Tuesday, July 7, 2020

The Limited Liability Corporation Returns (And It Isn't Pretty)

The dreaded "limited liability corporation" strikes again.  In today's find, the United States District Court for the North District California makes a boo boo. In assessing whether a court had jurisdiction over an LLC (limited liability company), the court proceeded through the following:
 
As to the first element, the Court agrees that the Eastern District of Michigan would have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The Class Action Fairness Act vests federal courts with original jurisdiction over class actions that meet the following prerequisites: (1) “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs”; (2) the parties meet minimal requirements for diversity such that “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant”; and (3) the class equals to or exceeds 100 individuals in the aggregate. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Those requirements are satisfied here. ... [A]t least one class member is a citizen of a different state from Defendant: Plaintiff Esquer is a citizen of California, id. ¶ 17, whereas Defendant is a Michigan limited liability company with its principal place of business in Michigan, id. ¶ 26; Rollins Decl. ¶ 11. Accordingly, the Eastern District of Michigan would have subject matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act.
As to the second element, Defendant StockX, LLC would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Michigan as a Michigan limited liability corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan, as set forth above.
 
Esquer v. StockX, LLC, 19-CV-05933-LHK, 2020 WL 3487821, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2020) (emphasis added).
 
Except that, unlike corporations, "the citizenship of an LLC is determined by the citizenship of its members." Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2010). The principal place of business and the state of formation matter for corporations, not LLCs, in jurisdictional determinations.  Perhaps that slip -- calling the LLC a "limited liability corporation," instead of correctly using "limited liability company" (as the court had done previously) -- led to this mistake.  
 
This decision may be correct, if any of the LLC's members are also Michigan citizens. But the rationale is unquestionably wrong.   
 

July 7, 2020 in Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 6, 2020

What is a Merger Anyway?

The title of this post is the title of a panel discussion I organized for the 2019 Business Law Prof Blog symposium, held back in September of last year.  (Readers may recall that I posted on this session back at the time, under the same title.)  The panel experience was indescribably satisfying for me.  It represented one of those moments in life where one just feels so lucky . . . .

Why?  Because it fulfilled a dream, of sorts, that I have had for quite a while.  Here's the story.

About ten years ago, I ended up in a conversation with two of my beloved Tennessee Law colleagues while we were grabbing afternoon beverages.  One of these colleagues is a tax geek; the other is a property guy.  Somehow, we got into a discussion about mergers and acquisitions.  I was asked how I would define a merger as a matter of corporate law, and part of my answer (that mergers are magic) got these two folks all riled up (in a professional, academic, nerdy way).  The conversation included some passionate exchanges.  It was an exhilerating experience.

I have remembered that exchange for all of these years, vowing to myself that some day, I would work on publishing what was said.  When the opportunity arose to hold a panel discussion to recreate our water-cooler chat at the symposium last fall, I jumped at the chance.  I was tickled pink that my two colleagues consented to join me in the recreation exercise.  They are good sports, wise lawyers, and excellent teachers.

My objective in convening the panel was two-fold.  

First, I thought that students would find the conversation illuminating.  "Aha," they might justifiably say.  "Now I know why I am confused about what a merger is.  It's because the term means different things to different lawyers, all of whom may have a role in advising on a business combination transaction.  I have to understand the perspective from which the question is being asked, and the purpose of answering the question, before I can definitively say what a merger is."  Overall, I was convinced that a recreation of the conversation through a panel discussion could be a solid teaching tool.

But that's not all.  Faculty also can earn from our dialogue.  It helped me in my teaching to know how my tax colleague (who teaches transactional tax planning and business taxation) and my property colleague (who teaches property and secured transactions) define the concept of a merger and what each had to say about his definition as it operates in practice.  I like to think my two colleagues similarly benefitted from an understanding of my definition of a merger (even if neither believes in statutory magic) . . . .

Now, you and your students also can benefit from the panel.  Although it is not quite as good as hearing us all talk about mergers and acquisitions in person (which one can do here), Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of Business Law, recently published an edited transcript of the panel discussion as part of the symposium proceedings.  It also is titled "What is a Merger Anyway?"  And you can find it here.  (The entire volume of the journal that includes the symposium proceedings can be found here.  Your friends from the BLPB are the featured authors!)  I am sure that your joy in reading it cannot match my joy in contributing to the project, but I hope you find joy in reading it nonetheless.

July 6, 2020 in Business Associations, Conferences, Corporate Finance, Corporations, Joan Heminway, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, June 24, 2020

Stakeholder v. Shareholder Capitalism: Bebchuk and Mayer Debate

Tomorrow (6/25/20) at 9am EST, Colin Mayer (Oxford) will debate Lucian Bebchuk (Harvard) on the topic of stakeholder v. shareholder capitalism. 

Oxford is streaming the debate for free here.  

June 24, 2020 in Business Associations, Corporate Governance, Corporations, CSR, Haskell Murray, International Business, Management, Research/Scholarhip, Shareholders | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 12, 2020

Padfield on "the Omnipresent Specter of Political Bias" in Corporate Decision-Making (and 3 other papers)

Tuesday, May 19, 2020

Teaching Moment: LLCs Don't Have "Corporate" Name Endings

I am teaching Business Associations this summer, and I am excited to get back in the classroom. Well, I was. Instead, I am teaching in virtual class room via Zoom.  I am still glad to be interacting with students in a teaching capacity, but I sure miss the classroom setting. I am glad, though, to have this experience so I am closer to what this has been like for our students and faculty.  I still have the benefit of my colleagues experiences, students who have been in the online learning environment, and a little time to plan, so it's better for me than it was for everyone in March. Still, there is quite a learning curve on all of this. 

Over the past several years, I have asked students to create a fictional limited liability company (LLC) for our first class.  It does a number of things. To begin, it connects them with a whole host of decisions businesses must make in choosing their entity form.  It also introduces them to the use of forms and how that works.  I always give them an old version of the form. This year, I used 2017 Articles of Organization for a West Virginia Limited Liability Company. It does a couple of things.  There is an updated form (2019), so it gives me a chance to talk about the dangers of using precedent forms and accepting what others provide you without checking for yourself.  (Side note: I used West Virginia even though I an in Nebraska, because Nebraska doesn't have a form. I use this one to compare and contrast.) 

