Business Law Prof Blog

Virtual ESG and Compliance Conference- November 7

 The Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics is hosting a virtual ESG and Compliance Conference on November 7.  I love to hear academics talk about these issues at conferences but because I still engage in the practice of law and I teach about compliance, governance, and sustainability, I find the conversations are very different when listening to practitioners.

My panel is titled ESG Due Diligence Across the Corporate Lifecycle From Start-Up to Maturity: The Roles of Compliance, Ethics, Legal, and the Board. My co-panelists, Ahpaly Coradin, Partner, Pierson Ferdinand, and Eugenia di Marco, a startup founder and international legal advisor, and I will focus on:

•  how to measure and prioritize ESG factors at different stages of a company's life cycle, according to a company's industry, and technology use.
•  how ESG creates value in M&A  beyond risk mitigation and learn the impact of ESG on target selection, valuation, and integration.
• board and management responsibilities in overseeing and managing ESG-related risks, particularly in light of Caremark duties and Marchand.

Date & Time: Thursday, November 7 from 12:45 PM – 1:45 PM central time

Other topics that speakers will discuss include:

• Supply chains and European due diligence 
• Global regulatory and legislative developments
• Sustainable governance in a global landscape
• Materiality assessments
• The intersection of governance and ESG
• OECD Guidelines

Who should attend?  (from the brochure)

• Compliance officers
• ESG, sustainability, and CSR professionals
• Audit professionals
• CFOs
• General counsel
• Corporate secretaries
• Risk managers
• Investment managers
• Supply chain and due diligence professionals
• Outside advisors

Although the official brochure clearly doesn't target academics, I strongly recommend that my peers attend. It may help inform your research and teaching, and I know that my students are very interested in these issues. 

Are you teaching on any of these areas? And what do you think practitioners should be focusing on that they aren't?

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Bocconi July Corporate Governance Workshop: ESG Information and Compliance

Last month I had the privilege of presenting some of my current work at Bocconi University in Milan, Italy.  The promotional poster for the event is included below. All of the workshop presentations (present company excepted) were engaging.

I presented on part of an ongoing research project--a series of papers on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) information.  The first two papers on the series, The Materiality of ESG Information: Why It May MatterT, 84 LSU L. Rev. 1365 (2024), and ESG and Insider Trading: Legal and Practical Considerations, 26 U. Penn. J. Bus. L. __ (forthcoming 2024), address the significance of ESG information under the U.S. federal securities laws and the potential and actual involvement of ESG information in insider trading.  In Milan, I shared my ideas and preliminary research for a third paper currently titled Corporate Information Compliance in an ESG World.  I expect to turn to work on this paper in earnest in the coming months.  I will briefly lay out my current thoughts here in the hope that you may have some feedback.

ESG information plays a role in many business operational settings that are invoked in legal compliance and addressed in compliance policies and programs.  These include:

• Obligations to disclose and report information;
• Protection of intellectual property protection;
• Information exchanges with competitors;
• Execution of a significant transaction;
• Clearance of a barrier to an operational action or anticipated transaction;
• Default under or breach of an important contract;
• Pending changes in mission-sensitive business structures, policies, or programs; and
• Imminent judicial, executive, legislative, or regulatory action.

ESG information is likely to impact legal risk in some of these areas of business operations.  The potential and actual effects of ESG information on legal risk raise questions about the adequacy of current business compliance regimes.

My work in this area is designed to meet a number of objectives, including confirming the connection between ESG information and legal risk, identifying related compliance review practices, offering preliminary suggestions about ESG information’s potential impacts, and proposing specific solutions.  My focus will be on securities regulation compliance, but I hope to make points that are more broadly applicable to business firm compliance practices.  Overall, I desire to use this research to create a heightened awareness of the potential legal significance of ESG information, catalyze specific ESG-related firm (and governmental) compliance activity, provide processes for engaging related compliance program review and revision, and offer substantive compliance guidance.  The ultimate core audiences for this work include compliance lawyers (in-house and outside counsel), compliance business professionals, firm management as a whole, plaintiff and defense bar litigators, and the judiciary.

Let me know what you think of this general idea--using ESG information as a leverage point for the inspection, reflection, and revision of business compliance policies and programs.  Please also respond to any of the rest of the content of this post that either resonates with you or raises questions or concerns.  And if you would like to see the current draft of the forthcoming paper, please let me know.  I am happy to send it to you.

Guest Post: Shareholder Proposals and the Next Step in Overboarding Disclosures

I am please to be able to publish this post authored by our former BLPB editor/co-blogger Stefan Padfield.  We miss his voice here, but he is doing good work in his current role, as this post shows!  Thanks for contributing this, Stefan.

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On November 14, 2023, the National Center for Public Policy Research (NCPPR) – where I work – submitted a shareholder proposal to Johnson & Johnson that sought disclosures related to overboarding. (For the uninitiated, overboarding refers to the issue of corporate directors sitting on too many boards but can also be extended, as it is here, to other commitments.) On March 1, 2024, the SEC staff informed J&J that no action would be recommended against the company by the staff if J&J excluded NCPPR’s proposal. This no-action relief arguably represents a change in the long-standing SEC practice of supporting proposals related to overboarding and is thus worthy of further examination. (The underlying documents can be accessed here; the SEC staff also granted no-action relief to Verizon and Lowe’s on the same proposal.)

By way of background, the SEC staff is on record as saying that an overboarding proposal “relates to director qualifications.” Accordingly, the SEC staff has stated in the past that it does “not believe that [a company] may omit [such a] proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(7)” as improperly relating to the ordinary business of the company.

Admittedly, our proposal was unique in that it asked directors to “disclose their expected allocation of hours among all formal commitments set forth in the director’s official bio, with allocation being permissible “on a weekly, monthly, or annual basis.” And perhaps this is sufficient for some to categorize our proposal as excludable micromanagement, as the SEC staff did. However, there is a good argument to be made that “the SEC has incorrectly applied the micromanagement rule to exclude disclosure proposals.” More generally, the active shareholder proponent just quoted also noted in the same piece the SEC’s heavy and arguably excessive reliance on the micromanagement exclusion this season:

In reality, the most significant substantive development in the Rule 14a-8 process in the last two seasons has been largely ignored in the anti-shareholder furor. Far from representing a system unfairly tilted toward proponents, the SEC is more readily concurring with issuers’ increasingly aggressive use of the micromanagement exclusion…. According to preliminary calculations by the Shareholder Rights Group, in 2023, micromanagement arguments accounted for 8 out of 27, or 30%, of successful Rule 14a-8(i)(7) requests. In 2024 so far, micromanagement arguments have accounted for 25 of 56, or 44.6%, of winning requests based on the ordinary business/micromanagement rule.

Regardless, in addition to prior no-action decisions that deemed overboarding proposals nonexcludable, we later submitted a similar proposal to Verizon and added the following stakeholder perspectives to urge the SEC staff to reconsider its conclusion in Johnson & Johnson:

• Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP: “The board should assess whether directors that may be overcommitted have sufficient time and ability to take on the significant tasks relating to public company directorship.” (Emphasis added.)
• Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz: “As board responsibilities grow, so has the focus on director bandwidth; directors should be realistic about their bandwidth when considering new opportunities for board service.”
• Vanguard: “The role of public company directors is complex and time-consuming, and the funds believe that directors should maintain sufficient capacity to effectively carry out their responsibilities to shareholders. For this reason, the funds look for directors to appropriately limit their board and other commitments to ensure that they are accessible and responsive to both routine and unexpected board matters …. The funds look for boards to have in place policies regarding director commitments and capacity and to disclose such policies (and any potential exceptions) to shareholders ….” (Emphasis added.)
• The Conference Board: “[W]hile adopting an overboarding policy can be useful, it is more important for boards to have candid conversations about their evolving time requirements and the ability of directors to devote the time necessary to the role.... In light of expanding workloads, boards should take a fresh look at the time commitments expected of directors …. Overboarding policies are now a predominant practice, embraced by three-quarters of the S&P 500 and over half the Russell 3000 and supported by the proxy advisory firms. But policies alone are insufficient. As part of the annual evaluation process, directors should assess their ability, both on an individual and collective level, to dedicate the necessary time to fulfill their responsibilities effectively and make informed decisions.” (Emphasis added.)
• State Street: “[I]n its Summary of Material Changes to State Street Global Advisors’ 2023 Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines, State Street[i] indicates that starting in 2024 for companies in the S&P 500, it will no longer use numerical limits to identify overcommitted directors and instead ‘require that companies themselves address this issue in their internal policy on director time commitments and that the policy be publicly disclosed.’” (Emphasis added.)

