Wednesday, June 9, 2021

Malveaux on Spaulding on Ideal and Actual Due Process

Today on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Suzette Malveaux’s essay, Getting Real About Procedure: Changing How We Think, Write and Teach About American Civil Procedure. Suzette reviews Norman Spaulding’s recent article, The Ideal and the Actual in Procedural Due Process, 48 Hastings Const. L.Q. 261 (2021).

 

 

 

 

June 9, 2021 in Recent Scholarship, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, May 28, 2021

SCOTUS Decision on District Court Discretion to Deny or Reduce Costs under FRAP 39

Yesterday the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L. P. Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court begins:

Civil litigation in the federal courts is often an expensive affair, and each party, win or lose, generally bears many of its own litigation expenses, including attorney’s fees that are subject to the so-called American Rule. Baker Botts L. L. P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U. S. 121, 126 (2015). But certain “costs” are treated differently. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 governs the taxation of appellate “costs,” and the question in this case is whether a district court has the discretion to deny or reduce those costs. We hold that it does not and therefore affirm the judgment below.

Although the Court concludes that “Rule 39 does not permit a district court to alter a court of appeals’ allocation of the costs listed in subdivision (e) of that Rule,” it does let the appellate court delegate the cost-allocation question to the district court:

In all events, if a court of appeals thinks that a district court is better suited to allocate the appellate costs listed in Rule 39(e), the court of appeals may delegate that responsibility to the district court, as several Courts of Appeals have done in the past. See, e.g., Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube Co., 324 F. 3d 616, 626 (CA8 2003); Guse v. J. C. Penney Co., 570 F. 2d 679, 681–682 (CA7 1978). The parties agree that this pragmatic approach is permitted. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 15, 44. And nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on it. See Rule 39(a) (imposing no direct limitations on the court’s ability to “orde[r] otherwise”); Rule 41(a) (the mandate includes “any direction about costs”).

And Justice Alito’s opinion also encourages litigants to make their arguments about cost allocation to the appellate court before it makes its cost-allocation decision. Although he recognizes that “the current Rules and the relevant statutes could specify more clearly the procedure that such a party should follow to bring their arguments to the court of appeals,” he writes:

Rule 27 sets forth a generally applicable procedure for seeking relief in a court of appeals, and a simple motion “for an order” under Rule 27 should suffice to seek an order under Rule 39(a). Compare Fed. Rule App. Proc. 39(a) (“The following rules apply unless . . . the court orders otherwise”) with Rule 27(a) (“An application for an order . . . is made by motion unless these rules prescribe another form”). The OTCs also identify instances where parties have raised their arguments through other procedural vehicles, including merits briefing, see Rule 28, objections to a bill of costs, see Rule 39(d)(2), and petitions for rehearing, see Rule 40. Brief for Respondents 42, nn. 9–11. We do not foreclose litigants from raising their arguments in any manner consistent with the relevant federal and local Rules.

And finally, Justice Alito flags but does not resolve an issue raised by the Solicitor General about the relationship between FRAP 39 and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Here’s footnote 4:

As the United States points out, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 4, we have interpreted Rule 54(d) to provide for taxing only the costs already made taxable by statute, namely, 28 U. S. C. §1920. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U. S. 437, 441–442 (1987). Supersedeas bond premiums, despite being referenced in Appellate Rule 39(e)(3), are not listed as taxable costs in §1920. San Antonio has not raised any argument that Rule 39 is inconsistent with §1920 in this respect. We accordingly do not consider this issue.

 

 

 

 

May 28, 2021 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, May 20, 2021

Erbsen on Gluck & Burch on Multidistrict Litigation

Today on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Allan Erbsen’s essay, Procedural Evolution in Multidistrict Litigation. Allan reviews Abbe Gluck & Beth Burch’s recent article, MDL Revolution, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2021).