In addition, I like my students to see how most businesses start with entity choice and formation -- by starting one.  It leads to some great conversations about limited liability, default rules, member/manager management choices, etc. Each year, I have had at least one person opt-in for personal liability, for example, for all members.

I also, which will shock no one, use the form to discuss the distinct nature of LLCs and how they are NOT corporations.  And yet, the West Virginia LLC form tries to under cut me at each turn.  For example, the form requires that the LLC name choose a "corporate name ending."  From the instructions: 

Enter the exact name of the company and be sure to include one of the required corporate name endings: “limited liability company,” “limited company,” or the abbreviations “L.L.C.,” “LLC,” “L.C.,” or “LC.” “Limited” may be abbreviated as “Ltd.” and “Company” may be abbreviated as “Co.” [WV Code §31B-1-105] Professional companies must use “professional limited liability company,” “professional L.L.C.,” “professional LLC,” “P.L.L.C.,” or “PLLC.” [WV Code §31B-13-1303] 

Seriously, people.  LLC are not corporate.  In fact, choosing a corporate name ending would be contrary to the statute.  

The form continues: 

13. a. The purpose(s) for which this limited liability company is formed is as follows (required): [Describe the type(s) of business activity which will be conducted, for example, “real estate,” “construction of residential and commercial buildings,” “commercial painting,” “professional practice of law" (see Section 2. for acceptable "professional" business activities). Purpose may conclude with words “…including the transaction of any or all lawful business for which corporations may be incorporated in West Virginia.] (final emphasis added)

Finally, the instructions state that

[t]he principal office address need not be in WV, but is the principal place of business for the company. This is generally the address where all corporate documents (records) are maintained.(final emphasis added)

My students know from day one this matters to me, and it's not just semantics. My (over) zealousness helps underscore the importance of entity decisions, and the unique opportunities entities can provide, within the default rules and as modified. My first day, I always make sure students see this at least twice: "A thing you have to know. LLCs are not Corporations!" 

Is it overkill? Perhaps, we all have our things.

Oh, and it's time for West Virginia to add a 2020 update to the LLC form.  

May 19, 2020 in Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, Law School, Lawyering, LLCs, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 20, 2020

The Ins-and-Outs of Corporate Leniency Programs

Friend-of-the-BLPB Miriam Baer recently posted a draft of her forthcoming book chapter on corporate leniency programs to SSRN.  The abstract follows.

Corporate leniency programs promise putative offenders reduced punishment and fewer regulatory interventions in exchange for the corporation’s credible and authentic commitment to remedy wrongdoing and promptly self-report future violations of law to the requisite authorities.

Because these programs have been devised with multiple goals in mind—i.e., deterring wrongdoing and punishing corporate executives, improving corporate cultural norms, and extending the government’s regulatory reach—it is all but impossible to gauge their “success” objectively. We know that corporations invest significant resources in compliance-related activity and that they do so in order to take advantage of the various benefits promised by leniency regimes. We cannot definitively say, however, how valuable this activity has been in reducing either the incidence or severity of harms associated with corporate misconduct.

Notwithstanding these blind spots, recent developments in the Department of Justice’s stance towards corporate offenders provides valuable insight on the structural design of a leniency program. Message framing, precision of benefit, and the scope and centralization of the entity that administers a leniency program play important roles in how well the program is received by its intended targets and how long it survives. If the program’s popularity and longevity says something about its success, then these design factors merit closer attention.

Using the Department of Justice’s Yates Memo and FCPA Pilot Program as demonstrative examples, this book chapter excavates the framing and design factors that influence a leniency program’s performance. Carrots seemingly work better than sticks; and centralization of authority appears to better facilitate relationships between government enforcers and corporate representatives.

But that is not the end of the story. To the outside world, flexible leniency programs can appear clubby, weak and under-effective. The very design elements that generate trust between corporate targets and government enforcers may simultaneously sow credibility problems with the greater public. This conundrum will remain a core issue for policymakers as they continue to implement, shape and tinker with corporate leniency programs.

That last paragraph rings true to me in so many ways.  The remainder of the abstract also raises some great points that engage my interest.  Looks like I am adding this to my summer reading list!

April 20, 2020 in Corporations, Joan Heminway, Litigation, White Collar Crime | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 15, 2020

Excerpts from "OPEN LETTER TO BLACKROCK CEO LARRY FINK"

The National Center for Public Policy Research has posted an open letter to Blackrock CEO Larry Fink that should be of interest to readers of this blog.  I provide some excerpts below.  The full letter can be found here.

Dear Mr. Fink,

….

This economic crisis makes it more important than ever that companies like BlackRock focus on helping our nation’s economy recover. BlackRock and others must not add additional hurdles to recovery by supporting unnecessary and harmful environmental, social, and governance (ESG) shareholder proposals.

…. we are especially concerned that your support for some ESG shareholder proposals and investor initiatives brings political interests into decisions that should be guided by shareholder interests…. when a company’s values become politicized, the interests of the diverse group of shareholders and customers are overshadowed by the narrow interests of activist groups pushing a political agenda.

…. ESG proposals will add an extra-regulatory cost .... This may harm everyday Americans who are invested in these companies through pension funds and retirement plans. While this won’t affect folks in your income bracket, this may be the difference between affording medication, being able to retire, or supporting a family member’s education for many Americans.

There is a financial risk to this tack as well. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that “[p]erformance of BlackRock’s own iShares range of ESG funds shows that ESG is no guarantee of gold-plated returns. Its two oldest in the U.S., set up in 2005 and 2006 and now tracking the MSCI USA ESG Select index and the MSCI KLD 400 Social index, have both lagged behind iShares’ S&P 500 fund.”

And while publicly traded companies operate under a legal fiduciary duty to their investors, this is also a moral imperative. Free market capitalism has lifted more people out of poverty than any economic system in world history. That’s because, at its simplest level, capitalism operates under the basic rule that all exchanges are voluntary. Therefore, to achieve wealth and create growth in a capitalist system, one must appeal to the self-interest of others….

April 15, 2020 in Corporate Governance, Corporations, CSR, Current Affairs, Ethics, Financial Markets, Shareholders, Stefan J. Padfield | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 3, 2020

It's Not Cool to Skip Completely the LLC Law. Not Cool.