Furthermore, the need for the requested disclosure can be demonstrated by looking at the bio of a director at CVS, where our proposal was unopposed: J. Scott Kirby. Doing so reveals the following nine commitments.

1. Director, CVS
2. CEO, United Airlines
3. Director, United Airlines
4. Executive Committee, United Airlines Board
5. Finance Committee, United Airlines Board
6. Director, SONIFI Solutions
7. Chairman, Star Alliance Chief Executive Board
8. Member, Board of Governors of the International Air Transport Association
9. Director, U.S. Air Force Academy Foundation

Suffice it to say, many would presume that Mr. Kirby would more than have his hands full simply as CEO of United Airlines. Accordingly, it seems a small thing for CVS shareholders to ask for an estimate of how exactly there will be enough hours in the day for Mr. Kirby to juggle these nine commitments without depriving CVS of the critical attention he is being nominated to provide as director. And to the extent some might argue that listing committee assignments as discrete commitments improperly inflates the perceived workload, we say: (1) either the discrete commitment is material or the disclosure of that commitment in the official bio is misleading; (2) a company is free to attribute zero hours to any disclosed commitment, and is thereby free to clarify for shareholders that, for example, membership on the finance committee is a nominal position.

Given the ever-increasing responsibilities of corporate directors, as well as generally increasing demands on their time, limiting oversight of overboarding to counting board seats and CEO spots is unsustainable. Accordingly, we will likely be submitting a similar proposal next season and urging the SEC staff to reconsider its conclusion in Johnson & Johnson. Asking prospective directors how they intend to allocate their hours among their often numerous commitments should not be viewed as improper micromanagement but rather basic accountability fully within the ambit of shareholders to request.

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[i] Our overboarding proposal at CVS was apparently defeated by a vote of 97% against. In light of the comments here by State Street and the preceding comments by Vanguard, it would be interesting to see how those asset managers voted (assuming they hold shares in CVS).

Fiduciary Duties Trump Contracts?!

Many in the business law world have been following the saga involving the adoption of  S.B. 313 by Delaware's General Assembly last week.  S.B. 313 adds a new § 122(18) to the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (DGCL) that broadly authorizes corporations to enter into free-standing stockholder agreements (not embodied in the corporation's charter) that restrict or eliminate the management authority of the corporation's board of directors.  See my blog posts here and here and others cited in them, as well as Ann's post here.

In the floor debate on S.B. 313 last Thursday in the Delaware State House of Representatives, a proponent of the legislation stated that fiduciary duties always trump contracts.  That statement deserves some inspection in a number of respects.  I offer a few simple reflections here from one, limited perspective.

The historical centrality of corporate director fiduciary duties (which were the fiduciary duties referenced on the House floor) is undeniable.  Those who have taken business associations or an advanced business course with me over the years know well that I emphasize in board decision making that the directors’ actions must be both lawful and consistent with their fiduciary duties in order to be legally valid and enforceable.  I doubt my teaching is exceptional in that regard.

But the floor debate involved a different kind of tangle between legal obligations and fiduciary duties than exists in the board decision-making context in which corporate action is written on a tabula rasa.  The comment made in last Thursday’s legislative session responded to the suggestion that a board of directors may later decide to breach a contract that is lawful and was approved by the board in a manner that is consistent with director fiduciary duty compliance.  That scenario involves board action to disregard the terms of an agreement—by authorizing and directing the corporation to breach a legal obligation of the corporation because the directors have, in good faith and with due care, determined that the breach of contract is in the best interest of the corporation.

This type of board action is certainly not unprecedented.  An example from my practice immediately springs to mind: no-shop, non-solicitation, and related clauses in business combination (M&A) agreements.  These provisions may be (or at least appear to be) lawful and compliant with director fiduciary duties when made but may interfere with a target board’s fiduciary duties if the board later determines it has a fiduciary obligation to engage in interactions with a potential transactional partner in violation of that type of deal protection provision. 

The resolution of this issue in the M&A context has largely been contractual.  Fiduciary outs of various kinds have been common in M&A agreements for decades.  (I gave my first CLE talk on them back in the 1980s.)  Through these provisions, directors consider and prepare in advance for the potentiality of a later conflict between the deal protection obligations of the corporation and their fiduciary duties to the corporation.  Properly drafted, fiduciary outs help  protect the legal validity and enforceability of the original contract from future challenge and preserve the board’s legal right to respond to new circumstances without breaching the contract.

As those who work in this space well know, a watershed case involving deal protection provisions is Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). In its Omnicare opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court assesses the validity of a merger agreement that effectively locked up a majority of the votes needed to approve the merger.  The merger agreement did not include a fiduciary out provision. The directors had no ability to terminate the merger agreement or nullify its terms to comply with their fiduciary duties without breaching the contract.  The court found the deal protections invalid and unenforceable.

Proponents of S.B. 313 clearly state that a corporation's exercise of its authority to enter into stockholder agreements under § 122(18) will be subject to challenge if the directors breach their fiduciary duties to the corporation in approving a stockholder agreement or in later authorizing the corporation's performance under that agreement.  If the corporation's directors are found to be in breach, the stockholder agreement then may be found invalid or unenforceable.  The prospect of that occurring in the stockholder agreement context is as real as it is in the M&A deal protection context.

Perhaps, then, fiduciary outs are a best practice that should grow out of the new DGCL § 122(18).  If the parties truly intend for fiduciary duties to trump the contract (as the bill proponents have claimed) and we can anticipate challenges in that regard based on the nature of the agreement, stockholder agreements should provide in advance for the eventuality of a conflict.  Otherwise, a stockholder agreement authorized under DGCL § 122(18) may be found either invalid ex post because the board’s original approval of the agreement may later be determined to have been a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties (for failure to include a fiduciary out, as in Omnicare) or unenforceable in litigation over a board decision to breach or refrain from breaching the agreement in the face of a perceived fiduciary duty conundrum related to the corporation’s performance under the terms of the agreement.  A well-crafted fiduciary out (which would undoubtedly be somewhat bespoke, as it should be in the M&A context, based on the nature of the corporation’s obligations in the contract) should help avoid litigation, or at least enable its early dismissal, in the event of either type of legal claim.

Your reactions to these musings are, as always, welcomed.  We will be operating in new territory here assuming the Governor of Delaware signs S.B. 313 into law (as he has signaled).  If I am missing an element of statutory or decisional law or strategic litigation practice that impacts my arguments, I would appreciate hearing about it.  Regardless, it is now time that we all think about how to address anticipated issues arising from the Pandora’s box that the Delaware General Assembly has opened.  That may include practice-oriented solutions to perceived legal questions or tensions as well as potential further adjustments to the DGCL.  As to the latter, I note that I raised in one of my earlier posts the desirability of looking at DGCL subchapter XIV in light of the provisions of DGCL § 122(18).  Perhaps that issue merits a subsequent post . . . .

I Also Write Letters!