 

 

 

 

May 20, 2021 in Federal Courts, MDLs, Recent Scholarship, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 19, 2021

SCOTUS Cert Grant on Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Applications to Confirm or Vacate Arbitration Awards

This week the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Badgerow v. Walters, which involves whether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over applications to confirm or vacate arbitration awards. Here’s the question presented (with the usual wind-up):

This case presents a clear and intractable conflict regarding an important jurisdictional question under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-16.

As this Court has repeatedly confirmed, the FAA does not itself confer federal-question jurisdiction; federal courts must have an independent jurisdictional basis to entertain matters under the Act. In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009), this Court held that a federal court, in reviewing a petition to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the Act, may “look through” the petition to decide whether the parties’ underlying dispute gives rise to federal-question jurisdiction. In so holding, the Court focused on the particular language of Section 4, which is not repeated elsewhere in the Act.

After Vaden, the circuits have squarely divided over whether the same “look-through” approach also applies to motions to confirm or vacate an arbitration award under Sections 9 and 10. In Quezada v. Bechtel OG & C Constr. Servs., Inc., 946 F.3d 837 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the 3-2 “circuit split,” and a divided panel held that the “look-through” approach applies under Sections 9 and 10. In the proceedings below, the Fifth Circuit declared itself “bound” by that earlier decision, and applied the “look-through” approach to establish jurisdiction. That holding was outcome-determinative, and this case is a perfect vehicle for resolving the widespread disagreement over this important threshold question.

The question presented is:

Whether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA where the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question.

You can find all the cert-stage briefing—and follow the merits briefs as they come in—at SCOTUSblog and at the Supreme Court website.

 

 

 

May 19, 2021 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 17, 2021

SCOTUS Decision on Appellate Review of Remand Orders: BP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

Today the Supreme Court issued a 7-1 decision in BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (covered earlier here). Justice Gorsuch writes the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Sotomayor dissents, and Justice Alito did not participate.

At issue in the case is 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which forbids appellate review of a district court’s remand order “except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” Justice Gorsuch’s opinion begins:

This case began when Baltimore’s mayor and city council sued various energy companies for promoting fossil fuels while allegedly concealing their environmental impacts. But the merits of that claim have nothing to do with this appeal. The only question before us is one of civil procedure: Does 28 U. S. C. §1447(d) permit a court of appeals to review any issue in a district court order remanding a case to state court where the defendant premised removal in part on the federal officer removal statute, §1442, or the civil rights removal statute, §1443?

The answer to that question is: Yes. Justice Gorsuch’s opinion emphasizes in particular the use of the word “order” in § 1447(d): “[W]hen a district court’s removal order rejects all of the defendants’ grounds for removal, §1447(d) authorizes a court of appeals to review each and every one of them. After all, the statute allows courts of appeals to examine the whole of a district court’s ‘order,’ not just some of its parts or pieces.”

The majority does not, however, consider the merits of the defendants’ arguments in favor of removal:

The Fourth Circuit erred in holding that it was powerless to consider all of the defendants’ grounds for removal under §1447(d). In light of that error, the defendants ask us to consider some of those additional grounds ourselves. That task, however, does not implicate the circuit split that we took this case to resolve and we believe the wiser course is to leave these matters for the Fourth Circuit to resolve in the first instance.

Justice Sotomayor dissents. Her opinion concludes:

Section 1447(d) places “broad restrictions on the power of federal appellate courts to review district court orders remanding removed cases to state court.” Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U. S. 124, 127 (1995). After today’s decision, defendants can sidestep these restrictions by making near-frivolous arguments for removal under §1442 or §1443. Congress, of course, can amend §1447(d) to make even clearer that appellate review of a district court remand order extends to only §1442 or §1443. Because I believe §1447 already bears that meaning, I respectfully dissent.

 

 

 

May 17, 2021 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

SCOTUS Decision on Habeas Retroactivity: Edwards v. Vannoy

Today the Supreme Court issued a 6-3 decision in Edwards v. Vannoy (covered earlier here). Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, begins:

Last Term in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___ (2020), this Court held that a state jury must be unanimous to convict a criminal defendant of a serious offense. Ramos repudiated this Court’s 1972 decision in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404, which had allowed non-unanimous juries in state criminal trials. The question in this case is whether the new rule of criminal procedure announced in Ramos applies retroactively to overturn final convictions on federal collateral review. Under this Court’s retroactivity precedents, the answer is no.