Plain Bay alleges that it is a citizen of Florida for diversity purposes as it is a Florida limited liability company incorporated in Florida with its principal place of business in Florida and that Yates is a citizen of California for diversity purposes as he “is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of California[.]” . . . In order for this Court to properly exercise jurisdiction over a case, “the action must be between ‘citizens of different States.’ ” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

Plain Bay Sales, LLC v. Gallaher, 9:18-CV-80581-WM, 2020 WL 961847, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2020) (emphasis added). 
 
Yates, though, was a UK citizen, who lived in Florida, and thus, "the Court concludes that, for diversity purposes, Yates should be considered a citizen of Florida." Id. The court eventually determines that Yates would destroy diversity, but Plain Bay removed him as a defendant, and as a dispensable party, diversity was restored. 
 
Okay, but there is a problem here. Two really. First, Plain Bay was not "incorporated" anywhere. It was formed. It is an LLC, not a corporation.  But more important, Plain Bay's citizenship has not been determined.  The state of formation and principal place of business is irrelevant to LLC citizenship. “[A] limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen.” Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings, L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004). Here, the court determined that the plaintiff LLC is an citizen of Florida without ever looking at the citizenship of any members. They may all be Florida residents, but WE DON'T KNOW. 
 
Anyway, not even stating the law for determining citizenship of an LLC is not cool. Not cool at all. 

March 3, 2020 in Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, Litigation, LLCs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, February 25, 2020

LLCs Are Not Corporations: A New Hero Emerges

The Honorable Aida M. Delgado-Colón made me smile today.  As BLPB readers know, An LLC By Any Other Name, Is Still Not a Corporation. Finally, I received a notice of a court acknowledging this fact and requiring a party to refer to their legal entity correctly. Judge Delgado-Colón writes: 

Pursuant to this Court’s sua sponte obligation to inquire into its own subject matter jurisdiction and noticing the unprecedented increase in foreclosure litigation in this District, the Court ordered plaintiff to clarify whether it is a corporation or a limited liability company (“LLC”).

REVERSE MORTGAGE FUNDING, LLC, Pl., v. THE ESTATE OF ANGEL RAFAEL ANTONINI-NAZARIO, et al, Defendants., CV 16-3092 (ADC), 2020 WL 881019, at *1 (D.P.R. Feb. 20, 2020).  
 
The opinion continues:
Here, the Court cannot ascertain that diversity exists among the parties. Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure holds attorneys responsible for “assur[ing] that all pleadings, motions and papers filed with the court are factually well-grounded, legally tenable and not interposed for any improper purpose.” Mariani v. Doctors Associates, Inc., 983 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). Despite Rule 11’s mandate, the Court finds significant inconsistencies among plaintiff’s representations, which to this date remain unclear. As noted at ECF No. 53, plaintiff has repeatedly failed to explain why its alleged principal place of business is in New Jersey instead of Michigan. To make matters worse, plaintiff now claims to be a “limited liability corporation”1 under Delaware law.
Id. at *2.
 
Because the court was "unable to determine that complete diversity exists between the parties," the Court dismissed "without prejudice the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Id.  
 
I might quibble with some parts of the opinion (mostly that I think it could make what the plaintiff should have done even more clear), but that's just quibbling.  I am thrilled to see an opinion that held the responsible party accountable for their entity descriptions.  
 
Thank you, Judge Delgado-Colón. 

February 25, 2020 in Corporations, Delaware, Joshua P. Fershee, Litigation, LLCs | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, February 11, 2020

LLCs: The Uncola (Bankruptcy Edition)

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky has opened my eyes to some bankruptcy law issues I hadn't previously seen. The court also committed what I consider to be a cardinal sin: the court refers to an LLC as a "limited liability corporation."  An LLC is a "limited liability company," which is a statutorily different entity than a corporation. 

The court states: "Sunnyview and TR are limited liability corporations. They are not individuals and do not meet the definition of insiders under 11U.S.C.§ 101(31)(B)[sic]." In re: Bullitt Utilities, Inc., No. 15-34000(1)(7), 2020 WL 547278, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Jan. 24, 2020) (emphasis added). Other than being LLCs, and not corporations, this appears to be correct. The statute, 11 U.S.C.§ 101(31), provides: 

(31)The term “insiderincludes

. . . . 
(B)if the debtor is a corporation
(i)
director of the debtor;
(ii)
officer of the debtor;
(iii)
person in control of the debtor;
(iv)
partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v)
general partner of the debtor; or
(vi)
relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;
The court continues, "If considered to be corporations, none of the entities meet the definition of a [sic] 'insider'”. Id. The LLCs at issue are creditors, without any express control, so it is correct that they could not be insiders on their own. The court also determined there was "no evidence" that the individual in control of the two LLCs had used his power in a manner that resulted in "inequitable conduct," so the LLCs under his control could not be held liable under any theory of vicariously liability (e.g., entity veil piercing). 
 
Based on the court's factual determinations, this all appears to come out correctly, notwithstanding the mischaracterization of the LLC. 
 
More frustrating, for me, is my discovery that bankruptcy law does, in fact, characterize a "corporation" as follows: 
(9) The term “corporation”— (A) includes— (i) association having a power or privilege that a private corporation, but not an individual or a partnership, possesses; (ii) partnership association organized under a law that makes only the capital subscribed responsible for the debts of such association; (iii) joint-stock company; (iv) unincorporated company or association; or (v) business trust; but (B) does not include limited partnership.
 
So, while I acknowledge the statute, I strenuously object. (We all know how effective that is.) Corporations are just not partnerships and they are really, really not unincorporated companies or associations. That would be like saying Coca-Cola or Pepsi are an "Uncola. (Yes, I am dating myself with that reference.) 
 
Couldn't we just use something like "Covered Entity" for the definition?  
 
Anyway, in closing, I will once again note that cases like this run the risk of creating bad law where an LLC is in control of a corporation. The court here states that the LLC is not and individual, but an LLC (I think) is a "person" under the definitions. The statute provides that "[t]he term 'person' includes individual, partnership, and corporation ...." 11 USC § 101(41). And as per 11 USC § 101(9), "corporation" includes unincorporated companies. Thus, I hope that the fact that LLCs in this case were not individuals, does not lead a potential future court to miss that they also need to consider whether an LLC might be a "person in control of the debtor."

