Business Law Prof Blog

Virtual ESG and Compliance Conference- November 7

 The Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics is hosting a virtual ESG and Compliance Conference on November 7.  I love to hear academics talk about these issues at conferences but because I still engage in the practice of law and I teach about compliance, governance, and sustainability, I find the conversations are very different when listening to practitioners.

My panel is titled ESG Due Diligence Across the Corporate Lifecycle From Start-Up to Maturity: The Roles of Compliance, Ethics, Legal, and the Board. My co-panelists, Ahpaly Coradin, Partner, Pierson Ferdinand, and Eugenia di Marco, a startup founder and international legal advisor, and I will focus on:

•  how to measure and prioritize ESG factors at different stages of a company's life cycle, according to a company's industry, and technology use.
•  how ESG creates value in M&A  beyond risk mitigation and learn the impact of ESG on target selection, valuation, and integration.
• board and management responsibilities in overseeing and managing ESG-related risks, particularly in light of Caremark duties and Marchand.

Date & Time: Thursday, November 7 from 12:45 PM – 1:45 PM central time

Other topics that speakers will discuss include:

• Supply chains and European due diligence 
• Global regulatory and legislative developments
• Sustainable governance in a global landscape
• Materiality assessments
• The intersection of governance and ESG
• OECD Guidelines

Who should attend?  (from the brochure)

• Compliance officers
• ESG, sustainability, and CSR professionals
• Audit professionals
• CFOs
• General counsel
• Corporate secretaries
• Risk managers
• Investment managers
• Supply chain and due diligence professionals
• Outside advisors

Although the official brochure clearly doesn't target academics, I strongly recommend that my peers attend. It may help inform your research and teaching, and I know that my students are very interested in these issues. 

Are you teaching on any of these areas? And what do you think practitioners should be focusing on that they aren't?

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Lebovitch on DGCL § 122(18)

As you may recall, Ann and I got a bit wound up last summer about the Delaware General Assembly's consideration of Delaware S.B. 313 (and, within it, the proposed addition of § 122(18) of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware ("DGCL")). We each offered brief oral testimony and even wrote letters to the Delaware House Judiciary Committee, which you can find here and here.

A comrade in that effort, Mark Lebovitch, has taken time to reflect a bit on the crazy summer that brought a new and troubling corporate purpose to Delaware's venerable corporate law and to prognosticate about the future impact of DGCL § 122(18).  The result?  Soap Opera Summer: Five Predictions About DGCL 122(18)’s Effect on Delaware Law and Practice.  The abstract follows.

Predictability and stability are often cited as leading reasons for why Delaware’s corporate law system is world renowned and widely emulated, giving the First State dominance in the competition for domiciling business entities. The first half of 2024 was anything but predictable and stable in Delaware’s legal community. Rarely has an amendment to the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) triggered as much public debate as SB 313, which became effective as of August 1, 2024. The crux of the dispute turned on identifying the greater risk to Delaware’s standing as the global leader in corporate law – a few recent judicial opinions that would have forced certain market practices to change, or the legislative fix seeking to nullify those opinions.

This article focuses on the most controversial aspect of SB 313. New DGCL Section 122(18) overrides the Court of Chancery’s February 23, 2024, Opinion in West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Company ("Moelis"), by broadly allowing corporate boards to contractually delegate to any stockholder or prospective stockholder the power to cause the company to act or refrain from acting in almost any manner, including many decisions normally reserved for the board itself. Now that the debate about recent cases and new legislation is over, this article takes the opportunity to assess how the new law will actually affect Delaware’s corporate law doctrine and litigation practice. Looking beyond the atypical drama of the past six months, this article offers five subtle (but hopefully not boring) predictions and observations about how new Section 122(18) is likely to affect the corporate world going forward.

Time will tell whether Mark gets the predictions "right" or not.  In the meantime, I am prepared for the eventual advent of legal challenges.  Like Mark, I see them coming . . . .

Updated (and Still Thoughtful!) CTA Analysis

Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC's Corporate Transparency Act ("CTA") guidance, about which I posted back in June, was recently updated.  You can find the update here.  Hat tip to friend-of-the-BLPB Tom Rutledge from Stoll Keenon Odgen on this development. 

I know many are struggling to interpret and apply the CTA.  I appreciate the work firms and individual lawyers are undertaking to help enlighten that effort.  Please feel free to send me links to guidance you may have seen that you believe to be particularly useful.

I Also Write Letters!

Further to Ann's post on Sunday sharing the text of her comment letter on Delaware's S.B. 313 (and more particularly the proposal to add a new § 122(18) to the General Corporation Law) and my post on § 122(18) last week, I share below the text of my comment letter to the Delaware State House of Representatives Judiciary Committee.  Although Ann and I each got one minute to deliver oral remarks at the hearing held by the Judiciary Committee on Tuesday, 60 seconds was insufficient to convey my overarching concerns--which represent a synthesis and characterization of selected points from my post last week.  The comment letter shared below includes the prepared remarks I would have conveyed had I been afforded additional time.

Madame Chair and Committee Members:

I appreciated the opportunity to speak briefly at today’s hearing. As I explained earlier today, although I am a professor in the business law program at The University of Tennessee College of Law, my appearance before the committee relates more to my nearly 39 years as a corporate finance practitioner, which has included bar work (most recently and extensively in the State of Tennessee) proposing and evaluating corporate and other business entity legislation. This letter expands on the virtual oral comments I offered at the hearing on the proposed addition of § 122(18) to the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (DGCL). My goal is simply to best ensure that the committee and the General Assembly are well informed about the significance of this proposed new section of the DGCL.

Both proponents and critics of proposed § 122(18) concur that the stockholder agreements that would be authorized by that provision can currently be accomplished in a corporation’s certificate of incorporation—the corporate charter. Indeed, as was alluded to in the testimony earlier today, current Delaware law expressly authorizes transferring governance authority from a corporation’s board of directors to its stockholders through charter amendments and through certificates of designation (instruments providing for new classes or series of stock) as well as for statutory close corporations, a status designated in the certificate of incorporation. As a result, questions raised at today’s hearing about why the new authority embodied in proposed DGCL § 122(18) is needed—or why it would be objectionable—are well taken. As I indicated in my oral testimony earlier today, the answer to those questions lies in public policy.

Current Delaware law on stockholder agreements promotes notice, transparency, and assent. Provisions in a Delaware corporation’s certificate of incorporation are matters of public record in the State of Delaware on which stockholders and prospective stockholders rely. They must be filed with the Delaware Secretary of State. Thus, Delaware’s corporate law currently requires that stockholders and potential future stockholders have public notice of any fundamental alteration in the statutory power of the board of directors to manage the corporation. Stockholder agreements like those authorized under proposed DGCL § 122(18) are not required to be filed with the state (although they would have to be filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the federal securities laws at some point after they are signed, for public companies). Moreover, under current Delaware law, if an amendment to the certificate of incorporation is required to achieve a shift in governance authority from the board of directors, then a stockholder vote is required. These requirements, which evidence Delaware’s public policies of notice, transparency, and assent, are what ultimately divide the supporters and detractors of proposed DGCL § 122(18). Your ultimate views on these policies—your determination as to whether they are important to the integrity of Delaware corporate law—should be strong factors in your determination of how to vote on proposed DGCL § 122(18). I submit that these policies should not be abandoned or reduced without careful consideration.