This Court has repeatedly stated that a decision announcing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 639–640, and n. 20 (1965). Indeed, in the 32 years since Teague underscored that principle, this Court has announced many important new rules of criminal procedure. But the Court has not applied any of those new rules retroactively on federal collateral review. See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 421 (2007) (Confrontation Clause rule recognized in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), does not apply retroactively). And for decades before Teague, the Court also regularly declined to apply new rules retroactively, including on federal collateral review. See, e.g., DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 635 (1968) (per curiam) (jury-trial rule recognized in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), does not apply retroactively).

Later in the opinion, Justice Kavanaugh overrules Teague v. Lane’s principle that “watershed” rules of criminal procedure may apply retroactively on habeas review:

If landmark and historic criminal procedure decisions—including Mapp, Miranda, Duncan, Crawford, Batson, and now Ramos—do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review, how can any additional new rules of criminal procedure apply retroactively on federal collateral review? At this point, some 32 years after Teague, we think the only candid answer is that none can—that is, no new rules of criminal procedure can satisfy the watershed exception. We cannot responsibly continue to suggest otherwise to litigants and courts. In Teague itself, the Court recognized that the purported exception was unlikely to apply in practice, because it was “unlikely” that such watershed “components of basic due process have yet to emerge.” 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion). The Court has often repeated that “it is unlikely that any of these watershed rules has yet to emerge.” Tyler, 533 U. S., at 667, n. 7 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Whorton, 549 U. S., at 417; Summerlin, 542 U. S., at 352. And for decades, the Court has rejected watershed status for new procedural rule after new procedural rule, amply demonstrating that the purported exception has become an empty promise. Continuing to articulate a theoretical exception that never actually applies in practice offers false hope to defendants, distorts the law, misleads judges, and wastes the resources of defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts. Moreover, no one can reasonably rely on an exception that is non-existent in practice, so no reliance interests can be affected by forthrightly acknowledging reality. It is time— probably long past time—to make explicit what has become increasingly apparent to bench and bar over the last 32 years: New procedural rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. The watershed exception is moribund. It must “be regarded as retaining no vitality.” Herrera v. Wyoming, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 11) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Justice Thomas writes a concurring opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch. And Justice Gorsuch writes a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas.

Justice Kagan writes a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. The dissenters take particular aim at the majority’s overruling of Teague. From Justice Kagan’s introduction:

So everything rests on the majority’s last move—the overturning of Teague’s watershed exception. If there can never be any watershed rules—as the majority here asserts out of the blue—then, yes, jury unanimity cannot be one. The result follows trippingly from the premise. But adopting the premise requires departing from judicial practice and principle. In overruling a critical aspect of Teague, the majority follows none of the usual rules of stare decisis. It discards precedent without a party requesting that action. And it does so with barely a reason given, much less the “special justification” our law demands. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266 (2014). The majority in that way compounds its initial error: Not content to misapply Teague’s watershed provision here, see ante, at 10–14, the majority forecloses any future application, see ante, at 14–15. It prevents any procedural rule ever—no matter how integral to adjudicative fairness—from benefiting a defendant on habeas review. Thus does a settled principle of retroactivity law die, in an effort to support an insupportable ruling.

 

 

 

May 17, 2021 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 3, 2021

Interesting Fifth Circuit Decision on Personal Jurisdiction: Douglass v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

On Friday, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued a very interesting per curiam decision in Douglass v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha. The case involves personal jurisdiction in federal court under FRCP 4(k)(2), which presents a different constitutional inquiry than most personal jurisdiction cases because it implicates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment.