Further to Ann's post on Sunday sharing the text of her comment letter on Delaware's S.B. 313 (and more particularly the proposal to add a new § 122(18) to the General Corporation Law) and my post on § 122(18) last week, I share below the text of my comment letter to the Delaware State House of Representatives Judiciary Committee.  Although Ann and I each got one minute to deliver oral remarks at the hearing held by the Judiciary Committee on Tuesday, 60 seconds was insufficient to convey my overarching concerns--which represent a synthesis and characterization of selected points from my post last week.  The comment letter shared below includes the prepared remarks I would have conveyed had I been afforded additional time.

Madame Chair and Committee Members:

I appreciated the opportunity to speak briefly at today’s hearing. As I explained earlier today, although I am a professor in the business law program at The University of Tennessee College of Law, my appearance before the committee relates more to my nearly 39 years as a corporate finance practitioner, which has included bar work (most recently and extensively in the State of Tennessee) proposing and evaluating corporate and other business entity legislation. This letter expands on the virtual oral comments I offered at the hearing on the proposed addition of § 122(18) to the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (DGCL). My goal is simply to best ensure that the committee and the General Assembly are well informed about the significance of this proposed new section of the DGCL.

Both proponents and critics of proposed § 122(18) concur that the stockholder agreements that would be authorized by that provision can currently be accomplished in a corporation’s certificate of incorporation—the corporate charter. Indeed, as was alluded to in the testimony earlier today, current Delaware law expressly authorizes transferring governance authority from a corporation’s board of directors to its stockholders through charter amendments and through certificates of designation (instruments providing for new classes or series of stock) as well as for statutory close corporations, a status designated in the certificate of incorporation. As a result, questions raised at today’s hearing about why the new authority embodied in proposed DGCL § 122(18) is needed—or why it would be objectionable—are well taken. As I indicated in my oral testimony earlier today, the answer to those questions lies in public policy.

Current Delaware law on stockholder agreements promotes notice, transparency, and assent. Provisions in a Delaware corporation’s certificate of incorporation are matters of public record in the State of Delaware on which stockholders and prospective stockholders rely. They must be filed with the Delaware Secretary of State. Thus, Delaware’s corporate law currently requires that stockholders and potential future stockholders have public notice of any fundamental alteration in the statutory power of the board of directors to manage the corporation. Stockholder agreements like those authorized under proposed DGCL § 122(18) are not required to be filed with the state (although they would have to be filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the federal securities laws at some point after they are signed, for public companies). Moreover, under current Delaware law, if an amendment to the certificate of incorporation is required to achieve a shift in governance authority from the board of directors, then a stockholder vote is required. These requirements, which evidence Delaware’s public policies of notice, transparency, and assent, are what ultimately divide the supporters and detractors of proposed DGCL § 122(18). Your ultimate views on these policies—your determination as to whether they are important to the integrity of Delaware corporate law—should be strong factors in your determination of how to vote on proposed DGCL § 122(18). I submit that these policies should not be abandoned or reduced without careful consideration.

Last week, I wrote about my policy concerns relating to proposed DGCL § 122(18) in a blog post published on the Business Law Prof Blog. That post can be found here. Although my blog post was written for a different and broader legal audience (and therefore includes some technical legal references), it may be useful to you as additional statutory and judicial support for the positions I have taken in this letter and in my oral testimony. The post also includes several drafting observations relevant to the productive introduction of statutory authority for stockholder agreements that you may appreciate having.

I am grateful to have had the opportunity to share these insights with you today in writing and orally during the hearing this afternoon. I wish you well in your deliberations.

Very truly yours,

Joan M Heminway
Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law
Member and Former Chair, Tennessee Bar Association Business Law Section
Former Chair and Member, Boston Bar Association Corporate Law Committee

The Delaware State House of Representatives may vote on the bill tomorrow (Thursday) afternoon.  It is the last item listed in the Main House Agenda for tomorrow's session.  I can only hope that the members of the House feel better informed after the House Judiciary Committee hearing on Tuesday.  I know many of us tried to ensure that they are well informed.

Moelis, § 122(18), and DGCL Subchapter XIV - Knowing Legislative Policy Shift?!

Like so many others, I have wanted to say a word about West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Company, 311 A.3d 809 (Del. Ch. 2024).  My angle is a bit different from that of many others.  It derives from my 15-year practice background, my 24-year law teaching background, and my 39-year bar service background.  It focuses on a doctrinal analysis undertaken through a policy lens.  But I want to note here the value of Ann Lipton’s existing posts on Moelis and the related proposed addition of a new § 122(18) to the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (DGCL).  Her posts can be found here, here, here, and here.  (Sorry if I missed one, Ann!)  Ben Edwards also published a related post here.  They (and others offering commentary that I have read) raise and touch on some of the matters I address here, but not with the same legislative policy focus.

I apologize at the outset for the length of this post.  As habitual readers know, long posts are “not my style” as a blogger.  This matter is one of relatively urgent legislative importance, however, and I am eager to get my thoughts out to folks here.

I begin by referencing the DGCL provision in the eye of the storm.  DGCL § 141(a) provides for management of the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation by or under the direction of the corporation’s board of directors, except as otherwise provided in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation or the DGCL.  In Moelis, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster found various provisions in a stockholder agreement unlawful under DGCL § 141(a).  Specifically, a series of governance-oriented contractual arrangements at issue in Moelis were not authorized under the corporation’s certificate of incorporation or another provision of the DGCL.

The tension in this space involving DGCL § 141(a) is not new.  For many years, the legal validity of so-called stockholder agreements—technically, agreements (as opposed to charter provisions) that shift governance power from the directors of a corporation to one or more of its stockholders—has been questionable for most Delaware corporations, including public companies.  (I say “many years” because the legal validity of these agreements was an issue I routinely wrestled with before I left the full-time private practice of law in 2000.) 

The DGCL is different from the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) in this regard.  The MBCA has long had a broad-based statutory provision, MBCA § 7.32, authorizing shareholder agreements under specified conditions.  States adopting the MBCA have made a (presumably) conscious choice to embrace shareholder governance under the circumstances provided in the MBCA, including through § 7.32.  The MBCA’s provision expressing the management authority of the corporation’s board of directors, MBCA § 8.01(b), expressly references MBCA § 7.32, providing that:

[e]xcept as may be provided in an agreement authorized under section 7.32, and subject to any limitation in the articles of incorporation permitted by section 2.02(b), all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of the board of directors.

There is no analogous provision in the DGCL.  The only way to be sure that one could accomplish a shift in governance power from directors to stockholders under the DGCL has been for a corporation either to include the governance provisions in its certificate of incorporation or to organize as a close corporation under Subchapter XIV.  Close corporation status requires charter-based notification and conformity to a number of statutory requirements set forth in DGCL §§ 341 & 342, including that the certificate of incorporation provide that the stock be represented by certificated shares “held of record by not more than a specified number of persons, not exceeding 30,” that the stock be subject to transfer restrictions, and that there not be a “public offering” of the stock. DGCL § 342(a)(1)-(3).  Thus, by legislative design, statutory close corporation status is not available to publicly held corporations organized under Delaware law (which makes total sense for those who understand what a closely held corporation is, in a general sense).

Members of the Delaware State Bar Association (DSBA) Corporation Law Section know all of this well.  As leaders in reviewing and proposing changes to the DGCL over the years, this group of folks has thoughtfully weighed policy considerations relating to the DGCL’s application to the myriad situations that Delaware corporations may face.  Without having researched or inquired about the matter, I find it hard to believe that the section has not previously discussed the desirability of an express statutory provision allowing for the approval and execution of stockholder agreements outside a corporation’s certificate of incorporation.  The matter has been addressed by the Executive Council of the Tennessee Bar Association’s Business Law Section, which engages in similar legislative initiatives in Tennessee, more than once during the time I have been serving on it.  I therefore assume that the choice to refrain from proposing a specific statute authorizing stockholder agreements outside a corporation’s certificate of incorporation over the years has been both informed and intentional.