Last week, I wrote about my policy concerns relating to proposed DGCL § 122(18) in a blog post published on the Business Law Prof Blog. That post can be found here. Although my blog post was written for a different and broader legal audience (and therefore includes some technical legal references), it may be useful to you as additional statutory and judicial support for the positions I have taken in this letter and in my oral testimony. The post also includes several drafting observations relevant to the productive introduction of statutory authority for stockholder agreements that you may appreciate having.

I am grateful to have had the opportunity to share these insights with you today in writing and orally during the hearing this afternoon. I wish you well in your deliberations.

Very truly yours,

Joan M Heminway
Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law
Member and Former Chair, Tennessee Bar Association Business Law Section
Former Chair and Member, Boston Bar Association Corporate Law Committee

The Delaware State House of Representatives may vote on the bill tomorrow (Thursday) afternoon.  It is the last item listed in the Main House Agenda for tomorrow's session.  I can only hope that the members of the House feel better informed after the House Judiciary Committee hearing on Tuesday.  I know many of us tried to ensure that they are well informed.

Moelis, § 122(18), and DGCL Subchapter XIV - Knowing Legislative Policy Shift?!

Like so many others, I have wanted to say a word about West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Company, 311 A.3d 809 (Del. Ch. 2024).  My angle is a bit different from that of many others.  It derives from my 15-year practice background, my 24-year law teaching background, and my 39-year bar service background.  It focuses on a doctrinal analysis undertaken through a policy lens.  But I want to note here the value of Ann Lipton’s existing posts on Moelis and the related proposed addition of a new § 122(18) to the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (DGCL).  Her posts can be found here, here, here, and here.  (Sorry if I missed one, Ann!)  Ben Edwards also published a related post here.  They (and others offering commentary that I have read) raise and touch on some of the matters I address here, but not with the same legislative policy focus.

I apologize at the outset for the length of this post.  As habitual readers know, long posts are “not my style” as a blogger.  This matter is one of relatively urgent legislative importance, however, and I am eager to get my thoughts out to folks here.

I begin by referencing the DGCL provision in the eye of the storm.  DGCL § 141(a) provides for management of the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation by or under the direction of the corporation’s board of directors, except as otherwise provided in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation or the DGCL.  In Moelis, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster found various provisions in a stockholder agreement unlawful under DGCL § 141(a).  Specifically, a series of governance-oriented contractual arrangements at issue in Moelis were not authorized under the corporation’s certificate of incorporation or another provision of the DGCL.

The tension in this space involving DGCL § 141(a) is not new.  For many years, the legal validity of so-called stockholder agreements—technically, agreements (as opposed to charter provisions) that shift governance power from the directors of a corporation to one or more of its stockholders—has been questionable for most Delaware corporations, including public companies.  (I say “many years” because the legal validity of these agreements was an issue I routinely wrestled with before I left the full-time private practice of law in 2000.) 

The DGCL is different from the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) in this regard.  The MBCA has long had a broad-based statutory provision, MBCA § 7.32, authorizing shareholder agreements under specified conditions.  States adopting the MBCA have made a (presumably) conscious choice to embrace shareholder governance under the circumstances provided in the MBCA, including through § 7.32.  The MBCA’s provision expressing the management authority of the corporation’s board of directors, MBCA § 8.01(b), expressly references MBCA § 7.32, providing that:

[e]xcept as may be provided in an agreement authorized under section 7.32, and subject to any limitation in the articles of incorporation permitted by section 2.02(b), all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of the board of directors.

There is no analogous provision in the DGCL.  The only way to be sure that one could accomplish a shift in governance power from directors to stockholders under the DGCL has been for a corporation either to include the governance provisions in its certificate of incorporation or to organize as a close corporation under Subchapter XIV.  Close corporation status requires charter-based notification and conformity to a number of statutory requirements set forth in DGCL §§ 341 & 342, including that the certificate of incorporation provide that the stock be represented by certificated shares “held of record by not more than a specified number of persons, not exceeding 30,” that the stock be subject to transfer restrictions, and that there not be a “public offering” of the stock. DGCL § 342(a)(1)-(3).  Thus, by legislative design, statutory close corporation status is not available to publicly held corporations organized under Delaware law (which makes total sense for those who understand what a closely held corporation is, in a general sense).

Members of the Delaware State Bar Association (DSBA) Corporation Law Section know all of this well.  As leaders in reviewing and proposing changes to the DGCL over the years, this group of folks has thoughtfully weighed policy considerations relating to the DGCL’s application to the myriad situations that Delaware corporations may face.  Without having researched or inquired about the matter, I find it hard to believe that the section has not previously discussed the desirability of an express statutory provision allowing for the approval and execution of stockholder agreements outside a corporation’s certificate of incorporation.  The matter has been addressed by the Executive Council of the Tennessee Bar Association’s Business Law Section, which engages in similar legislative initiatives in Tennessee, more than once during the time I have been serving on it.  I therefore assume that the choice to refrain from proposing a specific statute authorizing stockholder agreements outside a corporation’s certificate of incorporation over the years has been both informed and intentional.

Yet, earlier today, Senate Bill 313 passed in the Senate Chamber of the Delaware General Assembly.  In that bill, vetted and approved by the DSBA Corporation Law Section and blessed by the DSBA Executive Committee, the longstanding policy decision to refrain from allowing stockholder agreements outside of the certificate of incorporation or Subchapter XIV is being summarily reversed through the proposal to adopt a new DGCL § 122(18)—an alteration of the corporate powers provision of the DGCL.  That new proposed DGCL section provides a corporation with the power to enter into stockholder agreements within certain bounds, but those bounds are relatively broad.

As others have noted (at least in part), the drafting of the proposed DGCL § 122(18) (and the related additional changes to DGCL § 122) reflects a belt-and-suspenders approach and is otherwise awkward.  Multiple sentences are crammed into this one new subpart of DGCL §122 to effectuate the drafters’ aims.  The DGCL has been criticized for its complex drafting in the past (resulting in, among other things, a project creating a simplified DGCL), and the approach taken by the drafters of the proposed DGCL § 122 changes adds to the complexity of the statute in unnecessary ways.  A provision this significant should be addressed in a separate statutory section, the approach taken in MBCA §7.32.  That new section then can be cross-referenced in DGCL § 141(b)—and, if deemed necessary, DGCL § 122.  Breaking out the provision in its own section also should allow legislators to more easily and coherently identify strengths and weaknesses in the drafting and build in or remove any constraints on stockholder governance that they may deem necessary as the proposed provision gets continued attention in the Delaware State House of Representatives.  I offer that as a drafting suggestion.

Apart from the inelegance of the drafting, however, I have one large and important question as Senate Bill 313 continues to move through the Delaware legislative process: do members of the Delaware General Assembly voting on this bill fully understand the large shift in public policy represented by the introduction of DGCL § 122(18)?  If so, then they act on an informed basis and live with the consequences, as they do with any legislation they pass that is signed into law.  If not, we all must work harder to enable that understanding. 