The panel rejects jurisdiction, finding itself constrained by an earlier Fifth Circuit decision. But notwithstanding that case law, the Douglass panel finds the arguments in favor of jurisdiction “persuasive,” and Judge Elrod’s concurring opinion (joined by Judge Willett) calls for the en banc Fifth Circuit “to correct our course.” (In the interest of full disclosure, I joined an amicus brief with fellow civil procedure professors Helen Hershkoff, Arthur Miller, Alan Morrison, and John Sexton supporting the plaintiffs-appellants in this case.)

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May 3, 2021 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 27, 2021

Civil Procedure Workshop Summer 2021 Works-In-Progress Series (July 15 & August 12)

Pam Bookman, Brooke Coleman, and Dave Marcus have announced the CPW’s online works-in-progress series for summer 2021. Here are the details:

The organizers of the Civil Procedure Workshop (“CPW”), an annual gathering of civil procedure scholars, look forward to an in-person gathering at Northwestern University in May 2022.  In the meanwhile, we invite all interested in civil procedure scholarship to participate in an online works-in-progress series the CPW has scheduled for July 15, 2021, and August 12, 2021.  Both sessions will proceed from 1:00-3:00 pm east coast.  Anyone who wishes to present a paper on a topic related to civil procedure is welcome and encouraged to do so.  We will organize participants into small discussion groups, to enable all authors to present their work and receive feedback from colleagues. 

Authors are encouraged to present their work in whatever form it takes.  Full drafts are welcome, but so too are shorter summaries or partially completed papers. 

Those who do not wish to present their work are also encouraged to attend.  We hope that these sessions will give colleagues a chance to a gather, if only online, and continue to support our national community of procedure scholars that many of us enjoy so much.  

Please register for the works-in-progress series here.

You are encouraged to attend both sessions and are welcome to present at one, both, or neither.  If you plan to present your work, we ask that you submit your paper to the organizers by July 1, 2021, for the July 15 session, and by July 29, 2021, for the August 12 session, to give organizers a chance to assemble groups and distribute papers to participants.  If you are presenting a full draft, we ask that you also submit a ten-page excerpt that readers can particularly focus on in advance of the discussions.

 

 

 

April 27, 2021 in Conferences/Symposia | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 26, 2021

SCOTUS Cert Grant on the State Secrets Privilege and Section 1782 Discovery

Today the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Abu Zubaydah, which presents the following question:

Whether the court of appeals erred when it rejected the United States’ assertion of the state-secrets privilege based on the court’s own assessment of potential harms to the national security, and required discovery to proceed further under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a) against former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contractors on matters concerning alleged clandestine CIA activities.

You can find all the cert-stage briefing—and follow the merits briefs as they come in—at SCOTUSblog and at the Supreme Court website.

 

 

 

April 26, 2021 in Discovery, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, April 23, 2021

Coleman on Gadson on Stolen Plausibility

Today on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Brooke Coleman’s essay, Something Borrowed. Brooke reviews Marcus Gadson’s article, Stolen Plausibility, which is forthcoming in the Georgetown Law Journal.

 

 

 

April 23, 2021 in Recent Scholarship, Twombly/Iqbal, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 22, 2021

SCOTUS Decision in AMG Capital v. FTC

Today the Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC (covered earlier here). Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court begins:

Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the Commission to obtain, “in proper cases,” a “permanent injunction” in federal court against “any person, partnership, or corporation” that it believes “is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law” that the Commission enforces. 87 Stat. 592, 15 U. S. C. §53(b). The question presented is whether this statutory language authorizes the Commission to seek, and a court to award, equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement. We conclude that it does not.

The Court’s analysis relies heavily on the interplay between §13(b) and other provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (§5 and §19) that deal explicitly with monetary relief. Justice Breyer concludes by observing:

Nothing we say today, however, prohibits the Commission from using its authority under §5 and §19 to obtain restitution on behalf of consumers. If the Commission believes that authority too cumbersome or otherwise inadequate, it is, of course, free to ask Congress to grant it further remedial authority.

