Monday, April 20, 2020
Corporate leniency programs promise putative offenders reduced punishment and fewer regulatory interventions in exchange for the corporation’s credible and authentic commitment to remedy wrongdoing and promptly self-report future violations of law to the requisite authorities.
Because these programs have been devised with multiple goals in mind—i.e., deterring wrongdoing and punishing corporate executives, improving corporate cultural norms, and extending the government’s regulatory reach—it is all but impossible to gauge their “success” objectively. We know that corporations invest significant resources in compliance-related activity and that they do so in order to take advantage of the various benefits promised by leniency regimes. We cannot definitively say, however, how valuable this activity has been in reducing either the incidence or severity of harms associated with corporate misconduct.
Notwithstanding these blind spots, recent developments in the Department of Justice’s stance towards corporate offenders provides valuable insight on the structural design of a leniency program. Message framing, precision of benefit, and the scope and centralization of the entity that administers a leniency program play important roles in how well the program is received by its intended targets and how long it survives. If the program’s popularity and longevity says something about its success, then these design factors merit closer attention.
Using the Department of Justice’s Yates Memo and FCPA Pilot Program as demonstrative examples, this book chapter excavates the framing and design factors that influence a leniency program’s performance. Carrots seemingly work better than sticks; and centralization of authority appears to better facilitate relationships between government enforcers and corporate representatives.
But that is not the end of the story. To the outside world, flexible leniency programs can appear clubby, weak and under-effective. The very design elements that generate trust between corporate targets and government enforcers may simultaneously sow credibility problems with the greater public. This conundrum will remain a core issue for policymakers as they continue to implement, shape and tinker with corporate leniency programs.
That last paragraph rings true to me in so many ways. The remainder of the abstract also raises some great points that engage my interest. Looks like I am adding this to my summer reading list!
Thursday, April 9, 2020
Congressional securities trading has attracted a good bit of attention after controversial trades by Senators Burr and Loeffler. The scrutiny has even drawn more attention to another surprisingly well-timed trade by Senator Burr.
In his essay, Shill takes up the issue from a policy perspective, looking at how we ought to regulate Congressional Securities Trading. He draws from ordinary securities regulation and suggest pulling over the trading plan approach and short-swing profit prohibition we use for corporate executives. This approach should help manage ordinary securities transactions by members of Congress and their staff. He also advocates for limiting Congressional investing to U.S. index funds and treasuries. This would reduce the incentive to favor one market participant over another.
The proposed reforms would be a substantial improvement over the status quo. We should not have legislators with significant financial incentives to favor one company over another when making law and setting policy. We should also not subsidize public service by tolerating Congressional trading on Congressional information.
Of course, we'll still face some implementation challenges. When and how would we require newly-elected and currently-serving officials to liquidate existing portfolios? What kinds of exceptions would we make for private-company investments where no ready, liquid market exists? These implementation challenges strike me as mild compared to the benefits.
And Congressional adoption of the proposal would certainly yield substantial benefits. Although difficult to quantify, two broad benefits seem clear. First, adopting the proposal would generally increase confidence in government's integrity. As we're seeing with the pandemic, public trust in public officials can shift how society responds in times of collective crisis.
Allowing federal officials to trade securities generates real harm, confusion, and suspicion. Consider the hubbub over Trump's indirect ownership of a tiny stake in drug-maker Sanofi. Some have seized on the small, indirect interest to contend that he now hypes a particular drug for personal gain. A public-trust-focused regime limiting all elected officials to only broad index funds and U.S. Treasuries would likely cut down on the fear that officials recommend particular things to the public because of their economic interests. To be clear, it strikes me as extremely unlikely that the President now hypes the drug because of his minuscule ownership stake. The much likelier explanation is simply disordered magical thinking.
Many politicians have been targeted by similar attacks. This particular type of ill-informed charge has also been leveled at Senator Elizabeth Warren. One deeply misleading headline claimed she "invested in private prisons" before going on to explain that she owned a Vanguard index fund. It would be better to remove this line of attack entirely by sharply limiting the ways public officials invest.
Limiting Congressional ownership would also advance another vital national interest by increasing confidence in American securities markets. Our ability to attract capital and move it from investors to the real economy depends on confidence in the system. If investors fear that Congressional insiders have a leg up, they may not be as likely to participate in our markets.
As Congress considers how to regulate on these issues in the future, it should pay close attention to Shill's recommendations.
Friday, May 10, 2019
Join me in Miami, June 26-28.
June 26-28, 2019
Managing Compliance Across Borders is a program for world-wide compliance, risk and audit professionals to discuss current developments and hot topics (e.g. cybersecurity, data protection, privacy, data analytics, regulation, FCPA and more) affecting compliance practice in the U.S., Canada, Europe, and Latin America. Learn more
See a Snapshot: Who Will Be There?
Learn More: Visit the website for updated speaker information, schedule and topic details.
This program is designed and presented in collaboration with our partner in Switzerland
May 10, 2019 in Compliance, Conferences, Corporate Governance, Corporations, CSR, Current Affairs, Ethics, Financial Markets, International Business, Law Firms, Law School, Marcia Narine Weldon, White Collar Crime | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, March 28, 2019
According to people with knowledge of the cases, once Nike heard Mr. Avenatti’s claims, it acted to inform federal officials of the allegation that the company’s employees were paying players. The nature of the discussion with Mr. Avenatti raised the possibility that extortion was taking place.
Monday, February 4, 2019
This from our friend Heather Johnson at Hofstra Law:
This May and June, Hofstra Law will offer a three-credit or five-credit study abroad program on International Financial Crimes and Global Data Regulation. Both programs will begin Sunday, May 19; the three-credit program will conclude on June 1, 2019 and the five-credit program will conclude on June 13, 2019. The courses will be taught by Hofstra University School of Law Professor Scott Colesanti and Professor Giovanni Comande from the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna.
It will be held in Pisa, Italy, and is co-sponsored by the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna. This year, we have added a dinner with the Dean of our Law School, Gail Prudenti and an excursion to Milan to visit the Borsa headquarters!
