Monday, December 9, 2019
Once again, a court seems to arrive at the correct outcome, while making mistakes in the describing entity type. As usual, the court mislabeled a limited liability company (LLC). Here we go:
Andrea and Timothy Downs each held a 50% interest in a corporation, Downs Holdings, Inc. It held limited liability corporation (“LLC”) and limited partnership (“LP”) ownership interests. Eventually, the Downs agreed to dissolve the corporation and, as shareholders, passed a corporate resolution electing dissolution.
We acknowledge that some of the bankruptcy court’s findings lack support in the record, but we ignore harmless error because the bankruptcy court’s ultimate conclusion is correct: Downs Holdings owned the relevant assets, and Ms. Downs could not pledge them to Norio as collateral for the loan.
Monday, November 25, 2019
Many of us teach Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A. 2d 814 (N.J. 1981), in Business Associations courses as an example of a substantive duty of care case. The case involves a deceased woman, Lillian Pritchard, who, in her lifetime, did nothing as a corporate director to curb her sons' conversions of corporate funds. The court finds she has breached her duty of care to the corporation, stating that:
Mrs. Pritchard was charged with the obligation of basic knowledge and supervision of the business of Pritchard & Baird. Under the circumstances, this obligation included reading and understanding financial statements, and making reasonable attempts at detection and prevention of the illegal conduct of other officers and directors. She had a duty to protect the clients of Pritchard & Baird against policies and practices that would result in the misappropriation of money they had entrusted to the corporation. She breached that duty.
Id. at 826. In sum:
by virtue of her office, Mrs. Pritchard had the power to prevent the losses sustained by the clients of Pritchard & Baird. With power comes responsibility. She had a duty to deter the depredation of the other insiders, her sons. She breached that duty and caused plaintiffs to sustain damages.
Id. at 829.
Francis is followed in our text by a number of additional fiduciary duty law cases, including Delaware's now infamous Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), and In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 907 A 2d 693 (Del. 2005). In covering these cases and discussing them with students during office hours, I became focused on the following passage from the Disney case:
The business judgment rule . . . is a presumption that "in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, . . . and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company [and its shareholders]." . . . .
This presumption can be rebutted by a showing that the board violated one of its fiduciary duties in connection with the challenged transaction. In that event, the burden shifts to the director defendants to demonstrate that the challenged transaction was "entirely fair" to the corporation and its shareholders.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 746-47 (Del. Ch. 2005). I have some significant questions about the application of the "entire fairness" standard of review in certain types of cases. In thinking those through with some of my colleagues (including a few of my co-bloggers), I realized I was curious about the answer to a related question: How would the Francis case be pleaded, proven, and decided as a breach of duty action under Delaware law?
I have my own ideas. But before I share them, I want yours. How would you categorize/label the breach(es) of duty as a matter of Delaware law? What standard of conduct and liability would you expect a Delaware court to apply as a matter of Delaware law? And what standard of review would you expect that court to use? Leave your ideas on any or all of the foregoing in the comments, please!
Monday, July 8, 2019
Avid BLPB readers may have noticed that I failed to post on Monday of last week. I was traveling from Portugal to Spain that day. I did plan to make this post then, but travel scrambles (thanks to the Porto metro) and delays (thanks to Ryanair) prevented me from getting to a computer with Internet access until late in the day. By then, I was too exhausted to post. So, you get last Monday's post this Monday! No harm done; this post is not time-sensitive.
Ever heard of Graham's port? The Graham's port lodge was founded by brothers William and John Graham back at the beginning of the 18th century. Fast-forward 150 years, and the Graham family sells the then-very-successful Graham's port business to another family. That second family still runs the Graham's business today.
But a Graham descendant still wanted to be in the port business. He thought he had a "better way." So, 11 years after the Graham family sold Graham's, John Graham (not the same one, obviously!) established the Churchill port lodge. Here's what the Churchill's website says about its formation as a business:
Churchill’s was founded in 1981 by John Graham, making it the first Port Wine Company to be established in 50 years. The Founder wanted to continue his family’s long Port tradition but at the same time create his own individual style of Port. He named the Company after his wife, Caroline Churchill.
