Thursday, April 30, 2015
We covered yesterday the Supreme Court’s order adopting the latest round of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The full packet of material that the Supreme Court transmitted to Congress pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act was posted this afternoon on the U.S. Courts website. Here’s the portion dealing with the Civil Rules amendments:
If you’ve been following this batch of amendments as it has worked its way through the various committees, you may notice that the adopted rules include a couple of changes to the proposed committee notes (hat tip: Valerie Nannery).
The first involves the abrogation of Rule 84 and the deletion of the Forms that had long appeared in the FRCP Appendix. Many had expressed concern about this change because of its possible effect on pleading standards due to the elimination of Form 11, Form 18, and others. The committee note for Rule 84 now contains this sentence: “The abrogation of Rule 84 does not alter existing pleading standards or otherwise change the requirements of Civil Rule 8.”
The second change relates to the amendment to Rule 4(m), which reduces the default deadline for serving process from 120 days after filing the complaint to 90 days after filing the complaint. The committee note had stated: “Shortening the presumptive time for service will increase the frequency of occasions to extend the time for good cause.” The new version deletes the last three word of this sentence, which now reads: “Shortening the presumptive time for service will increase the frequency of occasions to extend the time.” This seems to recognize that the text of Rule 4(m) does not require a showing of good cause in order to extend the default deadline for service—although there remains some disagreement in the lower courts on this issue. (Readers may recall this Term’s Chen case, where the Court had granted a pro se cert. petition challenging the Fourth Circuit’s approach to Rule 4(m) extensions, only to dismiss it after Mr. Chen failed to file a brief and the Court’s “[a]dditional efforts to contact petitioner” were “unsuccessful.” Mr. Chen then resurfaced, represented by former Solicitor General Paul Clement, filing a petition for rehearing asking the case to be reinstated; but this too was unsuccessful.)
Emery G. Lee III, Catherine R. Borden, Margaret S. Williams, and Kevin M. Scott have published in Volume 12, Issue 2 of the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies their article, Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination.
Following the judiciary's experience with aggregate litigation in the 1960s, Congress established a procedure for the transfer of related cases to a single district court for coordinated pretrial proceedings. Originally designed to achieve efficiencies associated with coordinated discovery, the multidistrict litigation (MDL) process evolved from a rather modest starting point to become a central part of aggregate litigation in the federal courts today. Despite its importance, however, there is little empirical research on the MDL process. This article seeks to fill this gap in the empirical literature by addressing a few central questions about the work of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (Panel). Using a unique database, we examine how that body decided motions to centralize multidistrict litigation. We find, most importantly, that the Panel became more likely to order centralization of proceedings over time, after controlling for other factors. That trend is not, however, apparent in the most recent years' data. We also find, all else equal, that the Panel is more likely to centralize a proceeding including class allegations, and more likely to centralize proceedings raising certain kinds of claims.
Wednesday, April 29, 2015
Today the Supreme Court adopted the recent batch of proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Here is the order setting forth the amendments and submitting them to the House and Senate.
Absent congressional action, these amendments will become effective Dec. 1, 2015.
Note that today's order from the Court does not include a "redline" of the new changes or the committee notes that accompany them. Here are the redline and notes that were included in the Standing Committee report:
UPDATE: Valerie N (see comments below) reports that the Court has asked for two changes to the advisory committee notes. The entire package of materials--including the final version of the committee notes--is now available here.
Today the Supreme Court wrapped up its oral arguments for the Term. There are lots of cases still to be decided, of course. And the Court should be taking action this week (Friday is the deadline) on the latest batch of proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Also in the coming weeks, the Court will be considering an interesting petition for certiorari out of the Seventh Circuit on summary judgment. Estate of Brown v. Thomas (No. 14-1139) presents an important question that federal courts have been struggling with ever since Celotex and the 1986 summary judgment trilogy:
What initial burden does Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 impose on a moving party that seeks summary judgment on the ground that the non-moving party cannot prove its case?
Monday, April 27, 2015
Whether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute.
The Court granted cert. notwithstanding an invited brief from the Solicitor General arguing against review. That brief explained:
The court of appeals held that respondent had established Article III standing to sue petitioner “for publishing inaccurate personal information about [respondent]” because petitioner allegedly had violated respondent’s “statutory rights” protecting his “personal interests in the handling of his credit information.” Pet. App. 1a, 8a. The court below correctly concluded that the publication of such false information is a cognizable Article III injury.
You can find all the cert-stage briefing—and follow the merits briefs as they come in—at SCOTUSblog.