The deadline is Friday, March 29, 2019 — those interested should apply as soon as possible!
The course is open to law students around the country; students must have completed their full-time 1L course work by the start of this program. Attached to this e-mail you’ll find the up-to-date application, a poster about the program as well as the tentative schedule. Interested students should apply by AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
Students joining us from other universities should have these credits verified to transfer to your home institution, submit a letter of good standing to our office and work with financial services to complete a consortium agreement. Feel free to reach out to me with any questions regarding the above information.
Heather N. Johnson, M.A. International Education
Assistant Director of International Programs and Student Affairs Coordinator
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University
121 Hofstra University, Suite 203 | Hempstead, NY 11549
Heather.N.Johnson@hofstra.edu | Phone: (516) 463-0417 |Fax: (516) 463-4710
Sounds like a great opportunity for the right student. Contact Heather for more information.
Monday, March 12, 2018
As I read recent news reports (starting a bit over a week ago and exemplified by stories here, here, here, and here--with the original story featured here) about Carl Icahn's well-timed sale of Manitowoc Company, Inc. stock, I could not help but associate the Icahn/Manitowoc intrigue with the Stewart/ImClone affair from back in the early days of the new millennium--more than 15 years ago. As many of you know, I spent a fair bit of time researching and writing on Martha Stewart's legal troubles relating to her December 2001 sale of ImClone Systems, Inc. stock. Eventually, I coauthored and edited a law teaching text focusing on some of the key issues. A bit of my Martha Stewart work is featured in that book; much of the rest can be found on my SSRN author page. For those who may not recall or know about the Stewart/ImClone matter, the SEC's press release relating to its insider trading enforcement action against Stewart is here, and it supplies some relevant background. (Btw, ImClone apparently is now a privately held subsidiary of Eli Lilly and Company organized as an LLC.)
In reading about Icahn's Manitowoc stock sale, my thoughts drifted back to Stewart's ImClone stock sale because of salient parallels in the early public revelations. Just as Icahn had personal and professional connections with U.S. government officials who were aware of material nonpublic information regarding the later-announced imposition of steel tariffs, Martha Stewart had personal and professional connections with at least one member of ImClone management who was aware of impending negative news from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration regarding ImClone's flagship product. We know from the law itself and Stewart/ImClone fiasco not to jump to conclusions about insider trading liability from such scant facts. Stewart's insider trading case ended up being settled. (No, that's not why she went to jail . . . .) And I have argued in a book chapter (Chapter 4 of this book) that the facts associated with Stewart's stock sale may well have revealed that she did not violate U.S. insider trading prohibitions under Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Dirks v. SEC and Salman v. United States advise us that a tippee trading while in possession of material nonpublic information only violates U.S. insider trading prohibitions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if:
- disclosure of the material nonpublic information in the tippee's possession breached a duty of trust and confidence because it was shared (directly or indirectly) with the tippee improperly--typically (although perhaps not always--as I note and argue in a forthcoming essay) because the duty-bearing tipper benefitted in some way from disclosure of the information; and
- the tippee knew or should have known that the tipper breached his or her duty of trust and confidence.
See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
Thus, there is much more to tease out in terms of the facts of the Icahn/Manitowoc scenario before we can even begin to assert potential insider trading liability. Among the unanswered questions:
- what Icahn knew and when he knew it;
- whether any information disclosed to Icahn was material and nonpublic;
- who disclosed the information to Icahn and whether anyone directly or indirectly making disclosures to him had a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence;
- whether any disclosures directly or indirectly made to Icahn were inappropriate and, therefore, breached the tipper's fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence; and
- whether Icahn knew or should have known that the information he received was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence.
Icahn denies having any information about the Trump administration's imposition of tariffs on the steel industry. (See, e.g., here.) And the nature of the duties of trust and confidence owed by government officials is somewhat contended (although Donna Nagy's work in this area holds great sway with me). Regardless, it is simply too soon to tell whether Icahn has any U.S. insider trading liability exposure based on current news reports. I assume ongoing inquiries will result in more facts being adduced and made public. This post may serve as a guide for the digestion of those additoonal facts as they are revealed. In the mean time, feel free to leave your observations and questions in the comments.
Tuesday, October 31, 2017
When the indictment for Paul Manafort and Richard Gates was released yesterday, I decided to take a look, in part because I read that the charges included claims that the defendants "laundered money through scores of United States and foreign corporations, partnerships, and bank accounts." (Manafort Indictment ¶ 1.)
It did not take long for people to note an initial mistake in the indictment. The indictment states that Yulia Tymoshenko was the president of the Ukraine prior to Viktor Yanukovych. (Id. ¶ 22.) But, Dan Abrams' Law Newz notes, "Tymoshenko has never been the president of the Ukraine. She ran in the Ukrainian presidential election against Yanukoych in 2010 and came in second. Tymoshenko ran again in 2014 and came in second then, too." Abrams continues:
The Tymoshenko flub is a massive error of fact, but it doesn’t impinge much–if any–on the narrative contained in the indictment itself. The error doesn’t really bear upon the background facts related to Manafort’s and Gates’ alleged crimes. The error also doesn’t bear whatsoever upon the laws Manafort and Gates are accused of breaking. Rather, it’s an error which bears upon the credibility of the team now seeking to prosecute the men named in the indictment.
Perhaps. It is a high-profile mistake, but it doesn't go to the core of the charges, so I think this may overstate it a bit. Still, it is hardly ideal, and it's definitely an unforced error. And unfortunately, there is a second such error.
Paragraph 12 of the indictment provides a chart of entities that were "owned or controlled" by the defendants. The chart headings provide "Entity Name," "Date Created," and "Incorporation Location." But a number of the entities are not corporations. They are LLCs, and you do not "incorporate" an LLC. You form an LLC. (Also, just to be clear, LLCs are not "partnerships," either. They are LLCs.)
Similar to the Tymoshenko error, the type of entity does not appear to impact the underlying narrative or charges. For example, entity type does not appear to impact the "conspiracy to launder money" count. And other jurisdictions, such as Cyprus, do tend to merge the corporate concept with the company concepts in a way that might make the chart headings less wrong than it is for U.S. entities. Nonetheless, it would not have been that hard to go with "Entity Origin" or "Formation Location."