I went to a port wine tasting at the Churchill's lodge in Vila Nova de Gaia, Portugal last Monday with my husband and daughter. We tasted the uniqueness of the Churchill's product. (My daughter, who is not a port wine fan, actually enjoyed what she tasted at Churchill's.) The wine is less sweet than one would expect from a port wine. John Graham himself explains why:
My Ports are made with as much natural fermentation, and with as little fortification brandy, as possible. I like to make wines in the most natural way. Above all I look for balance. I believe I brought this balance to Churchill’s Ports. There is a consensus around the characteristics that define our house style which are easily identified.
While we were at the tasting, we took a tour and learned the basic facts I relate here.
I was enchanted by the business story! Headline: A Graham founds Churchill's after the Graham family sells Graham's. A bit confusing, but a great narrative involving family business, M&A (and corporate finance more generally), intellectual property, business formation, and more. We learned, for example, that the grapes are foot-treaded (stomped on by human feet). Imagine the interesting employment questions. (The shifts are twelve hours and there are stems and seeds in with the grapes . . . .) And the tasting is still done by John Graham himself, raising questions about key man insurance and business succession planning. (We were told that John Graham has chosen a successor taster--not a member of the family. But we did not ask about management.) Finally, a major real estate acquisition--buying a vineyard (Quinta da Gricha) with a special terroir--is part of the tale.
I am scheming to find ways to integrate what I learned into my teaching this year. I know I will find places to work aspects of the story in--particularly in Advanced Business Associations and Corporate Finance. Because I teach on a dry campus, no wine tasting will take place during the lessons. But maybe an optional out-of-class session could be planned. Hmmm . . . .
Tuesday, May 14, 2019
So, this post is about shameless self-promotion and a cautionary tale. A while back I was asked to write the West Virginia section of Texas A &M Journal of Property Law's Oil and Gas Survey. It's a short overview of recent developments, and one of the many perils of the law review process is how long such things take to get to print.
Even worse than a slow timeline, a miscommunication meant that my final round of edits did not make it into the piece, and there are a couple of errors. The editors were appropriately apologetic, and I know it all happened in good faith. I take some ownership, too, in that I was not at all demanding about knowing the schedule for the next round of edits or the overall timeline.
Ultimately, despite the (nonsubstantive) errors, I hope the piece will be helpful to some folks. There are some interesting oil and gas cases happening in West Virginia (and around the country), and how they turn out could have a significant impact on the oil and gas business.
Here's the abstract to my article, which you can find here:
This Article summarizes and discusses important recent developments in West Virginia’s oil and gas law, including legislative action and case law. This Article is divided into three Sections. First, West Virginia’s evolution in its approach to fractional mineral owner disputes in the Marcellus Shale. After multiple efforts to pass a forced pooling bill, the state settled instead on a cotenancy solution. Second, West Virginia addressed flat-rate royalties, following two court cases, a legislative response, and a subsequent court challenge to the legislation. Finally, this Article discusses three developments in lease interpretation: (1) what will be deemed “reasonably necessary” for oil and gas development in West Virginia; (2) if implied pooling rights are included in West Virginia leases that are silent on the matter; and (3) whether non-executory and non-participating royalty owners have rights to approve pooling.