Yet, earlier today, Senate Bill 313 passed in the Senate Chamber of the Delaware General Assembly.  In that bill, vetted and approved by the DSBA Corporation Law Section and blessed by the DSBA Executive Committee, the longstanding policy decision to refrain from allowing stockholder agreements outside of the certificate of incorporation or Subchapter XIV is being summarily reversed through the proposal to adopt a new DGCL § 122(18)—an alteration of the corporate powers provision of the DGCL.  That new proposed DGCL section provides a corporation with the power to enter into stockholder agreements within certain bounds, but those bounds are relatively broad.

As others have noted (at least in part), the drafting of the proposed DGCL § 122(18) (and the related additional changes to DGCL § 122) reflects a belt-and-suspenders approach and is otherwise awkward.  Multiple sentences are crammed into this one new subpart of DGCL §122 to effectuate the drafters’ aims.  The DGCL has been criticized for its complex drafting in the past (resulting in, among other things, a project creating a simplified DGCL), and the approach taken by the drafters of the proposed DGCL § 122 changes adds to the complexity of the statute in unnecessary ways.  A provision this significant should be addressed in a separate statutory section, the approach taken in MBCA §7.32.  That new section then can be cross-referenced in DGCL § 141(b)—and, if deemed necessary, DGCL § 122.  Breaking out the provision in its own section also should allow legislators to more easily and coherently identify strengths and weaknesses in the drafting and build in or remove any constraints on stockholder governance that they may deem necessary as the proposed provision gets continued attention in the Delaware State House of Representatives.  I offer that as a drafting suggestion.

Apart from the inelegance of the drafting, however, I have one large and important question as Senate Bill 313 continues to move through the Delaware legislative process: do members of the Delaware General Assembly voting on this bill fully understand the large shift in public policy represented by the introduction of DGCL § 122(18)?  If so, then they act on an informed basis and live with the consequences, as they do with any legislation they pass that is signed into law.  If not, we all must work harder to enable that understanding. 

It is all fine and good for us to point out how hasty the drafting process has been, how traditional debate and procedures may have been short-changed or subverted, how waiting for the Delaware Supreme Court to act on the appeal of the Chancery Court decision before proceeding is prudent, etc.  But the fact of the matter has been that potential and actual stockholders of Delaware corporations have been able to rely exclusively on charter-based exceptions to the management authority of the board of directors—whether those exception are authorized in Subchapter XIV of the DGCL or otherwise.  This has meant that prospective equity investors in a Delaware corporation knew to carefully consider a corporation’s certificate of incorporation to identify any pre-existing constraints on the management authority of the board of directors before investing.  This also has meant that any new constraints on the board of directors’ authority to manage the corporation’s business and affairs required a charter amendment of some kind—either a board-approved and stockholder-approved amendment of the certificate of incorporation or the board’s approval of a certificate of designations under charter-based authority of which existing stockholders should be aware.

Ann noted this issue in a previous post.  The enactment of proposed DGCL § 122(18) will make it more challenging for potential equity investors to identify the locus/loci of management power in the corporation.  Although both the certificate of incorporation and any stockholder agreement would be required to be filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for reporting companies (the latter as an instrument defining the right of security holders under paragraph (b)(4) or as a material contract (b)(10) of Regulation S-K Item 601), the current draft of proposed DGCL § 122(18) does not provide that a copy of any contract authorized under its provisions be filed with the Delaware Secretary of State or that its existence be noted on stock certificates (a requirement included in MBCA §7.32(c)).  In addition, stockholders will lose their franchise if the stockholder agreement would otherwise have required a stockholder vote.

Finally, it seems important to note that the judicial doctrine or independent legal significance—or equal dignity—has been strong in Delaware over the years as a factor in the interpretation of Delaware corporate law.  This has helped practitioners and the judiciary to navigate difficult issues in advising clients about the outcomes of Delaware corporate law debates.  The rule typically has been that, if one takes a path afforded by the statute, they get what the statute provides.  And if one does not take a provided statutory path, they cannot later be heard to argue for what the statute provides for users of that untaken statutory path. 

Classically, in dicta in Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (1993), Chief Justice Veasey wrote (on pp. 1380-81) about the importance of DGCL Subchapter XIV in construing corporate governance arrangements in light of the doctrine of independent legal significance:

 . . . the provisions of Subchapter XIV relating to close corporations and other statutory schemes preempt the field in their respective areas. It would run counter to the spirit of the doctrine of independent legal significance and would be inappropriate judicial legislation for this Court to fashion a special judicially-created rule for minority investors when the entity does not fall within those statutes, or when there are no negotiated special provisions in the certificate of incorporation, by-laws, or stockholder agreements.

With the passage of proposed DGCL § 122(18), parts of Subchapter XIV of the DGCL will seemingly be rendered vestigial (i.e., they will no longer have independent legal significance).  Consideration of this and any other potential collateral damage to the interpretation of Delaware corporate law that may be created by the enactment of proposed DGCL § 122(18) should be carefully undertaken and, as desired, additional changes to the DGCL should be debated before voting on Senate Bill 313 is undertaken in the Delaware State House of Representatives.

I do not argue for a specific result in this post.  Rather, I mean to illuminate further the significance of the decision facing the Delaware General Assembly (and, potentially, the decision of the Governor of the State of Delaware) in the review of proposed DGCL § 122(18).  In doing so, I admit to some sympathy for those who may have clients with stockholder agreements they now know or suspect to be unlawful under the Moelis opinion.  In all candor, any legislation on this topic should more directly address those existing agreements given that the provisions of proposed DGCL § 122(18) are not a mere clarification of existing law.  Agreements not re-adopted under any new legislative authority may be found unlawful in the absence of clarity on this point.  As a reference point, I note that, in amending MBCA § 7.32 to remove a previous 10-year duration limit, the drafters specified the effect on pre-existing agreements in MBCA § 7.32(h).  Take that as another drafting suggestion . . . .

I welcome comments on any or all of what I offer here.  If I have anything incorrect, please correct me.  Regardless, I hope this post provides some additional information to those in the Delaware General Assembly and elsewhere who have an interest in proposed DGCL § 122(18).

Status and Corporate Stakeholders

Check out High-Status Versus Low-Status Stakeholders, an intriguing paper authored by one of our business school brethren, Justin Pace.  In this work, Justin approaches an important, yet difficult, topic at the intersection of corporate governance and the class divide.  The SSRN abstract follows.

The literature on stakeholder theory has largely ignored the difficult and central issue of how judges and firms should resolve disputes among stakeholders. When the issue is addressed, focus has largely been on the potential for management to use stakeholder theory as cover for rent seeking or on disputes between classes of stakeholders. Sharply underappreciated is the potential for disparate interests within a stakeholder class.

That potential is particularly acute due to a (largely education-driven) stark and growing class divide in the United States. There is a substantial difference between the interests of a highly educated professional and managerial elite and a pink-collar and blue-collar working class who mostly do not hold four-year degrees. Despite their smaller numbers, the professional and managerial elite will frequently win out in intra-stakeholder disputes with working class stakeholders due to their greater status, power, and influence.

Because this class divide is cultural, social, and political as well as economic, these disputes will go beyond financial pie splitting to culture war issues. This threatens to be destabilizing for both the republic and individual firms and undermines both the practical and ethical arguments for the stakeholder theory.

I also have been engaged by the idea that no class of stakeholders is homogeneous.  Business law scholars certainly could do a lot more work fleshing our salient differences of interest among stakeholders of a single type (including shareholders).  I (along with many others) have been known to note that not all shareholders have the same interests, for example. 

