Friday, September 28, 2018
This action was commenced when Citibank, N.A. filed a routine state-court collection action against respondent George W. Jackson. Petitioner Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. was not a party to that action and never became a party to that collection dispute. Jackson then filed a counterclaim against Citibank asserting class-action consumer-protection claims. In addition to naming Citibank, Jackson named Home Depot and another company as original defendant to that counterclaim class action. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, permits "any defendant in a state-court class action to remove the action to federal court if it satisfies certain jurisdictional requirements. Petitioner Home Depot is an original defendant in the class action at issue here and was never a plaintiff in any claim associated with this case.
The question presented is: Whether an original defendant to a class-action claim can remove the class action if it otherwise satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act when the class action was originally asserted as a counterclaim against a co-defendant.
The Court also directed the parties to address the following question:
Should this court’s holding in Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941)—that an original plaintiff may not remove a counterclaim against it—extend to third-party counterclaim defendants?
Tuesday, September 25, 2018
Now on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Robin Effron’s essay, Lies, Dating Lies, and Small Claims Court. Robin reviews Irina Manta’s recent article, Tinder Lies, which is forthcoming in the Wake Forest Law Review.
Wednesday, September 19, 2018
Zach Clopton has published Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106 Cal. L. Rev. 411 (2018). Here’s the abstract:
Although not always headline grabbing, the Roberts Court has been highly interested in civil procedure. According to critics, the Court has undercut access to justice and private enforcement through its decisions on pleading, class actions, summary judgment, arbitration, standing, personal jurisdiction, and international law.
While I have much sympathy for the Court’s critics, the current discourse too often ignores the states. Rather than bemoaning the Roberts Court’s decisions to limit court access—and despairing further developments in the age of Trump—we instead might productively focus on the options open to state courts and public enforcement. Many of the aforementioned decisions are not binding on state courts, and many states have declined to follow their reasoning. This Article documents state courts deviating from Twombly and Iqbal on pleading; the Celotex trilogy on summary judgment; Wal-Mart v. Dukes on class actions; and Supreme Court decisions on standing and international law. Similarly, many of the Court’s highly criticized procedural decisions do not apply to public enforcement, and many public suits have proceeded where private litigation would have failed. This Article documents successful state-enforcement actions when class actions could not be certified, when individual claims would be sent to arbitration, and when private plaintiffs would lack Article III standing.
In sum, this Article evaluates state court and state-enforcement responses to the Roberts Court’s procedural decisions, and it suggests further interventions by state courts and public enforcers that could offset the regression in federal court access. At the same time, this analysis also illuminates serious challenges for those efforts, and it offers reasons to be cautious about state procedure and enforcement. Leveling down to state actors may not completely escape the political forces that have shaped federal procedure, and it may exacerbate some of the political economies that have undermined private enforcement and private rights to date.
Friday, September 14, 2018
Here is a quick summary:
- H.R. 3487. This bill’s purpose is to “amend section 1332 of title 28, United States Code, to provide that the requirement for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is met if any one party to the case is diverse in citizenship from any one adverse party in the case.”
Here is the text of the bill.
H.R. 3487 was not reported, apparently because no reporting quorum was present. (See 3:54:25 here.)
- H.R. 6730, the “Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2018.” This bill’s purpose is to “amend title 28, United States Code, to prohibit the issuance of national injunctions, and for other purposes.”
Here is the text of the bill.
H.R. 6730 was ordered to be reported during the hearing.
- H.R. 6754, the “CIRCUIT Act of 2018” or the “Court Imbalance Restructure Concerning Updates to Impacted Tribunals Act of 2018.” This bill’s purpose is to “amend title 28, United States Code, to modify the structure of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and for other purposes.”
Here is the text of the bill.
H.R. 6754 was ordered to be reported during the hearing.
- H.R. 6755, the “Judiciary Reforms, Organization and Operational Modernization Act of 2018” or the “Judiciary ROOM Act of 2018.” This bill’s purpose is to “provide for additional Article III judges, to modernize the administration of justice, and for other purposes.”