Tuesday, December 19, 2017
A recent case in Washington state introduced me to some interesting facets of Washington's recreational marijuana law. The case came to my attention because it is part of my daily search for cases (incorrectly) referring to limited liability companies (LLCs) as "limited liability corporations." The case opens:
In 2012, Washington voters approved Initiative Measure 502. LAWS OF 2013, ch. 3, codified as part of chapter 69.50 RCW. Initiative 502 legalizes the possession and sale of marijuana and creates a system for the distribution and sale of recreational marijuana. Under RCW 69.50.325(3)(a), a retail marijuana license shall be issued only in the name of the applicant. No retail marijuana license shall be issued to a limited liability corporation unless all members are qualified to obtain a license. RCW 69.50.331(1)(b)(iii). The true party of interest of a limited liability company is “[a]ll members and their spouses.”1 Under RCW 69.50.331(1)(a), the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board (WSLCB) considers prior criminal conduct of the applicant.2
(b) No license of any kind may be issued to:. . . .(iii) A partnership, employee cooperative, association, nonprofit corporation, or corporation unless formed under the laws of this state, and unless all of the members thereof are qualified to obtain a license as provided in this section;
True party of interest: Persons to be qualified
Sole proprietorship: Sole proprietor and spouse.General partnership: All partners and spouses.Limited partnership, limited liability partnership, or limited liability limited partnership: All general partners and their spouses and all limited partners and spouses.Limited liability company: All members and their spouses and all managers and their spouses.Privately held corporation: All corporate officers (or persons with equivalent title) and their spouses and all stockholders and their spouses.Publicly held corporation: All corporate officers (or persons with equivalent title) and their spouses and all stockholders and their spouses.
Multilevel ownership structures: All persons and entities that make up the ownership structure (and their spouses).
(1) A corporation has the officers described in its bylaws or appointed by the board of directors in accordance with the bylaws.(2) A duly appointed officer may appoint one or more officers or assistant officers if authorized by the bylaws or the board of directors.(3) The bylaws or the board of directors shall delegate to one of the officers responsibility for preparing minutes of the directors' and shareholders' meetings and for authenticating records of the corporation.(4) The same individual may simultaneously hold more than one office in a corporation.
Requirement for and duties of board of directors.
(1) Each corporation must have a board of directors, except that a corporation may dispense with or limit the authority of its board of directors by describing in its articles of incorporation, or in a shareholders' agreement authorized by RCW 23B.07.320, who will perform some or all of the duties of the board of directors.(2) Subject to any limitation set forth in this title, the articles of incorporation, or a shareholders' agreement authorized by RCW 23B.07.320:(a) All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the corporation's board of directors; and(b) The business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of directors, which shall have exclusive authority as to substantive decisions concerning management of the corporation's business.
(4) Persons who exercise control of business - The WSLCB will conduct an investigation of any person or entity who exercises any control over the applicant's business operations. This may include both a financial investigation and/or a criminal history background.
December 19, 2017 in Corporations, Current Affairs, Entrepreneurship, Family Business, Joshua P. Fershee, Legislation, Licensing, LLCs, Management, Nonprofits, Partnership, Shareholders, Unincorporated Entities | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, December 5, 2017
The DePaul Law Review recently posted the article, Cooperatives: The First Social Enterprise, written by my friend and colleague Elaine Waterhouse Wilson (West Virginia Univ. College of Law). I recommend checking it out. Here is an overview:
As the cooperative and social enterprise movements merge, it is necessary to examine the legal and tax structures governing the entities to see if they help or hinder growth. If the ultimate decision is to support the growth of cooperatives as social enterprise, then those legal and tax structures that might impede this progress need to be re-examined.
This Article considers some of the issues that may impede the charitable sector in supporting the growth of the cooperative business model as a potential solution to issues of income inequality. To do so, the Article first defines a “cooperative.” Part II examines the definition of a cooperative from three different viewpoints: cooperative as social movement, cooperative as economic arrangement, and cooperative as legal construct. From these definitions, it is possible to identify those elements inherent in the cooperative model that might qualify as a tax-exempt purpose under the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) §501(c)(3). Part III reviews the definition of “charitable” for § 501(c)(3) purposes, specifically in the context of economic development and the support of workers. This Part demonstrates that many of the values inherent in the cooperative model are, in fact, charitable as that term is understood for federal tax purposes.
If a cooperative has charitable elements, however, then it should be possible for the charitable sector to support the cooperative move- ment. Part IV analyzes the possibilities and limitations of direct support by the charitable sector, including mission-related investing by charities and program-related investing by private foundations. In this regard, the cooperative can be viewed in many respects as an ex- isting analog to the new social enterprise forms, such as the benefit corporation or the L3C. Finally, Part V provides recommendations for changing both federal and state law to further support the cooperatibe movement in the charitable sector.