I look forward to digging into Justin's article in more depth.  Based on my review so far, there are insights in it for many different business law scholars.  (Co-blogger John Anderson might enjoy his references to virtue theory, for example . . . .)  Anyway, give it a look.

Packin and Alon-Beck on Board Observers

I had the opportunity to attend one of the sessions in the Interdisciplinary Workshop on Corporations, Private Ordering, and Corporate Law last week.  The program was co-hosted by Foundations of Law and Finance (Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Advanced Studies) and Columbia Law School.  Luckily for me, the piece of the program I attended featured Nizan Geslevich Packin presenting a work-in-progress she is co-authoring with Anat Alon-Beck entitled Board Observers: Shadow Governance in the Era of Big Tech.

Although a draft of the paper is not yet posted, here is the SSRN abstract:

This Article examines the rise in corporate governance practice of appointing board observers, especially in the context of private equity, venture capital (VC), and corporate venture capital (CVC). Board observers are non-voting members attending board meetings to gain knowledge and insight. They arguably also provide valuable feedback, an outside perspective, and can even help ensure corporate operations. In recent years, board observer seats – a notion also existing in the nonprofit sector – have become increasingly popular in the for-profit business world, where investors have various market and business justifications for using board observers, including corporate governance considerations, minimizing litigation exposure, navigating antitrust issues, CFIUS regulation, and ERISA concerns. It was not until November 2023 that mainstream media started paying more attention to the concept of board observers, after OpenAI, the corporate entity that brought the world ChatGPT, gave Microsoft a board observer seat following the drama in OpenAI’s boardroom. But what the mainstream media did not explore in its coverage of the board observer concept was its seemingly less interesting nature as a non-voting board membership, which was an important element in the complex relationship between OpenAI and Microsoft. This signaled deepening ties between the two companies that also eventually got the attention of the DOJ and FTC, as well as the influential role of CVC in funding and governing the research and development of OpenAI.

This Article makes several contributions. First, it provides an account of the board observer phenomenon, which has significantly developed and become a common practice in recent years given antitrust and national security considerations and scrutiny. Second, it presents fresh insights, groundbreaking empirical findings, and data on the scope of this corporate governance vehicle. Third, it considers the theoretical circumstances and implications of these developments. It argues for a shift in contractual innovation in deal-making and regulatory reviews, necessitating the development of corporate culture norms emphasizing disclosure and prioritizing company interests, communication, and trust-building as crucial elements in service of board observers. Finally, the Article considers the practical implications of these developments and explains why more empirical data collection and further research are necessary to determine whether current corporate governance mechanisms require modification in connection with liability, accountability, and fiduciary duties for board observers.

As someone who had to deal with board observer requests and provisions in an earlier corporate finance era, I was fascinated by the work.  So much of what their research is revealing felt familiar (even though much also has changed): what is old can be new again.  I look forward to reading the draft and learning more.

Are Lawyers, Lawmakers, and Law Professors Really Ready for AI in 2024?

We just finished our second week of the semester and I’m already exhausted, partly because I just submitted the first draft of a law review article that’s 123 pages with over 600 footnotes on a future-proof framework for AI regulation to the University of Tennessee Journal of Business Law. I should have stuck with my original topic of legal ethics and AI.

But alas, who knew so much would happen in 2023? I certainly didn’t even though I spent the entire year speaking on AI to lawyers, businesspeople, and government officials. So, I decided to change my topic in late November as it became clearer that the EU would finally take action on the EU AI Act and that the Brussels effect would likely take hold requiring other governments and all the big players in the tech space to take notice and sharpen their own agendas.

But I’m one of the lucky ones because although I’m not a techie, I’m a former chief privacy officer, and spend a lot of time thinking about things like data protection and cybersecurity, especially as it relates to AI. And I recently assumed the role of GC of an AI startup. So, because I’m tech-adjacent, I’ve spent hours every day immersed in the legal and tech issues related to large and small language models, generative AI (GAI), artificial general intelligence (AGI), APIs, singularity, the Turing test, and the minutiae of potential regulation around the world. I’ve become so immersed that I actually toggled between listening to the outstanding Institute for Well-Being In Law virtual conference and the FTC’s 4-hour tech summit yesterday with founders, journalists, economists, and academics. Adding more fuel to the fire, just before the summit kicked off, the FTC announced an inquiry into the partnerships and investments of  Alphabet, Inc., Amazon.com, Inc., Anthropic PBC, Microsoft Corp., and OpenAI, Inc. Between that and the NY Times lawsuit against OpenAI and Microsoft alleging billions in damages for purported IP violations, we are living in interesting times.

If you’ve paid attention to the speeches at Davos, you know that it was all AI all the time. I follow statements from the tech leaders like other people follow their fantasy football stats or NCAA brackets. Many professors, CEOs, and general consumers, on the other hand, have been caught by surprise by the very rapid acceleration of the developments, particularly related to generative AI.

However, now more members of the general public are paying attention to the concept of deepfakes and demanding legislation in part because the supernova that is Taylor Swift has been victimized by someone creating fake pornographic images of her. We should be even more worried about the real and significant threat to the integrity of the fifty global elections and occurring in 2024 where members of the public may be duped into believing that political candidates have said things that they did not, such as President Biden telling people not to vote in the New Hampshire primary and to save their votes for November.

For those of us who teach in law schools in the US and who were either grading or recovering from grading in December, we learned a few days before Christmas that Lexis was rolling out its AI solution for 2Ls and 3Ls. Although I had planned to allow and even teach my students the basics of prompt engineering and using AI as a tool (and not a substitute for lawyering) in my business associations, contract drafting, and business and human rights class, now I have to also learn Lexis’ solution too. I feel for those professors who still ban the use of generative AI or aren’t equipped to teach students how to use it ethically and effectively.

Even so, I’m excited and my students are too. The legal profession is going to change dramatically over the next two years, and it’s our job as professors to prepare our students. Thompson Reuters, the ABA, and state courts have made it clear that we can’t sit by on the sidelines hoping that this fad will pass.

Professionally, I have used AI to redraft an employee handbook in my client’s voice (using my employment law knowledge, of course), prepare FAQs for another client’s code of conduct in a very specialized industry, prepare interview questions for my podcast, and draft fact patterns for simulations for conferences and in class. I’ve also tested its ability to draft NDAs and other simple agreements using only ChatGPT. It didn’t do so well there, but that’s because I know what I was looking for. And when I gave additional instructions, for example, about drafting a mutual indemnification clause and then a separate supercap, it did surprisingly well. But I know what should be in these agreements. The average layperson does not, something that concerns Chief Justice Roberts and should concern us all.

How have you changed your teaching with the advent of generative AI? If you’re already writing or teaching about AI or just want more resources, join the 159 law professors in a group founded by Professors April Dawson and Dan Linna. As for my law review article, I’m sure a lot of it will be obsolete by the time it’s published, but it should still be an interesting, if not terrifying, read for some.

Of Directorships: Reconfiguring the Theory of the Firm

It always is a great pleasure to pass along and promote the work of a colleague.  And today, I get to post about the work of a UT Law colleague!  Many of you know Tomer Stein, who came to join us at UT Law back in the summer.  He is such an ideal colleague and, like many of us, has broad interests across business finance and governance.

This post supports a recent draft governance piece, the title of which is the same as this post--Of Directorships: Reconfiguring the Theory of the Firm.  You can find the draft here.  The abstract is included below.

This Article develops a novel account of directorships and then uses it to reconfigure the theory of the firm. This widely accepted theory holds that firms emerge to satisfy the economic need for carrying out vertically integrated business activities under a fiduciary contract that substitutes for the owners’ multiple agreements with contractors and suppliers. As per this theory, the fiduciary contract is inherently incomplete, yet often preferable: while it cannot address all future contingencies in the firm, it will effectively direct all unaccounted-for firm events by placing them under the owners’ purview as a matter of default, or residual right. Under this contractual mechanism, firm owners, such as corporate shareholders, acquire the status of residual claimants who have the power to decide on all contractually unenumerated contingencies.

