Three Things Make a Post

Thing One:  I jotted!  Which is to say, I wrote a Jotwell review of Hilary Allen’s Interest Rates, Venture Capital, and Financial Stability, forthcoming in the University of Illinois Law Review.  Her paper is here, and you can find my review here.

Thing Two:  I have a new paper-ish thing.  As y’all know, I’ve been keeping an eye on litigation-limiting bylaw and charter provisions, including – as I previously posted – the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Lee v. Fisher, which permitted The Gap to enforce a forum selection bylaw directing derivative Section 14(a) claims to Delaware’s Court of Chancery – even though that court has no jurisdiction to hear Section 14(a) claims.  In practical effect, then, the bylaw operated as a waiver of the federal claim.

That decision cited a draft version of an article by Professors Mohsen Manesh and Joseph Grundfest, Abandoned and Split But Never Reversed: Borak and Federal Derivative Litigation, in which they defended such bylaws.  The article was published in the Business Lawyer late last year, and is available here.

Anyhoo, I now have a (very short) reply to Professors Manesh and Grundfest, also forthcoming in the Business Lawyer, called Not Dead Yet.  The Reply is available here, and this is the abstract: 

In their article, Abandoned and Split, But Never Reversed: Borak and Federal Derivative Litigation, Professors Mohsen Manesh and Joseph Grundfest argue that corporations should be permitted to waive derivative Section 14(a) claims in their constitutive documents, partly because such claims are duplicative of other causes of action, and partly because of the weakness of the original Supreme Court case to recognize them. In this Reply, I defend the continuing vitality of the derivative Section 14(a) cause of action, and its necessity as a source of investor protection

But! Mine is not the last word; Mohsen and Joe will have a reply to my reply in the same issue.  When that’s public, I’ll edit this post with a link.

Thing Three:  The Lee v. Fisher case was one of a series of cases arguing that companies were lying about their efforts to diversify their boards.  Another such case was brought against Qualcomm, and it was dismissed by a federal district court in 2021.

The plaintiff in that case then sought books and records in Delaware, and relied on those to file a state law complaint, which once again alleged that the company lied about its efforts to diversify when seeking director candidates.  This time, however, the complaint was brought for breach of state law fiduciary obligations rather than federal proxy fraud, and the claim was direct rather than derivative.  Not long ago, Vice Chancellor Laster dismissed that claim in a bench ruling. 

The transcript is worth a read.  Among other things, VC Laster explicitly (though not unsurprisingly) held that directors only have a duty to maximize firm value.  Demographic diversity may further that goal by fostering innovation; demographic diversity may also further that goal by inspiring the confidence of stakeholders, who would otherwise lose faith if they “only see very few people who look like them.”  But boards have discretion to make their own judgment as to the financial value that diversity provides.

What they can’t do, of course, is explicitly lie to shareholders in their proxy statement, or omit material information, which is what the plaintiff was alleging.  And here was the second interesting point: VC Laster noted that a voting rights claim based on a misleading or incomplete proxy statement is not, per se, subject to the business judgment rule.  As he put it, “Directors have a duty to disclose material information, but there is no separate standard of review that overlays that obligation, such as the business judgment rule…. [I]n a case involving stockholder action, a plaintiff need only plead two elements: First, that there was a request for stockholder action, and certainly there was here.  These were elections of directors. And second, that there was a material misrepresentation or omission.”

With that set up, however, he found that Kiger had not in fact stated facts that made it reasonably conceivable that Qualcomm misled shareholders about its diversity efforts, and that was the end of that.