Sunday, November 12, 2017
I am putting together a panel or discussion group (depending on how many folks respond positively) for the SEALS conference for next summer, which is scheduled to be held August 5-11, 2018, at the Marriott Harbor Beach Resort & Spa in Fort Lauderdale, Florida (details here).
Here is the proposed title and a brief draft description (which may have to be shortened for the submission):
The Role of Corporate Personhood in Masterpiece Cakeshop
The United States Supreme Court is scheduled to hear arguments in the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission on Dec. 5, 2017 (SCOTUSblog summary here). The issue presented in that case is: “Whether applying Colorado's public accommodations law to compel the petitioner to create expression that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage violates the free speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment.” A group of corporate law professors have filed an amicus brief in support to the CCRC (available here). One of the two arguments in that brief is: “Because Of The Separate Legal Personality Of Corporations And Shareholders, The Constitutional Interests Of Shareholders Should Not Be Projected Onto The Corporation.” This [panel] [discussion group] features [paper presentations] [a dialogue] on the pros and cons of this argument, together with related analysis and observations. Please note that the Supreme Court will likely have issued its opinion in the case by the time of the panel/discussion.
Please email me at firstname.lastname@example.org if you would like to participate in this program, letting me know if you are interested in presenting a paper, participating in a discussion, or both. Also, let me know if you know of anyone else who may want to participate—or just pass this on to others. I must file the proposal soon in order to ensure its consideration (the “best practices” deadline for submissions has already passed).
November 12, 2017 in Business Associations, Call for Papers, Conferences, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporate Personality, Corporations, Current Affairs, Family Business, Stefan J. Padfield | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, January 10, 2017
I am happy to say I just received my new article, co-authored with a former student, S. Alex Shay, who is now a Trial Attorney in the Office of the United States Trustee, Department of Justice. The article discusses property law challenges that can impeded business development and negatively impact landowners and mineral owners in shale regions, with a focus on the West Virginia portion of the Marcellus Shale. The article is Horizontal Drilling Vertical Problems: Property Law Challenges from the Marcellus Shale Boom, 49 John Marshall Law Review 413-447 (2015).
If you note the 2015 publication date, you can see the article has been a long time coming. The conference it is linked to took place in September 2015, and it has taken quite a while to get to print. On the plus side, I was able to do updates to some of the issues, and add new cases (and resolutions to cases) during the process. I just received my hard copies yesterday -- January 9, 2017 -- and I received a notice it was on Westlaw as of yesterday, too.
I always find it odd when law reviews use a specific year for an issue, as opposed to the actual publication year. I can understand how a January publication might have a 2016 date. That would have made sense, but dating the issue back to 2015, when I discuss cases decided in 2016 seems a little weird. I know there is a certain level of continuity that the dates can provide, but still, this seems too long.
When I was editor in chief of the Tulane Law Review, one of the things we prided ourselves on was not handing off any issue from our volume to the next board. A few years prior to our arrival, a committed group of Law Review folks caught up everything -- publishing, if memory serves (and legend was correctly passed on), two and a half volumes. And Tulane Law Review publishes six issues a year. They, apparently, did not sleep.
I am happy to have the article our, and the editors did good work. It just would have been nice to have it appear a little more timely and relevant than I think this "new" article does. For anyone who is interested, here's the abstract (article available here):
This article focuses on key property challenges appearing as part of the West Virginia Marcellus Shale play. The paper opens with an introduction to the Marcellus Shale region that is the focus of our analysis. The paper explains the horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing process that is an essential part of shale oil and gas development. To help readers understand the property challenges related to shale development, we include an introduction to the concept of severed estates, which can create separate ownership of the surface estate and the mineral estate. The article then focuses on two keys issues. First, the article discusses whether horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing constitute a “reasonably necessary” use of surface land to develop mineral rights, and concludes they are, at least in most instances. Second, the article discusses difficulties in analyzing deed language related to minerals rights and royalty interests, which has created challenges for mineral owners, leasing companies, and oil and gas developers. Please note that although the publication date is 2015, the article was not in print until January 2017 and discusses cases from 2016.