It is all fine and good for us to point out how hasty the drafting process has been, how traditional debate and procedures may have been short-changed or subverted, how waiting for the Delaware Supreme Court to act on the appeal of the Chancery Court decision before proceeding is prudent, etc.  But the fact of the matter has been that potential and actual stockholders of Delaware corporations have been able to rely exclusively on charter-based exceptions to the management authority of the board of directors—whether those exception are authorized in Subchapter XIV of the DGCL or otherwise.  This has meant that prospective equity investors in a Delaware corporation knew to carefully consider a corporation’s certificate of incorporation to identify any pre-existing constraints on the management authority of the board of directors before investing.  This also has meant that any new constraints on the board of directors’ authority to manage the corporation’s business and affairs required a charter amendment of some kind—either a board-approved and stockholder-approved amendment of the certificate of incorporation or the board’s approval of a certificate of designations under charter-based authority of which existing stockholders should be aware.

Ann noted this issue in a previous post.  The enactment of proposed DGCL § 122(18) will make it more challenging for potential equity investors to identify the locus/loci of management power in the corporation.  Although both the certificate of incorporation and any stockholder agreement would be required to be filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for reporting companies (the latter as an instrument defining the right of security holders under paragraph (b)(4) or as a material contract (b)(10) of Regulation S-K Item 601), the current draft of proposed DGCL § 122(18) does not provide that a copy of any contract authorized under its provisions be filed with the Delaware Secretary of State or that its existence be noted on stock certificates (a requirement included in MBCA §7.32(c)).  In addition, stockholders will lose their franchise if the stockholder agreement would otherwise have required a stockholder vote.

Finally, it seems important to note that the judicial doctrine or independent legal significance—or equal dignity—has been strong in Delaware over the years as a factor in the interpretation of Delaware corporate law.  This has helped practitioners and the judiciary to navigate difficult issues in advising clients about the outcomes of Delaware corporate law debates.  The rule typically has been that, if one takes a path afforded by the statute, they get what the statute provides.  And if one does not take a provided statutory path, they cannot later be heard to argue for what the statute provides for users of that untaken statutory path. 

Classically, in dicta in Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (1993), Chief Justice Veasey wrote (on pp. 1380-81) about the importance of DGCL Subchapter XIV in construing corporate governance arrangements in light of the doctrine of independent legal significance:

 . . . the provisions of Subchapter XIV relating to close corporations and other statutory schemes preempt the field in their respective areas. It would run counter to the spirit of the doctrine of independent legal significance and would be inappropriate judicial legislation for this Court to fashion a special judicially-created rule for minority investors when the entity does not fall within those statutes, or when there are no negotiated special provisions in the certificate of incorporation, by-laws, or stockholder agreements.

With the passage of proposed DGCL § 122(18), parts of Subchapter XIV of the DGCL will seemingly be rendered vestigial (i.e., they will no longer have independent legal significance).  Consideration of this and any other potential collateral damage to the interpretation of Delaware corporate law that may be created by the enactment of proposed DGCL § 122(18) should be carefully undertaken and, as desired, additional changes to the DGCL should be debated before voting on Senate Bill 313 is undertaken in the Delaware State House of Representatives.

I do not argue for a specific result in this post.  Rather, I mean to illuminate further the significance of the decision facing the Delaware General Assembly (and, potentially, the decision of the Governor of the State of Delaware) in the review of proposed DGCL § 122(18).  In doing so, I admit to some sympathy for those who may have clients with stockholder agreements they now know or suspect to be unlawful under the Moelis opinion.  In all candor, any legislation on this topic should more directly address those existing agreements given that the provisions of proposed DGCL § 122(18) are not a mere clarification of existing law.  Agreements not re-adopted under any new legislative authority may be found unlawful in the absence of clarity on this point.  As a reference point, I note that, in amending MBCA § 7.32 to remove a previous 10-year duration limit, the drafters specified the effect on pre-existing agreements in MBCA § 7.32(h).  Take that as another drafting suggestion . . . .

I welcome comments on any or all of what I offer here.  If I have anything incorrect, please correct me.  Regardless, I hope this post provides some additional information to those in the Delaware General Assembly and elsewhere who have an interest in proposed DGCL § 122(18).

ESG Greenwashing

ESG greenwashing has been getting attention among legal academics.  In Rainbow-Washing, 15 Ne. U. L. Rev. 285 (2023), LMU Law's John Rice explores the

increasingly common, but destructive, practice in which corporations make public-facing statements espousing their support of the LGBTQIA+ community . . . to draw in and retain consumers, investors, employees, and public support, but then either fail to fulfill the promises implicit in those statements or act in contravention to them. 

My own forthcoming article in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, presented at the November 2023 ILEP-Penn Carey Law symposium honoring Jill Fisch, mentions the increasing notoriety of ESG greenwashing and cites to John's article.

Last week, UVA Law Professor Naomi Cahn called out ESG greenwashing in Forbes, citing to a study to be published in the Journal of Accounting Research that finds "firms’ ESG rhetoric may not match their reality."  She suggests that "a meaningful analysis of a firm’s ESG commitment requires much further digging, and ultimately it requires meaningful oversight from outside the ESG community on what should be disclosed and the accuracy of the reports."  The article references a forthcoming book coauthored by Cahn, June Carbone (Minnesota Law) ,and Nancy Levit (UMKC Law) and quotes Minnesota Law Professor Claire Hill.  (Hat tip to Claire for leading me to this Forbes piece.)  It's a solidly good read.  I added a citation to it in my forthcoming article.

I suspect more will be done in this space academically and practically as ESG continues to occupy the minds of legal academics, lawyers, and business principals.  I will be continuing to work in this area, focusing next on corporate compliance issues.  Stay tuned for news on that project (and for a notification about the publication of my forthcoming University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law article referenced above).

2024 Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop

Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop: 

Call for Papers 

UCLA School of Law, in partnership with the University of Illinois College of Law, University of Richmond School of Law, and Vanderbilt Law School invites submissions for the Eleventh Annual Workshop for Corporate & Securities Litigation. This workshop will be held on September 20-21, 2024 in Los Angeles, California. 

Overview 

This annual workshop brings together scholars focused on corporate and securities litigation to present their scholarly works. Papers addressing any aspect of corporate and securities litigation or enforcement are eligible, including securities class actions, fiduciary duty litigation, and SEC enforcement actions. We welcome scholars working in a variety of methodologies, as well as both completed papers and works-in-progress at any stage. Authors whose papers are selected will be invited to present their work at a workshop hosted by UCLA School of Law. Participants will pay for their own travel, lodging, and other expenses. 

Submissions 

If you are interested in participating, please send the paper you would like to present, or an abstract of the paper, to [email protected] by Friday, June 7, 2024 Please include your name, current position, and contact information in the e-mail accompanying the submission. Authors of accepted papers will be notified in early July. 

Questions 

Any questions concerning the workshop should be directed to the organizers: Jim Park ([email protected]), Jessica Erickson ([email protected]), Amanda Rose ([email protected]), and Verity Winship ([email protected]). 