This view of the firm is conceptually flawed and normatively mistaken. Firms do carry vertically integrated business activities managed by their fiduciaries, but those fiduciaries—agents, trustees, and directors—are not functional equivalents from either the legal or economic standpoint. Unlike agents and trustees who receive commands from principals and settlors, respectively, directors manage the firm’s business by exercising decisional autonomy. Conceptually, shareholders who hire directors do not run the firm’s business as residual claimants. Rather, it is the directors who manage the firm as residual obligors—all contractually unaccounted for contingencies are placed under the fiduciary’s purview as a matter of obligation. This feature makes directorship an attractive management mechanism that often outperforms other fiduciary mechanisms, and the residual-claimant structure that stands behind them, in a broad variety of contexts. By developing this critical insight, the Article proposes not only to reconfigure the prevalent theory of the firm, but also to redesign both federal and state laws in a way that will facilitate directorships not only in corporations, but also across several indispensable dimensions of our financial, communal, and familial organizations.

As someone who understands both the central role of the director in corporate governance and the incomplete and inaccurate principal/agent relationship between shareholders and directors, I have enthusiasm for this project!  But I also am intrigued by the thought that the ideas in the paper can be translated to non-business institutions and groups.

Read on, and enjoy!

Governance, Finance, and HBO Max's Succession

The title of this post is the name of the advanced business associations law course I will teach in the spring.  I got the idea for this course after talking to students about decreasing enrollments in advanced business law courses.  Although they attributed much of the decrease to grade shopping, they also noted that they and their peers often base course registration decisions on course names (from which they make assumptions) without reading the course descriptions.  So, a course named "Advanced Business Associations," no matter how creatively it is taught (and I teach it as a discussion seminar), is not likely to attract positive attention.  When I floated using the HBO Max series Succession as a jumping off point for a discussion seminar on business law, they responded favorably.  The rest is, as they say, history. The proof of the pudding will be in the registration numbers.

The idea for the Succession-oriented course came to me quite naturally. I already was writing an essay on fiduciary duties relating to the series--forthcoming in the DePaul Law Review in a special volume focusing on Succession.  So, it was only a small jump to think about teaching more broadly from the many business law situations in the four seasons of the show.

Some of my friends from West Publishing heard about my teaching plans when they were visiting UT Law recently.  They mentioned the course to their colleague, Leslie Y. Garfield Tenzer, who produces a podcast for West Academic, Legal Tenzer: Casual Conversations on Noteworthy Legal Topics.  Leslie reached out and asked me to record an episode with her on the series and my course, which I recently did.  The podcast was released last week.  You can find it here.

My Succession course syllabus is still under construction.  If you have a favorite episode that you would like me to include--one that illustrates concepts from business governance or finance--let me know.  I admit that I am excited to teach from the material in Succession, a series that I enjoyed watching.

What Business Lawyers Needs to Ask their Clients About Generative AI Usage

Last week I had the pleasure of joining my fellow bloggers at the UT Connecting the Threads Conference on the legal issues related to generative AI (GAI) that lawyers need to understand for their clients and their own law practice. Here are some of the questions I posed to the audience and some recommendations for clients. I'll write about ethical issues for lawyers in a separate post. In the meantime, if you're using OpenAI or any other GAI, I strongly recommend that you read the terms of use. You may be surprised by certain clauses, including the indemnification provisions. 

I started by asking the audience members to consider what legal areas are most affected by GAI? Although there are many, I'll focus on data privacy and employment law in this post.

Data Privacy and Cybersecurity

Are the AI tools and technologies you use compliant with relevant data protection and privacy regulations, such as GDPR and CCPA? Are they leaving you open to a cyberattack?

This topic also came up today at a conference at NCCU when I served as a panelist on cybersecurity preparedness for lawyers.

Why is this important?

ChatGPT was banned in Italy for a time over concerns about violations of the GDPR. The Polish government is investigating OpenAI over privacy issues. And there are at least two class action lawsuits in California naming Microsoft and OpenAI. Just yesterday, a US government agency halted the use of GAI due to data security risks. 

It’s also much easier for bad actors to commit cybercrime because of the amount of personal data they can  scrape and analyze and because deepfake technology allows impersonation of images and voices in a matter of seconds. The NSA and FBI have warned people to be worried about misinformation and cyberthreats due to the technology. On a positive note, some are using GAI to fight cybercrime.

Surveillance and facial recognition technology can violate privacy and human rights. Governments have used surveillance technology to tamp down on and round up dissidents, protestors, and human rights defenders for years. Now better AI tools makes that easier. And if you haven't heard some of the cautions about Clearview AI and the misidentification of citizens, you should read this article. A new book claims that this company could "end privacy as we know it."

What should (you and) your clients do?

• Ensure algorithms minimize collection and processing of personal data and build in confidentiality safeguards to comply with privacy laws
• Revise privacy and terms of use policies on websites to account for GAI
• Build in transparency for individuals to control how data is collected and used
• Turn on privacy settings in all AI tools and don’t allow your data to be used for training the large language models
• Turn off chat history in settings on all devices
• Prevent browser add-ons
• Check outside counsel guidelines for AI restrictions (or draft them for your clients)
• Work with your IT provider or web authority to make sure your and your clients’ data is not being scraped for training
• Use synthetic data sets instead of actual personally identifiable information
• Ensure that you have a Generative AI Security Policy
• Check vendor contracts for AI usage
• Enhance cybersecurity training
• Conduct a table top exercise and make sure that you have an incident response plan in place
• Check cyberinsurance policies for AI clauses/exclusions

What about the employment law implications?

According to a Society for Human Resources Management Member Survey about AI usage:

• 79% use AI for recruiting and hiring

• 41% use AI for learning and development

• 38% use AI for performance management

• 18% use AI for productivity monitoring

• 8% use Ai for succession planning

• 4% use AI or promotional decisions

GAI algorithms can also have significant bias for skin color. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released research showing that "not just dark African-American faces, but also Asian faces were up to 100 times more likely to be failed by these systems than the faces of white individuals.”

Then there’s the question of whether recruiters and hiring managers should use AI to read emotions during an an interview. The EU says absolutely not. 

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has taken notice. In a panel discussion, Commissioner Keith Sonderling explained, “carefully designed and properly used, AI has potential to enhance diversity and inclusion, accessibility in the workplace by mitigating the risk of unlawful discrimination. Poorly designed and carelessly implemented, AI can discriminate on a scale and magnitude greater than any individual HR professional.” The EEOC also recently settled the first of its kind AI bias case for $365,000.

What to do 

• Use AI screening tools to disregard name, sec, age, national origin, etc.
• Use bots for interviews to eliminate bias because of accents
• Check local laws such as New York City's automated decision tools guidance for employers
• Be careful about training large language models on current workforce data because that can perpetuate existing bias
• Review the EEOC Resource on AI

Questions to Ask Your Clients:

• How are you integrating human rights considerations into your company's strategy and decision-making processes, particularly concerning the deployment and use of new technologies?

• Can you describe how your company's corporate governance structure accounts for human rights and ethical considerations, particularly with regards to the use and impact of emerging technologies?

• How does your company approach balancing the need for innovation and competitive advantage with the potential societal and human rights impact of technologies like facial recognition and surveillance?

• As data becomes more valuable, how is your company ensuring ethical data collection and usage practices?

• Are these practices in line with both domestic and international human rights and privacy standards?

• How is your organization addressing the potential for algorithmic bias in your technology, which can perpetuate and exacerbate systemic inequalities?