February 11, 2020 in Bankruptcy/Reorganizations, Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs, Unincorporated Entities | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 10, 2020

Me, Too and #MeToo: Women in Congress and the Boardroom

My short essay, "Me, Too and #MeToo: Women in Congress and the Boardroom," was recently published in the George Washington Law Review.  The abstract follows.

The “Year of the Woman” (1992) and the year of #MeToo (2018) were landmark years for women in federal congressional elections. Both years also represent significant milestones for women’s roles as U.S. public company directors. In each of these two years, social context was interconnected with these political and corporate gender changes. The relevant social context in 2018 is most clearly defined by public revelations of sexual misconduct involving a significant number of men in positions of political and business power. The relevant social context in 1992 similarly involved specific, highly public disclosures and allegations of sexual misconduct.

These parallels beg many questions. In particular, one may ponder whether the correlation between social context and congressional or public company board elections is coincidence or something more. Apropos of the current era, those of us who focus on corporate board diversity may wonder whether looking at the election of women to Congress and corporate boards in the #MeToo era provides any insights or lessons about female corporate board representation.

This brief Essay examines and comments on possible gender effects of the #MeToo movement on public company board composition in relation to the possible gender effects of the #MeToo movement on the composition of legislative bodies. Although #MeToo has clarified, and perhaps expanded, the salient connections between business issues and women’s issues, those who have the power to elect corporate directors may not fully recognize this connection or other factors as unique values of female corporate board participation. Until additional female membership on corporate boards is substantively valued, swift sustainable changes in the gender makeup of corporate boards may not be realizable without specific, enforceable legal mandates. Although California’s state legislature has taken a bold step in this direction in the #MeToo era, it seems unlikely that additional state legislatures will follow its lead. As a result, the pace of change in corporate board gender composition is likely to continue to be more evolutionary than revolutionary.

I appreciate the opportunity to publish these thoughts generated in connection with a conference held at GWU Law back in 2018.  The conference, "Women and Corporate Governance: A Conference Exploring the Role and Impact of Women in the Governance of Public Corporations," featured a number of super panels.  I had the opportunity to moderate one ("Women as Counsel and Gatekeepers") and publish this piece.

February 10, 2020 in Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Joan Heminway, Management | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, January 26, 2020

Law Firms Should Not Have Corporate Practice Groups

As a new dean in a new city, I have had the opportunity to meet hundreds of impressive lawyers in Omaha.  I have been incredibly impressed by the sophisticated practices at the very law firms I have visited. For "midsized" firms, there are lawyers doing incredible work here that is the same work being done on the coasts, including some amazing M & A work. 

But here in Omaha, just like every city around the country, law firms have "corporate" practices.  But really, those are business law practices or transactional practices.  Almost every corporation of significant size also owns some LLCs (limited liability companies) and perhaps other entities. And certainly these firms, especially those working with real estate companies, will work with LLCs and other pass through entities.  

So, consistent with my prior posts on this subject, I urge lawyers and firms to acknowledge the full scope of what we do.  It's not just corporate.  It's so much more. And that's a good thing. I just ask that we embrace business practice or transactional practice to try to include all we do.   

 

 

 

January 26, 2020 in Business Associations, Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs, Partnership, Unincorporated Entities | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 24, 2019

Did A Child Die to Make Your Smartphone, Tablet, Laptop, or Car?

Happy holidays! Billions of people around the world are celebrating Christmas or Hanukah right now. Perhaps you’re even reading this post on a brand new Apple Ipad, a Microsoft Surface, or a Dell Computer. Maybe you found this post via a Google search. If you use a product manufactured by any of those companies or drive a Tesla, then this post is for you. Last week, a nonprofit organization filed the first lawsuit against the world’s biggest tech companies alleging that they are complicit in child trafficking and deaths in the cobalt mines of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Dodd-Frank §1502 and the upcoming EU Conflict Minerals Regulation, which goes into effect in 2021, both require companies to disclose the efforts they have made to track and trace "conflict minerals" -- tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold from the DRC and surrounding countries. DRC is one of the poorest nations in the world per capita but has an estimated $25 trillion in mineral reserves (including 65% of the world's cobalt). Armed militia use rape and violence as a weapon of war in part so that they control the mineral wealth. The EU and US regulators believe that consumers might make different purchasing decisions if they  knew whether companies source their minerals ethically. The EU legislation, notably, does not limit the geography to the DRC, but instead focuses on conflict zones around the world.

If you’ve read my posts before, then you know that I have written repeatedly about the DRC and conflict minerals. After visiting DRC for a research trip in 2011, I wrote a law review article and co-filed an amicus brief during the §1502 litigation arguing that the law would not help people on the ground. I have also blogged here about legislation to end the rulehere about the EU's version of the rule, and here about the differences between the EU and US rule. Because of the law and pressure from activists and socially-responsible investors, companies, including the defendants, have filed disclosures, joined voluntary task forces to clean up supply chains, and responded to shareholder proposals regarding conflict minerals for years. I will have more on those initiatives in my next post. Interestingly, cobalt, the subject of the new litigation, is not a “conflict mineral” under either the U.S. or E.U. regulation, although, based on the rationale behind enacting Dodd-Frank §1502, perhaps it should have been.  Nonetheless, in all of my research, I never came across any legislative history or materials discussing why cobalt was excluded.

The litigation makes some startling claims, but having been to the DRC, I’m not surprised. I’ve seen children who should have been in school, but could not afford to attend, digging for minerals with shovels and panning for gold in rivers. Although I was not allowed in the mines during my visit because of a massacre in the village the night before, I could still see child laborers on the side of the road mining. If you think mining is dangerous here in the U.S., imagine what it’s like in a poor country with a corrupt government dependent on income from multinationals.