Fiduciary Duties: A Tale of Two Families

Check out the third issue of volume 73 of the DePaul Law Review!  It includes a series of papers emanating from the HBO series Succession.  As you may recall, I posted a call for papers for this issue about a year ago.  Most of the papers in the issue came from a venture originated and organized by Susan Bandes and Diane Kemker called the Waystar Royco School of Law.  I wrote about that enterprise here.  

I participated in the Waystar Royco School of Law Zoom meetings as the “Roy/Demoulas Distinguished Professor of Law and Business.”  I presented on fiduciary duty issues comparing the principals of two family businesses--The Demoulas family from Northern Massachusetts and Succession's Roy family from New York.  You can find my Zoom session here (Passcode: #hN+7J5N).  That presentation resulted in an essay that I wrote for the DePaul Law Review issue as well as an advanced business associations course based on the Succession series. I finish teaching that course this week.  I also presented on the topic of my Succession essay at the Popular Culture Association conference back in March.  I include a screenshot of my cover slide below.

I just posted the essay to SSRN.  The piece is entitled What the Roys Should Learn from the Demoulas Family (But Probably Won’t).  The SSRN abstract is set forth below.

This essay offers a comparison of the actions taken by members of two families: the Demoulas family, best known as owner-operators of northeastern regional supermarkets, and the Roy family featured in HBO's series "Succession." The comparative appraisal focuses principally on the selfish pursuit of individualized financial, social, and familial status by key members of both the Demoulas and Roy families as they relate to the law of business associations (principally corporate law). At the heart of the matter is the legal concept of fiduciary duty. A comparison of the two families’ exploits reveals that lessons earlier learned by the Demoulas family (and observers of the multifaceted, multi-year litigation involving them and their business undertakings) fail to positively impact the destiny and legacy of Succession’s Roy family—at least as far as the Roy family story has been told to date. Although hope may be limited, there is still time for the remaining Roy family members to take heed and make changes.

To execute and comment on the comparison of these two families, the essay starts by outlining relevant information concerning legally recognized fiduciary duties in the corporate (and, to a lesser degree, partnership) contexts. Next, the essay offers background information about the Demoulas and Roy families and their respective businesses (both organized as corporations) and selected business dealings and governance, noting actual and potential breaches of fiduciary duty in each case. A brief conclusion offers comparative observations about the actions taken by members of the Demoulas and Roy families that contravene or challenge applicable fiduciary duties and the opportunity for general reflection. Of particular note is the observation that the ability of corporate directors and officers to comply with their fiduciary duties may become more difficult and complicated when integrating family dynamics and business succession issues into business decisions in a family business context.

I have enjoyed the research and teaching I have done in this area over the past year.  It always is nice to take a fresh approach to familiar concepts.  I daresay my students have felt the same way in covering business associations topics through the lens of the happenings in the series.  They certainly have been attentive and communicative, which is what I had been shooting for in teaching corporate and other business associations law through the course.  I am happy to answer questions about the course and provide my syllabi to anyone who wants to see what I assigned and did for the course.  Just ask.

Corporate Transparency Act Held Unconstitutional

A U.S. District Court judge sitting in the Northeastern Division of the Northern District of Alabama found the Corporate Transparency Act (affectionately referred to in short form as the CTA) unconstitutional as detailed in a memorandum opinion issued on Friday.  The opinion granted the plaintiffs, the National Small Business United (NSBU) and Isaac Winkles, an NSBA member, their summary judgment motion on this basis.  The accompanying final judgment permanently enjoined the Secretary of the Treasury and other government defendants, as well as "any other agency or employee acting on behalf of the United States," from enforcing the Corporate Transparency Act against the plaintiffs in the litigation.

Many of us business law profs--and all of our business law practice brethren--have been following the CTA, endeavoring to gain a more comprehensive understanding of its provisions and fashioning advice on compliance.  The CTA, enacted in 2021 and effective as of January 1, 2024, requires nonexempt companies (domestic or foreign corporations, limited liability companies, and other entities formed or, in the case of foreign entities, registered to do business in any U.S. state or tribal jurisdiction) to disclose certain information, including about their beneficial owners, to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), part of the U.S. Treasury Department.  Exempt firms include (among others) “large operating companies” with a presence in the U.S., entities with a class of securities registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (or registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, or the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended), and controlled or wholly owned subsidiaries of certain exempt firms.

The March 1 memorandum opinion specifically holds that the U.S. Congress acted outside the scope of its constitutional power in enacting the CTA.  In holding the CTA unconstitutional, the court found that the congressional enactment of the CTA was not authorized under the Commerce Clause, Congress's taxing power, or the Necessary and Proper Clause and could not be justified as incidental to the exercise by Congress of its express legislative authority.  As to the Commerce Clause--which has been interpreted broadly in many contexts--the court noted that "the CTA does not regulate economic or commercial activity on its face."  The court also found that the CTA does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  In essence, the court finds the CTA analogous to incorporation--a state entity structure and governance matter and not a matter of interstate commerce.

It will be interesting to see if there is any reaction at the federal level or any fallout in other federal trial courts.  The memorandum opinion is well written and easy to follow.  Having said that, although I am no constitutional law scholar, it seems that the court's reasoning is subject to attack on a number of points.  I will continue to keep my ear to the ground on this.

Baiardi Endowed Law Speaker Series - Wayne State Law

I have the privilege and honor to be in Detroit today to present the second annual Baiardi lecture at Wayne State University Law School.  Wayne Law is a bit of a second home for me (a status it enjoys with several other law schools).  I have presented at two symposia here (publishing twice, as a result, with the Wayne Law Review).  Also, Wayne Law was the academic pied à terre of Peter Henning, who was a trusted and dear mentor (and an accomplice in reasoning through insider trading and applied corporate governance questions) until his untimely death.

My lecture addresses aspects of a joint project I previewed at the National Business Law Scholars Conference at Tennessee Law last June.  The project is the brainchild of my Tennessee Law colleague Tomer Stein and involves taking a new approach to the ongoing debate about federalizing corporate law.  The talk offers some practical applied thoughts on the project and is entitled "Visioning (Not Advocating or Discounting) Federal Corporate Law." I undoubtedly will have more to say on this topic as our work on the project progresses.  But if you think of or come across anything you deem relevant to the cause and have time to contact me or Tomer, I know we would be grateful for your insights and suggestions.

[Please note that, although the notice above says the day of the week is a Thursday, I am speaking today--Monday.]

Packin and Alon-Beck on Board Observers

I had the opportunity to attend one of the sessions in the Interdisciplinary Workshop on Corporations, Private Ordering, and Corporate Law last week.  The program was co-hosted by Foundations of Law and Finance (Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Advanced Studies) and Columbia Law School.  Luckily for me, the piece of the program I attended featured Nizan Geslevich Packin presenting a work-in-progress she is co-authoring with Anat Alon-Beck entitled Board Observers: Shadow Governance in the Era of Big Tech.