Here is the text of the bill.
H.R. 6755 was ordered to be reported during the hearing.
Friday, September 7, 2018
Now on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Fred Smith’s essay, The Politically Powerful and Judicial Review. Fred reviews Aaron Tang’s recent article, Rethinking Political Power in Judicial Review, which is forthcoming in the California Law Review.
Thursday, September 6, 2018
Shirin Sinnar has published Procedural Experimentation and National Security in the Courts, 106 Cal. L. Rev. 991 (2018). Here’s the abstract:
In the last fifteen years, individuals have brought hundreds of cases challenging government national security practices for violating human rights or civil liberties. Courts have reviewed relatively few of these cases on the merits, often deferring broadly to the executive branch on the grounds that they lack expertise, political accountability, or the ability to protect national security secrets. Yet in cases where courts have permitted civil suits to proceed far enough to decide legal questions, influence policy, or afford litigants relief, they have often experimented with new methods for managing the secret information implicated in many national security cases. These procedures include centralizing cases through Multidistrict Litigation, conducting in camera review of sensitive documents, pressing the government to provide opposing counsel access to secret evidence, appointing special experts of their own, facilitating interlocutory review, and deciding cases in an incremental and dynamic fashion. Illuminating this procedural experimentation, this Article contends that courts can address secrecy in national security adjudication in a tailored, pragmatic fashion, rather than deferring to the executive at the threshold. But this account also shows the limits of such strategies: where misapplied, some procedures may fall short of due process, undermine norms of public access and transparency in the courts, reduce pluralism in the adjudication of disputes, or import bias into judicial decision-making. Together, this suggests that courts should adopt these procedures cautiously and with case-specific assessment of their costs and benefits. Panning out from national security litigation, the Article also offers a set of secondary insights for civil procedure more generally: it highlights the role of the executive branch in making procedural law, the costs of certain trans-substantive procedures, and distorted perceptions across the civil–criminal procedure divide.
Tuesday, September 4, 2018
Aggregation — the ability to join parties or claims in a federal civil lawsuit — has usually been governed by subject-matter jurisdiction, claim and issue preclusion, and the joinder rules. These doctrines have tended to favor aggregation because of its efficiency, consistency, and predictability. Yet aggregation is suddenly under attack from a new threat, one that has little to do with aggregation directly: personal jurisdiction. In this Article, I chronicle how a recent restrictive turn to personal jurisdiction — especially though modern cases narrowing general jurisdiction and last Term’s blockbuster case Bristol-Myers Squibb — threatens the salutary benefits of aggregation across a number of areas, including simple joinder of parties and claims, representative actions, and multidistrict litigation. I offer a solution for preserving aggregation’s advantages in the face of the personal-jurisdiction trend: authorize a broader personal-jurisdiction scope in federal court for certain multiparty and multiclaim cases that would benefit from aggregation. I defend such a regime as constitutional and consistent with the norms of both personal jurisdiction and aggregation.
Ben Grunwald was published Strategic Publication, 92 Tul. L. Rev. 745 (2018). Here’s the abstract:
Under the standard account of judicial behavior, when a panel of appellate court judges cannot agree on the outcome of a case, the panel has two options. First, it can publish a divided decision with a majority opinion and a dissent. Panels usually do not take this route because a dissent dramatically increases the probability of reversal. The second and more common option is for the panel to bargain and compromise over the reasoning of the decision and then publish a unanimous opinion.
This Article argues that a divided panel has a third option: strategic publication. The panel can choose not to publish any opinion at all and thus sap its decision of precedential weight and insulate it from further scrutiny by higher courts. This Article also reports the results of a novel empirical analysis of case-level data on published and unpublished decisions in one federal circuit court. While it finds little empirical evidence that majority-Democrat panels in the sample engage in strategic publication, it finds evidence that majority-Republican panels do. The Article concludes by offering several policy proposals to diminish strategic publication by separating the publication decision from judicial negotiations over the merits.