Ultimately, the article concludes, legislators and regulators may choose to add surface owner protections and impose other measures to lessen the burden on impacted regions to ease the conflict between surface owners and mineral developers. Such efforts may, at times, be necessary to ensure continued economic development in shale regions. Communities, landowners, interest groups, companies, and governments would be well served to work together to seek balance and compromise in development-heavy regions. Although courts are well-equipped to handle individual cases, large-scale policy is better developed at the community level (state and local) than through the adversarial system.
Monday, December 19, 2016
In her post on Saturday, co-blogger Ann Lipton offered observations about possible legal issues resulting from the President-Elect's tweets regarding public companies. She ends her post with the following:
So, it's all a bit unsettled. Let's just say these and other novel legal questions regarding the Trump administration are sure to provide endless fodder for academic analysis in the coming years.
Today, I take on a somewhat related topic. I briefly explore the President-Elect's conflicting interests through the lens of a corporate law advisor. For the past few weeks, the media (see, e.g., here and here and here) and many folks I know have been concerned about the potential for conflict between the President-Elect's role as the POTUS, public investor and leader of the United States, and his role as "The Donald," private investor and leader of the Trump corporate empire.
The existence of a conflicting interest in an action or transaction is not, in and of itself, fatal or even necessarily problematic. In a number of common situations, fiduciaries have interests in both sides of a transaction. For example, a business founder who serves as a corporate director and officer may lease property she owns to the corporation. What matters under corporate law is whether the fiduciary's participation in the transaction on both sides results in a deal made in a fully informed manner, in good faith, and in the bests interests of the corporation. Conflicting interests raise a concern that the fiduciary is or may be acting for the benefit of himself, rather than for and in the best interest of the corporation.
Corporate law generally provides several possible ways to overcome concerns that a fiduciary has breached her duty because of a conflicting interest in a particular action or transaction:
- through good faith, fully informed approval of the action or transaction (e.g., after disclosure of information about the nature and extent of the conflicts) by either the corporation's shareholders or members of the board of directors who are not interested in the transaction; and
- through approval of a transaction that is entirely fair--fair as to process and price.
See, e.g., Delaware General Corporation Law Section 144. Yet, if I believe what I read, no similar processes exist to combat concerns about actions or transactions in which the POTUS has or may have conflicting interests. In particular, to the extent one does not already exist, should a disinterested body of monitors be identified or constituted to receive information about actual and potential conflicting interests of the POTUS and approve the action or transaction involving the conflicting interests? Perhaps the Office of Government Ethics ("OGE") already has something like this in place . . . . If it does, then both the public media and I are underinformed about it. While there seems to be OGE guidance on the President-Elect's nominees for executive branch posts (see, e.g., here and here) and on overall executive branch standards of conduct (see here), I have not found or read about anything applicable to the President-Elect or POTUS.
In making these observations, I recognize that our federal government is different in important ways from the corporation. I also understand that the leadership of a country/nation is different from the leadership of a corporation. Having said that, however, conflicting interests can have similar deleterious effects in both settings. The analogy I raise here and this overall line of inquiry may be worth some more thought . . . .
Friday, October 9, 2015
My wife and I both have many close family members in South Carolina, so the recent flood has been on our minds recently.
My first thoughts are with all of those affected by the flood.
Relevant to this blog, the flood also reminds me of one of the opening passages in Conscious Capitalism by Whole Food's co-CEO John Mackey. In that passage, Mackey recalls the massive flood in Austin, TX in 1981. At that time, Whole Foods only had one store, and the flood filled that store with eight feet of water. Whole Foods had loses of $400,000 and no savings and no insurance.