Although a draft of the paper is not yet posted, here is the SSRN abstract:

This Article examines the rise in corporate governance practice of appointing board observers, especially in the context of private equity, venture capital (VC), and corporate venture capital (CVC). Board observers are non-voting members attending board meetings to gain knowledge and insight. They arguably also provide valuable feedback, an outside perspective, and can even help ensure corporate operations. In recent years, board observer seats – a notion also existing in the nonprofit sector – have become increasingly popular in the for-profit business world, where investors have various market and business justifications for using board observers, including corporate governance considerations, minimizing litigation exposure, navigating antitrust issues, CFIUS regulation, and ERISA concerns. It was not until November 2023 that mainstream media started paying more attention to the concept of board observers, after OpenAI, the corporate entity that brought the world ChatGPT, gave Microsoft a board observer seat following the drama in OpenAI’s boardroom. But what the mainstream media did not explore in its coverage of the board observer concept was its seemingly less interesting nature as a non-voting board membership, which was an important element in the complex relationship between OpenAI and Microsoft. This signaled deepening ties between the two companies that also eventually got the attention of the DOJ and FTC, as well as the influential role of CVC in funding and governing the research and development of OpenAI.

This Article makes several contributions. First, it provides an account of the board observer phenomenon, which has significantly developed and become a common practice in recent years given antitrust and national security considerations and scrutiny. Second, it presents fresh insights, groundbreaking empirical findings, and data on the scope of this corporate governance vehicle. Third, it considers the theoretical circumstances and implications of these developments. It argues for a shift in contractual innovation in deal-making and regulatory reviews, necessitating the development of corporate culture norms emphasizing disclosure and prioritizing company interests, communication, and trust-building as crucial elements in service of board observers. Finally, the Article considers the practical implications of these developments and explains why more empirical data collection and further research are necessary to determine whether current corporate governance mechanisms require modification in connection with liability, accountability, and fiduciary duties for board observers.

As someone who had to deal with board observer requests and provisions in an earlier corporate finance era, I was fascinated by the work.  So much of what their research is revealing felt familiar (even though much also has changed): what is old can be new again.  I look forward to reading the draft and learning more.

Are Lawyers, Lawmakers, and Law Professors Really Ready for AI in 2024?

We just finished our second week of the semester and I’m already exhausted, partly because I just submitted the first draft of a law review article that’s 123 pages with over 600 footnotes on a future-proof framework for AI regulation to the University of Tennessee Journal of Business Law. I should have stuck with my original topic of legal ethics and AI.

But alas, who knew so much would happen in 2023? I certainly didn’t even though I spent the entire year speaking on AI to lawyers, businesspeople, and government officials. So, I decided to change my topic in late November as it became clearer that the EU would finally take action on the EU AI Act and that the Brussels effect would likely take hold requiring other governments and all the big players in the tech space to take notice and sharpen their own agendas.

But I’m one of the lucky ones because although I’m not a techie, I’m a former chief privacy officer, and spend a lot of time thinking about things like data protection and cybersecurity, especially as it relates to AI. And I recently assumed the role of GC of an AI startup. So, because I’m tech-adjacent, I’ve spent hours every day immersed in the legal and tech issues related to large and small language models, generative AI (GAI), artificial general intelligence (AGI), APIs, singularity, the Turing test, and the minutiae of potential regulation around the world. I’ve become so immersed that I actually toggled between listening to the outstanding Institute for Well-Being In Law virtual conference and the FTC’s 4-hour tech summit yesterday with founders, journalists, economists, and academics. Adding more fuel to the fire, just before the summit kicked off, the FTC announced an inquiry into the partnerships and investments of  Alphabet, Inc., Amazon.com, Inc., Anthropic PBC, Microsoft Corp., and OpenAI, Inc. Between that and the NY Times lawsuit against OpenAI and Microsoft alleging billions in damages for purported IP violations, we are living in interesting times.

If you’ve paid attention to the speeches at Davos, you know that it was all AI all the time. I follow statements from the tech leaders like other people follow their fantasy football stats or NCAA brackets. Many professors, CEOs, and general consumers, on the other hand, have been caught by surprise by the very rapid acceleration of the developments, particularly related to generative AI.

However, now more members of the general public are paying attention to the concept of deepfakes and demanding legislation in part because the supernova that is Taylor Swift has been victimized by someone creating fake pornographic images of her. We should be even more worried about the real and significant threat to the integrity of the fifty global elections and occurring in 2024 where members of the public may be duped into believing that political candidates have said things that they did not, such as President Biden telling people not to vote in the New Hampshire primary and to save their votes for November.

For those of us who teach in law schools in the US and who were either grading or recovering from grading in December, we learned a few days before Christmas that Lexis was rolling out its AI solution for 2Ls and 3Ls. Although I had planned to allow and even teach my students the basics of prompt engineering and using AI as a tool (and not a substitute for lawyering) in my business associations, contract drafting, and business and human rights class, now I have to also learn Lexis’ solution too. I feel for those professors who still ban the use of generative AI or aren’t equipped to teach students how to use it ethically and effectively.

Even so, I’m excited and my students are too. The legal profession is going to change dramatically over the next two years, and it’s our job as professors to prepare our students. Thompson Reuters, the ABA, and state courts have made it clear that we can’t sit by on the sidelines hoping that this fad will pass.

Professionally, I have used AI to redraft an employee handbook in my client’s voice (using my employment law knowledge, of course), prepare FAQs for another client’s code of conduct in a very specialized industry, prepare interview questions for my podcast, and draft fact patterns for simulations for conferences and in class. I’ve also tested its ability to draft NDAs and other simple agreements using only ChatGPT. It didn’t do so well there, but that’s because I know what I was looking for. And when I gave additional instructions, for example, about drafting a mutual indemnification clause and then a separate supercap, it did surprisingly well. But I know what should be in these agreements. The average layperson does not, something that concerns Chief Justice Roberts and should concern us all.

How have you changed your teaching with the advent of generative AI? If you’re already writing or teaching about AI or just want more resources, join the 159 law professors in a group founded by Professors April Dawson and Dan Linna. As for my law review article, I’m sure a lot of it will be obsolete by the time it’s published, but it should still be an interesting, if not terrifying, read for some.

Of Directorships: Reconfiguring the Theory of the Firm

It always is a great pleasure to pass along and promote the work of a colleague.  And today, I get to post about the work of a UT Law colleague!  Many of you know Tomer Stein, who came to join us at UT Law back in the summer.  He is such an ideal colleague and, like many of us, has broad interests across business finance and governance.

This post supports a recent draft governance piece, the title of which is the same as this post--Of Directorships: Reconfiguring the Theory of the Firm.  You can find the draft here.  The abstract is included below.

This Article develops a novel account of directorships and then uses it to reconfigure the theory of the firm. This widely accepted theory holds that firms emerge to satisfy the economic need for carrying out vertically integrated business activities under a fiduciary contract that substitutes for the owners’ multiple agreements with contractors and suppliers. As per this theory, the fiduciary contract is inherently incomplete, yet often preferable: while it cannot address all future contingencies in the firm, it will effectively direct all unaccounted-for firm events by placing them under the owners’ purview as a matter of default, or residual right. Under this contractual mechanism, firm owners, such as corporate shareholders, acquire the status of residual claimants who have the power to decide on all contractually unenumerated contingencies.