The seventy-nine page class action Complaint was filed filed in federal court in the District of Columbia on behalf of thirteen children claiming: (1) a violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) negligent supervision; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. I’ve listed some excerpts from the Complaint below (hyperlinks added):

Defendants Apple, Alphabet, Dell, Microsoft, and Tesla are knowingly benefiting from and providing substantial support to this “artisanal” mining system in the DRC. Defendants know and have known for a significant period of time the reality that DRC’s cobalt mining sector is dependent upon children, with males performing the most hazardous work in the primitive cobalt mines, including tunnel digging. These boys are working under stone age conditions for paltry wages and at immense personal risk to provide cobalt that is essential to the so-called “high tech” sector, dominated by Defendants and other companies. For the avoidance of doubt, every smartphone, tablet, laptop, electric vehicle, or other device containing a lithium-ion rechargeable battery requires cobalt in order to recharge. Put simply, the hundreds of billions of dollars generated by the Defendants each year would not be possible without cobalt mined in the DRC….

Plaintiffs herein are representative of the child cobalt miners, some as young as six years of age, who work in exceedingly harsh, hazardous, and toxic conditions that are on the extreme end of “the worst forms of child labor” prohibited by ILO Convention No. 182. Some of the child miners are also trafficked. Plaintiffs and the other child miners producing cobalt for Defendants Apple, Alphabet, Dell, Microsoft, and Tesla typically earn 2-3 U.S. dollars per day and, remarkably, in many cases even less than that, as they perform backbreaking and hazardous work that will likely kill or maim them. Based on indisputable research, cobalt mined in the DRC is listed on the U.S. Department of Labor’s International Labor Affairs Bureau’s List of Goods Produced with Forced and Child Labor.

When I mentioned above that I wasn’t surprised about the allegations, I mean that I wasn’t surprised that the injuries and deaths occur based on what I saw during my visit to DRC. I am surprised that companies that must perform due diligence in their supply chains for conflict minerals don’t perform the same kind of due diligence in the cobalt mines. But maybe I shouldn't be surprised at all, given how many companies have stated that they cannot be sure of the origins of their minerals. In my next post, I will discuss what the companies say they are doing, what they are actually doing, and how the market has reacted to the litigation. What I do know for sure is that the Apple store at the mall nearest to me was so crowded that people could not get in. The mall also has a Tesla showroom and people were gearing up for test drives. Does that mean that consumers are not aware of the allegations? Or does that mean that they don’t care?  I’ll discuss that in the next post as well.

Wishing you all a happy and healthy holiday season.

December 24, 2019 in Compliance, Corporate Personality, Corporations, CSR, Current Affairs, Ethics, Financial Markets, Human Rights, Litigation, Marcia Narine Weldon, Securities Regulation, Shareholders | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 9, 2019

Calling LLCs "Corporations" Is Sometimes Harmless Error, But It Can't Be Ignored

Once again, a court seems to arrive at the correct outcome, while making mistakes in the describing entity type. As usual, the court mislabeled a limited liability company (LLC).  Here we go:  

Andrea and Timothy Downs each held a 50% interest in a corporation, Downs Holdings, Inc. It held limited liability corporation (“LLC”) and limited partnership (“LP”) ownership interests. Eventually, the Downs agreed to dissolve the corporation and, as shareholders, passed a corporate resolution electing dissolution.

In re: ANDREA STEINMANN DOWNS, Debtor. NORIO, INC., Appellant, v. THOMAS H. CASEY, Chapter 7 Tr., Appellee., No. 8:16-BK-12589-CB, 2019 WL 6331564, at *1 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2019) (emphasis added). 
 
The Downs did not follow the necessary formalities to dissolve Downs Holdings, Inc., and had instead ask that the corporation's management company "distribute the payments and monies owed to Downs Holdings to each shareholder separately, 50% to Mr. Downs and 50% to Ms. Downs." Id. Further, it appeared that the Downs asked to be treated as separate interest holders for both the LLC and LP. Id. Ms. Downs later borrowed $50,000 from Norio, Inc. and pledged pledged her claimed interests in the LLC and the LP as collateral. Id. at *2.
 
Because Downs Holdings, Inc., was the named interest holder in the LLC and the LP, and it had not been dissolved, and because there was no showing "that the assets transferred from Downs Holdings to Ms. Downs, the bankruptcy court did not err when it determined that Norio, Inc. lacked secured status.  Id. at *5. 

That all seems about right.  At the beginning of the opinion, the court states, 
 
We acknowledge that some of the bankruptcy court’s findings lack support in the record, but we ignore harmless error because the bankruptcy court’s ultimate conclusion is correct: Downs Holdings owned the relevant assets, and Ms. Downs could not pledge them to Norio as collateral for the loan.
Id.at *1. Calling a LLC a corporation in this context is, this time, anyway, harmless error. But I am not inclined to ignore it. I mean, the entity type is specifically at issue in this case, with respect to the corporate form. Making sure the corporation and the LLC are clearly recognized as distinct entity types may not be essential to finding right outcome, but it sure would be appropriate.  

December 9, 2019 in Bankruptcy/Reorganizations, Corporations, Family Business, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, December 1, 2019

Dissent Duly Noted: LLCs, Private Ordering, and Ample Notice

Over at Kentucky Business Entity Law Blog, Tom Rutledge recently posted Respectfully, I Dissent: Dean Fershee and Elimination of Fiduciary Duties, in response to my recent paper, An Overt Disclosure Requirement for Eliminating the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty. Tom and I have crossed paths many times over the past few years, and I greatly value his insight, expertise, and opinion. On this one, though, we will have to agree to disagree, but I recommend checking out his writing.  You may well agree with him.  

I actually agree with Tom in most cases when he says, "I do not believe there is justification for protecting people from the consequences of the contracts into which they enter." Similarly, I generally agree with Tom "that entering into an operating agreement that may be amended without the approval of a particular member constitutes that member placing themselves almost entirely at the mercy of those with the capacity to amend the operating agreement . . . . "  Nonetheless, I maintain that there is a subtle but significant difference where, as in Delaware, such changes can be made to completely eliminate (not just reduce or modify) the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 

As applied, Tom may be right. Still, until Delaware's recent change, we had a long history, in every U.S. jurisdiction, prohibiting the elimination of the duty of loyalty. It is simply expected, that at some basic level, those in control of an entity owe the entity some level of a duty of loyalty. Because that is such a long-held rule and expectation, I remain convinced that the option to eliminate the duty requires some type of special notice to those entering an entity. Until now, even conceding that a lack of control could put an LLC member "almost entirely at the mercy of those with the capacity to amend the operating agreement," the amending member's power was still limited by the duty of loyalty.  