Okay, so all of this is rather nitpicky, and I get that. The underlying charges are serious, and I hope and expect that the charges and the surrounding facts (not these mistakes) will be the focus of the legal process as it runs its course. But, it is also proper, I think, to work toward getting the entire document right. Details matter, and at some point could mean the difference between winning and losing, even if that does not appear to be the case this time around.
Thursday, August 31, 2017
Uber has a new CEO. Perhaps his first task should be to require one of his legal or compliance staff to attend the FCPA conference at Texas A & M in October given the new reports of an alleged DOJ investigation.. I might have some advice, but Uber needs to hear the lessons learned from Walmart, who will be sending its Chief Compliance Officer. Thanks to FCPA expert, Mike Koehler, aka the FCPA Professor, for inviting me. Mike has done some great blogging about the Walmart case (FYI- the company has reported spending $865 million on fees related to the FCPA and compliance-related costs). Details are below:
THE FCPA TURNS 40:
AN ASSESSMENT OF FCPA ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
Thursday, October 12, 2017
Texas A&M University School of Law
Fort Worth, Texas
This conference brings together Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement officials, experienced FCPA practitioners, and leading FCPA academics and scholars to discuss the many legal and policy issues relevant to the current FCPA enforcement and compliance landscape.Register here
Registration, 8:30 a.m.
Morning Session, 9:00 a.m. to Noon
FCPA Legal and Policy Issues
- Daniel Chow, Professor, Ohio State School of Law
China’s Crackdown on Government Corruption and the FCPA
- Mike Koehler, Professor, Southern Illinois School of Law
Has the FCPA Been Successful In Achieving Its Objectives?
- Peter Reilly, Associate Professor, Texas A&M School of Law
The Fokker Circuit Court Opinion and Deferred Prosecution of FCPA Matters
- Juliet Sorensen, Professor, Northwestern School of Law
The Phenomenon of an Outsize Number of Male Defendants Charged with Federal Crimes of Corruption
- Marcia Narine Weldon, Professor, Univ. of Miami School of Law
What the U.S. Can Learn from Enforcement in Other Jurisdictions and What Other Jurisdictions Can Learn from Us
Luncheon, Noon to 1:00 p.m.
Afternoon Session, 1:00 to 3:00 p.m.
(1:00 to 2:00 p.m.)
- Jay Jorgensen
Executive Vice President, Global Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer, Walmart
Follow-up panel (2:00 to 3:00 p.m.):
FCPA Enforcement and Compliance Landscape: Past, Present, and Future
- Kit Addleman, Attorney, Haynes and Boone LLP, Dallas and Fort Worth Offices
- Jason Lewis, Attorney, Greenberg Traurig LLP, Dallas Office
Saturday, August 5, 2017
I have been at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) conference all week. As usual, there have been too many program offerings important to my scholarship and teaching. I have participated in and attended so many things. I am exhausted.
But I know that all of this activity also energizes me. Once I am back at home tomorrow night and get a good night's sleep, I will be ready to rock and roll into the new academic year (which starts for us at UT Law in a few weeks). I use the SEALS conference as this bridge to the new year every summer.
One of my favorite discussion groups at the conference was the White Collar Crime discussion group that John Anderson and I organized. A number of us focused on insider trading law this year. John, for example, shared his preliminary draft of an insider trading statute. I asked folks to ponder the result under U.S. insider trading law of a tipping case with the following general facts:
- A person with a fiduciary duty of trust and confidence to a principal conveys material nonpublic information obtained through the fiduciary relationship to a third person;
- The recipient of the information is someone with whom the fiduciary has no prior familial or friendship relationship;
- The conveyance is made to the recipient by the fiduciary without the consent of the principal;
- The conveyance is made to the recipient gratuitously;
- The fiduciary’s purpose in conveying the information is to benefit the recipient;
- Specifically, the fiduciary knows that the recipient has the ability and incentive to trade on the information or convey it to others who have the ability and incentive to trade; and
- The fiduciary has clear knowledge and understanding of resulting detriment to the principal.
The question, of course, is whether the fiduciary has engaged in deception that constitutes a willful violation of insider trading proscriptions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The answer, based on what we now know under U.S. insider trading law, depends on whether the fiduciary's sharing of information is improper. What do you think? I shared my views and others in the group shared theirs. I may have more to say on this problem and my related work in a later post.
Monday, May 1, 2017
A bit more than a year ago, I had the opportunity to participate in a conference on corporate criminal liability at the Stetson University College of Law. The short papers from the conference were published in a subsequent issue of the Stetson Law Review. This was the second time that Ellen Podgor, a friend and white collar crime scholar on the Stetson Law faculty, invited me to produce a short work on corporate criminal liability for publication in a dedicated edition of the Stetson Law Review. (The first piece I published in the Stetson Law Review reflected on corporate personhood in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's Citizen's United opinion. It has been downloaded and cited a surprising number of times. So, I welcomed the opportunity to publish with the law review a second time.)
For the 2016 conference, I chose to focus on the reckless conduct of employees and its capacity to generate corporate criminal insider trading liability for the employer. The abstract for the resulting paper, (Not) Holding Firms Criminally Responsible for the Reckless Insider Trading of their Employees (recently posted to SSRN), is as follows:
Criminal enforcement of the insider trading prohibitions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 is the root of corporate criminal liability for insider trading in the United States. In the wake of assertions that S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P. actively encouraged the unlawful use of material nonpublic information in the conduct of its business, the line between employer and employee criminal liability for insider trading becomes both tenuous and salient. An essential question emerges: when do we criminally prosecute the firm for the unlawful conduct of its employees?
The possibility that reckless employee conduct may result in the employer's willful violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 (and, therefore, criminal liability for that employer firm) motivates this article. The article first reviews the basis for criminal enforcement of the insider trading prohibitions established in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 and describes the basis and rationale for corporate criminal liability (a liability that derives from the activities of agents undertaken in the course of the firm’s business). Then, it reflects on that basis and rationale by identifying the potential for corporate criminal liability for the reckless insider trading violations of employees under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, arguing against that liability, and suggesting ways to eliminate it.