Mackey notes that "there was no way for [Whole Foods] to recover with [its] own resources" and then:
- "[a] wonderfully unexpected thing happened: dozens of our customers and neighbors started showing up at the store....Over the next few weeks, dozens and dozens of our customers kept coming in to help us clean up and fix the store...It wasn't just our customers who helped us. There was an avalanche of support from our other stakeholders as well [such as suppliers extending credit and deferring payment]. . . . It is humbling to think about what would have happened if all of our stakeholders hadn't cared so much about our company then. Without a doubt, Whole Foods Market would have ceased to exist. A company that today has over $11 billion in sales annually would have died in its first year if our stakeholders hadn't loved and cared about us--and they wouldn't have loved and cared for us had we not been the kind of business we were." pgs. 5-7
I have two questions. First, what decisions lead to that sort commitment from stakeholders? Second, does this sort of commitment only attach to small businesses?
Asked another way, would Whole Foods still have that sort of stakeholder turnout today? If not, is it because they have not continued to make decisions that inspire stakeholders or simply because they have grown so large that stakeholders assume the company can fend for itself.
It is seemingly easier to make connection with a small, local business than with a large chain, but there do seem to be a few larger companies that still reach their stakeholders on an individual and personal level. Companies, of all sizes, seem to reach stakeholders through making thoughtful decisions in hiring, training, producing, and giving. Authenticity seems to be quite important, as does listening to stakeholders and taking action to address stakeholder needs.
Thursday, September 24, 2015
This comes to us courtesy of Rachel Ezrol at Emory Law:
A Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative & Feminism and Legal Theory Workshop Project
A Workshop on Vulnerability at the Intersection of the Changing Firm and the Changing Family
When: October 16-17, 2015
Where: Emory University School of Law
Registration is FREE for Emory students, faculty, and staff.
From the Call for Papers:
Theories of dependency situate the limitations that attend the caregiving role in the construction of the relationship between work and family. The “worker,” defined without reference to family responsibilities, becomes capable of autonomy, self-sufficiency, and responsibility through stable, full-time employment. The privatized family, created by the union of spouses, is celebrated in terms of a self-sufficient ideal that addresses dependency within its own ranks, often through the gendered assumptions regarding responsibility for caretaking. The feminist project has long critiqued these arrangements as they enshrine the inequality that follows as natural and inevitable and cloak the burdens of caretaking from examination or critique. The interpenetrations of the family and the firm have thus been understood as both multiple and wide-ranging. Both this system and the feminist critique of it, however, are associated with the construction of wage labor that arose with industrialization. This workshop will apply the lens of vulnerability to consider the implications that arise from large scale changes in the structure of employment - changes that place this prior ideal of stable self-sufficiency beyond the reach of much of the population.
Issues For Discussion May Include:
This workshop will use vulnerability theory to explore the implications of the changing structure of employment and business organizations in the information age. In considering these changes, we ask in particular:
- How does the changing relationship between employment and the family, and particularly the disappearance of the breadwinner capable of earning a stable “family wage,” affect our understanding of the family and its association with care and dependency?
- How does the changing structure of employment and business organization affect possibilities for reform? What should be the role of a responsive state in directing these shifting flows of capital and care?
- How might a conception of the vulnerable subject help our analysis of the changing nature of the firm? What relationships does it bring into relief?
- What kind of legal subject is the business organization? Are there relevant distinctions among business and corporate forms in regard to understanding both vulnerability and the need for resilience?
- How are business organizations vulnerable? The family? Have these vulnerabilities shifted over time, and what forms of resilience are available for both institutions to respond to new economic realities?
- What, if any, should be the role of international and transnational organizations in a neoliberal era? What is their role in building both human and institutional resilience?
- Is corporate philanthropy an adequate response to the retraction of state regulation? What forms of resilience should be regulated and which should be left to the ‘free market’?
- How does the Supreme Court's willingness to assign rights to corporate persons (Citizen's United, Hobby Lobby), affect workers, customers and communities? The relationship between public and private arenas?
