted the possibility that, particularly in light of our subsequent decisions, Henry could be interpreted as assuming the applicability of Article 971 for purposes of that case without deciding its applicability in federal courts more generally. Lozovyy, 813 F.3d at 582–83. Similarly, we noted in Pylant that Henry did not address “whether, under the Erie doctrine, the array of state procedural rules surrounding anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss (viz. discovery stays, accelerated timetables for decision, and the like) follow the core anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss into federal court.” Pylant, 814 F.3d at 706 n.6; cf. id. at 719 (Graves, J., dissenting) (addressing Erie question not reached by majority opinion and stating that similar anti-SLAPP statute in Texas is inapplicable in federal court because it is procedural (citing Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
Wednesday, July 19, 2017
Betty Dukes, the lead plaintiff in the historic class action Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C-01-2252 (N.D. Calif.), has died at age 67. Although the lower courts granted and affirmed class certification in a gender- and race-based discrimination suit, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia for the majority, reversed the grant of class certification.
Hat tip: Janet Alexander.
Friday, March 10, 2017
We covered earlier several bills that could make significant changes to federal civil procedure. Two of these passed the House of Representatives yesterday.
- H.R. 725 (the Innocent Party Protection Act) passed by a vote of 224–194.
- H.R. 985 (the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act) passed by a vote of 220-201-1.
Stay tuned. Getting to 60 votes in the Senate will be a more difficult proposition.
Monday, March 6, 2017
In my opinion, the video is suitable for law students and also the general public. I think there is a great need for clear, brief videos on various aspects of the U.S. government. There appears to be a dearth of knowledge on that score. For example, the Annenberg Public Policy Center recently found that only 27% of Americans could name all three branches of government, and 31% could not name any of the three branches.
Thursday, March 2, 2017
The House of Representatives Committee on Rules has announced that it will meet the week of March 6 “to grant a rule that may provide a structured amendment process for floor consideration of” H.R. 720 (amendments to FRCP 11), H.R. 725 (on so-called “fraudulent” joinder), and H.R. 985 (on class actions and MDLs).
Hat tip: Adam Zimmerman
Wednesday, March 1, 2017
In addition to the six bills already reported here and here, House Republicans have also introduced H.R. 1118, the so-called “Innocent Sellers Fairness Act,” which would federalize the law of product liability by limiting liability for the sellers of a product. The bill is sponsored by Rep. Blake Farenthold (R-TX 27), Rep. John Duncan (R-TN 2), and Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX 21).
The operative provisions of the bill provide:
(a) In general
No seller of any product shall be liable for personal injury, monetary loss, or damage to property arising out of an accident or transaction involving such product, unless the claimant proves one or more of the following activities by the seller:
(1) The seller was the manufacturer of the product.
(2) The seller participated in the design of the product.
(3) The seller participated in the installation of the product.
(4) The seller altered, modified, or expressly warranted the product in a manner not authorized by the manufacturer.
(5) The seller had actual knowledge of the defect in the product as a result of a recall from the manufacturer or governmental entity authorized to make such recall or actual inspection at the time the seller sold the product to the claimant.
(6) The seller had actual knowledge of the defect in the product at the time the seller supplied the product.
(7) The seller intentionally altered or modified a product warranty, warning or instruction from the manufacturer in a way not authorized by the manufacturer.
(8) The seller knowingly made a false representation about an aspect of the product not authorized by the manufacturer.
(b) Liability of seller in cases of negligence
If the claimant proves one or more of the activities described in subsection (a) and such activity was negligent, the seller’s liability is limited to the personal injury, monetary loss, or damage to property, directly caused by such activity.
These provisions resemble Section 8 of the American Legislative Exchange Council's so-called “model policy” on product liability for state legislators to copy.
Unlike the other six bills, this one has not passed the House Judiciary Committee.