I was not the only conference participant concerned about the criminal liability of an employer for the insider trading conduct of an employee. John Anderson, who co-led an insider trading discussion group with me at the 2017 Association of American Law Schools annual meeting back in January and also enjoys exploring criminal insider trading issues, contributed his research on the overcriminalization of insider trading at the conference. His paper, When Does Corporate Criminal Liability for Insider Trading Make Sense?, identifies the same overall problem as my article does (employer criminal liability for insider trading based on employee conduct). However, he views both the problem and the potential solutions more broadly.
Tuesday, December 6, 2016
In a relatively brief opinion released this morning, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's judgment in Salman v. United States. The decision of the Court was unanimous. The big take-aways include:
- doctrinally, the Court's complete, unquestioning reliance on the language in Dirks v. Sec's Exch. Comm'n, 463 U. S. 646 (1983), as to when the sharing of information through a tip is improper, and therefore a basis for insider trading liability (quoting from the text on page 662 of the Dirks opinion: “'[T]he test,' we explained, 'is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.'”);
- factually, the emphasis placed by the Court on the value proposition represented by the information-sharing between the close brothers, Maher and Michael--that information passed on with the knowledge that it will be traded on was effectively a substitute for a monetary gift ("In one of their tipper-tippee interactions, Michael asked Maher for a favor, declined Maher’s offer of money, and instead requested and received lucrative trading information."), noting "[a]s Salman’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument, Maher would have breached his duty had he personally traded on the information here himself then given the proceeds as a gift to his brother.";
- constitutionally, the Court finding no vagueness ("Dirks created a simple and clear 'guiding principle' for determining tippee liability") and also rejecting on a similar basis application of the rule of lenity; and
- procedurally, because of the Court's ruling on the merits, the Court finding the jury instructions entirely proper.
The opinion offers some clarity on the application of U.S. insider trading doctrine by unanimously affirming the "gift" language from Dirks in a solid way: "To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of a 'pecuniary or similarly valuable nature' in exchange for a gift to family or friends, . . . we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks." Having said that, the Court also hints in several places that the facts in these cases do matter. The following quote is particularly relevant in this respect:
Salman’s conduct is in the heartland of Dirks’s rule concerning gifts. It remains the case that “[d]etermining whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be easy for courts.” . . . But there is no need for us to address those difficult cases today, because this case involves "precisely the ‘gift of confidential information to a trading relative’ that Dirks envisioned.”
In that context, the Court reminds us that "the disclosure of confidential information without personal benefit is not enough." This, indeed, places continuing pressure on the nature of the relationship between the tipper and the tippee and other facts relevant to the transmission of the information, all of which must be ascertained and then proven at trial. And so, it goes on . . . .
Thursday, November 10, 2016
I have been on hiatus for a few weeks, and had planned to post today about the compliance and corporate governance issues related to Wells Fargo. However, I have decided to delay posting on that topic in light of the unexpected election results and how it affects my research and work.
I am serving as a panelist and a moderator at the ABA's annual Labor and Employment meeting tomorrow. Our topic is Advising Clients in Whistleblower Investigations. In our discussions and emails prior to the conference, we never raised the election in part because, based on the polls, no one expected Donald Trump to win. Now, of course, we have to address this unexpected development in light of the President-elect's public statements that he plans to dismantle much of President Obama's legacy, including a number of his executive orders.
President-elect Trump's plan for his first 100 days includes, among other things: a hiring freeze on all federal employees to reduce federal workforce though attrition (exempting military, public safety, and public health); a requirement that for every new federal regulation, two existing regulations must be eliminated; renegotiation or withdrawal from NAFTA; withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership; canceling "every unconstitutional executive action, memorandum and order issued by President Obama; and a number of rules related to lobbyists and special interests.
Plaintiffs' lawyers I have spoken to at this conference so far are pessimistic that standards will become even more pro-business and thus more difficult to bring cases. That's probably true. However, I have the following broader business-law related questions:
- What will happen to Dodd-Frank? There are already a number of house bills pending to repeal parts of Dodd-Frank, but will President Trump actually try to repeal all of it, particularly the Dodd-Frank whistleblower rule? How would that look optically? Former SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins, a prominent critic of Dodd-Frank and the whistleblower program in particular, is part of Trump's transition team on economic issues, so perhaps a revision, at a minumum, may not be out of the question.
2. What will happen with the two SEC commissioner vacancies? How will this president and Congress fund the agency?
3. Will SEC Chair Mary Jo White stay or go and how might that affect the work of the agency to look at disclosure reform?
4. How will the vow to freeze the federal workforce affect OSHA, which enforces Sarbanes-Oxley?
5. In addition to the issues that Trump has with TPP and NAFTA, how will his administration and the Congress deal with the Export-Import (Ex-IM) bank, which cannot function properly as it is due to resistance from some in Congress. Ex-Im provides financing, export credit insurance, loans, and other products to companies (including many small businesses) that wish to do business in politically-risky countries.
6. How will a more conservative Supreme Court deal with the business cases that will appear before it?
7. Who will be the Attorney General and how might that affect criminal prosecution of companies and individuals? Should we expect a new memo or revision of policies for Assistant US Attorneys that might undo some of the work of the Yates Memo, which focuses on corporate cooperation and culpable individuals?
8. What will happen with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which the DC Circuit recently ruled was unconstitutional in terms of its structure and power?
9. What will happen with the Obama administration's executive orders on Cuba, which have chipped away at much of the embargo? The business community has lobbied hard on ending the embargo and eliminating restrictions, but Trump has pledged to require more from the Cuban government. Would he also cancel the executive orders as well?
10. What happens to the Public Company Accounting Board, which has had an interim director for several months?
11. Jeb Henserling, who has adamantly opposed Ex-Im, the CFPB, and Dodd-Frank is under consideration for Treasury Secretary. What does this say about President-elect Trump's economic vision?