Ultimately, I tend to be a big fan of private ordering and freedom of contract, especially for LLCs. But, when we change fundamental rules, I also think we should more overtly acknowledge those changes, for at least some period of time, to let people catch up.  

December 1, 2019 in Contracts, Corporations, Delaware, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, November 25, 2019

I Hate Federal Partnership Law, But LLCs Are Still Not Corporations

Last Friday, a new opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit tackled a complex application of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) law that required an analysis of “federal partnership law,” which assessed whether two entities had created a “partnership-in-fact, as a matter of federal common law.”  Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, No. 16-1376, 2019 WL 6243370, at *5 (1st Cir. Nov. 22, 2019). I hate the idea of “federal partnership law,” but I concede it is a thing for determining certain responsibilities under the tax code and ERISA. I still maintain that rather than discussing federal entity law and entity type in these cases, we should instead be discussing liability under certain code sections as they apply to the relevant persons and/or entities.  Nonetheless, that’s not the state of the law.

Even though I don’t like the concept of federal partnership law, I can work with it. As such, I think it is fair to ask courts to respect entity types if they are going to insist on using entity types to determine liability. Alas, this is too much to ask.  Friday’s opinion explains:

The issue on appeal is whether two private equity funds, Sun Capital Partners III, LP (“Sun Fund III”) and Sun Capital Partners IV, LP (“Sun Fund IV”), are liable for $4,516,539 in pension fund withdrawal liability owed by a brass manufacturing company which was owned by the two Sun Funds when that company went bankrupt. The liability issue is governed by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (“MPPAA”). Under that statute, the issue of liability depends on whether the two Funds had created, despite their express corporate structure, an implied partnership-in-fact which constituted a control group. That question, in the absence of any further formal guidance from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”), turns on an application of the multifactored partnership test in Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067 (1964).

Id. at *1 (emphasis added). The court continued: “To the extent the Funds argue we cannot apply the Luna factors because they have organized an LLC through which to operate SBI, we reject the argument. Merely using the corporate form of a limited liability corporation cannot alone preclude courts recognizing the existence of a partnership-in-fact.” Id. at *6. (emphasis added).

LLCs are not corporations, and they do not have a corporate form or structure! They are limited liability companies, which are totally different entities from corporations.  

It seems I am often saying this, but the court does seem to get to the right conclusion despite the entity errors:

The fact that the entities formally organized themselves as limited liability business organizations under state law at virtually all levels distinguishes this case from Connors and other cases in which courts have found parties to have formed partnerships-in-fact, been under common control, and held both parties responsible for withdrawal liability.

Id. at *8.

That courts tend to get it right, even when using improper entity language, does not mean it’s not a big deal. It simply means that judges (and their clerks) understand the distinctions between entities and entity types, even if their language is not perfect. That seems to be generally okay as applied in the individual cases before each court. However, these cases communicate beyond just the parties involved and could influence poor drafting decisions that could have impacts as between individual members/partners/shareholders down the road.  It sure would be great if  more courts would take the chance when there is an opportunity to be clear and precise. 

 

November 25, 2019 in Business Associations, Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs, Partnership | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, November 18, 2019

Dear Florida: LLCs Are Still Not Corporations

It’s been a minute since I took some time to look at whether courts are still treating LLCs as corporations.  Spoiler alert: They are.  Last week, the Southern District of Florida gave a shining example:

Defendants argue that Vista, a limited liability corporation, is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen for diversity purposes. Because the January 26, 2018 written agreement (“Agreement”) granted the PJM Defendants a 10% ownership interest in Vista, Defendants maintain that Vista is a Florida citizen by virtue of the PJM Defendants’ Florida citizenship, thereby destroying complete diversity. . . .

Plaintiffs contend that Vista is a California corporation and complete diversity exists. In support, Plaintiffs proffer Vista’s California LLC records which show that Armen Temurian is the entity’s only member. Defendants argue that these records are self-serving, and that the plain language of the Agreement contradicts these records and establishes the PJM Defendants’ ownership in Vista.  . . .

The Agreement expressly recognizes that the PJM Defendants have obtained a 10% ownership of all Vista current and future direct and indirect entities, which contradicts Plaintiffs’ proffered California LLC records on their face. . . . Because Vista is a citizen of every state that any member is a citizen of, Vista is a citizen of Florida, which destroys diversity. The Court therefore does not have diversity jurisdiction over this matter.

ARMEN A. TEMURIAN, et al, Plaintiffs, v. PHILLIP A. PICCOLO, JR., et al, Defendants. Additional Party Names: George Foerst, Joseph Reid, K.F.I. Software, Kevin Dalton Johnson, Paul Morris, Travelada, LLC, Vista Techs. LLC, No. 18-CV-62737, 2019 WL 5963831, at *3-*4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2019) (emphasis added).

The court seems to arrive at the correct conclusion, though without clearly and properly identifying the entities involved, it’s hard to be sure.  Note that here, according to the court, the defendants claim Vista is an LLC ( a limited liability company.) The Plaintiffs replied, the court says, that the company is a “California corporation.” If Vista is an LLC, as it seems to be, and it had members who were also Florida citizens, the court would be correct to find a lack of diversity jurisdiction. Still, it would be a big help if the court would help lay out the facts in an accurate way so that the facts more clearly lead to the legal outcome.

November 18, 2019 in Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs, Unincorporated Entities | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, November 4, 2019

Micromanagement through Shareholder Proposals

I approached with some curiosity the Securities and Exchange Commission's recent shareholder proposal guidance in Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14J ("SLB 14J").  My interest in this topic stems from my past life as a full-time lawyer in private practice.  During that time, I both wrote shareholder proposals and wrote no-action letters to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to keep shareholder proposals out of corporate proxy statements.

In SLB 14J, the SEC clarifies its application of the "ordinary business" exception to the inclusion of a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8.  Specifically, "[t]he Commission has stated that the policy underlying the 'ordinary business' exception rests on two central considerations. The first relates to the proposal’s subject matter; the second relates to the degree to which the proposal 'micromanages' the company."  I want to share the SEC's guidance with you on the latter.

