Wednesday, August 31, 2016
Maya Steinitz and Paul Gowder have posted on SSRN their article Transnational Litigation As a Prisoner’s Dilemma, which has been published in the North Carolina Law Review. Here’s the abstract:
In this Article we use game theory to argue that perceptions of widespread corruption in the judicial processes in developing countries create ex ante incentives to act corruptly. It is rational (though not moral) to preemptively act corruptly when litigating in the courts of many developing nations. The upshot of this analysis is to highlight that, contrary to judicial narratives in individual cases — such as the (in)famous Chevron–Ecuador dispute used herein as an illustration — the problem of corruption in transnational litigation is structural and as such calls for structural solutions. The article offers one such solution: the establishment of an international court of civil justice.