This view of the firm is conceptually flawed and normatively mistaken. Firms do carry vertically integrated business activities managed by their fiduciaries, but those fiduciaries—agents, trustees, and directors—are not functional equivalents from either the legal or economic standpoint. Unlike agents and trustees who receive commands from principals and settlors, respectively, directors manage the firm’s business by exercising decisional autonomy. Conceptually, shareholders who hire directors do not run the firm’s business as residual claimants. Rather, it is the directors who manage the firm as residual obligors—all contractually unaccounted for contingencies are placed under the fiduciary’s purview as a matter of obligation. This feature makes directorship an attractive management mechanism that often outperforms other fiduciary mechanisms, and the residual-claimant structure that stands behind them, in a broad variety of contexts. By developing this critical insight, the Article proposes not only to reconfigure the prevalent theory of the firm, but also to redesign both federal and state laws in a way that will facilitate directorships not only in corporations, but also across several indispensable dimensions of our financial, communal, and familial organizations.

As someone who understands both the central role of the director in corporate governance and the incomplete and inaccurate principal/agent relationship between shareholders and directors, I have enthusiasm for this project!  But I also am intrigued by the thought that the ideas in the paper can be translated to non-business institutions and groups.

Read on, and enjoy!

What Business Lawyers Needs to Ask their Clients About Generative AI Usage

Last week I had the pleasure of joining my fellow bloggers at the UT Connecting the Threads Conference on the legal issues related to generative AI (GAI) that lawyers need to understand for their clients and their own law practice. Here are some of the questions I posed to the audience and some recommendations for clients. I'll write about ethical issues for lawyers in a separate post. In the meantime, if you're using OpenAI or any other GAI, I strongly recommend that you read the terms of use. You may be surprised by certain clauses, including the indemnification provisions. 

I started by asking the audience members to consider what legal areas are most affected by GAI? Although there are many, I'll focus on data privacy and employment law in this post.

Data Privacy and Cybersecurity

Are the AI tools and technologies you use compliant with relevant data protection and privacy regulations, such as GDPR and CCPA? Are they leaving you open to a cyberattack?

This topic also came up today at a conference at NCCU when I served as a panelist on cybersecurity preparedness for lawyers.

Why is this important?

ChatGPT was banned in Italy for a time over concerns about violations of the GDPR. The Polish government is investigating OpenAI over privacy issues. And there are at least two class action lawsuits in California naming Microsoft and OpenAI. Just yesterday, a US government agency halted the use of GAI due to data security risks. 

It’s also much easier for bad actors to commit cybercrime because of the amount of personal data they can  scrape and analyze and because deepfake technology allows impersonation of images and voices in a matter of seconds. The NSA and FBI have warned people to be worried about misinformation and cyberthreats due to the technology. On a positive note, some are using GAI to fight cybercrime.

Surveillance and facial recognition technology can violate privacy and human rights. Governments have used surveillance technology to tamp down on and round up dissidents, protestors, and human rights defenders for years. Now better AI tools makes that easier. And if you haven't heard some of the cautions about Clearview AI and the misidentification of citizens, you should read this article. A new book claims that this company could "end privacy as we know it."

What should (you and) your clients do?

• Ensure algorithms minimize collection and processing of personal data and build in confidentiality safeguards to comply with privacy laws
• Revise privacy and terms of use policies on websites to account for GAI
• Build in transparency for individuals to control how data is collected and used
• Turn on privacy settings in all AI tools and don’t allow your data to be used for training the large language models
• Turn off chat history in settings on all devices
• Prevent browser add-ons
• Check outside counsel guidelines for AI restrictions (or draft them for your clients)
• Work with your IT provider or web authority to make sure your and your clients’ data is not being scraped for training
• Use synthetic data sets instead of actual personally identifiable information
• Ensure that you have a Generative AI Security Policy
• Check vendor contracts for AI usage
• Enhance cybersecurity training
• Conduct a table top exercise and make sure that you have an incident response plan in place
• Check cyberinsurance policies for AI clauses/exclusions

What about the employment law implications?

According to a Society for Human Resources Management Member Survey about AI usage:

• 79% use AI for recruiting and hiring

• 41% use AI for learning and development

• 38% use AI for performance management

• 18% use AI for productivity monitoring

• 8% use Ai for succession planning

• 4% use AI or promotional decisions

GAI algorithms can also have significant bias for skin color. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released research showing that "not just dark African-American faces, but also Asian faces were up to 100 times more likely to be failed by these systems than the faces of white individuals.”

Then there’s the question of whether recruiters and hiring managers should use AI to read emotions during an an interview. The EU says absolutely not. 

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has taken notice. In a panel discussion, Commissioner Keith Sonderling explained, “carefully designed and properly used, AI has potential to enhance diversity and inclusion, accessibility in the workplace by mitigating the risk of unlawful discrimination. Poorly designed and carelessly implemented, AI can discriminate on a scale and magnitude greater than any individual HR professional.” The EEOC also recently settled the first of its kind AI bias case for $365,000.

What to do 

• Use AI screening tools to disregard name, sec, age, national origin, etc.
• Use bots for interviews to eliminate bias because of accents
• Check local laws such as New York City's automated decision tools guidance for employers
• Be careful about training large language models on current workforce data because that can perpetuate existing bias
• Review the EEOC Resource on AI

Questions to Ask Your Clients:

• How are you integrating human rights considerations into your company's strategy and decision-making processes, particularly concerning the deployment and use of new technologies?

• Can you describe how your company's corporate governance structure accounts for human rights and ethical considerations, particularly with regards to the use and impact of emerging technologies?

• How does your company approach balancing the need for innovation and competitive advantage with the potential societal and human rights impact of technologies like facial recognition and surveillance?

• As data becomes more valuable, how is your company ensuring ethical data collection and usage practices?

• Are these practices in line with both domestic and international human rights and privacy standards?

• How is your organization addressing the potential for algorithmic bias in your technology, which can perpetuate and exacerbate systemic inequalities?

• What steps are you taking to ensure digital accessibility and inclusivity, thereby avoiding the risk of creating or enhancing digital divides?

• How is your company taking into account the potential environmental impacts of your technology, including e-waste and energy consumption, and what steps are being taken to mitigate these risks while promoting sustainable development?

• Are you at risk of a false advertising or unfair/deceptive trade practices act claim from the FTC or other regulatory body due to your use of AI?

Whether or not you're an AI expert or use GAI in your practice now, it's time to raise these issues with your clients. Future posts will address other legal issues and the ethical implications of using AI in legal practice. 

The LLC As a Corporation -- The Hits Keep Coming

A new opinion this week tells us that "Defendant, Intermed Resources TN, LLC, [is] a Tennessee limited liability company that markets medical equipment."  Camber Spine Technologies v. Intermed Resources TN, LLC, No. CV 22-3648, 2023 WL 5182597, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2023). The opinion later, though, tells us that Intermed is a "Tennessee limited liability corporation." It was right, before it was wrong. 