 

 

 

 

 

April 22, 2021 in Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 21, 2021

SCOTUS Adopts 2021 Rules Amendments

Last week the Supreme Court adopted amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and transmitted them to Congress. 

Readers may be particularly interested in the amendment to Appellate Rule 3 and its accompanying forms. Among other things, the amendment provides: “The notice of appeal encompasses all orders that, for purposes of appeal, merge into the designated judgment or appealable order. It is not necessary to designate those orders in the notice of appeal.”

Unless Congress intervenes, these amendments will take effect on December 1, 2021.

You can find the full transmittal package, including redlines and advisory committee notes, here

 

 

 

 

April 21, 2021 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 15, 2021

D.C. Circuit Certifies Personal Jurisdiction Questions to D.C. Court of Appeals

In an interesting decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has certified four questions to the D.C. Court of Appeals. The case is Akhmetshin v. Browder, which involves a defamation claim against a citizen of the United Kingdom. Personal jurisdiction in D.C. federal court depends on the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, which the panel’s original opinion summarized as follows:

Section 13-423(a)(4) authorizes the “exercise [of] personal jurisdiction over a person” who has “caus[ed] tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia.” Any such party over whom personal jurisdiction is sought must have satisfied one of three “plus factors” within the District. See Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1987). These factors are “[1] regularly do[ing] or solicit[ing] business, [2] engag[ing] in any other persistent course of conduct, or [3] deriv[ing] substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered.” D.C. CODE § 13-423(a)(4). However, “entr[ies] into the District ... by nonresidents for the purpose of contacting federal governmental agencies [or instrumentalities]” do not factor into the jurisdictional calculus. Env't Rsch. Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813 (D.C. 1976) (en banc) (explaining the “government contacts exception”).

Here are the certified questions:

1. May nonresident aliens who are citizens only of foreign countries invoke the government contacts exception?

2. If the first question is answered in the affirmative, must those nonresident aliens possess cognizable rights pursuant to the First Amendment generally, or any specific clause thereunder, in order to invoke the exception?

3. Does the government contacts exception extend to efforts to influence federal policy other than direct contacts with agents, members, or instrumentalities of the federal government?

4. If the third question is answered in the affirmative, what standard governs in determining whether activities not involving direct contacts with the federal government are covered under the exception?

 

 

 

April 15, 2021 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, State Courts | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 14, 2021

Virtual Event: Unpacking Iqbal (April 15, 2021)

Below are the details for Unpacking Iqbal, which will be co-hosted by the Chicago-Kent MLSA with the MLSA at UIUC and Georgetown:

When: Apr 15 (Thu), 6:00 PM - 7:15 PM CDT

Where: Zoom, register here: https://lu.ma/qgugl5o3   

Ashcroft v. Iqbal is known as the seminal case that every 1L agonizes over because it transformed the pleading standard starting in 2008. But this case goes beyond pleading standards. It is intertwined with questions surrounding qualified immunity, Xenophobia, Islamophobia and carries a holding that eerily resembles a rationale for blatant racism and discrimination. We have invited panel speakers Professor Alexander Reinert (who argued the case in front of the Supreme Court) and Professor Shirin Sinnar to discuss the impact that Iqbal has had on the entire American litigation system for ethnic and racial minorities.

 

Unpacking Iqbal

 

H/T: Greg Reilly

 

 

 

 

 

April 14, 2021 in Conferences/Symposia, Twombly/Iqbal | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 13, 2021

11th Circuit Decision on FRCP 6

Last week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision in Circuitronix, LLC v. Shenzen Kinwong Electronic Co., which addresses (among other things) FRCP 6(a)(3)’s provision for extending a filing deadline when “the clerk’s office is inaccessible . . . on the last day for filing.”

In that case, the district court’s chief judge “had designated July 5 as a holiday such that ‘the Court will be closed.’” The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that “the clerk’s office remained accessible on July 5 because Kinwong could have filed its motion electronically.” Noting that “Rule 6 refers to the clerk’s physical office,” it held that “[t]he clerk’s office is inaccessible when its building is officially closed or otherwise unavailable, even if the parties are still able to submit filings electronically.”