• What steps are you taking to ensure digital accessibility and inclusivity, thereby avoiding the risk of creating or enhancing digital divides?

• How is your company taking into account the potential environmental impacts of your technology, including e-waste and energy consumption, and what steps are being taken to mitigate these risks while promoting sustainable development?

• Are you at risk of a false advertising or unfair/deceptive trade practices act claim from the FTC or other regulatory body due to your use of AI?

Whether or not you're an AI expert or use GAI in your practice now, it's time to raise these issues with your clients. Future posts will address other legal issues and the ethical implications of using AI in legal practice. 

Matteo Gatti on Corporate Governing

I am excited to highlight the recent posting by Matteo Gatti of his draft paper entitled Corporate Governing: Promises and Risks of Corporations as Socio-Economic Reformers.  I got a preview of this work at the National Business Law Scholars Conference back in June.  The title of the paper is both descriptive and clever, as the abstract below reveals.

Corporations are involved in public affairs: racial equity, women’s rights, LGBTQIA rights, climate efforts are just a few examples of an increasingly long list of areas in which corporations are active and vocal. One phenomenon is well-known: corporations promote, contrast, or finetune governmental initiatives through political messaging. In addition, corporations perform quasi-governmental functions when the actual government cannot (because of its dysfunction) or does not want to (because of its political credo) perform such functions. Economists, legal scholars, and policymakers are split as to whether corporations should take this role.

This Paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it maps various areas of reform by corporations in the socio-economic sphere. Then, it provides legal and policy frameworks for corporate governing by analyzing the underlying conducts under our current laws and by evaluating its multifaceted normative merits: Is there a business case for corporate governing? Is corporate governing strategically wise for corporations? Does it help social advocacy and society at large? Does corporate governing undermine actual government and imperil democratic institutions? Further, this Paper assesses corporate governing by looking into its promises and risks from a corporate and from a societal perspective and singles out two risks. First, corporate governing cannot help society in fields in which corporations have a conflicting interest, like on themes such as antitrust, tax, labor, privacy, financial and corporate reform. Second, with corporations having a greater role in policymaking, citizens may become less accustomed to expecting reform via traditional politics: addressing this risk requires efforts from citizens, civil society, and politicians to preserve democratic values and institutions—corporate governance can help but cannot be the driving force.

The article offers helpful, coherent observations about and analyses of the roles business firms play--and should play--in political governance, as well as the possible effects of those political governance engagements.  I look forward to spending more time with this work!

Time for an Italian Symposium!

Ciao, from Italy.

Tomorrow, I have the privilege of sharing my work in an international symposium at the University of Genoa at the invitation of Vanessa Villanueva Collao.  This symposium offers a unique opportunity for transnational collaboration among corporate governance scholars.  We also are celebrating Vanessa's completion of her J.S.D. degree (University of Illinois 2023).  

I am presenting my paper, forthcoming in the Michigan State Law Review, on civil insider trading in personal networks.  This is the companion paper to my article on criminal insider trading in personal networks, recently published in the Stetson Business Law Review and part of my larger, long-term project on U.S. insider trading in friendships and family situations.  As many readers may know, this project has fascinated me for a number of years now.  Each phase of the project offers new insights.  And each audience helps provide valuable food for thought. I am confident that the participants in and audience members at tomorrow's symposium will be no exception.  I look forward to the interchanges on my work and the work of others being featured.

The program for the symposium is included below.  You will see more than a few fascinating members of the U.S. corporate governance law academic community (and friends of the BLPB) on the program for this event!  It is always good to reconnect with colleagues, especially our contributors and readers.

 

Generative AI Is the Greatest Thing Since the Discovery of Fire And/Or Will Kill Us All

Depending on who you talk to, you get some pretty extreme perspectives on generative AI. In a former life, I used to have oversight of the lobbying and PAC money for a multinational company. As we all know, companies never ask to be regulated. So when an industry begs for regulation, you know something is up. 

Two weeks ago, I presented the keynote speech to the alumni of AESE, Portugal’s oldest business school, on the topic of my research on business, human rights, and technology with a special focus on AI. If you're attending Connecting the Threads in October, you'll hear some of what I discussed.

I may have overprepared, but given the C-Suite audience, that’s better than the alternative. For me that meant spending almost 100 hours  reading books, articles, white papers, and watching videos by data scientists, lawyers, ethicists, government officials, CEOs, and software engineers. 

Because I wanted the audience to really think about their role in our future, I spent quite a bit of time on the doom and gloom scenarios, which the Portuguese press highlighted. I cited the talk by the creators of the Social Dilemma, who warned about the dangers of social media algorithms and who are now raising the alarms about AI's potential existential threat to humanity in a talk called the AI Dilemma.

I used statistics from the Future of Jobs Report from the World Economic Forum on potential job displacement and from Yale's Jeffrey Sonnenfeld on what CEOs think and are planning for. Of the 119 CEOs from companies like Walmart, Coca-Cola, Xerox and Zoom, 34% of CEOs said AI could potentially destroy humanity in ten years, 8% said that it could happen in five years,  and 58% said that could never happen and they are “not worried.” 42% said the doom and gloom  is overstated, while 58% said it was not. I told the audience about deepfakes where AI can now mimic someone's voice in three seconds.

But in reality, there's also a lot of hope. For the past two days I've been up at zero dark thirty to watch the live stream of the AI For Good Global Summit in Geneva. The recordings are available on YouTube. While there was a more decidedly upbeat tone from these presenters, there was still some tamping down of the enthusiasm.

Fun random facts? People have been using algorithms to make music since the 60s. While many are worried about the intellectual property implications for AI and the arts, AI use was celebrated at the summit. Half of humanity's working satellites belong to Elon Musk. And  a task force of 120 organizations is bringing the hammer down on illegal deforestation in Brazil using geospatial AI. They've already netted 2 billion in penalties. 

For additional perspective, for two of the first guests on my new podcast, I've interviewed lawyer and mediator, Mitch Jackson, an AI enthusiast, and tech veteran, Stephanie Sylvestre, who's been working with OpenAI for years and developed her own AI product somehow managing to garner one million dollars worth of free services for her startup, Avatar Buddy. Links to their episodes are here (and don't forget to subscribe to the podcast).

If you’re in business or advising business, could you answer the following questions I asked the audience of executives and government officials in Portugal?

• How are you integrating human rights considerations into your company's strategy and decision-making processes, particularly concerning the deployment and use of new technologies?

 

• Can you describe how your company's corporate governance structure accounts for human rights and ethical considerations, particularly with regards to the use and impact of emerging technologies?

 

• How are you planning to navigate the tension between increasing automation in your business operations and the potential for job displacement among your workforce?

 

• How does your company approach balancing the need for innovation and competitive advantage with the potential societal and human rights impact of technologies like facial recognition and surveillance?

 

• In what ways is your company actively taking steps to ensure that your supply chain, especially for tech components, is free from forced labor or other human rights abuses?

 

• As data becomes more valuable, how is your company ensuring ethical data collection and usage practices? Are these practices in line with both domestic and international human rights and privacy standards?

 

• What steps are you taking to ensure digital accessibility and inclusivity, thereby avoiding the risk of creating or enhancing digital divides?

 

• How is your company taking into account the potential environmental impacts of your technology, including e-waste and energy consumption, and what steps are being taken to mitigate these risks while promoting sustainable development?

 

• What financial incentives do you have in place to do the ”right thing” even if it’s much less profitable? What penalties do you have in place for the “wrong” behavior?

 

• Will governments come together to regulate or will the fate of humanity lie in the hands of A few large companies?

Luckily, we had cocktails right after I asked those questions.

Are you using generative AI like ChatGPT4 or another source in your business 0r practice? If you teach, are you integrating it into the classroom? I'd love to hear your thoughts. 