The idea of shareholders micromanaging most public firms is almost laughable.  Yet, certain shareholder proposals do get somewhat specific in their direction of the firm and its resources.

In considering arguments for exclusion based on micromanagement, . . . we look to whether the proposal seeks intricate detail or imposes a specific strategy, method, action, outcome or timeline for addressing an issue, thereby supplanting the judgment of management and the board. [A] proposal, regardless of its precatory nature, that prescribes specific timeframes or methods for implementing complex policies, consistent with the Commission’s guidance, may run afoul of micromanagement. In our view, the precatory nature of a proposal does not bear on the degree to which a proposal micromanages. . . .

This makes some sense to me, yet this guidance may not be as easy to apply as the SEC may think.  Here is the SEC's example of an excludable proposal:

For example, this past season we agreed that a proposal seeking annual reporting on “short-, medium- and long-term greenhouse gas targets aligned with the greenhouse gas reduction goals established by the Paris Climate Agreement to keep the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius and to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius” was excludable on the basis of micromanagement. In our view, the proposal micromanaged the company by prescribing the method for addressing reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. We viewed the proposal as effectively requiring the adoption of time-bound targets (short, medium and long) that the company would measure itself against and changes in operations to meet those goals, thereby imposing a specific method for implementing a complex policy.

I am note sure how I feel about the characterization of this proposal as excludable.  Is the described proposal about reporting or about "prescribing the method for addressing the reduction of addressing reduction of greenhouse gas emissions"?  Well, maybe a little of each . . . .  What do you think?

During my time in active, full-time law practice, the format and content of Rule 14a-8 changed a number of times.  It appears that the SEC may be poised to make another change--one more fundamental than enhanced guidance.  According to one recent report, the SEC may announce as early as tomorrow "changes . . . to make it harder for shareholders to file proposals, and harder for proposals to be eligible for re-filing in subsequent years."  Stay tuned for that possible announcement.

[Note: All footnote references in the quotations used in this post have been omitted.]

November 4, 2019 in Corporate Governance, Corporations, Joan Heminway, Securities Regulation, Shareholders | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, September 30, 2019

Call for Proposals - Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Corporate Law

Call for Proposals – Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Corporate Law

DEADLINE: Friday November 1, 2019

The U.S. Feminist Judgments Project seeks contributors of rewritten judicial opinions and private contracts, and commentaries on rewritten opinions and contracts, for an edited collection tentatively titled Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Corporate Law.  This edited volume is part of a collaboration among law professors and others to rewrite, from a feminist perspective, key judicial decisions in the United States.  The initial volume, Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court, edited by Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger, and Bridget J. Crawford, was published in 2016 by Cambridge University Press.  Cambridge University Press has approved a series of Feminist Judgments books. In 2017, Cambridge University Press published the tax volume titled Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions. Other volumes in the pipeline include rewritten opinions in the areas of reproductive justice, family law, torts, employment discrimination, trusts and estates, and health law. More information about the project can be found at https://law.unlv.edu/us-feminist-judgments.

Corporate law volume editors are Anne Choike, Usha R. Rodrigues and Kelli Alces Williams. The corporate law volume’s advisory panel is comprised of Alina Ball; Lisa Fairfax; Theresa Gabaldon; Joan MacLeod Heminway; Kristin Johnson; Elizabeth Pollman; Poonam Puri; Darren Rosenblum; Cindy Schipani; Kellye Testy; Cheryl Wade; and Cindy Williams.

With the guidance of the advisory panel, the editors have selected cases that have not appeared in other Feminist Judgments volumes, doctrinally significant cases, and cases that raised issues of particular salience to women’s lives.  This volume also seeks to include a rewritten “contract,” given corporate law’s emphasis upon default law and the precedent-setting power of privately negotiated arrangements. Potential authors are welcome to suggest other opinions or contracts that they would like to address, but the overall number of cases and contracts finally included in the volume must remain limited.

Interested prospective contributors should submit a proposal to either: 1) rewrite an opinion or contract (subject to a 10,000 word limit), or 2) comment on a rewritten opinion (4,000 word limit). Rewritten opinions may be majority opinions, concurrences, dissents, or private contracts.

Authors of rewritten opinions or contracts will be bound by the law and precedent in effect at the time of the original decision. Commentators will explain the original court decision or contract and its context, how the feminist opinion or contract differs from the original, and the impact that the rewritten feminist opinion or contract might have made.  The volume editors conceive of feminism as a broad movement and welcome proposalsthat bring into focus intersectional concerns beyond gender, such as race, class, disability, gender identity, age, sexual orientation, national origin, and immigration status.

To facilitate collaboration among contributors across the entire volume, the editors tentatively plan to host a gathering at the Law & Society Annual Meeting on May 28–31, 2020 in Denver, Colorado.  All contributors are invited, but not required, to participate in the workshop. Contributors attending the gathering must cover their own travel, lodging and meal expenses.

The editors will notify accepted authors and commentators by Saturday, November 30, 2019. Abstracts of rewritten opinions or contracts will be due on April 30, 2020 for circulation to fellow authors. Abstracts of commentaries will be due on May 15, 2020 for circulation to fellow authors. First drafts of rewritten opinions will be due on Wednesday, July 15, 2020. First drafts of commentaries will be due on Tuesday, September 15, 2020. The target date for submission of the completed, compiled manuscript for publication is February 2021.

To submit a proposal for rewriting an opinion or contract or providing commentary, please e-mail the following information to the volume co-editors, Anne Choike, anne.choike@wayne.edu, Usha R. Rodrigues, rodrig@uga.edu, and Kelli Alces Williams, kalces@law.fsu.edu by Friday, November 1, 2019:

  1. Your CV, your areas of corporate law interest or expertise, and why you are interested in and well suited to participate in this project. The Feminist Judgments Project and the Corporate Law volume editors are committed to including authors from diverse backgrounds. If you feel an aspect of your personal identity is important to your participation, please feel free to include that in your expression of interest.
  2. Your top two or three preferences of cases or contracts to write about from the list below. Alternatively, if you have another case or contract that you feel strongly should be included instead of one of the selected cases or contracts and that you would like to write about, provide a summary of the case or contract (no more than 250 words), a copy of the full text of the case or contract, and a brief summary (no more than 250 words) of the reasons that you think it should be included. Contributors who wish to co-author a rewritten opinion, rewritten contract or commentary, or work together on a rewritten opinion or contract and the commentary thereupon, are welcome to indicate that in the application.
  3. Your preference for contributing a rewritten opinion or contract, or a commentary.
  4. Any time constraints and other obligations that may impact your ability to meet the submission deadlines.
  5. Your willingness and ability to attend the tentatively planned gathering at the Law & Society Annual Meeting in Denver, Colorado in May 2020. Selection of contributors does not depend on their ability or willingness to attend this gathering.