H/T: C.E. Petit

 

 

 

April 13, 2021 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, April 9, 2021

Some Thoughts on the Google v. Oracle Decision and the Standard of Review for Civil Jury Verdicts

This week’s Supreme Court decision in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. is mostly about copyright law. But there was a very interesting procedural question in the case regarding what standard of review the Court should use in connection with the jury’s verdict in favor of Google on its fair use defense. The answer is: it’s complicated. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion does say that “the ultimate ‘fair use’ question” is subject to de novo review. But he also states that “subsidiary factual questions” must be reviewed deferentially—and that deference ends up playing a very important role in the Court’s decision.

In this post I want to make two quick points about how the Court handles the standard of review issue. First, as I’ve argued in a recent article, I don’t think that Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a court may displace a jury’s verdict only when “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue,” allows a court to declare that a certain issue (like fair use) is categorically subject to de novo review. But second, Justice Breyer’s deference to the jury on implicitly-found “subsidiary” facts leads to an analysis of fair use that—at the end of the day—isn’t so different from the sort of deferential review Rule 50 would require.

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April 9, 2021 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, April 8, 2021

Thomas on Coleman on Federal Procedural Rulemaking Committees

Now on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Suja Thomas’s essay, Should the Rules Committees be Remade? Suja reviews Brooke Coleman’s recent article, #SoWhiteMale: Federal Procedural Rulemaking Committees, 68 UCLA L. Rev. Disc. 370 (2020).

 

 

 

 

April 8, 2021 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 6, 2021

SCOTUS Cert Grant in Brown v. Davenport

Yesterday the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Brown v. Davenport. Here’s the question presented (with the usual wind-up)…

In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Court held that the test for determining whether a constitutional error was harmless on habeas review is whether the defendant suffered “actual prejudice.” Congress later enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which prohibits habeas relief on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Although the Court has held that the Brecht test “subsumes” § 2254(d)(1)’s requirements, the Court declared in Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 267 (2015), that those requirements are still a “precondition” for relief and that a state-court harmlessness determination under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), still retains “significance” under the Brecht test. The question presented is:

May a federal habeas court grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the Brecht test is satisfied, as the Sixth Circuit held, or must the court also find that the state court’s Chapman application was unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1), as the Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held?

You can find all the cert-stage briefing—and follow the merits briefs as they come in—at SCOTUSblog and at the Supreme Court website.

April 6, 2021 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Stetson Law Review Virtual Symposium: "Civil Procedure Transformation After Fifteen Years of the Roberts Court" (April 9, 2021)

Here is the announcement and registration details:

Stetson Law Review is pleased to announce its Spring 2021 Virtual Symposium: Civil Procedure Transformation After Fifteen Years of the Roberts Court.  The Symposium will be held virtually on Friday, April 9 from 1-4:30 p.m. Panels will discuss the Roberts Court’s transformative influence on personal jurisdiction doctrine, court access and choice, as well as the adjudication process. More information on the panels and panelists can be found at https://www2.stetson.edu/law-review/symposia/.

The event will be held over Zoom. If you would like to attend, please email lrmarked@law.stetson.edu or register directly at https://lnkd.in/eggmuJM.

 

 

 

April 6, 2021 in Conferences/Symposia | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 5, 2021

SCOTUS Decision in Google v. Oracle

Today the Supreme Court issued its decision in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. By a 6-2 vote, it holds that Google’s copying of a portion of a computer program owned by Oracle constituted “fair use” for purposes of federal copyright law. The opinion is focused mostly on substantive copyright law, but—as covered earlier here and here—the posture of the case prompted some interesting procedural questions. The jury had ruled in favor of Google on its fair use defense, and the Supreme Court asked the parties to file supplemental letter briefs addressing “the appropriate standard of review” regarding fair use, “including but not limited to the implications of the Seventh Amendment, if any, on that standard.”

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April 5, 2021 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (2)