Trust in Business Associations: Fiduciary Duties

The University of Tennessee College of Law's business law journal, Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of Business Law, recently published my essay, "The Fiduciary-ness of Business Associations."  You can find the essay here.  This essay--or parts of it, anyway--has been rattling around in my brain for a bit.   It is nice on a project like this to be able to get the words out on a page and release all that tension building up inside as you fashion your approach.

The abstract for the essay is included below. 

This essay offers a window and perspective on recent fiduciary-related legislative developments in business entity law and identifies and reflects in limited part on related professional responsibility questions impacting lawyers advising business entities and their equity owners. In addition—and perhaps more pointedly—the essay offers commentary on legal change and the legislative process for state law business associations amendments in and outside the realm of fiduciary duties. To accomplish these purposes, the essay first provides a short description of the position of fiduciary duties in U.S. statutory business entity law and offers a brief account of 21st century business entity legislation that weakens the historically central role of fiduciary duties in unincorporated business associations. It then reflects on these changes as a matter of theory, policy, and practice before briefly summarizing and offering related reflections in concluding.

Although I always welcome thoughts on my work, I am especially interested in your thoughts on this essay. It relates to all three of my activities as a law professor--my scholarship, teaching, and service.  And I know that fiduciary duty waivers and opt-ins have different impacts in different business sectors . . . .  So, let me know what you think.

C. Warren Neel - Celebrating Corporate Governance Research and an Accidental Mentor

Earlier today, I had the honor of making a brief presentation at a luncheon honoring both the 20th anniversary of the Corporate Governance Center at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and a dear colleague and mentor, C. Warren Neel, who passed away at the end of March.  Set forth below are the reflections I shared at the luncheon--in relevant part.   These are my prepared remarks, but I often comment extemporaneously, rather than read.  So, please understand that I did not exactly say what is set forth below, although it accurately captures the content I delivered.

+     +     +

Lawyers must be lawyers, and so I start with law.

On July 30, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002—the most broad-based federalization of corporate governance since the adoption of the federal securities law regime itself in the 1930s. It was in the shadow of that landmark legislation that The University of Tennessee’s Corporate Governance Center—now appropriately named the Neel Corporate Governance Center—was born. Like the legislation itself, the Corporate Governance Center cast a wide net. As an interdisciplinary research program that includes the College of Law and the College of Business Administration, the Corporate Governance Center brought to the campus (and I am using Warren Neel’s own words here, from an email message he wrote in support of my tenure) “an interdisciplinary approach to the critical issues of corporate governance.”

I remember the first all-hands meeting to solidify the structure and build-out of the Corporate Governance Center. We met next door (Stokely Management Center) in a classroom. After introductions, Warren kicked things off, as I recall, and then Joe Carcello led us by sharing the vision for the center and soliciting information about our research agendas that could be used to construct research collaborations and build out the center’s website and other promotional materials.

Back then, Warren and Joe envisioned categorizing the work of each of us into one of three substantive “buckets” mirroring the three key committees of a public company’s board of directors (other than the executive committee): audit, compensation, and nominating. I was the unpopular kid at the party when I noted that my work intersected all three buckets. That was the beginning of a recognition that working across departments might not be as simple as it initially seemed. We spent years together untangling that mess—a mess we still revisit with new Ph.D. students and (sometimes) faculty who join our merry band.

Little did I know then all that we would go through so much together.
Little did I know then that both Warren and Joe would become such dear friends and scholarly sparring partners.

Little did I know then that Warren, the accidental dean, would become my accidental mentor.

There is not enough time here today to unpack all of that. But suffice it to say that, after many Corporate Governance Center research forums and lectures and, more importantly, my periodic breakfasts with Warren and Tracie Woidtke (during which we entertained Corporate Governance Center distinguished speakers—maybe no one else was willing to get up that early?), Warren rubbed off on me more than a bit. I never could agree with him on a legal rule to separate the CEO and board chair functions or on mandatory term limits for corporate directors. But I deeply appreciated the analogies he could draw between and among political, academic, and corporate governance. And his insights on audit committee process and documentation from his many years as a board member were so well taken. He especially loved to talk about his board memberships at Saks, Inc. and Healthways, Inc. (now Tivity Health, Inc.) at our breakfasts.

Also, I admired the strong position he took on the need for more transparency in the disclosure of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports. In particular, Warren favored disclosure of the quality control criticisms included in Part II of those inspection reports. Some of you, like me and Tracie, may have heard him argue forcefully on that topic more than once.

Since Warren’s death, I have reflected often on these memories and Warren’s elemental place in my career here at UTK. As I earlier indicated, like Warren’s deanship at the College of Business, his role as my mentor was largely unplanned. But i had good fortune in a number of things that turned out to be the perfect storm that has created a satisfying academic career here at UTK over the past 23 years.   They included:

• leaving law practice to become an academic:
• settling here in Knoxville, at UTK, during the dot-com bust and just as fraud at many of our country’s largest public companies was becoming apparent;
• being contacted by Warren and Joe to join the Corporate Governance Center as a research fellow; and
• as a result, spending quality time with Warren.

“Those accidents would not have resulted in my career if, perhaps, I were at some university other than the University of Tennessee.” Those words are Warren’s—not mine—taken from the Epilogue of his 2010 book, The Accidental Dean.  I cannot think of a better way of capturing my own thoughts, honoring Warren, and celebrating the 20th anniversary of the Corporate Governance Center than by quoting Warren's own wise words.

I do appreciate the opportunity to be before you today to talk about the Neel Corporate Governance Center and my accidental mentor, Warren Neel.  Thank you.

Quotables: Lipton & Edwards on TripAdvisor

Friend-of-the-BLPB Tom Rutledge alerted me earlier today to a Thomson Reuters piece on the TripAdvisor reincorporation litigation that quotes not one but two of our blogger colleagues: Ann Lipton and Ben Edwards (in that order).  Ann is quoted (after a mention and quotation of one of her recent, more entertaining tweets) on the Delaware judicial aspects of the case.  Ben is quoted on the Nevada corporate law piece.  So great to see these two offering their legal wisdom on this interesting claim.

Ann's tweet (perhaps predictably) offers a different "take" on Nevada law than Ben's press statements.

Ann: “I tell my students, Nevada is where you incorporate if you want to do frauds . . . .” 

Ben: “The folks here are people acting in good faith, trying to do what’s right – not cynically racing to the bottom . . . .”

And then Ben gets the last word: “Nevada . . . has become a home for billionaires leaving Delaware in a huff.”

Beautiful.

Wake Forest Law - ESG and Blockchain

I am honored to be speaking later today on ESG, blockchains, and corporate governance at this symposium at Wake Forest University School of Law.  This practitioner-centered symposium promises to offer significant information useful to my teaching and scholarship.  My fellow speakers hail from law firms and other organizations across the United States.  I am excited to share and learn!

Heminway on Fiduciary Duties and Succession - Tonight!!

As I noted in a post a few weeks ago, I am presenting on corporate fiduciary duties tonight as the Roy/Demoulas Distinguished Professor of Law and Business at the Waystar/ROYCO School of Law.  The title of my presentation is: What the Roys Should Learn from the Demoulas Family (But Probably Won't).  The presentation will run from 9:00 pm to 10:00 pm Eastern on Zoom at the following link:  https://us02web.zoom.us/j/86783560319?pwd=cTJza2N6elFyVGhBUFVjdk1Gb2oxQT09.

If you do not know about the Demoulas family and their fiduciary duty tangles up in Massachusetts, my presentation will inform you (and may even get you interested).  Members of the family were locked in litigation with each other for over 20 years.  Much of that litigation relates to alleged breaches of corporate and trust fiduciary duties.  And for those who have not watched the HBO Max series Succession, I will offer a window on some of the characters and plot lines, tying them in to observations about the Demoulas family.  

I welcome your attendance and participation!