The United States Supreme Court has told us that the test for general personal jurisdiction for LLCs is the same test that is used for corporations. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 123 (2014). Unfortunately, in that case, Justice Ginsburg referred to "MBUSA" as "a Delaware limited liability corporation." MBUSA is an LLC, not a corporation. It's a little less clear in cases of specific jurisdiction, so there is least some potential litigation value in the getting this right, in addition the more general principle of being accurate. 

Camber Spine was one the case calling an LLC a corporation that I found this week. Last week there were four more: 

1.  Ocean Tomo LLC v. Golabs, Inc., No. 22 C 4966, 2023 WL 4930348, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2023) )" Plaintiff is a limited liability corporation with a principal place of business in Illinois . . . ."). 
2. Jackson v. Reliance Constr. Servs., LLC, No. 1:20-CV-799, 2023 WL 4933269, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2023) ("Defendant Reliance Construction is a limited liability corporation that is currently unrepresented.").
3. Universitas Educ., LLC v. Benistar, No. 3:20-CV-00738 (KAD), 2023 WL 4932034, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2023) ("Greyhound Partners is a Connecticut limited liability corporation with the following current members: Greyhound Management Inc. and Constance Ann Carpenter.") 
4. NetApp, Inc. v. Cinelli, No. 2020-1000-LWW, 2023 WL 4925910, at *12, n.172 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 2023) (citing "Metro Communication Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 153-55 (Del. Ch. 2004)  and stating that "imputing fraud to the corporation where the manager of a limited liability corporation designated by the corporation made false statements.")

I suppose it is painfully obvious I am not going to let this go. If nothing else, these cases are reinforcing the need for my new paper, with Samantha Prince (available on SSRN): An LLC By Any Other Name Is Still Not A Corporation. We're still talking to editors for those interested in helping us clean up this mess.  One day, we hope to put an end to this madness.

New Paper: An LLC By Any Other Name Is Still Not A Corporation

It's been little while since I posted here, but long-time readers of theis blog will not be surprised by the topic.  I am happy to say that, after a lot of work with an exceptional co-author who shares my concerns, Professor Samantha Prince from Penn State Dickinson Law, we have an article documenting the problems with mislabeling LLCs and providing a variety of solutions.  I have been writing on this for nearly 15 years, and unfortunately, not a lot has changed. 

The article, An LLC By Any Other Name Is Still Not A Corporation, is now available on SSRN, here, and has been submitted for publication. In the meantime, we welcome thoughts and comments.  

Here is the abstract: 

Business entities have their own unique characteristics. Entrepreneurs and lawyers who represent them select an entity structure based on the business’s current and projected needs. The differing needs of each business span across myriad topics such as capital requirements, taxation, employee benefits, and personal liability protection. These choices present advantages and disadvantages many of which are built into the type of entity chosen.

It is critically important that people, especially lawyers, recognize the difference between entities such as corporations and limited liability companies (LLCs). It is an egregious, nearly unforgivable, error in our view to call an LLC a “limited liability corporation.” In part, this is because lawyers should try to get things right, but it is also because conflating the two entity types can lead to unpredictable outcomes. Perhaps more important, it could lead to incorrect and unjust outcomes. A prime example lies within the veil piercing context.

Lest you think that this is not a prevalent occurrence, there are nearly 9,000 references to the phrase “limited liability corporation” in court cases. Practicing attorneys are not the only people messing this up. Judges, legislators, federal and state agency officials, and media pundits are also getting it wrong. Most recently, Justice Samuel Alito scribed an op-ed that was published in the Wall Street Journal where he misused the term. Even the TV show Jeopardy! allowed as correct the answer, “What is a limited liability corporation?,” during one episode.

Enter artificial intelligence. AI relies on information it can find, and therefore AI generators, like ChatGPT, replicate the incorrect term. With a proliferation of users and programs using ChatGPT and other AI, the use of incorrect terminology will balloon and exacerbate the problem. Perhaps one day, AI can be used to correct this problem, but that cannot happen until there is widespread understanding of the distinct nature of LLCs and a commitment to precise language when talking about them.

This article informs of the looming harms of misidentifying and conflating LLCs with corporations. Additionally, it presents a warning together with ideas on how to assist with correcting the use of incorrect terminology in all contexts surrounding LLCs.

Matteo Gatti on Corporate Governing

I am excited to highlight the recent posting by Matteo Gatti of his draft paper entitled Corporate Governing: Promises and Risks of Corporations as Socio-Economic Reformers.  I got a preview of this work at the National Business Law Scholars Conference back in June.  The title of the paper is both descriptive and clever, as the abstract below reveals.

Corporations are involved in public affairs: racial equity, women’s rights, LGBTQIA rights, climate efforts are just a few examples of an increasingly long list of areas in which corporations are active and vocal. One phenomenon is well-known: corporations promote, contrast, or finetune governmental initiatives through political messaging. In addition, corporations perform quasi-governmental functions when the actual government cannot (because of its dysfunction) or does not want to (because of its political credo) perform such functions. Economists, legal scholars, and policymakers are split as to whether corporations should take this role.

This Paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it maps various areas of reform by corporations in the socio-economic sphere. Then, it provides legal and policy frameworks for corporate governing by analyzing the underlying conducts under our current laws and by evaluating its multifaceted normative merits: Is there a business case for corporate governing? Is corporate governing strategically wise for corporations? Does it help social advocacy and society at large? Does corporate governing undermine actual government and imperil democratic institutions? Further, this Paper assesses corporate governing by looking into its promises and risks from a corporate and from a societal perspective and singles out two risks. First, corporate governing cannot help society in fields in which corporations have a conflicting interest, like on themes such as antitrust, tax, labor, privacy, financial and corporate reform. Second, with corporations having a greater role in policymaking, citizens may become less accustomed to expecting reform via traditional politics: addressing this risk requires efforts from citizens, civil society, and politicians to preserve democratic values and institutions—corporate governance can help but cannot be the driving force.

The article offers helpful, coherent observations about and analyses of the roles business firms play--and should play--in political governance, as well as the possible effects of those political governance engagements.  I look forward to spending more time with this work!

Is Your Law School Ready for Generative AI? Fifteen Questions You Should Consider

Greetings from SEALS, where I've just left a packed room of law professors grappling with some thorny issues related to ChatGPT4, Claude 2, Copilot, and other forms of generative AI. I don't have answers to the questions below and some are well above my pay grade, but I am taking them into account as I prepare to teach courses in transactional skills; compliance, corporate governance, and sustainability; and ethics and technology this Fall.

In no particular order, here are some of the questions/points raised during the three-hour session. I'll have more thoughts on using AI in the classroom in a future post.