Last week, Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-Va) introduced H.R. 1927, ironically entitled “Fairness in Class Action Litigation 2015.”
The bill provides:
“(a) IN GENERAL.—No Federal court shall certify any proposed class unless the party seeking to maintain a class action affirmatively demonstrates through admissible evidentiary proof that each proposed class member suffered an injury of the same type and extent as the injury of the named class representative or representatives.
“(b) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘injury’ means the alleged impact of the defendant’s actions on the plaintiff’s body or property.”
It seems to me that this bill would eviscerate class actions.
There will be a hearing on this bill before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice, this Wednesday, April 29, 2015, at 3:00 p.m.
Thursday, April 23, 2015
The Eighth Annual Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop is happening at the University of California, Irvine School of Law on September 11-12, 2015. If you wish to present a paper, the deadline to submit abstracts is June 19, 2015. Howard Wasserman has posted the details over at PrawfsBlawg.
As we covered earlier, the first annual Civil Procedure Workshop is being held July 16-17 at Seattle University School of Law. You can find more details and registration information in the document linked below:
Wednesday, April 22, 2015
Today the Supreme Court issued its decisions in United States v. Wong and United States v. June. As covered earlier, the cases address whether two time limits contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act are subject to equitable tolling. (Although Wong and June were not formally consolidated, the Court explains in footnote 1 that “we address them together because everyone agrees that the core arguments for and against equitable tolling apply equally to both of §2401(b)’s deadlines.”)
It’s a 5-4 split. Once again, the Justices examine—and disagree about—whether a statutory time limitation is “jurisdictional.” Justice Kagan writes the majority opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor. Here’s the opening paragraph (emphasis added):
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or Act) provides that a tort claim against the United States “shall be forever barred” unless it is presented to the “appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues” and then brought to federal court “within six months” after the agency acts on the claim. 28 U. S. C. §2401(b). In each of the two cases we resolve here, the claimant missed one of those deadlines, but requested equitable tolling on the ground that she had a good reason for filing late. The Government responded that §2401(b)’s time limits are not subject to tolling because they are jurisdictional restrictions. Today, we reject the Government’s argument and conclude that courts may toll both of the FTCA’s limitations periods.
Justice Alito writes a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas. He argues that these limitations are jurisdictional and create an “absolute bar” that “is not subject to equitable tolling.”
Monday, April 20, 2015
The movant was defendant Shaquille O’Neal. The plaintiff Jahmel Binion—a Michigan resident—alleged claims for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and general negligence based on posts Shaq had made on Instagram and Twitter that included pictures of Binion. Although the court stated that Shaq’s posts were “highly offensive,” it found after a discussion of Zippo and the “effects test” from Calder v. Jones that jurisdiction in Michigan would not comport with due process.
Here’s the New York Daily News with some background on the incident that gave rise to the lawsuit.
Sunday, April 19, 2015
Shay Lavie has published Are Judges Tied to the Past? Evidence from Jurisdiction Cases in the Hofstra Law Review. Here’s the abstract:
Do past decisions bias judges? This Article argues that judges might be unduly affected by previously spent judicial efforts. Appellate courts, for instance, are more reluctant to reverse a case if the trial judge invested a large amount of resources in coming to a decision.
To provide empirical evidence for this proposition, this Article examines reversal rates of jurisdictional questions. As jurisdiction is independent of the merits, its resolution should not be affected by subsequent judicial efforts on the merits. Nonetheless, this Article finds that the more resources that are invested on the merits of the case, the less likely appellate courts are to reverse the underlying jurisdictional determination. This correlation is statistically significant and non-trivial in size.
This Article then discusses the normative implications of this phenomenon. The major implication is reforming the final judgment rule. A broader right to interlocutory appeals would moderate appellate judges’ tendency to rely on past proceedings and improve decision-making.
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
The Sedona Conference has posted a "Commentary on Rule 34 and Rule 45 'Possession, Custody, or Control.'” The commentary suggests uniform principles as to the meaning of "possession, custody, or control" as used in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 34 and 45.
The commentary can be downloaded without charge here.
Tuesday, April 14, 2015
Now available on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is an essay by Sergio Campos entitled Standing (in) for the Government. Sergio reviews Seth Davis’s recent article, Standing Doctrine’s State Action Problem, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015).
Thursday, April 9, 2015
In In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litigation, No. 12-4067 (3d Cir. April 8, 2015), the court vacated the trial court's certification of a class of purchasers of blood reagents, which alleged price-fixing by the two defendants.