This list of cases and contracts that the editors have selected for consideration to be included in the volume Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Corporate Law, is as follows:

Legal Personality, Identity, and Limited Liability of Corporate Entities:

  1. Citizens United (rights of corporate “persons” and nature of corporate personality)
  2. Walkovszky v. Carlton (limited liability/veil piercing)

Role and Purpose of the Corporation and Corporate Combinations in Society

  1. Dodge v. Ford (shareholder primacy)
  2. Merriam v. Demoulas Super Mkts. (stakeholder responsibility in family-owned business)
  3. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (directors’ duty to maximize share price in corporate takeover)

Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Governance

  1. Meinhard v. Salmon (duty of loyalty)
  2. Smith v. Van Gorkom (duty of care and business judgment rule)
  3. Francis v. United Jersey Bank (duty of care to understand business)
  4. In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation (duty of care regarding executive compensation)
  5. Harvey Weinstein Employment Agreement (duty of care to monitor compliance)

Closely Held Businesses and Other Considerations Regarding the Composition of Boards, Management, and Owners

  1. Ringling Bros.--Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling (dispute over board seats)
  2. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart (legitimacy of board member personal relationships)
  3. Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype (close corporations and minority shareholder oppression)

Protecting Vulnerable Investors and Potential Investors in Corporations

  1. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps (duty to disclose material information)
  2. SEC v. Howey (definition of investment contract)
  3. US v. Chestman (culpability for insider trading based on personal relationships)

September 30, 2019 in Call for Papers, Corporations, Joan Heminway, Research/Scholarhip | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, September 7, 2019

Beyond Bitcoin: Leveraging Blockchain to Benefit Business and Society

Have you ever wanted to learn the basics about blockchain? Do you think it's all hype and a passing fad? Whatever your view, take a look at my new article, Beyond Bitcoin: Leveraging Blockchain to Benefit Business and Society, co-authored with Rachel Epstein, counsel at Hedera Hashgraph.  I became interested in blockchain a year ago because I immediately saw potential use cases in supply chain, compliance, and corporate governance. I met Rachel at a Humanitarian Blockchain Summit and although I had already started the article, her practical experience in the field added balance, perspective, and nuance. 

The abstract is below:

Although many people equate blockchain with bitcoin, cryptocurrency, and smart contracts, the technology also has the potential to transform the way companies look at governance and enterprise risk management, and to assist governments and businesses in mitigating human rights impacts. This Article will discuss how state and non-state actors use the technology outside of the realm of cryptocurrency. Part I will provide an overview of blockchain technology. Part II will briefly describe how public and private actors use blockchain today to track food, address land grabs, protect refugee identity rights, combat bribery and corruption, eliminate voter fraud, and facilitate financial transactions for those without access to banks. Part III will discuss key corporate governance, compliance, and social responsibility initiatives that currently utilize blockchain or are exploring the possibilities for shareholder communications, internal audit, and cyber security. Part IV will delve into the business and human rights landscape and examine how blockchain can facilitate compliance. Specifically, we will focus on one of the more promising uses of distributed ledger technology -- eliminating barriers to transparency in the human rights arena thereby satisfying various mandatory disclosure regimes and shareholder requests. Part V will pose questions that board members should ask when considering adopting the technology and will recommend that governments, rating agencies, sustainable stock exchanges, and institutional investors provide incentives for companies to invest in the technology, when appropriate. Given the increasing widespread use of the technology by both state and non-state actors and the potential disruptive capabilities, we conclude that firms that do not explore blockchain’s impact risk obsolescence or increased regulation.

Things change so quickly in this space. Some of the information in the article is already outdated and some of the initiatives have expanded. To keep up, you may want to subscribe to newsletters such as Hunton, Andrews, Kurth's Blockchain Legal Resource. For more general information on blockchain, see my post from last year, where I list some of the videos that I watched to become literate on the topic. For additional resources, see here and here

If you are interested specifically in government use cases, consider joining the Government Blockchain Association. On September 14th and 15th,  the GBA is holding its Fall 2019 Symposium, “The Future of Money, Governance and the Law,” in Arlington, Virginia. Speakers will include a chief economist from the World Bank and banking, political, legal, regulatory, defense, intelligence, and law enforcement professionals from around the world.  This event is sponsored by the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, Criminal Investigations and Network Analysis (CINA) Center, and the Government Blockchain Association (GBA). Organizers expect over 300 government, industry and academic leaders on the Arlington Campus of George Mason University, either in person or virtually. To find out more about the event go to: http://bit.ly/FoMGL-914.

Blockchain is complex and it's easy to get overwhelmed. It's not the answer to everything, but I will continue my focus on the compliance, governance, and human rights implications, particularly for Dodd-Frank and EU conflict minerals due diligence and disclosure. As lawyers, judges, and law students, we need to educate ourselves so that we can provide solid advice to legislators and business people who can easily make things worse by, for example, drafting laws that do not make sense and developing smart contracts with so many loopholes that they cause jurisdictional and enforcement nightmares.

Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding blockchain, I'm particularly proud of this article and would not have been able to do it without my co-author, Rachel, my fantastic research assistants Jordan Suarez, Natalia Jaramillo, and Lauren Miller from the University of Miami School of Law, and the student editors at the Tennessee Journal of Business Law. If you have questions or please post them below or reach out to me at mweldon@law.miami.edu. 

 

 

September 7, 2019 in Compliance, Conferences, Contracts, Corporate Governance, Corporations, CSR, Current Affairs, Financial Markets, Human Rights, Law Reviews, Lawyering, Legislation, Marcia Narine Weldon, Securities Regulation, Shareholders, Technology | Permalink | Comments (0)