Program Coordinator | Emory University School of Law
1301 Clifton Road | Atlanta, GA 30322 | Room G500 Gambrell Hall
404-712-2420 (t) | 404-727-1973 (f)
Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative
Feminism and Legal Theory Project
Friday, September 11, 2015
Last week I ventured a few blocks from Belmont's campus to our neighbor Vanderbilt University Law School for their conference on The Future of International Corporate Governance.
One of the many interesting papers presented was Independent Directors in Singapore: Puzzling Compliance Requiring Explanation by Dan Puchniak and Luh Luh Lan, both of the National University of Singapore.
The entire paper is worth reading, but I want to share three take-aways with our readers.
"[O]nly a handful of jurisdictions [roughly 7%] have ever adopted the American concept of the independent director (i.e., where directors who are independent from management only— but not substantial shareholders—are deemed to be independent)." (pg. 6)
Singapore adopted an American-style definition of "independent director" in 2001, which did not include independence from substantial shareholders. Despite this weaker definition of independence in a jurisdiction with much more concentrated shareholding than the U.S., Singapore enjoyed relative success through "functional substitutes" that limited the private benefits of control. According to the authors, these "functional substitutes" include social relationships in Family Controlled Firms ("FCFs")" and legally imposed limits on the controlling government shareholder in Government Linked Companies ("GLCs").
Despite relative success with the American-style definition of "independent director," Singapore changed its definition "independent director" to require independence from management and 10%+ shareholders in their 2012 Corporate Code (effective at the start of 2015). This change seems prompted, at least in part, by scandals involving S-Chip companies (non-Singapore based companies that are listed on the Singapore Exchange.) The authors suggest that these S-Chip companies do not have the same "functional substitutes" as the FCFs and GLCs.
The article includes a helpful history of Singapore's recent corporate codes, and is a useful article for comparative corporate governance research. I do wonder if the "functional substitutes" explain quite as much as the authors suggest, but I highly recommend the article, especially for those interested in international corporate law.
September 11, 2015 in Business Associations, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Family Business, Haskell Murray, International Business, International Law, Research/Scholarhip | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, August 6, 2015
We here in Tennessee took a strong interest in the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, since one of the cases being decided was from Tennessee (Tanco v. Haslam). We at The University of Tennessee were especially interested. The plaintiffs in the Tanco case are University of Tennessee faculty members at the College of Veterinary Medicine, located on our adjacent sister campus (for The University of Tennessee Institute of Agriculture) here in Knoxville. As East Tennessee awaited the Supreme Court's decision--and in the aftermath of the opinion's release, the press sought for and found many angles on the case.
Of interest to me, as a business lawyer, was the interaction of the case with local business--existing and potential. As with most things, there were (and are) two sides to this coin. Locally, and nationally, both have gotten some play. For opportunistic business lawyers, both sides present advisory possibilities.
Some press time was spent on what I call the "Sweet Cakes" issue (covered by blogs as well as the traditional press, with my favorite law coverage coming from Eugene Volokh over at The Volokh Conspiracy, including this post). Sweet Cakes is, of course, the now-famous family-owned-and-run Oregon wedding cake purveyor that expressly refused to sell wedding cakes to same-sex couples. Eugene outlines a number of interesting legal issues in his posts, and regardless of whether you agree with his conclusions, you can see there is much lawyering involved in the business decisions of those who are intent on being conscientious objectors to same-sex marriage through their business activities. In Tennessee, the Obergefell decision has been famously followed with reports of anti-same-sex marriage signage, like this press item on a sign posted by the owner/proprietor of a hardware store.