1. AI detectors that schools rely on have high false positives for nonnative speakers and neurodivergent students and they are easy to evade. How can you reliably ensure that students aren't using AI tools such as ChatGPT if you've prohibited it?
2. If we allow the use of AI in classrooms, how do we change how we assess students?
3. If our goal is to teach the mastery of legal skills, what are the legal skills we should teach related to the use of AI? How will our students learn critical thinking skills if they can rely on generative AI?
4. How should we keep up with the rapid pace of change?
5. How will adjuncts use AI with our students if they are already integrating it into their practice? Alternatively, will adjuncts see the use of AI as cheating?
6. If students use papers as writing samples, should there be attestations indicating that they are AI free? Same question for journals/law reviews.
7. Can clinicians and others use generative AI to help with access to justice? If so, how can we ensure that the information is reliable and not a hallucination??
8. How should schools assess faculty coming up for promotion and tenure? Will junior faculty feel pressured to rely on AI to be more productive?
9. Can generative AI be helpful with students with disabilities and neurodivergent students? AI tools can help with creating study schedules, note taking (organizing by topic), time management, summarizing large articles, staying on task, academic support tool, ascertaining how long will tasks take, planning meals and more. If a policy prohibits the use of generative AI in the classroom, should its use be a reasonable accommodation?
10. Do we as faculty members have the growth mindset to deal with this change? Or will we teach the way we always do, which may do a disservice to our students. How do we prepare our students to deal with generative AI in practice?
11. Do you need a uniform policy or should each professor have their own policy? Should the default policy be that students cannot use it for work that gets academic credit unless the professor has specifically opted in?
12. Should we embrace AI especially for students who can’t write? Is using ChatGPT any different from using a calculator? Is it any different from asking a partner for a template so you don't have to start from scratch?
13. Should we use more in-class exams? Should they be closed book? Do we need more oral presentations? How might this affect space planning at exam time?
14. Should class participation count for more than it already does?
15. If you're not familiar with generative AI tools, where should you start?

How many of these questions have  you asked yourself, your colleagues, or your dean? If you have some best practices or thoughts, please share them in the comments. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Generative AI Is the Greatest Thing Since the Discovery of Fire And/Or Will Kill Us All

Depending on who you talk to, you get some pretty extreme perspectives on generative AI. In a former life, I used to have oversight of the lobbying and PAC money for a multinational company. As we all know, companies never ask to be regulated. So when an industry begs for regulation, you know something is up. 

Two weeks ago, I presented the keynote speech to the alumni of AESE, Portugal’s oldest business school, on the topic of my research on business, human rights, and technology with a special focus on AI. If you're attending Connecting the Threads in October, you'll hear some of what I discussed.

I may have overprepared, but given the C-Suite audience, that’s better than the alternative. For me that meant spending almost 100 hours  reading books, articles, white papers, and watching videos by data scientists, lawyers, ethicists, government officials, CEOs, and software engineers. 

Because I wanted the audience to really think about their role in our future, I spent quite a bit of time on the doom and gloom scenarios, which the Portuguese press highlighted. I cited the talk by the creators of the Social Dilemma, who warned about the dangers of social media algorithms and who are now raising the alarms about AI's potential existential threat to humanity in a talk called the AI Dilemma.

I used statistics from the Future of Jobs Report from the World Economic Forum on potential job displacement and from Yale's Jeffrey Sonnenfeld on what CEOs think and are planning for. Of the 119 CEOs from companies like Walmart, Coca-Cola, Xerox and Zoom, 34% of CEOs said AI could potentially destroy humanity in ten years, 8% said that it could happen in five years,  and 58% said that could never happen and they are “not worried.” 42% said the doom and gloom  is overstated, while 58% said it was not. I told the audience about deepfakes where AI can now mimic someone's voice in three seconds.

But in reality, there's also a lot of hope. For the past two days I've been up at zero dark thirty to watch the live stream of the AI For Good Global Summit in Geneva. The recordings are available on YouTube. While there was a more decidedly upbeat tone from these presenters, there was still some tamping down of the enthusiasm.

Fun random facts? People have been using algorithms to make music since the 60s. While many are worried about the intellectual property implications for AI and the arts, AI use was celebrated at the summit. Half of humanity's working satellites belong to Elon Musk. And  a task force of 120 organizations is bringing the hammer down on illegal deforestation in Brazil using geospatial AI. They've already netted 2 billion in penalties. 

For additional perspective, for two of the first guests on my new podcast, I've interviewed lawyer and mediator, Mitch Jackson, an AI enthusiast, and tech veteran, Stephanie Sylvestre, who's been working with OpenAI for years and developed her own AI product somehow managing to garner one million dollars worth of free services for her startup, Avatar Buddy. Links to their episodes are here (and don't forget to subscribe to the podcast).

If you’re in business or advising business, could you answer the following questions I asked the audience of executives and government officials in Portugal?

• How are you integrating human rights considerations into your company's strategy and decision-making processes, particularly concerning the deployment and use of new technologies?

 

• Can you describe how your company's corporate governance structure accounts for human rights and ethical considerations, particularly with regards to the use and impact of emerging technologies?

 

• How are you planning to navigate the tension between increasing automation in your business operations and the potential for job displacement among your workforce?

 

• How does your company approach balancing the need for innovation and competitive advantage with the potential societal and human rights impact of technologies like facial recognition and surveillance?

 

• In what ways is your company actively taking steps to ensure that your supply chain, especially for tech components, is free from forced labor or other human rights abuses?

 

• As data becomes more valuable, how is your company ensuring ethical data collection and usage practices? Are these practices in line with both domestic and international human rights and privacy standards?

 

• What steps are you taking to ensure digital accessibility and inclusivity, thereby avoiding the risk of creating or enhancing digital divides?

 

• How is your company taking into account the potential environmental impacts of your technology, including e-waste and energy consumption, and what steps are being taken to mitigate these risks while promoting sustainable development?

 

• What financial incentives do you have in place to do the ”right thing” even if it’s much less profitable? What penalties do you have in place for the “wrong” behavior?

 

• Will governments come together to regulate or will the fate of humanity lie in the hands of A few large companies?

Luckily, we had cocktails right after I asked those questions.

Are you using generative AI like ChatGPT4 or another source in your business 0r practice? If you teach, are you integrating it into the classroom? I'd love to hear your thoughts. 

Trust in Business Associations: Fiduciary Duties

The University of Tennessee College of Law's business law journal, Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of Business Law, recently published my essay, "The Fiduciary-ness of Business Associations."  You can find the essay here.  This essay--or parts of it, anyway--has been rattling around in my brain for a bit.   It is nice on a project like this to be able to get the words out on a page and release all that tension building up inside as you fashion your approach.

The abstract for the essay is included below. 

This essay offers a window and perspective on recent fiduciary-related legislative developments in business entity law and identifies and reflects in limited part on related professional responsibility questions impacting lawyers advising business entities and their equity owners. In addition—and perhaps more pointedly—the essay offers commentary on legal change and the legislative process for state law business associations amendments in and outside the realm of fiduciary duties. To accomplish these purposes, the essay first provides a short description of the position of fiduciary duties in U.S. statutory business entity law and offers a brief account of 21st century business entity legislation that weakens the historically central role of fiduciary duties in unincorporated business associations. It then reflects on these changes as a matter of theory, policy, and practice before briefly summarizing and offering related reflections in concluding.

Although I always welcome thoughts on my work, I am especially interested in your thoughts on this essay. It relates to all three of my activities as a law professor--my scholarship, teaching, and service.  And I know that fiduciary duty waivers and opt-ins have different impacts in different business sectors . . . .  So, let me know what you think.