In part, the court vacated because the class certification had occurred before the Supreme Court's decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). In addition, the court held that if, on a motion for class certification, plaintiffs relied on expert testimony to establish "predominance" under Rule 23(b)(3), then the expert's testimony must satisfy the Daubert standard for admissibility.
On the earlier motion for class certification, the plaintiffs had relied in part on expert testimony to produce their antitrust impact analyses and damages models. The district court held that the expert's testimony "could evolve to become admissible evidence" at trial. The Third Circuit held that "the trial court should have scrutinized the plaintiffs' expert's testimony under Daubert."
The court stated that it was joining the Seventh and Eighth Circuits in holding Daubert applicable on class certification motions.
Tuesday, April 7, 2015
The 21st Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy will be held April 16 and 17, 2015 at DePaul University College of Law. The topic this year is "The Supreme Court, Business and Civil Justice." Presenters and discussants include (in order of appearance) David Horton, Anthony Sebok, Katherine Stone, Stephan Landsman, Margaret Blair, Elizabeth Pollman, Gregory Mark, Eric Orts, Thomas Colby, Mark Geistfeld, John Goldberg, Benjamin Zipursky, Thomas Lee, Sandra Sperino, Richard Epstein, Stephen Burbank, Sean Farhang, Richard Marcus, Joanna Schwartz, Elizabeth Thornburg, Margo Schlanger, Elizabeth Burch, Erwin Chemerinsky, Marc Galanter, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and David Franklin.
From the web site:
Recent empirical research suggests that corporate interests do unusually well in the United States Supreme Court. The Court’s decisions concerning business entities do not only affect matters of corporate law and regulation, but also a wide array of civil justice issues. They have enhanced the reach of arbitration as a substitute for court-based adjudication. They have dramatically altered federal civil procedure. They have changed the tort law landscape despite the traditional anchoring of tort principles in state legislation and judicial precedent. These shifts and their implications for the civil justice system will be the focus of this year’s Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy.
This event is free and open to the public but you must register to attend by April 13, 2015 at
Friday, April 3, 2015
Boston University Law School
October 2-3, 2015
This annual workshop brings together scholars focused on corporate and securities litigation to present their works-in-progress. The papers may address any aspect of corporate and securities litigation or enforcement, including but not limited to securities class actions, fiduciary duty litigation, or comparative approaches to business litigation. We welcome scholars working in a variety of methodologies, including empirical analysis, law and economics or other fields, and traditional doctrinal analysis. Participants will generally be expected to have drafts completed by the fall, although work in a more formative stage may also be included. Each author will provide a brief introduction, but most of the time in each session will be devoted to collective discussion of the paper.
Submission Procedure : If you are interested in participating in the conference, which will be held at Boston University Law School on October 2-3, 2015, please send an abstract or draft of the paper you would like to present to firstname.lastname@example.org no later than May 29, 2015. Please include your name, current position, and contact information in the e-mail accompanying the submission. Authors of accepted papers will be notified by June 30, 2015.
Questions: Any questions concerning the workshop should be directed to the organizers: Professor David Webber (email@example.com), Professor Jessica Erickson (firstname.lastname@example.org) and Professor Verity Winship (email@example.com).
Just received the annual report of the Oklahoma Bar Association on attorney discipline in calendar year 2014. (86 Okla. B.J. No. 8, p. 624.) All 16 attorneys publicly disciplined in 2014 in Oklahoma were men (based upon their first names). Of three other attorneys charged with disciplinary violations who were exonerated, two were women.
Although Oklahoma is a relatively small and perhaps unrepresentative state, the outsized proportion of male disciplined attorneys is consistent with my study of all 3,500 publicly-disciplined US attorneys in the year 2000. My co-author Kevin Simmons and I found that although male and female attorneys comprised 76.4% and 23.6% of all licensed attorneys in the US in 2000, 88.3% of the disciplined attorneys were male and 11.7% were female.
Thursday, April 2, 2015
Now available on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is an essay by Linda Mullenix entitled Into Litigation’s Black Hole: A Cosmic Solution. Linda reviews Judge Eduardo Robreno’s recent article, The Federal Asbestos Product Liablity Multidistrict Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole Or New Paradigm?, 23 Widener L.J. 97 (2013).
Wednesday, April 1, 2015
Yesterday the Supreme Court decided Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, ruling by a 5-4 vote that Medicaid providers could not sue state officials for failing to comply with § 30(A) of the Medicaid Act (also known as the “equal access” provision). Justice Scalia writes the majority opinion, joined in full by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito. Justice Breyer joins part of Scalia’s opinion to provide the fifth vote, but also authors a separate concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor writes the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Kagan.