Of course, there are many more questions and I have no answers but I will be interested to see how future announcements affect the world financial markets, which as of the time of this writing appear to have calmed down.
November 10, 2016 in Compliance, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Financial Markets, International Law, Legislation, Marcia Narine Weldon, Securities Regulation, White Collar Crime | Permalink | Comments (2)
Tuesday, August 30, 2016
Although we review claims of insufficiency de novo, United States v. Harvey, 746 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2014), it is well recognized that “a defendant mounting such a challenge bears a heavy burden” because “in assessing whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all inferences in the government's favor and deferring to the jury's assessments of the witnesses' credibility.” . . .
[W]e reject Jasmin's challenge to her Hobbs Act conviction. The evidence presented at trial more than sufficiently describes the consideration received by Jasmin in exchange for her official actions as Mayor, including the $5,000 in cash from Stern, “advance” cash for their partnership, and shares in the limited liability corporation that would develop the community center.
Friday, August 19, 2016
The concept of private prisons has always seemed off to me. Prisons have a role in society, but the idea of running such institutions for profit, it seems to me, aligns incentives in an improper way. The U.S. Justice Department apparently agrees and said yesterday that it plans to end the use of private prisons. The announcement sent stocks tumbling for two private prison companies, Corrections Corp. of America (CCA) and GEO. Both dropped as much as 40% and remain down more than 30% from where they were before the announcement.
Obviously, this can't make shareholders happy, but I figured this had to be a known risk. I was right -- CCA's 10-K makes clear that such government decisions related to future contracts could lead to a reduction in their profitability. So, the disclosure seems proper from a securities regulation perspective. Still, reading the disclosure raises some serious questions for me about the proper role of government. I frankly find this kind of outsourcing chilling. For example, CCA states:
Our results of operations are dependent on revenues generated by our jails, prisons, and detention facilities, which are subject to the following risks associated with the corrections and detention industry.
We are subject to fluctuations in occupancy levels, and a decrease in occupancy levels could cause a decrease in revenues and profitability. . . . We are dependent upon the governmental agencies with which we have contracts to provide inmates for our managed facilities.
. . . .
We are dependent on government appropriations and our results of operations may be negatively affected by governmental budgetary challenges. . . . [and] our customers could reduce inmate population levels in facilities we own or manage to contain their correctional costs. . . .
The idea of "customers" in this contest simply does not sit well with me. It suggests a desire for something that is not a positive. CCA's 10-K continues:
Competition for inmates may adversely affect the profitability of our business. We compete with government entities and other private operators on the basis of bed availability, cost, quality, and range of services offered, experience in managing facilities and reputation of management and personnel. While there are barriers to entering the market for the ownership and management of correctional and detention facilities, these barriers may not be sufficient to limit additional competition. In addition, our government customers may assume the management of a facility that they own and we currently manage for them upon the termination of the corresponding management contract or, if such customers have capacity at their facilities, may take inmates currently housed in our facilities and transfer them to government-run facilities. . . .
Competition is a good thing in many (I think most), but this is not one of them. These companies are responding to the existing demand for prison services, but there can be no question the real opportunity for market growth is to increase demand for such services (e.g., increase the number of prisoners, seek longer sentences). This, too, is made clear in the disclosures:
Our growth is generally dependent upon our ability to obtain new contracts to develop and manage new correctional and detention facilities. This possible growth depends on a number of factors we cannot control, including crime rates and sentencing patterns in various jurisdictions, governmental budgetary constraints, and governmental and public acceptance of privatization. The demand for our facilities and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation of enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction or parole standards and sentencing practices or through the decriminalization of certain activities that are currently proscribed by criminal laws. For instance, any changes with respect to drugs and controlled substances or illegal immigration could affect the number of persons arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby potentially reducing demand for correctional facilities to house them. Immigration reform laws are currently a focus for legislators and politicians at the federal, state, and local level. Legislation has also been proposed in numerous jurisdictions that could lower minimum sentences for some non-violent crimes and make more inmates eligible for early release based on good behavior. Also, sentencing alternatives under consideration could put some offenders on probation with electronic monitoring who would otherwise be incarcerated. Similarly, reductions in crime rates or resources dedicated to prevent and enforce crime could lead to reductions in arrests, convictions and sentences requiring incarceration at correctional facilities.
CCA does note that their "policy prohibits [them] from engaging in lobbying or advocacy efforts that would influence enforcement efforts, parole standards, criminal laws, and sentencing policies." These disclosures, though, sure make clear what kind of policies their shareholders would want to support.
I don't have any illusion that government run prisons are much (if any) better, but I do think that government's incentives are at least supposed to be aligned with the public good when it comes to the prison system. I often think government should take a more limited role than it does when it comes to regulations. That is especially true when it comes to criminal law. But privatizing prisons is not reducing the role of government in our lives -- it is simply outsourcing one key portion of the government's role. Private prisons do not equate to smaller government. Fewer laws, or relaxed enforcement and punishment, do. If the government is paying for it, it's still a government program.
Here's hoping that the reduction in use of private prisons leads to a reduction in the use of all prisons. Let's save those for truly the dangerous folks.
Wednesday, August 3, 2016
The Federal Reserve Board announced its enforcement actions against Goldman Sachs from 2012-2014 events where a Goldman Sachs banker, a former NY Fed employee, received confidential documents from a NY Fed employee. The individuals involved plead guilty to the resulting charges and Goldman Sachs paid fines in New York. The Federal Reserve Board took separate actions this week based upon evidence that the banker "repeatedly obtained, used and disseminated [confidential supervisory information or CSI] ... including CSI concerning financial institutions’ confidential CAMELS ratings, non-public enforcement actions, and confidential documents prepared by banking regulators." Even though Goldman Sachs terminated the banker involved and reported the matter to authorities, apparently the misconduct was sustained over a long-enough period of time and used to "solicit business" in a way that compelled Federal Reserve Board Action.