The other side of the coin is, of course, the new opportunities that same-sex marriage creates for existing businesses and entrepreneurs. In the run-up to the Supreme Court's ruling, The Tennessean reported that "[o]pening marriage to same-sex couples would yield an additional $36.7 million in spending in Tennessee in three years as more than 5,400 same-sex weddings are expected to be held in the state during that period, according to estimates from the Williams Institute, a think tank at UCLA Law dedicated to sexual orientation and gender identity research." And after the decision, the Nashville Business Journal reiterated the message. New businesses formed to take advantage of this new market for marriages in the state will need--you guessed it--lawyers! Since Gatlinburg--in the Smoky Mountains just a stone's throw from Knoxville--is a wedding destination, our end of the state should see its fair share of that "action," assuming the business environment is welcoming . . . . This article indicates there may be some businesses in that part of the state that are willing to participate in same-sex weddings.
So, as with other legal changes of any magnitude, we may conceptualize Obergefell as a full-opportunity-for-lawyers act, and those opportunities will likely enure to business lawyers as well as others.
Friday, July 10, 2015
I’ve always been eager to do pro bono work. I went to law school with the intent of helping the indigent upon graduation, but then with a six-figure debt load, I went to BigLaw in New York and Miami, and then corporate America so that I could pay that debt off. But even as an associate and as in house counsel, I dutifully accepted pro bono cases. As a relatively new academic, I paid my way out of pro bono for the first couple of years as Florida allows and assuaged my guilt with the knowledge that my payments were going to fund the local legal aid office.
This year, as a condition of attending a family law CLE for free, I volunteered to take a case. I’ve devoted over 70 hours to it thus far, and we still aren’t finished even after today’s marathon 6.5 hour hearing dealing with a motion for contempt and enforcement, modification of alimony and child support, a QDRO (qualified domestic relations order), and a house in foreclosure. The case was complicated even according to my seasoned family law practitioner friends.
As a former litigator and current BA professor, I found that my skills helped to make up for my lack of family law expertise. The techniques for cross examining witnesses, preparing for hearing, and introducing exhibits came flooding back. From a BA perspective, knowing to ask questions about the structure of the petitioner’s LLC, inquiring about charging orders, and dissecting the financial statements and corporate tax returns put me in a much better position to protect my client’s interests. I always tell my students on the first day of BA that they never know where they will end up as practitioners, and that in today’s market many of them will be in small firms taking on a number of kind of clients. I try to make them understand how BA can help them in practice areas that don’t seem directly related to business. Now, thanks to this pro bono case I can back that up with proof from my own experience.
Wednesday, May 27, 2015
As a semi-closeted (now "out," I guess) foodie* and as a lover of "things Brazilian" (including Havaianas flip-flops and Veja sneakers, as well as churrascarias and caipirinhas), I read with interest a recent electronic newsletter headline about a thriving Brazilian chef. I clicked through to the article. I loved it even more than I had thought I would.
The article tells the story of an emergent Brazilian chef and restauranteur, Rodrigo Oliveira, and his flagship establishment (Mocotó), as promised. That was great. But that was not all. The piece also told the story of a business run using a "holistic business model."
Today, Oliveira focuses on his employees as much as his customers. . . . Oliveira pays for his employees’ part-time education. And their kids’ health care. And daily jiujitsu and yoga classes in the room he built upstairs. It’s a rarely encountered, holistic business model that contributes to his restaurant’s roaring success. . . .
. . .
Beneath the street level they’re boring out new dormitories for employees, for a quick nap and shower between jiujitsu, work and class. . . .
He also seems to be attentive to the greater local community beyond his customers and employees, preferring (to date) to expand his business locally rather than into larger metropolitan areas. Good business? Yes! But it seems like more than that. This business appears to have more than one bottom line!
Perhaps this is not a remarkable story, in the end. Regardless, I wanted to share it. Another Brazilian social enterprise, Ashoka, gets a lot of attention.** But it's now clear to me that we can and should look beyond larger, storied examples of social entrepreneurship for other manifestations of social enterprise in action in Brazil.
**Actually, much to my surprise, Ashoka is a U.S. organization that networks social enterprises across the globe. So, it's not even Brazilian! Having been in Rio teaching for a few summers and known of its presence there, I assumed it was a Brazilian organization. Please forgive the error. Hat tip to co-blogger Haskell Murray for pointing it out to me.