The Fed's release and copies of the orders are available here. The sanctions against Goldman Sachs include the monetary fine as well a requirement to 'Within 90 days of this Order, ...submit to the Board of Governors an acceptable written plan, and timeline for implementation, to enhance the effectiveness of the internal controls and compliance functions regarding the identification, monitoring, and control of confidential supervisory information."
Financial press coverage of the matter is available in a variety of outlets:
Thursday, July 14, 2016
Two weeks ago, I blogged about the potential unintended consequences of (1) Dodd-Frank whistleblower awards to compliance officers and in-house counsel and (2) the Department of Justice’s Yates Memo, which requires companies to turn over individuals (even before they have determined they are legally culpable) in order to get any cooperation credit from the government.
Today at the International Legal Ethics Conference, I spoke about the intersection of state ethics laws, common law fiduciary duties, SOX §307 and §806, and the potential erosion of the attorney-client relationship. I posed the following questions regarding lawyer/whistleblowers and the Yates Memo at the end of my talk:
- How will this affect Upjohn warnings? (These are the corporate Miranda warnings and were hard enough for me to administer without me having to tell the employee that I might have to turn them over to the government after our conversation)
- Will corporate employees ask for their own counsel during investigations or plead the 5th since they now run a real risk of being criminally and civilly prosecuted by DOJ?
- Will companies have to pay for separate counsel for certain employees and must that payment be disclosed to DOJ?
- Will companies turn people over to the government before proper investigations are completed just to save the company?
- Will executives cooperate in an investigation? Why should they?
- What’s the intersection with the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine (which Stephen Bainbridge has already criticized as "running amok")?
- Will there be more claims/denials for D & O coverage?
- Will individuals who cooperate get cooperation credit in their own cases?
- Will employees turn on their superiors without proper investigation?
- How will individuals/companies deal with parallel civil/criminal enforcement proceedings?
- What about indemnification clauses in employment contracts?
- Will there be more trials because there is little incentive for a corporation to plead guilty?
- What about data privacy restrictions for multinationals who operate in EU?
- How will this affect voluntary disclosure under the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants, especially in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act cases?
- What ‘s the impact on joint defense agreements?
- As a lawyer for lawyers who want to be whistleblowers, can you ever advise them to take the chance of losing their license?
I didn’t have time to talk about the added complication of potential director liability under Caremark and its progeny. During my compliance officer days, I used Caremark’s name in vain to get more staff, budget, and board access so that I could train them on the basics on the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. I explained to the Board that this line of cases required them to have some level of oversight over an effective compliance program. Among other things, Caremark required a program with “timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning the [company’s] compliance with law and its business performance.”
I, like other compliance officers, often reviewed/re-tooled our compliance program after another company had negotiated a deferred or nonprosecution agreement with the government. These DPAs had an appendix with everything that the offending company had to do to avoid prosecution. Rarely, if ever, did the DPA mention an individual wrongdoer, and that’s been the main criticism and likely the genesis of the Yates Memo.
Boards will now likely have to take more of a proactive leadership role in demanding investigations at an early stage rather than relying on the GC or compliance officer to inform them of what has already occurred. Boards may need to hire their own counsel to advise on them on this and/or require the general counsel to have outside counsel conduct internal investigations at the outset. This leads to other interesting questions. For example, what happens if executives retain their own counsel and refuse to participate in an investigation that the Board requests? Should the Board designate a special committee (similar to an SLC in the shareholder derivative context) to make sure that there is no taint in the investigation or recommendations? At what point will the investigation become a reportable event for a public company? Will individual board members themselves lawyer up?
I will definitely have a lot to write about this Fall. If you have any thoughts leave them below or email me at email@example.com.
July 14, 2016 in Compliance, Conferences, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Ethics, Lawyering, Marcia Narine Weldon, Securities Regulation, Shareholders, White Collar Crime | Permalink | Comments (1)
Friday, July 1, 2016
This post concerns the rights and responsibilities of whistleblowers. I sit on the Department of Labor Whistleblower Protection Advisory Committee. These views are solely my own.
Within a week of my last day as a Deputy General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer for a Fortune 500 company and shortly before starting my VAP in academia, I testified before the House Financial Services Committee on the potential unintended consequences of the proposed Dodd-Frank whistleblower law on compliance programs. I blogged here about my testimony and the rule, which allows whistleblowers who provide original information to the SEC related to securities fraud or violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to receive 10 to 30 percent of the amount of the recovery in any action in which the Commission levies sanctions in excess of $1 million dollars. During my testimony in 2011, I explained to some skeptical members of Congress that:
…the legislation as written has a loophole that could allow legal, compliance, audit, and other fiduciaries to collect the bounty although they are already professionally obligated to address these issues. While the whistleblower community believes that these fiduciaries are in the best position to report to the SEC on wrongdoing, as a former in house counsel and compliance officer, I believe that those with a fiduciary duty should be excluded and have an “up before out” requirement to inform the general counsel, compliance officer or board of the substantive allegation or any inadequacy in the compliance program before reporting externally.
Thankfully, the final rule does have some limitations, in part, I believe because of my testimony and the urgings of the Association of Corporate Counsel, the American Bar Association and others. In a section of the SEC press release on the program discussing unintended consequences released a few weeks after the testimony, the agency stated:
However, in certain circumstances, compliance and internal audit personnel as well as public accountants could become whistleblowers when:
- The whistleblower believes disclosure may prevent substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the entity or investors.
- The whistleblower believes that the entity is engaging in conduct that will impede an investigation.
- At least 120 days have elapsed since the whistleblower reported the information to his or her supervisor or the entity’s audit committee, chief legal officer, chief compliance officer – or at least 120 days have elapsed since the whistleblower received the information, if the whistleblower received it under circumstances indicating that these people are already aware of the information.
At least two compliance officers or internal audit personnel have in fact received awards—one for $300,000 and another for $1,500,000. When I served on a panel a couple of years ago with Sean McKessy, Chief of the Office of the Whistleblower, he made it clear that he expected lawyers, auditors, and compliance officers to step forward and would not hesitate to award them.
Compliance officers have even more incentive to be diligent (or become whistleblowers) because of the DOJ Yates Memo, which requires companies to serve up a high ranking employee in order for the company to get cooperation credit in a criminal investigation. I blogged about my concerns about the Memo’s effect on the attorney-client relationship here, stating:
The Yates memo raises a lot of questions. What does this mean in practice for compliance officers and in house counsel? How will this development change in-house investigations? Will corporate employees ask for their own counsel during investigations or plead the 5th since they now run a real risk of being criminally and civilly prosecuted by DOJ? Will companies have to pay for separate counsel for certain employees and must that payment be disclosed to DOJ? What impact will this memo have on attorney-client privilege? How will the relationship between compliance officers and their in-house clients change? Compliance officers are already entitled to whistleblower awards from the SEC provided they meet certain criteria. Will the Yates memo further complicate that relationship between the compliance officer and the company if the compliance personnel believe that the company is trying to shield a high profile executive during an investigation?
The US Chamber of Commerce shares my concerns and issued a report last month that echoes the thoughts of a number of defense attorneys I know. I will be discussing these themes and the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower aspect at the International Legal Ethics Conference on July 14th at Fordham described below:
Current Trends in Prosecutorial Ethics and Regulation
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cardozo School of Law (US) (Moderator); Tamara Lave, University of Miami Law School (US); Marcia Narine, St. Thomas University School of Law (US);Lawrence Hellman, Oklahoma City University School of Law (US); Lissa Griffin, Pace University Law School (US); Kellie Toole, Adelaide Law School (Australia); and Eric Fish,Yale Law School (US)
Nationally and internationally, prosecutors' offices face new, as well as ongoing, challenges and their exercise of discretion significantly affects individuals and entities. This panel will explore a wide range of issues confronting the modern prosecutor. This will include certain ethical obligations in handling cases, organizational responsibility for wrongful convictions, the impact of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in whistleblower cases, and the cultural shifts in prosecutors' offices.
To be clear, I believe that more corporate employees must go to jail to punish if not deter abuses. But I think that these mechanisms are the wrong way to accomplish that goal and may have a chilling effect on the internal investigations that are vital to rooting out wrongdoing. If you have any thoughts about these topics, please leave them below or email me at firstname.lastname@example.org. My talk and eventual paper will also address the relationship between Sarbanes-Oxley, the state ethical rules, and the Catch-22 that in house counsel face because of the conflicting rules and the realities of modern day corporate life.
July 1, 2016 in Compliance, Conferences, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Ethics, Financial Markets, Lawyering, Marcia Narine Weldon, Securities Regulation, White Collar Crime | Permalink | Comments (1)
Monday, May 30, 2016
This year, my research and writing season has started off with a bang. While grading papers and exams earlier this month, I finished writing one symposium piece and first-round-edited another. Today, I will put the final touches on PowerPoint slides for a presentation I give the second week in June (submission is required today for those) and start working on slides for the presentation I will give Friday.
All of this sets into motion a summer concert conference, Barbri, and symposium tour that (somewhere along the line) got a bit complicated. Here are the cities and dates:
New Orleans, LA - June 2-5
Atlanta, GA - June 10-11
Nashville, TN - June 17
Chicago, IL - June 23-24
Seattle, WA - June 27
I know some of my co-bloggers are joining me along the way. I look forward to seeing them. Each week, I will keep you posted on current events as best I can while managing the research and writing and presentation preparations. The topics of my summer research and teaching run the gamut from insider trading (through by-law drafting, agency, unincorporated business associations, personal property, and benefit corporations) to crowdfunding. A nice round lot.
This coming week, I will be at the Law and Society Association annual conference. My presentation at this conference relates to an early-stage project on U.S. insider trading cases. The title and abstract for the project and the currently envisioned initial paper (which I would, of course, already change in a number of ways) are as follows:
May 30, 2016 in Business Associations, Conferences, Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Joan Heminway, Research/Scholarhip, Securities Regulation, Social Enterprise, Teaching, White Collar Crime, Writing | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, May 9, 2016
Thought Josephine Sandler Nelson's recent Oxford Business Law Blog post on Volkswagen might be of interest to our readers. It is reposted here with permission.
Fumigating the Criminal Bug: The Insulation of Volkswagen’s Middle Management
New headlines each day reveal wide-spread misconduct and large-scale cheating at top international companies: Volkswagen’s emissions-defeat devices installed on over eleven million cars trace back to a manager’s PowerPoint from as early as 2006. Mitsubishi admits that it has been cheating on emissions standards for the eK and Dayz model cars for the past 25 years—even after a similar scandal almost wiped out the company 15 years ago. Takata’s $70 million fine for covering up its exploding air bags in Honda, Ford, and other car brands could soon jump to $200 million if a current Department of Justice probe discovers additional infractions. The government has ordered Takata’s recall of the air bags to more than double: one out of every five cars on American roads may be affected. Now Daimler is conducting an internal investigation into potential irregularities in its exhaust compliance.
A recent case study of the 2015-16 Volkswagen (‘VW’) scandal pioneers a new way to look at these scandals by focusing on their common element: the growing insulation and entrenchment of middle management to coordinate such large-scale wrongdoing. “The Criminal Bug: Volkswagen’s Middle Management” describes how VW’s top management put pressure on the rest of the company below it to achieve results without inquiring into the methods that the agents would use to achieve those results. The willing blindness of top executives to the methods of the agents below them is conscious and calculated. Despite disclosure-based regulation’s move to strict-liability prosecutions, the record of prosecutorial failure at trial against top executives in both the U.S. and Germany demonstrates that assertions of plausible deniability succeed in protecting top executives from accountability for the pressure that they put on agents to commit wrongdoing.
Agents inside VW receive the message loud and clear that they are to cheat to achieve results. As even the chairman of the VW board has admitted about the company, “[t]here was a tolerance for breaking the rules”. And, contrary to VW’s assertion, no one believes that merely a “small group of engineers” is responsible for the misconduct. Only middle management at the company had the longevity and seniority to shepherd at least three different emissions-control defeat devices through engine re-designs over ten years, to hide those devices despite heavily documented software, and to coordinate even across corporate forms with an outside supplier of VW’s software and on-board computer.
The reason why illegal activity can be coordinated and grow at the level of middle management over all these years is rooted in the failure of the law to impose individual accountability on agents at this level of the corporation. Additional work by the same author on the way in which patterns of illegal behavior in the 2007-08 financial crisis re-occur in the 2015-16 settlements for manipulations of LIBOR, foreign currency exchange rates, and other parts of the financial markets indicates that middle management is further protected from accountability by regulators’ emphasis on disclosure-based enforcement. In addition, U.S. law has lost the ability to tie together the behavior of individuals within a corporation through conspiracy or other types of prosecutions.
Previous research has shown that the more prominent the firm is, and the higher the expectations for performance, the more likely the firm is to engage in illegal behavior. Now we understand more about the link between the calculated pressure that top executives put on their companies and the protection of middle management that supports the patterns of long-term, large-scale wrongdoing that inflict enormous damage on the public. It is not solely VW that needs to fumigate this criminal bug: the VW case study suggests that we need to re-think the insulation from individual liability for middle management in all types of corporations.
This post originally appeared on the Oxford Business Law Blog, May 5, 2016.
Tuesday, April 19, 2016
A recent Illinois case uniquely applied the alter ego doctrine in the context of a criminal case. See People v. Abrams, 47 N.E.3d 295, ¶¶ 57-61, 399 Ill. Dec. 790 (2015) ( slip op. PDF here ). In my view, not quite right, either.
In the case, the defendant (Abrams) stole $1.87 million from the victim (Lev), which led to a restitution order for that amount and a twelve-year prison sentence for Abrams. The conviction was for a Class 1 felony, for the the theft of property exceeding $500,000. Id.¶ 23 (citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/16-1(a(2) (West 2012)). The statute provides, "Theft of property exceeding $500,000 and not exceeding $1,000,000 in value is a Class 1 non-probationable felony." 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/16-1(b)(6.2).
On appeal, the defendant argued the indictment was wrong in that it stated the money was stolen from Lev, when most of the money actually belonged to Lev's company, The Fred Lev Company (presumably a corporation, but that is not stated expressly). Abrams claimed:
the State did not prove he obtained “unauthorized control” of more than $500,000 of Lev’s property. Abrams recognizes the evidence presented at trial established that over $1.8 million was taken. Abrams contests the finding that the entire amount was taken from Lev and not The Fred Lev Company.
Abrams, 47 N.E.3d 295 ¶ 57. The court countered: "This is a distinction without a difference. Two separate doctrines of law guide our decision." Id. Although I think the court is probably right on the outcome, one of the rationales is wrongly explained.
The court's first assertion is as follows:
First, the alter ego doctrine of corporate law was developed for and has been traditionally used by third persons injured due to their reliance on the existence of a distinct corporate entity. In re Rehabilitation of Centaur Insurance Co., 158 Ill. 2d 166, 173 (1994). “The doctrine fastens liability on the individual or entity that uses a corporation merely as an instrumentality to conduct that person’s or entity’s business.” Peetoom v. Swanson, 334 Ill. App. 3d 523, 527 (2002). In the context of “piercing the corporate veil,” an alter ego analysis starts with examining the factors which reveal how the corporation operates and the particular party’s relationship to that operation. A.G. Cullen Construction, Inc. v. Burnham Partners, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 122538, ¶ 43. Generally, did the corporation function simply as a facade for the dominant shareholder? Id. Here, without question, the corporate entity, The Fred Lev Company, served as the alter ego or business conduit of Lev, and Abrams’ own testimony confirmed it.
Id.¶ 58. This is an overreach, as far as I am concerned, and I don't like the ease with which the court uses veil piercing without a detailed analysis. I believe that veil piercing, if it is to be used, should have some consistency, though I know that's now how it tends to work (i.e., without consistency). Here, would the court have pierced the veil if this were a creditor bringing suit directly against Lev because his corporation couldn't satisfy a judgment? I think it would be wrong to do so on similar facts, so I think it is careless to apply the alter ego doctrine in this manner here.
The court continues:
Second, the indictments sufficiently apprised Abrams of the charges against him. See People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 219-20 (2005) (any variance was neither material nor prejudicial to defendant). We do not believe that the defendant was in any way prejudiced by the indictments at issue.
Id.¶ 59. I totally and completely buy this. And, in addition, the court noted:
Even more convincing is that in opening statements to the jury, defense counsel told the jury that the checking accounts “were not used solely for [Lev’s and Abrams’] corporate work. They didn’t separate the corporation from their personal lives and personal expenses. *** They were using everything that went into that corporate account and writing checks on it for their own personal private, for their own person use. There was a commingling.” Additionally, defense counsel referred to “Fred Lev and Company” as being both Abrams and Lev. In closing argument, defense counsel argued that the company was “a small-time operation” with “one corporate book” that both Lev and Abrams used as “their own personal piggybank.”
Id.¶ 60. In the trial, it was determined that the statutory felony monetary amount threshold was met. And the defendant admitted that he considered the funds to be Lev's and that he (the defendant) disregarded the entity. I see no notice problem as to the defendant, and I have no concern that a jury couldn't understand whether the theft occurred in the amount claimed. I can see an argument, perhaps, that the prosecution should still get it right as to whom the money actually belonged, but it seems to me correct to say the crime was properly analyzed and assessed as to the criminal elements, so the claim is harmless error in this instance. Lev would have been the one to assert the claim for the Company, so it is hard to see how Abrams was harmed.
I will maintain, though, that the veil piercing rationale is unnecessary and overstated. (I might be comfortable if they used the analogy to explain harmless error, but the way it was done is too much for me.) Furthermore, as to the judgment for restitution to Lev, it is wrong. That money (or some portion of it) belongs to The Fred Lev Company. Suppose there are creditors out there who have gone unpaid. Or they are unpaid down the road. At a minimum, the funds stolen from the company should go back through the company so it could be clear what funds were there and should have been available. Thus, as to the charges, I think the court probably got it right. But as to respecting the entity (and protecting creditors now, and in the future), this could have been handled better.
H/T Prof. Gary Rosin